

ASIA TODAY



AMERICA, CHINA, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR WORLD ORDER

**Ideas, Traditions, Historical
Legacies, and Global Visions**

Edited by G. John Ikenberry, Wang Jisi & Zhu Feng



ASIA TODAY

Before 1820, Asia generated more than half of the world's gross domestic product. Since then, the region underwent a period of decay and decline. Today, Asia is in the midst of a great transformation, and it is estimated that by 2035 it will be responsible for more than one half of the world's gross domestic product. Propelled by three decades of rapid economic growth, momentous political transitions, and intensified regional integration, Asia is no longer simply a fast-expanding and evolving region; it is increasingly the geopolitical epicenter for the global system itself. The goal of this series is to offer readers a front-row seat to view and better understand this kaleidoscope of regional change in all its dazzling dynamism and diversity. Who would have thought in 1978, when Deng Xiaoping came to power in Beijing, that China would soon begin a generation of double-digit economic growth? Who could have foreseen that Asia would become the region where the world's richest countries, Singapore and Brunei, would live shoulder-to-shoulder with the world's poorest, Afghanistan and Laos? The Asia Today series is designed to respond to the growing demand for sustained research and deep knowledge of contemporary Asia. It covers the full expanse of this vast region—from China to India, Japan to Pakistan, Kazakhstan to Turkey, Mongolia to Israel, Iraq to Indonesia. The series editors, Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry, aided by a 44-member advisory board, are dedicated to identifying fresh and penetrating studies of Asia by the region's foremost experts.

Series Editors

Takashi Inoguchi, Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo and President, University of Niigata Prefecture, Japan

G. John Ikenberry, the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University, Department of Politics, and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs

Published by Palgrave Macmillan:

Political Parties and Democracy: Contemporary Western Europe and Asia

Edited by Takashi Inoguchi and Jean Blondel

The Troubled Triangle: Economic and Security Concerns for the United States, Japan, and China

Edited by Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry

Japan, the US, and Regional Institution-Building in the New Asia: When Identity Matters

By Kuniko Ashizawa

The Rise of Korean Leadership: Emerging Powers and Liberal International Order

By G. John Ikenberry and Jongryn Mo

Asia-Pacific Nations in International Peace Support and Stability Operations

Edited by Chiyuki Aoi and Yee-Kuang Heng

The Globalization of Chinese Propaganda: International Power and Domestic Political Cohesion

By Kingsley Edney

The Australia-ASEAN Dialogue: Tracing 40 Years of Partnership

Edited by Sally Percival Wood and Baogang He

Japanese and Korean Politics: Alone and Apart from Each Other

Edited by Takashi Inoguchi

Japanese and Russian Politics: Polar Opposites or Something in Common?
Edited by Takashi Inoguchi

Ethics in Public Life: Good Practitioners in a Rising Asia
By Kenneth Winston


*America, China, and the Struggle for World Order: Ideas, Traditions,
Historical Legacies, and Global Visions*
Edited by G. John Ikenberry, Wang Jisi, and Zhu Feng

America, China, and the Struggle for World Order

Ideas, Traditions, Historical Legacies,
and Global Visions

Edited by
G. John Ikenberry, Wang Jisi,
and Zhu Feng

palgrave
macmillan



AMERICA, CHINA, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR WORLD ORDER

Copyright © G. John Ikenberry, Wang Jisi, and Zhu Feng, 2015.

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2015 978-1-137-53218-3

All rights reserved.

First published in 2015 by

PALGRAVE MACMILLAN®

in the United States—a division of St. Martin's Press LLC,

175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.

ISBN 978-1-349-55327-3

ISBN 978-1-137-50831-7 (eBook)

DOI 10.1057/9781137508317

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

America, China, and the struggle for world order : ideas, traditions, historical legacies, and global visions / edited by G. John Ikenberry, Wang Jisi, and Zhu Feng.

pages cm. —(Asia today)

Summary: "This book brings together twelve scholars – six Americans and six Chinese – to explore the ways America and China think about international order. What are the traditions, historical experiences, and ideologies that each country brings to debates about how the rules and institutions of the global system should be organized? The book addresses this question by pairing American and Chinese scholars in each chapter on specific topics related to global order: sovereignty, collective security, resources and the environment, trade, alliances, and monetary and financial relations. The book offers a vivid portrait of how the two countries come to global affairs from richly diverse and divergent starting points, and, in turn, how these factors affect current global dialogues"—Provided by publisher.

Summary: "This book brings together twelve scholars – six Americans and six Chinese – to explore the ways America and China think about international order. What are the traditions, historical experiences, and ideologies that each country brings to debates about how the rules and institutions of the global system should be organized? The book addresses this question by pairing American and Chinese scholars in each chapter on specific topics related to global order. These topics include: sovereignty, collective security, resources and the environment, trade, alliances, and monetary and financial relations. The book offers a vivid portrait of how the two countries come to global affairs from richly diverse and divergent starting points, and, in turn, shows how the influence of these views on current global dialogues"—Provided by publisher.

ISBN 978-1-349-55327-3

1. United States—Foreign relations—Philosophy. 2. China—Foreign relations—Philosophy. 3. United States—Foreign relations—China.

4. China—Foreign relations—United States. I. Ikenberry, G. John, editor of compilation. II. Wang, Jisi, 1948– editor of compilation.

III. Zhu, Feng, 1964– editor of compilation.

JZ1480.A9575 2015

327.73—dc23

2015002132

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

Design by Newgen Knowledge Works (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.

First edition: July 2015

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

<i>List of Illustrations</i>	vii
Introduction: The United States, China, and Global Order <i>G. John Ikenberry</i>	1
Part I Sovereignty and the State System	
1 Sovereignty American Style: Protecting Apple Pie, Fixing Foreign Recipes <i>Jeffrey W. Legro</i>	19
2 From <i>Tianxia</i> to Westphalia: The Evolving Chinese Conception of Sovereignty and World Order <i>Fei-Ling Wang</i>	43
Part II Collective Security and the United Nations	
3 The United States, the United Nations, and Collective Security: Exploring the Deep Sources of American Conduct <i>Stewart Patrick</i>	71
4 China's Evolving Attitudes and Approaches toward UN Collective Security <i>Jianwei Wang</i>	103
Part III Global Economic Governance	
5 Is There an Exceptional American Approach to Global Economic Governance? <i>Daniel W. Drezner</i>	135
6 China's Approach to Economic Diplomacy <i>Yang Yao</i>	161

Part IV Trade and Resources

- 7 Still the Liberal Leader? Domestic Legacies, International Realities, and the Role of the United States in the World Economy 189
Michael Mastanduno
- 8 China as a Listian Trading State: Interest, Power, and Economic Ideology 211
Weixing Hu

Part V Global Environment

- 9 A Green Giant? Inconsistency and American Environmental Diplomacy 245
Joshua W. Busby
- 10 China and International Cooperation on the Environment: Historical and Intellectual Roots of Chinese Thinking about the Environment 275
Ming Wan

Part VI Alliances and Arms Control

- 11 The American Way of Seeking Security: Ideology and Pragmatism 299
John Owen
- 12 In Search of Security and Self-Identity: Promise and Paradox of China's Nuclear Weapons 327
Bin Yu
- Conclusion: The United States, China, and World Order 359
Wang Jisi and Zhu Feng

List of Contributors 379

Index 383

Illustrations

Figures

6.1	Government and household saving rates	172
9.1	US contributions to the GEF 1994–2013	259
9.2	Keyword search in English-language digitized books	263
9.3	Keyword search congressional hearings 2001–2010	263
9.4	Keyword search <i>New York Times</i> 2001–2010	264
11.1	Nuclear stockpiles of United States and USSR, 1976–1993	311
12.1	China's Share of World GDP (in PPP terms), 1600–2014	343

Tables

5.1	Predicting US engagement with international economic norms	139
5.2	The pattern of US engagement with global economic governance	150
6.1	Government expenditures in selected countries	171
6.2	Shares of SOEs in industrial value-added and profits	175
11.1	Formal US alliances since 1945	307
11.2	Major Non-NATO allies (MNNAs)	309
11.3	Current US allies	309
12.1	Nuclear warheads—the five nuclear-weapon states under the NPT	334

Introduction: The United States, China, and Global Order

G. John Ikenberry

Introduction

The United States and China are the two most powerful states in the world today. Each has massive economic, political, and military capacities that allow it to project power and influence around the world. For the United States, this is nothing new. For almost a century, the United States has been the leading world power, facing and overcoming rival great powers in two world wars and a Cold War. In the decades since the end of the Cold War, the United States has reigned in world politics as a “unipolar” state—unrivaled by other great powers or peer competitors. Indeed, as some observers see it, the world has been living through an “American century.” For China, the rise to global power has been more recent and sudden. Beginning with the post-Mao economic reforms of the 1980s, China embarked on three decades of unprecedented economic growth and modernization, recently overtaking Japan as the second largest economy on the world. Through trade, investment, and diplomacy, Chinese power increasingly has global reach. The distribution of global power is constantly shifting. Great powers are always rising and declining. The future is never certain. But amid these changes and for decades to come, the United States and China appear uniquely positioned to dominate world politics.

The United States and China are destined to influence and shape world politics. But toward what ends? Globally powerful states have advantages over weaker states in the day-to-day struggles within the international system. They are more likely to get what they want in their pursuit of economic, political, and security interests. But globally powerful states—such as the United States and China—also have unique opportunities, at various historical moments, to shape the underlying rules and institutions of world order itself. The United States realized these opportunities throughout the twentieth century, particularly after World War II, and

it undertook far-reaching efforts to lay down the basic rules and norms of order. As it rises in power, China too will find opportunities to influence the rules and norms of the global system. The transition away from American “unipolarity” and growing Chinese capabilities ensure that the world will enter a new moment—perhaps not as dramatic as the one that appeared after World War II, but nonetheless a new moment—when the deep architecture of international order is again open for shaping and reshaping. Other great powers, of course, will also seek to influence and shape these underlying rules and institutions. But just as the United States and China are uniquely powerful, so too are they uniquely positioned to lead the struggle over the organizing principles and logics of world order in the twenty-first century.

While many observers expect the United States and China to struggle over the terms of global order, less is known about the specific ideas and values that each will bring to the table. If each country has deeply rooted and historically derived ideas—or visions—of world order, what are these ideas and visions? What are the national-historical sources of these ideas and visions? How have these ideas and visions been manifest in American and Chinese foreign policy, particularly as moments when the rules and institutions of international order have been open for shaping and reshaping? Given the answers to these questions, how might the United States and China clash, compete, and cooperate over the rules and institutions of international order? The United States and China might clash and compete simply because they have different interests at stake in the organization of global rules and institutions. But do they also have different national traditions and values that have and will influence their views of global order? To what extent and in what ways will the struggles between the United States and China over the terms of global order be informed by divergent and unique national ideas and visions?

This book explores these questions. It brings together six American and six Chinese scholars to probe how the two countries think about the logic and character of international order. In paired chapters, the authors look at the ways in which American and Chinese domestic traditions and historical experiences shape and inform the way their leaders view world order. The focus is on the “second image,” that is, on the way in which domestic ideas and orientations feed into foreign policy thinking.¹ These paired chapters focus on six areas relating to world order—sovereignty, collective security, finance and economic governance, trade and resources, environment, and alliances and arms control. Through these chapters, this volume offers a portrait of how the United States and China think about the basic organizing principles and logics of international order. And in doing this, it illuminates the consequences of these national ideas and visions for how the two countries clash, compete, and cooperate with each other as they struggle and shape the terms of global order.

The “dependent variable” in this volume is American and Chinese preferences and policies in a specific area of world order. That is, the focus in

the first instance is not on world order itself or cooperation and conflict in US-Chinese relations—although the authors explore these outcomes as implications of their arguments. Rather, the focus is on preferences and policies of American and Chinese governments as they conduct foreign policy. The “independent variable” is what can be called “basket three” variables—if basket one and two are, respectively, “power” and “interests.” “Basket three” variables are national traditions, ideas, and historical legacies. In a given area of world order policy, such as trade, environment, or collective security, American and Chinese preferences and policies might be explained in straightforward terms through variables defined in terms of power and interest. In this sense, there would be nothing uniquely American or Chinese about the explanation. Basket one and two explanations trace preferences and policies to the generic circumstances in which the country is situated. An account is rendered for the outcomes without reference to unique national characteristics—traditions, ideas, legacies. Basket three variables are the rich array of national characteristics that, at least analytically, can be distinguished from power and interest variables.

Framed in these terms, the volume asks the question: to what extent and in what ways do basket three variables come into play in shaping American and Chinese preferences and policies? The chapters explore the way in which each country’s power and interests interact with ideas and historical legacies to shape their orientations toward the rules and institutions of international order. As noted, these basket three variables include ideological legacies, historical experiences, domestic traditions, and deep-rooted thinking toward general and specific features of international order. The authors do not all argue that basket three variables matter most in shaping US and Chinese preferences and policies in specific areas of world order, but each has an argument about the role of these variables. In this sense, the chapters together provide a dual portrait of the “baggage”—ideational, historical, domestic—that informs and shaped how the two countries think about the past, present, and future of international order.

The arguments and themes that emerge from these chapters help inform the larger scholarly debate about the rise of China, power transitions, and struggles over world order. There is a large and growing literature that suggests that China and the United States are headed toward a future of protracted conflict over the rules and institutions of world order. Some observers see deep clashes beginning to surface, triggered by different ideas and values relating to sovereignty, institutions, economics, and governance.² In the rendering of some, this is a conflict between Western and non-Western ideas and traditions of world order.³ The chapters that follow do find some evidence of deeply rooted and historically derived differences in ideas and visions. In some areas, historical and ideological factors do shape and constrain US and Chinese preferences and policies. But in some areas they do not. In most instances, basket three variables interact with power and interest variables rather than operate as truly independent variables. More generally, the chapters show a rich complexity in the historical

traditions and ideas in both countries. There are ideas and traditions in both countries that can justify and reinforce a wide range of preferences and policies.

This volume suggests that in studying the character of the American and Chinese struggle over the terms of world order, it is useful to make two types of distinctions. First, it is useful to distinguish between different realms of rules and institutions. The shape of international order is built around a variety of layers and realms—security, trade, environment, and so forth. Unlike the great peace conferences or Vienna or Versailles or Yalta, the rules and institutions of world order in the coming decades will be hammered out in more incremental and segmented ways across policy realms. Second, it is important to distinguish the sources of conflict and cooperation over the rules and institutions of order. In some instances, the dynamics of conflict are simply a result of the competition ignited by the US-China power shifts and divergent interests that inform the foreign policies of the two states. In other instances, basket three variables are at play, often in complex ways that interact with power and interests. These analytic distinctions are critical in clarifying and illuminating the logic and character of American and Chinese relations.⁴

Taken together, the volume offers a guardedly optimistic view of the coming American and Chinese struggle over world order. The United States and China will no doubt struggle and compete over the rules and institutions of international order. But this struggle and competition will not be full-scale ideological battle for two divergent visions of twenty-first-century world order. Deep differences exist, but they will play out on a more complex and decentralized geopolitical landscape. The United States and China are not destined to recreate the sorts of global ideological struggles that underlay and intensified the US-Soviet completion during the Cold War.⁵

This rest of this introduction presents the basic themes of the book and its organizing framework. It situates the six areas of international order within the larger scholarly debate over US-Chinese relations and theories of international order. The introduction also explores the various ways in which ideas, ideology, national traditions, and historical legacies matter in the shaping of preferences and policies. The conclusion to this volume reflects on the chapters and discusses the implications for both scholarly debates on the logic and character of international order and the future of US-Chinese relations.

Ideas, Traditions, and Historical Legacies

Great powers, such as the United States and China, periodically find opportunities to influence and shape the terms of world order. When they do, to what extent and in what ways do these states bring distinct ideas and national traditions to the table? Clearly, states at these ordering moments wield power in the service of their self-understood national interests. Power

and interests are the “coin of the realm” in international relations, and it would be difficult to understand the flow of conflict and cooperation among states without reference to these basic realities. But how do states think about their interests in the context of struggles over world order? In what ways do basket three variables—ideas, traditions, historical experiences—help give shape to the way interests are defined and power is exercised?⁶

The United States certainly brought distinct liberal ideas to its efforts to shape the terms of postwar order in 1919 and 1945. Henry Kissinger has noted that the United States has stood out among the great powers of the last two centuries in its national embrace of a liberal vision. “It is above all to the drumbeat of Wilsonian idealism that American foreign policy has marched since his watershed presidency, and continues to march to this day.”⁷ Certainly, Woodrow Wilson’s agenda for postwar peace—collective security, the League of Nations, and international order based on democracy and international law—reflected distinctive American ideas and ideals. After World War II, the United States again advanced ideas about the organization of economic, politics, and security based on the American experience and liberal ideals.⁸ At home, the New Deal recast state-market relations and generated new approaches to the management of the economy and national commitments to equity and social welfare. These programs—and the ideas about economic security and the management of markets—informed American efforts at creating postwar rules and institutions. As chapters by Michael Mastanduno and John Owen argue, throughout the twentieth century, American-style understandings of liberalism and modernization helped shape US policies toward the organization of the international system.⁹

More generally, great powers have on various occasions undertaken sweeping shifts in their strategic orientation toward international order. Jeffrey Legro has explored the moments of transition when the United States and Japan shifted from isolationist to internationalist orientations, and the emergence of Gorbachev-era “new thinking” in the Soviet Union, which paved the way for the end of the Cold War. In each case, domestic political struggles created space for competing ideas about grand strategy and international order. The basic domestic understanding of the national interest was thrown open. International crisis and party-elite competition at home created circumstances where grand foreign policy alternatives were in play and ideas mattered.¹⁰

Of course, the distribution of power and national interests are never too far below the surface of struggles over international order. The United States would not have been able to think about the possibility of shaping the basic architecture of the global system after the two world wars and more recently if it did not possess such massive power advantages. And as realist scholars such as Robert Gilpin note, when powerful states have opportunities to shape the rules and institutions of global order, they do so in ways that advantage themselves. China has historically embraced notions of a Sino-centered hierarchical order in Asia—and, of course, these were

ideas that put China at the center of the region.¹¹ In Chapter 2, Fei-Ling Wang provides a portrait of China's longstanding vision of "*Tinxia*"—of an harmonious regional order organized around and led by China. At the same time, China has resisted ideas of American-led hegemonic order both at the global level and within Asia at least in part because such an order impinges on China's realization of its interests. It has championed Westphalian notions of state sovereignty not so much as a reflection of deep-seated Chinese notions of the ideal political order. Rather, norms of state sovereignty, such as self-determination and nonintervention, reinforce the type of international order that is congenial with Chinese interests. In this way, both American and Chinese orientations toward world order are in some sense explicable in terms of their circumstances defined in terms of power and interests.

Clearly, "basket three" variables interact with power and interest variables to shape American and Chinese preferences and policies relating to international order. As the chapters in this volume suggest, there are several different ways in which ideas, traditions, and national experiences have helped shape American and Chinese approaches to the rules and institutions of order. There are at least three basic ways in which ideas, traditions, and historical experiences matter in influencing how interests are defined and power is exercised.

First, countries can have distinctive ideas and ideologies about politics, economics, and the dynamics and direction of world historical change. Countries—certainly great powers with revolutionary foundings—tend to have "master ideas" about themselves, their political traditions, and their place within the larger global setting. The United States is rightly famous for embodying expansive notions of its political ideals and their global significance. Americans have seen the birth of the United States as the leading edge of an ongoing world political movement. And they have seen their political ideals about liberalism and democracy as deeply universal in their scope and significance. China also has seen itself as embodying universal ideas, or at least ideas that have appeal and standing beyond China. There are several layers to this set of ideas. One is the ancient notion of China as the Middle Kingdom—the center of the wider world, projecting ideas and authority outward. More recently, China has seen its own dramatic economic accomplishments as a reflection of a distinctive type of political system. China is not simply a rising developing country. It embodies ideas and traditions that make it a global leader.¹²

In both the United States and China, these ideas and ideologies of national identity can remain in the background or they can—at specific moments—feed directly into preferences and policy. Samuel Huntington has depicted this dynamic in his study of American ideas and ideology. Huntington sees the United States alternating between "normal" foreign policy, driven by day-to-day considerations of interests and the play of domestic politics, and moments when ideas and ideals drive American foreign policy.¹³

Second, countries have distinctive domestic political institutions, and this has an impact on how they come to define their interests and pursue policies. Distinctive domestic political institutions can matter in several ways. They can matter as they shape the process and politics of policy making. Democratic and pluralistic institutions—such as those in the United States—can create competitive political dynamics and party competition that generate frequent sharp shifts in policy. Leaders come and go. Political parties offer different agendas for foreign policy. Democratic politics both explains why Woodrow Wilson became president and why, ultimately, he failed to realize his vision of American leadership in the League of Nations and a liberal world order. China's Communist Party-led government creates different circumstances for policy making. The absence of democratic elections and party competition may give government elites more discretion in the formulation of foreign policy—and policy itself may be more coherent at various moments than policy generated within a freewheeling democracy. Nonetheless, as scholars note, China's government has its own internal dynamics of elite competition and informal checks on power and authority. In accounting for American and Chinese preferences and policies toward global rules and institutions, domestic politics matters—although the specific ways that domestic institutions push and pull policy differs within the two countries.

Domestic institutions appear to have some impact on the manner and degree to which states seek and are able to make international commitments. As several of the chapters in this volume show, the United States is deeply ambivalent about binding itself to international rules and institutions. The United States likes to live in a world where other states are deeply tied to American-style global rules and institutions while it remains relatively free and unbound. The American system of liberal democracy has reinforced this ambivalent orientation. It has spread authority across branches of government and created high standards for congressional ratification of treaties. Even when American presidents have wanted to pursue treaty agreements in areas such as arms control and the environment, they have frequently found the Senate unwilling to sign on. More generally, the American democratic system provides a pluralistic and competitive setting that allows vocal and well-organized minorities to resist American foreign policy action and leadership. In recent years, for example, right-wing opposition to the United Nations, global warming, and the International Criminal Court has undermined efforts by internationalist-oriented American presidents.¹⁴

China's own distinctive political institutions and traditions may shape and constrain Chinese leaders in different ways. The legitimacy and integrity of the Chinese state remains an overriding concern of the Chinese party leadership. This consideration appears to matter greatly when China makes its foreign policy choices. It would prefer an international order that affirms and reinforces state sovereignty. Such an order reinforces respect

for China's own claims of sovereign rights on its borders. China seeks an international order that provides stability as Chinese society and economy grow and transform. In these various ways, Chinese elites appear to bias their international order preferences and policies in the direction of a traditional state system—one that is stable and upholds sovereignty, openness, and multipolarity. These general orientations and impulses spring from China's geopolitical setting defined in terms of its power and interests. But these are orientations and impulses that also serve to protect, reinforce, and legitimate the domestic political institutions of the Chinese state.

Third, countries bring forward from their past different lessons and historical experiences that also help shape the way interests are defined and power is exercised. These are lessons and historical experiences that have shaped the identities and world views of leaders and peoples within these countries—narratives of the country's founding, wars and national sacrifice, grand achievements and failures, and so forth. The United States has drawn on both national triumphs and tragedies as its national myths and narratives. Most grand, perhaps, is its self-image as the first "new nation" of the world. This is the American understanding of its own founding—a bold new experiment in the affirmation of universal ideas of democracy and the rights of mankind. Later generations added narratives of world war, the rise of American power, the New Deal and the modernization of the American state, and great accomplishments in building and leading the liberal world of democracies. The United States has also carried forward lessons of failure and upheaval. The mercantilism and breakdown of order in the 1930s has reinforced ideas about the virtue of free trade. The Great Depression was seen as a failure of American leadership and international cooperation. The Munich Agreement in the fall of 1938 and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 created bitter illusions and world-weary lessons about power and weakness. The Vietnam War and the more recent Iraq War are also woven into these grand narratives of American global power and interests. When the United States debates issues of global order today, this rich set of narratives and lessons are always close at hand.

China too has its own historical narratives and lessons that inform its preferences and policies. While the United States has been at the center of world order over the last century, China has remained until recently at a more peripheral distance. China has seen a "century of humiliation" as the object of Japanese and European imperialism in the nineteenth and twentieth century. While the so-called Western order is seen by the United States as a great and progressive system that has supported economic growth and political advancement, China sees it from a position of historical weakness and dependence. The Chinese communist revolution and the Maoist era of communist rule has further reinforced anticolonial and anti-imperial narratives about the world beyond China's borders. The United States did oppose the communist revolution against the crumbling and weak nationalist Chinese nationalist regime in the late 1940s. But China's historical

experience has not been entirely one of American hostility and opposition. China suffered the most at the hands of Japanese aggression, and it was the United States that ended up defeating Japan. During the Roosevelt administration, the United States insisted that China receive one of the five permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council. Beginning in the 1970s, the United States has generally supported the Chinese opening to the world, its participation in the World Trade Organization and other global bodies. This diverse patchwork of historical experiences provide the lessons and narrative settings as China makes choices about how to engage the United States and the West over issues of world order.

Chapters, Policy Realms, and Themes

The chapters that follow are organized as six paired portraits of American and Chinese ideas, traditions, and legacies that inform their respective views of world order. To begin with, Jeffrey Legro and Fei-Ling Wang explore the ways in which the United States and China think about the norms of state sovereignty. Legro focuses on American thinking about sovereignty, understood as norms and ideas about the value of national autonomy and the sanctity of its borders. Legro suggests that the United States has two sets of views about sovereignty—views about its own sovereignty and views about the sovereignty of others. Across decades—despite changes in its power position and specific array of interests—the United States has been very protective of its sovereignty, resisting agreements that impinge on the Constitution and domestic laws. But its views about the norms of sovereignty that guide intervention in other states have changed much more readily with the rise of American power and the specific circumstances of the moment. Legro argues that the United States' understanding of its own sovereignty is deeply shaped by America's longstanding self-identity, reinforced by the US constitutional structure and, in the twentieth century, by the growth of American power.

The chapter by Fei-Ling Wang provides a portrait of Chinese ideas and ideals about sovereignty and world order. A range of ideas and ideologies coexist within China today. Wang argues that the most deeply rooted notion that lurks in the background is that of *tianxia*, a millennia-old traditional conception of China as a singularly sovereign and imperial state at the center of a political order that should and must govern the whole known world—an empire-world order. The revival of *tianxia* thinking has followed the rise of China itself in recent decades, coexisting and competing with Westphalian notions of state sovereignty and liberal ideas of globalization. Containing some elements of globalism and universalism, *tianxia* nonetheless largely speaks to a vision of world order in which an authoritarian governor (China) presides over other nations and projects authority and leadership within a hierarchical setting, precluding international competition. As the same time, Wang argues, China currently is not

willing to let go of Western notions of sovereignty because of their value as normative tools to resist American-led and liberal-oriented interventions and impositions.

Chapters by Stewart Patrick and Jianwei Wang look at how the two countries have approached global order in the area of collective security and the United Nations. Patrick traces the ambitious and repeated efforts that the United States has made over the last hundred years to build a global system of collective security. Looking closely at American debates over the League of Nations, the United Nations, the Cold War-era shift to collective defense systems, and the post-Cold War efforts to revive United Nations security cooperation, Stewart finds American preferences influenced by power and interests—but also ideas and historical legacies. At each historical junction, Stewart finds that American perceptions of national power and prevailing views of security threats have tended to mix with old and enduring ideas and images of American exceptionalism to shape preferences and policy. “Liberal identity commitments” are deeply embedded in the American political system and play a role in reinforcing national conceptions of exceptionalism. But they also propel the United States outward, manifest in efforts to export liberal ideas and collective security practices. American political institutions tend to reinforce this complex and conflicted orientation.

Jianwei Wang details the steady shift in Chinese thinking about the United Nations and collective security. During the Cold War and until recently, China has been very reluctant to involve itself in collective security undertakings or endorse United Nations ideals in this area. Power and interest have largely shaped Chinese policy, reinforced by suspicion of Western efforts to use the United Nations in pursuit of their geopolitical interests. But this has begun to change. Although driven initially by ad hoc and selective interests related to specific United Nations operations, Wang argues that China has slowly become more involved in UN-sponsored multilateralism and collective security. The chapter shows various ways in which Beijing’s views of national sovereignty, the legitimacy of the use of force, and the role of the United Nations have evolved. There are no deep national values that drive China in this direction. Rather, it is China’s slow embrace of international norms—and the perceived value of working within an international order with shared and legitimate norms of conduct—that give shape and force to Chinese preferences and policies.

Daniel Drezner and Yang Yao explore American and Chinese approaches to finance and economic governance. Drezner focuses on the various eras of American foreign economic policy since the late nineteenth century and the evolution of policy and commitments toward global economic rules and institutions. He acknowledges that shifting configurations of power and interests are helpful in explaining changes in preferences and policy. But they are also ultimately inadequate. Drezner finds that an “historical institutional” logic is also at work, in which legacies of the past and established institutions weigh heavily on American foreign economic

policy. This is particularly evident during the 1930s, when power and interests would have propelled the United States in a different direction. Drezner argues that historical institutional influences also help explain America's general inclination over the last century to be more engaged in global finance than trade. Generally, the liberal ideas that are embedded in America's political tradition and ideologies of international order tend to reinforce Washington's repeated embrace of economic multilateralism.

Yang Yao traces the changing orientation of Chinese economic diplomacy. The chapter does not find an old and deeply rooted idea or ideology driving preferences and policy. Rather, Yao emphasizes the growth of a Chinese culture of competition and market society. Reinforcing this culture is the expansion of domestic interest groups and business elites that are seeking a voice over policy. In this sense, China today looks like Great Britain in the early nineteenth century or the United States in the early twentieth century. The Chinese economy is growing rapidly and international trade and investment are expanding. In the wake of these transformations within the Chinese economy, Yao sees a Chinese identity or ideational orientation developing, which legitimates and reinforces the trade-oriented direction of change. As Yao shows, there is not a distinctive "model" that is emerging from China; rather, the logic behind China's approach is not so different from those prevailing in other countries.

Chapters by Joshua Busby and Ming Wan probe the sources of American and Chinese preferences and policies toward the global environment. Busby seeks to explain the "inconsistency" in American environmental leadership. The United States has a long tradition of conservationism and environmental activism. But, as in other areas of foreign policy, the US government has been reluctant to submit itself to binding international commitments or take costly steps to strengthen international environmental standards and practices. Busby finds American political institutions and the policy-specific setting of interest groups to be particularly important in explaining variations in American leadership. When activist groups and business interests seek common cause to internationalize American environmental standards or when foreign actors cause environmental harm to US businesses, Washington typically provides leadership. In Busby's rendering, US preferences and policies reflect domestic interests and pressure-group politics more than the dictates of ideas and ideology. But the American ideological tradition of exceptionalism tends to reinforce policy outcomes.

Ming Wan argues that, despite popular views to the contrary, China's conception of the environment is deeply tied to Chinese natural philosophy, which in turn is the intellectual foundation for its understanding of world order. Wan traces these Chinese conception of the environment to classical Chinese philosophy, neo-Confucianism, Western modernity, and Mao's war against nature. Despite this multilayered historical tradition, Wan concedes that the actual positions that China takes in global environmental negotiations are explicable in terms of power and interest variables. China is not deviating from policy positions that look sensible given China's economic

and political setting. China's priority is economic growth, and ideas and ideologies of the past are not making a strong appearance in the rhetoric or actions of the government.

Michael Mastanduno and Weixing Hu examine American and Chinese orientations toward trade and natural resources. Mastanduno sees great consistency in American trade policy since the interwar decades. The United States has embraced free trade and multilateralism, together with a commitment to Washington leadership and various privileges and exemptions from global rules and obligations. Mastanduno finds that power and interest can explain the overall pattern of this grand emergence of the American-led postwar open trading system. But US preferences and policy can only make sense with attention to the pluralistic political institutions and legacies of the past that informed decision makers at the postwar order-building moment. Mastanduno argues that the American ideological tradition is not "one dimensional." Ideas matter but there is a marketplace of ideas that politicians can draw from and that rise and fall in different political and economic eras. Nationalist ideas about economic protection and sovereignty have recently surfaced in American politics to suggest that the marketplace of ideas is still in business.

Weixing Hu argues that China has increasingly pursued a free-trade-oriented economic policy and taken steps as a "responsible stakeholder" to operate within the rules and institutions of the global trade system. According to Hu, China has done this while seeking to fashion a more statist—or "state capitalist"—version than exists within the West. The chapter shows that China's preference for free trade is not embedded in a liberal political or economic ideology. Economic interests and the imperatives of development have driven Chinese thinking and international trade policy. But Hu does argue that ideas are important in China's evolving trade orientation. China's traditional image of the world and historical lessons learned in dealing with the outside world, especially those from the "century of humiliation," have shaped and reshaped evolving Chinese thinking on its way of participating in world economy. China is searching for an ideational framework to explain and legitimate what it is doing. Categories such as free trade and mercantilism are too stark to describe the fullness of Chinese trade and economic policy. China has looked back to Listian economics for inspiration even as it has sought to articulate a distinctive Chinese model of trade and development. Hu argues that what divides China and the United States are not alternative grand ideologies of capitalism and socialism but different ideas about the practices of capitalism.

Finally, John Owen and Bin Yu offer chapters on American and Chinese orientations toward alliances, nuclear weapons, and arms control. John Owen argues that there are connections between America's political and ideological traditions and its approaches to security. The United States does seek to protect its liberal, capitalist, and democratic system. This is not just a security goal in the traditional realist sense but a felt need within

the society to protect the domestic institutions and traditions that are the repository and embodiment of long-held values. This dynamic, Owen argues, has led the United States to several directions. One direction is toward the promotion of democracy and capitalism abroad, sometimes doing so by resorting to force and coercion. It has also meant building alliance ties and other forms of complex institutionalized cooperation with other liberal democracies. Patterns of alliance, arms control, and nuclear weapons show this liberal democratic favoritism. But the United States has cooperated with nonliberal democratic states in the past. Owen argues that cooperation is possible, particularly in areas of common vulnerability, such as nuclear proliferation. If China were to fully develop and advance a sharp alternative to the liberal, democratic, capitalist model, this would greatly raise the stakes and impede cooperation.

Bin Yu examines Chinese ideas and policies in the area of nuclear weapons and force posture. Yu argues that although China's initial steps to acquire and build nuclear forces were driven by traditional concerns about security, survival, and retaliatory capabilities, its nuclear posture is significantly shaped by ideational factors derived from its tradition, culture, and history, such as prudence in war-fighting. Even though its "lean" nuclear force posture dates back to the 1960s when it was more economically constrained, China has continued its moderate buildup even when resources and opportunities have increased. Yu details ideas within China's political history and strategic culture that emphasize the virtues of caution and prudence. These virtues, in turn, can be seen in various ways within the national security establishment as guiding and legitimating principles for its "lean" nuclear posture. Yu argues that these distinctive Chinese ideational factors—while different from the West—can actually work well to facilitate future nuclear arms control.

Conclusion

The chapters in this volume provide a rich portrait of the many ways that ideas, traditions, and historical legacies shape and impinge on American and Chinese preferences and policies toward world order. The chapters do not argue—individually or collectively—that the United States and China are trapped in ideological cages. Both countries have rich historical traditions and distinctive political institutions—and these traditions and institutions bias and bind their respective views about international order.

The chapters that follow show that basket three variables have three characteristics as explanations for American and Chinese preferences and policies. First, they almost always are found to work together with power and interest to account for outcomes. That is, to argue that ideas, institutions, and legacies matter is not to argue that power and interests do not. Rather these variables are brought into the explanation in efforts to explain the way interests are defined and power is exercised. The United States has made efforts to build international order, drawing on its power

advantages and its prevailing understanding of its own interests. But the substantive definition of interests have come, at least in part and in various ways, from ideas, institutions, and historical experiences. China too has developed understandings of its position in the world and desirable pathways to reform of international order, understandings that draw upon ideas and narratives of its own past.

Second, the ideas, traditions, and legacies that inform American and Chinese preferences and policies do not all speak with a singular voice. Both countries have rich sets of ideas and legacies that can be used to advance a wide array of policies. And finally, to see how ideas, traditions, and legacies play a role in American and Chinese foreign policy toward global order, it is necessary to look closely at specific policy areas and moments. The United States and China are not prisoners of their past or of their native-grown ideas and ideals. History—as the old adage goes—is always changing. Leaders do look back to learn from the past, but what they see and how they can use the past is not fixed. We can look more closely at the realms of international order and American and Chinese policies.

Finally, while the United States and China bring divergent ideologies, traditions, and legacies to foreign policy, this volume does not find strong evidence of deep and inimical ideational divides. During the Cold War, the United States and China offered starkly different images and ideologies of politics, economics, and modernity itself. It was truly a clash of world-views, which geopolitical conflict itself reinforced. The differences between the United States and China are not of this sort. China is more capitalist today than it is state socialist or communist, and it is much more deeply embedded in the liberal world economy. Nonetheless, the United States and China do operate with different visions of the state, market, and global order. China is searching for ways of reconciling its political traditions with modern capitalism and international interdependence. In a sense, Chinese leaders are seeking ways to reach back and connect today's preferences and policies to older ideas and traditions, if only to legitimate those policy orientations and find ways to resist foreign pressures for Western-style reform. The United States and China are also in many ways very similar, particular in their persistent claims of uniqueness and exceptionalism. Both countries want to be at the center of world politics and both want to remain as autonomous as possible within it. In the conclusion to this volume, we explore the implications of these observations for the future of US-China relations.

Notes

1. The “second image” is a reference to the three images or levels of international relations, with level one referring to the individual, level two to the domestic system, and level three to the structure of the international system. The classic discussion of these three images, in the context of the causes of war, is Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, originally published in 1954).

2. For recent works on US-Chinese relations that emphasize power shifts and the rising risk of conflict between the two states, see Aaron Friedberg, *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia* (New York: Norton, 2012); John Mearsheimer, "China's Unpeaceful Rise," *Current History* (April 2006); Mearsheimer, "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to U.S. Power in Asia," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3 (2010): 381–396.
3. See Martin Jacques, *When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order* (New York: Penguin Press, 2009); Robert Kagan, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams* (New York: Vintage, 2009); and Charles A. Kupchan, *No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). For a study of China's efforts at reshaping the international order, see Juan Pablo Cardenal and Heriberto Araujo, *China's Silent Army: The Pioneers, Traders, Fixers and Workers Who Are Remaking the World in Beijing's Image* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2013).
4. This volume does not explore the ways in which international order—manifest in rules, institutions, norms, and ways of operating—shapes and constrains Chinese and American foreign policy. For important efforts to understand these "outside-in" dynamics, see Alastair Iain Johnston, *Social States: China and International Institutions, 1980–2000* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); and Barry Buzan, "China in International Society: Is 'Peaceful Rise' Possible?" *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2010): 5–36.
5. For other recent efforts to explore American and Chinese policies toward international order, see Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter, *China, the United States, and Global Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); and David Shambaugh, ed., *Tangled Titans: The United States and China* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012). For a focus on China's engagement with existing international order, see David Shambaugh, *China Goes Global: The Partial Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
6. In thinking about how "ideas matter," Max Weber famously argued that while "interests" tended to drive human action, ideas can act like a switch on a railroad track and alter the direction of human action. "Not ideas, but material and ideal interests directly govern men's conduct. Yet very frequently the 'world-images' that have been created by 'ideas' have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamics of interest." Max Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. and trans. Gerth and C. W. Mills, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948), 280. For an influential statement of the relationship between "ideas" and foreign policy, see Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Policy Change* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). On the ways in which ideas and identities may impact foreign policy and international order, see Henry R. Nau, *At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); and Christian Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). For the ways ideas spread, with particular focus on small states in Southeast Asia, see Amitav Acharya, *Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).
7. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 30.
8. G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), chapters 5 and 6.

9. For a study of the impact of liberal modernization thinking on American foreign policy, see David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).
10. Jeffrey Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).
11. See David Kang, *China Rising: Peace, Power and Order in East Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).
12. For contemporary Chinese elite views of the Chinese model and leadership role, see Wang Jisi and Kenneth Lieberthal, *Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2012).
13. Samuel Huntington, "American Ideals versus American Institutions," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 97, No. 1 (Spring 1982): 1–37.
14. See Charles A. Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz, "Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal Internationalism in the United States," *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Fall 2007); and Walter Russell Mead, "The Tea Party and American Foreign Policy: What Populism Means for Globalism," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90, No. 2 (March/April 2011).

Part I

Sovereignty and the State System

Sovereignty American Style: Protecting Apple Pie, Fixing Foreign Recipes

Jeffrey W. Legro

Sovereignty is an idea that states hold about authority and autonomy over their own polity and others' polities. How leaders think about their sovereignty and that of other states helps shape international cooperation and conflict. To the extent that a country is willing to cut deals that might somehow limit its autonomy or freedom of decision making, cooperation becomes possible. Highly defensive attitudes toward sovereignty and extreme nationalism can be harbingers of conflict.¹ Understanding how and why the United States thinks about sovereignty offers insights into American foreign policy and the potential for future US-China conflict and collaboration.

American views are particularly important for international relations in the contemporary era. The United States is the most powerful country in the world in the early part of the twenty-first century. US attitudes toward autonomy and the sanctity of borders shape both US policy and the international order. US notions of sovereignty have affected Washington with regard to joining the Kyoto Protocol, adhering to international law (such as the additional protocol of the Geneva Convention), and signing on to treaties such as the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. How the United States has conceived of the sanctity of foreign borders has been an important factor in its decision making on military interventions.² And because of the United States' imposing presence in international politics, its choices have contributed to the making of global rules as seen in the strengthening of the World Trade Organization (which the United States supports) and the weakening of the International Criminal Court (ICC) (which the United States believes violates its citizens' rights). Moreover, how the United States thinks of sovereignty may affect how other countries, including China, view sovereignty.³

US notions of sovereignty have two facets. The first is *own-sovereignty*: how the United States views its national authority and autonomy vis-à-vis international commitments, obligations, and the influence and interventions of others in the United States. Should the United States commit to international agreements that limit its freedom of action on issues such as trade or building nuclear weapons? Should it join, and/or support new international laws that require changes in its domestic laws?

The second is *other-sovereignty*: how the United States views the autonomy and sanctity of the political authority of other countries. Does the United States have the right to alter political developments in other countries? Should it get involved to prevent human rights abuses? Can it militarily intervene to protect the well-being of Americans abroad?

US attitudes on these two facets have shown significant periods of continuity, but have also experienced change. The two different types of sovereignty ideas, however, have not varied together. The United States at its birth was highly protective of its autonomy and eschewed intervention in the affairs of other states. Over time, US leaders have accepted more international commitments, and joined in cooperative ventures that have necessarily limited US freedom of action. Yet the country has also remained allergic to many agreements that impinge on its constitution and domestic laws. It is fiercely defensive of the well-being of its citizens and soldiers abroad and their rights as defined by US domestic laws. Own-sovereignty attitudes have been comparatively resilient.

US other-sovereignty notions have seen more change over time—as apparent in US military interventions in foreign countries. Americans became much more likely to consider military involvement in other countries at the turn of the twentieth century and then after World War II, especially in Latin America and in nations that border oceans adjoining US territory. In the current era, a paradox has flummoxed and alienated many countries: the United States does not want anyone tinkering with American apple pie traditions, but it does not hesitate to rearrange the preferred politics of other countries.

How can we best explain variations in US attitudes on sovereignty?⁴ The search for a single cause of sovereignty views is likely to be frustrated by two hurdles. The first is that causes differ depending on which facet (own versus other) of sovereignty is being considered. US views of own-sovereignty have diverged from its views of other-sovereignty, indicating different determinants of the two notions.

The second is that there are often multiple sources of sovereignty attitudes, some pushing for continuity, others for change. What we see is that factors from the three baskets—power, interests, and traditions—are all involved. The causal dynamics work across the categories. For example, power (basket one) works conjointly to inform and constrain ideas (basket three) at the national level (e.g., US notions of exceptionalism) and international level (“right to protect” norms). Domestic interests (basket two) are shaped by global economic interdependence. And sovereignty ideas

themselves are molded by factors not easily captured by any basket such as threats and the actions and/or traits of foreign actors. The point is not that “everything matters” but that the two facets of sovereignty have been shaped by different factors in regular ways—a pattern likely to continue in the future.

Own-sovereignty ideas have been profoundly shaped and maintained by the combination of American identity reinforced by US constitutional structure and increasingly by US power. These notions have changed slowly over the years largely based on crises induced by the functional pressures of growing global interdependence and global leadership that required some self-binding cooperation.⁵ Other-sovereignty ideas have been more (than the relatively stable own-sovereignty ideas) prone to change and have been most influenced by relative US global power, international norms, and threats from other states/actors, though again tradition has acted as mainly a constraining force in many instances.

In what follows, I first explore the concept of sovereignty used in this essay. I then turn to sovereignty in the US context. US views of sovereignty have developed along two lines, and the essay examines major phases for each in US history, attempting to assess how different causes shaped those notions. This trajectory of sovereignty views has implications for US-China relations and the potential for conflict and cooperation.

Concepts and Puzzles

Sovereignty in its broadest conception is about the autonomy of the state in an interdependent world. Whether the threat to autonomy comes from the demands of powerful actors, international organizations and norms, uncontrolled cross-border movements, or the opportunities of cooperation, states have always faced choices regarding accepting constraints on their independent action: there are often benefits from making commitments to others, but doing so involves a constraint on autonomy. And how states think about and value their own autonomy and the autonomy of others will affect how they respond to external pressures and how they treat others.

Sovereignty is a much-contested thing—both in relations among countries and in academic writings. In world politics states have disputed and reconstructed the rules of political authority and boundaries throughout history. In academia, scholars have debated various aspects and definitions of sovereignty.⁶ This essay explores how US views of sovereignty have developed with an eye on their impact on US-China relations. For this aim, a simple definition provides a useful starting point:

Sovereignty: The Autonomy of a State to Govern Itself⁷

Here we see the foundation for the two basic macro categories of attitudes on sovereignty relevant to international relations: how a state sees its own

autonomy (own-sovereignty) and how it sees the autonomy of others (other-sovereignty).

Countries may hold different views in each of these categories. In terms of the authority of a state to govern itself, it may welcome plans that necessarily limit its freedom, whether it be binding trade treaties, defensive alliances, or joining a regional organization. For example, the United States of America originated in a decision by 13 colonies to sacrifice their individual rights in order to strengthen their federal union. Alternatively states may energetically protect their autonomy as India did in the postcolonial period through its rigorous pursuit of nonalignment.

A state's view toward the authority of *other* states to govern themselves independently can also vary dramatically. Leaders might have a strict belief in the absolute sanctity of the borders of all states. Many countries that have a history as a target of outside interference have this attitude. Indeed, a version of this strict view is one of the central principles in the founding of the United Nations: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."⁸

In contrast, a state may feel that it has a responsibility to transgress authority in a foreign country. In the heyday of imperialism, this was sometimes justified with hubris as the "white man's burden." In contemporary times, intervention is often based on the need to protect human rights and well-being by preventing massacres and genocide in a "right to protect" (R2P).⁹ The intervening powers in Libya in 2011 justified their actions by claiming a need to thwart exactly such a massacre.¹⁰ In a series of historical waves over several centuries, countries have advocated foreign interventions to contribute to the spread of their preferred ideology or regime type.¹¹

In examining US views, several natural questions arise. Have US views of sovereignty fluctuated over history? If so, how have they changed? Finally, if they have changed, how can one account for such shifts? The remainder of this section addresses each of these issues in turn.

In the United States, the limits and nature of sovereignty have always been a matter of political and legal debate. Americans have not all subscribed to a single view of sovereignty. Often "US views" are fractured with the government opposing a particular action while civil society groups support it, for example, the jurisdiction of the ICC. Yet amid heated debates and the assortment of opinions, dominant views of sovereignty have almost always existed in political discourse. Even while individuals and groups may dissent from those dominant views, it is possible to say that the United States at particular times—often quite over long periods—has embraced distinct views that have structured national policy and action. Critics of these views meanwhile have developed their case and waited for the day when their arguments might be more compelling in shaping the dominant ethos about sovereignty.¹²

The record of US views on sovereignty presents two important puzzles. The first is that the two dimensions of sovereignty have not moved in

tandem.¹³ A state that believes in open borders and adaptation of domestic principles to international norms may also disavow the right to intervene elsewhere. Likewise a country that is protective of its sovereignty may not feel the same about the sovereignty of others. US views of the need to protect domestic autonomy remained relatively constant throughout the nineteenth century, but there were alterations in its views of the sovereignty of others.¹⁴ In short, there appear to be different causes of own- versus other-sovereignty notions at any particular time. What are these causes?

A second puzzle relates to history. US views of sovereignty have varied when considering long stretches of history. These views do not typically change overnight and often have remained stable over decades. Consider, for example, the contrast between US ideas about sovereignty in the country's early history versus ideas about sovereignty today. The Founders were attempting to establish a new nation and were very concerned that no one should violate US sovereignty. In turn they mostly tried to avoid interference in the sovereignty of others—either via international agreements that might “entangle” or in terms of direct intervention or regime promotion. Today, however, the United States is more willing to countenance agreements that restrict independent action and has a much broader definition of the circumstances that allow or compel US intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries. What explains this change and continuity over time?

The history of US views of sovereignty provides rich material for thinking about causes in the past, and their relevance in the future. The evolution of America's thinking is different in terms of its own sovereignty versus the sovereignty of others. What follows provides a brief overview of each. The aim is to provide a descriptive summary that allows some initial rough—and necessarily preliminary and inconclusive—observations about the causes of views of sovereignty.

Own-Sovereignty

US attitudes toward own-sovereignty of the United States have shown much continuity from the origins of the country to the current day. States, like other organizations, are powerfully shaped by their founding ethos, self-images, and rules—these are at heart of basket three” factors. Deep-seated domestic norms and institutions have acted as a powerful brake on any rapid move to quickly transform the US polity. In addition, Washington has been more able to thwart intrusions on its autonomy because of the sharp increase in its relative might from the end of the nineteenth century forward. Yet even with the power to thwart change, US own-sovereignty attitudes have changed in some ways, as Americans have had to grapple with new challenges from abroad, to play a greater role in dealing with global problems that threaten domestic values, and to respond to economic incentives from the global economy.

Origins and Identity

Own-sovereignty views were most profoundly shaped by the founding ideas and sense of exceptionalism known as the “American Creed.”¹⁵

The essence of nationhood is when citizens are willing to give up their individual freedom to a broader authority in order to realize collective goals that they cannot otherwise attain. For example, citizens pay taxes to a central authority in return for public goods such as clean water or defense from external threats.¹⁶

It is ironic and significant that the centralization of authority that produced the United States had its origins in a revolt against taxes and central authority. The rebels were ultimately brought together in protest against a British tax on tea to the American colonies. For these people—many of whom had made the hard journey to the new land to escape overbearing authority, practice their religion freely, and/or take advantage of new opportunity—their aim was to assert their freedoms, not limit them.

To achieve and truly protect their freedom, however, the Founders of the country would have to make new compromises on that freedom. At first this took the form of loyalty to a confederation of the 13 colonies. When the United States won its freedom, but threats still loomed, the country opted for a stronger form of federal government to help the young nation develop faster economically and navigate external challenges more competently.¹⁷ In doing so, of course, individual liberty was necessarily limited for the benefit of collective good; individual liberties of a sort were protected by sacrificing other liberties to a higher authority.

The distinctive part of the new American state was this debate about the size of the government and what actual prerogatives and rights individuals and states should give to it. The new country, in comparison to the European countries that were its main focus, had a distinct creed that favored individual liberties, smaller governments, no standing military, decentralized power, and a balance of power in governmental structure.¹⁸ The Founders wanted to protect their country from external threats but avoid building so much centralized power that individual liberty was at risk. The United States was pulled by competing impulses as seen in two of its early mottoes: “e pluribus Unum,” or the desire for greater centralization to deal with collective action problems, and “don’t tread on me,” or the desire for unconstrained rights.¹⁹

This same tension would quickly dominate discussions of national freedom (also known as “sovereignty”) in an international community. The United States had to weigh decisions in foreign policy that would implicate its autonomy and indeed its very existence. The young country needed to be involved in the international arena to conduct commerce that would help it grow and it had to protect itself from predators. Doing so might require agreements or alliances with others, however, which might entangle the United States or limit its flexibility. Different political factions preferred different allies (the Hamiltonians, Britain; the Jeffersonians, France). To

manage this trade-off, the Founders came down on the side of neutrality—they wanted to avoid commitments that could drag them into unneeded fights or long-term military buildups that would weaken and change the very character of the nation.²⁰ As Washington wrote in his Farewell Address:

As avenues to foreign influence in innumerable ways, such attachments are particularly alarming to the truly enlightened and independent patriot. How many opportunities do they afford to tamper with domestic factions, to practice the arts of seduction, to mislead public opinion, to influence or awe the public councils!²¹

The protection of US autonomy and the distinctive American experience may have involved sacrifices of individual and state rights to a federal government, but it also demanded sovereignty from foreign encroachment and entanglement.

Over time, the creed came under pressure as the United States became involved in the world. The United States was fierce about protecting these principles not only because it believed in them, but also because it has had a distinctive political structure that has privileged defenders of tradition.²² This structure includes a system of checks and balances that makes it very difficult for any particular administration to reach agreements that violate US sovereignty. For example, it takes a two-thirds vote in the US Senate to approve international treaties that might somehow require the United States to sacrifice elements of its authority. This means that a minority of opinion can maintain traditions that even a majority might reject. Likewise, US judicial review can check legislative or executive actions that alter the status quo. These checks are an important source of continuity in US views.

It would be a mistake however to suggest that there was no change in US own-sovereignty views in the first 100 years of its history: in fact the United States did bend and adapt, including at least one area of the founding creed—the notion that some men by the color of their skins should be masters of other men. Slavery was abolished in the United States, but only after a bitter civil war. That war was fought over slavery and “states’ rights”—whether the federal government or individual states should have authority. The outcome of the war was a step in favor of “unitary” sovereignty located in the US federal government, a shift that also contributed to its autonomy vis-à-vis other countries.²³

External Pressures and Opportunities

As the twentieth century unfolded, increasing US foreign economic ties and distant threats brought nearer by technology challenged a popular belief in small government and no standing army. Rigidness in defending autonomy is a privilege of the powerful, economically self-sufficient, or geographically remote. The United States benefitted from the former in its early years

and then from its rapidly growing relative might. But even the United States could not be too rigid. Ironically, growing US power necessitated various cooperative arrangements that inevitably constrained US flexibility of action. For example, US leaders realized during the Great Depression and World War II that the world faced collective action problems that would demand US help (as the world's largest power) to address them. This in turn required commitments that the United States, to this point, had rejected.²⁴ The functional pressures and practical problems generated by a “shrinking world” in conjunction with US hegemonic power altered US attitudes of own-sovereignty regarding the degree of acceptable cooperation.

The shape of US sovereignty views began to bend slowly under the weight of global economic and military challenges. In earlier times, geography, the limited reach of global events, and nascent US capabilities meant that the US could only carry a limited load vis-à-vis world problems, and a limited world role helped keep the world's problems out of the United States. World War I, the Great Depression, and World War II, however, would dramatically change US views of how much the United States should compromise its own autonomy to deal with larger challenges.

World War I

Many Americans hoped that the United States could remain detached from the Great War that was raging in Europe—that was what President Woodrow Wilson had promised in his 1912 campaign. Yet those hostilities disrupted the US's freedom of the seas and threatened to bring the war to the Americas (e.g., the potential for German attack via Mexico as indicated in the Zimmermann). Suddenly, it seemed, the world was threatening the US system and the president declared the need to “make the world safe for democracy.”

US intervention in the war helped produce Allied victory, but it also brought its own rebound effect. Wilson believed that the war and the reach of European power meant that global peace and US security now depended on a global approach to conflict prevention—a League of Nations. Yet joining it would require a commitment from the United States to get permanently entangled in great power matters. In short, Washington would need to agree to Article X of the League's Covenant that called for US involvement if any member of the League was attacked. This implied limitations on US sovereign action (or so critics argued in debates). The subsequent political standoff and US rejection of the League brought the United States back to its long-held orthodoxy of nonentanglement. Indeed, in the interwar years, the United States seemed even more hesitant to get involved in collective global problems that would compromise US autonomy. Americans were disillusioned by their World War I involvement and gun-shy to get involved again.²⁵

The problem with this position was that the United States was the most powerful country in the world. Ignoring global problems was no longer a possibility because if the United States did not address troubles early, they

might metastasize and become much worse. The functional demands of interdependence and the growing weight of the United States in the international system required a different response, but the combination of tradition and the disillusionment from World War I trumped such imperatives. Such problems could be ignored for only so long.

The Great Depression

If it was not apparent beforehand, the economic calamity that involved the shutdown of the global economy brought home the notion that the United States was not an economic island. Beginning with the stock market crash of 1929, the collapse was induced by each economy adopting “beggar thy neighbor” policies. The United States joined the cascade and upped its own wall of tariffs (e.g., Smoot Hawley Tariff). Such mass defections from more open trade smothered the international commerce needed to keep the global economy breathing. Sovereignty was protected, but at a terrible cost.

The Depression saw the emergence of a US economic policy that embraced greater freedom of trade, coordinated fixed currencies (needed for stability at the time), and the growth of international finance. Such policies however required cooperation with others such as the quid pro quo efforts required by the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 that would pave the way for later more expansive agreements (e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or GATT). The precedent showed how the US sacrifice of freedom of action could enhance overall growth and stability.

World War II and Cold War

World War II marked a turning point in Americans’ thought about own-sovereignty. The interwar period, especially the 1930s, saw the United States attempting to return to a strict policy of neutrality—one akin to that of the Founders in dealing with the Napoleonic wars. Once again Americans hoped that neutrality would avoid needlessly enmeshing the United States in Europe’s squabbles—especially when doing so might change the nature of the United States through militarism or the growth of a “garrison state.”²⁶

Yet the 1930s were different than the early nineteenth century. Technology allowed countries to project massive nation-crushing military power over long distances—even across oceans. Economies depended on overseas trade. And the United States was no longer a developing state that could do little to affect outcomes. The rise, success, and threat from Germany, then Japan, convinced Americans that their resolute belief in nonentanglement as a recipe for national safety and prosperity was a chimera. The more the United States tried to remain aloof in the 1930s the worse the results: faith in nonentanglement eroded, giving rise to new attitudes toward international commitments.²⁷ US leaders recognized that they had to engage other countries in more fundamental ways to shape an environment conducive to US purposes.

US internationalism, however, would implicate sovereignty. Engagement would involve cooperation, and cooperation by its very definition, would

require compromises to freedom of action and perhaps even to the American creed. Joining the UN meant signing up to set of norms and the judgment and review of others concerning key US foreign policy decisions. Creating NATO involved an open-ended security commitment to European stability. Joining GATT implied a willingness to forgo increases in certain tariffs that would otherwise be very desirable for important specific US economic interests.

Indeed, this was what the United States took on in the postwar period. However, at almost every turn, Washington attempted to limit the extent of its commitments. Roosevelt insisted that the new internationalism would not infringe on US sovereignty.²⁸ The United States was not interested in an open-ended pledge to world peace—it wanted some control in the form of a veto in the Security Council of the United Nations. In negotiating the NATO treaty, the United States demanded that it not violate Congress's authority to declare war. And the GATT treaty did not provide for binding settlement of disputes—in effect the United States had a veto.²⁹

As the implications of nuclear interdependence, evident in the Mutual Assured Destruction logic of the Cold Wars' arms race, became clear, the United States also was more willing to cut deals, even with its most dangerous enemy, the Soviet Union. As President John F. Kennedy said about an international arena with nuclear weapons, "In such a world, absolute sovereignty no longer assures us of absolute security."³⁰ What followed were a series of arms control agreements that were aimed at stabilizing the rivalry. Similarly the two collaborated to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, but of course, doing so meant some limitations on their own actions.

US own-sovereignty views did change with World War II and the Cold War. But US thinking changed mostly at the margins and haltingly—only in response to major failures and new challenges in both security and economic affairs.

Power and Commitment

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has shown a sometimes-bewildering mix of readiness to alter certain aspects of traditional sovereignty and a surprising defensiveness given America's significant relative global power. This vacillation is mirrored in political fights in the United States between modern "sovereignists" and "globalizers."³¹

On the one hand, the United States has accepted new inroads on its authority. One change has been in commerce. Washington has agreed to binding international review panels that judge international trade disputes in the World Trade Organization and in the North American Free Trade Agreement. In these instances, the United States has bound itself to international cooperation in a way that affects significant domestic interests, but without a veto.³² The United States has accepted commitments that impinge on sovereignty despite its preponderant power. Undoubtedly US decision

makers hope to rely on sheer market power to retain decisive US influence in these areas. Yet US market power is quickly leveling off relative to other players.³³

A core tenet of the founding American creed was a prohibition against a big government, especially one that entailed a standing army and a militarized society. Yet the challenges of the Cold War and new US commitments around the world altered this deeply held belief. Even when the Cold War ended, the United States retained its significant military establishment.³⁴

Similarly, in human rights, an issue central to sovereignty, the United States has changed its position significantly encouraged by external forces. For example, in the late 1940s and early 1950s the country witnessed a number of civil rights cases that were based on the claims, not of the US Constitution, but the UN Charter's provisions on human rights. While the United States had a sturdy record of furthering particular individual rights, the notion of "human rights" seems to have gained life only in World War II. President Eisenhower was moved in part to promote civil rights due to critical global opinion of US discrimination against African Americans.³⁵

Despite these adaptations to founding principles, the United States has remained fiercely protective of its own authority. The human rights efforts after World War II also spurred an ardent opposition, some of which was motivated by fears of the end of racial segregation in the United States.³⁶ In the post-Cold War era, protectors of US independence from higher authority have argued against joining an International Criminal Court (ICC) that has jurisdiction over states. Moreover the United States has actively battled against efforts by the ICC to gain jurisdiction over US citizens (especially soldiers) when the United States has not signed the treaty.³⁷

Likewise the United States has often rejected ratification of international agreements that it had supported and helped develop. For example in human rights, the US Congress has declined to endorse "the Helsinki process, the American Convention, the CRC [Convention on the Rights of Children], and the ICC."³⁸ US leaders have spurned similar agreements in other areas including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the verification procedures for Chemical and Biological Weapons, a Landmine Ban Treaty, and the Kyoto Protocol. American lawyers have fiercely debated whether the interpretation of the constitution in modern circumstances needs to be more open to dialogue with transnational legal authorities.³⁹

This pattern—slow adaptation in US views of own-sovereignty with continual backtracking to the protective view of the Founders—seems to stem from a cross-cutting mix of factors.⁴⁰ On the one hand there are the forces of greater interdependence and shrinking global space that makes international factors an imposing part of US domestic life. Nuclear weapons mean that great powers are never secure without some kind of understanding with potential adversaries. The interwoven nature of global and national markets means that prosperity depends on deals that would limit the unilateral flexibility of the mercantilist mentality of the Founders. Perhaps most

significant, a range of problems have dominated the global agenda in recent years that reach deep into the US domestic arena: international crime, population control, the environment, and, of course, human rights.⁴¹

On the other hand there are the reactionary forces that seek to maintain traditions of own-sovereignty. What keeps this widespread international functional imperative from morphing US views of own-sovereignty are a combination of internal and external factors. The internal factors are a strong identity of exceptionalism that is supported by an institutional structure (e.g., the two-thirds rule) that allows a minority to “veto” change. In addition, the relative power of the United States in the world allows it the capacity to resist functional systemic pressures better than other weaker countries. Because the United States takes on special responsibilities due to its predominate power, and because it has a proven system (of political and economic results), Washington seems to believe it should be allowed more slack in adherence to international norms—in some cases to enforce the broader system of which those norms are a part. The United States does not see itself above all the rules of order, it just wants to have a strong say in where it will claim exceptions. Specifically US officials believe they should be allowed more flexibility in protecting their own domestic order (“don’t mess with success”) while carrying out system maintenance tasks.⁴²

The US default mechanism for managing these cross-cutting demands is to nurture the creation of international agreements, pacts, and laws that address the given problem, but then to create an exception for the United States to avoid some level of constraint. The result is often compliant behavior with symbolic defection for identity maintenance. Whether the United States can continue to walk this fine line if problems (such as global warming or cyber governance) are not being addressed remains to be seen.

Other-Sovereignty

There is a stark difference between US views of its own sovereignty and US views of the sovereignty of others. On the one hand the United States seeks to shield its own sovereignty; on the other hand it often seems to violate the sovereignty of others. One important task, then, is to understand and explain these different contemporary views, which are documented in several important studies.⁴³ Yet the focus on contemporary difference obscures a second puzzle: dominant US attitudes toward intervention in other countries have changed over time.⁴⁴ The Founders had very different attitudes toward intervention than do modern presidents. Why?

Power (basket one) and tradition (basket three) seem to play a central role, though one that is mediated by international threats and norms. In terms of power, the United States was simply too vulnerable to mix it up in the Napoleonic wars, whether one sympathized with France’s republican revolution or not. But power is also not a sufficient explanation for US attitudes toward other-sovereignty, because as the United States’ power grew, its propensity to intervene abroad varied—it did not just grow

monotonically with America's relative capabilities. At times, creed pushed back against power, limiting the United States from involvement in others' sovereignty in ways unexpected by what the United States was able to do with its capabilities. Tradition, however, has not just constrained, it has also enabled. The United States has been especially eager to involve itself in other countries' affairs if that country was not a democracy.⁴⁵ US exceptionalism fed into views of racial and civilizational superiority that encouraged interventionist thinking.⁴⁶

Two other factors were also involved. One is threat perception. In instances where the United States has perceived the need to take preemptive or preventive actions to protect its security, especially its existential security, the sovereignty of others has fallen by the wayside. This was the case in a string of Cold War interventions (e.g., Greece, Korea, Vietnam, Congo, Grenada, etc.). It has also been true of attitudes in the age of terrorism as witnessed by the preventive emphasis of the Bush Doctrine and the turn toward intervention in weak or failed states that might harbor terrorists (Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Philippines, Pakistan, etc.). Today such concerns drive the extensive use of drones in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where complaints about violations of sovereignty are often heard.⁴⁷

Another key source of US other-sovereignty notions is international norms that have varied, in some instances encouraging intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, at other times serving as a brake on tendencies to intervene. The United States may be protected, constrained, or empowered depending on prevailing practices and rules on the possibility and conditions of foreign interventions or the relationship between international and domestic law. International standards of sovereignty have changed over time and these shape the views of countries, including the United States.⁴⁸

In the late nineteenth century, the United States was pulled along by the prevailing "scramble for empire" ethos of the day and initiated its own hesitant ventures in Cuba, Hawaii, and the Philippines. It also intervened more regularly in Latin America.

Yet despite these seemingly constant factors that favored notions of US superiority and need to control others, US attitudes toward intervention have waxed and waned. In part, this is because US tradition has also pushed back against intervention at particular times. Many argued that US imperialism at the turn of the twentieth century was profoundly anti-American, that the United States was founded in rebellion to British imperialism. Indeed there was a resurgence of anti-imperial sentiment and appearance of self-determination discourse both in reaction to the US-Philippine war and in the wake of World War I.⁴⁹ Likewise during the Cold War, the promulgation of "sovereign equality norms" constrained unilateral military interventions and shifted the nature of influence efforts to covert, political, and economic means.⁵⁰ In the most recent period the rise of "responsibility to protect" norms have facilitated a new wave of interventions.

Several distinct periods in US attitudes on other-sovereignty are apparent. I explore these with particular attention to US military interventions—the pointed end of US violations of others’ autonomy.

Origins: Creed versus Vulnerability

In the revolutionary and postrevolutionary periods, the United States was extremely hesitant to get involved in the affairs of other countries. One of the main dilemmas for US leaders at the time involved the Napoleonic wars. Many sympathized with the revolution against monarchy in France and were torn over how the world’s first modern democracy should relate to similar aspirations on the continent.

Washington’s Farewell Address again summarized what became the conventional wisdom:

Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor, or caprice? . . . It is folly in one nation to look for disinterested favors from another—that it must pay with a portion of independence for whatever it may accept under that character.⁵¹

As president, Washington had accordingly issued the Neutrality Proclamation, which declared the United States would be impartial to both sides of the conflict. The United States was happy to rely on the principles of neutrality embedded in international law because it recognized that intervention in Europe might lead to intervention in the United States. The United States was too weak to risk such a possibility.⁵²

Emerging Power, Expanded Boundaries

As the United States recovered from the Civil War and strengthened in economic and military terms, its views on the sovereignty of others changed somewhat. The United States had intervened militarily in the territories of others but mostly it was not about altering their autonomy or form of government. Primarily these short-term interventions were to protect US merchant and naval shipping, commercial interests, and citizens or soldiers.⁵³ The United States was involved in a variety of military missions in regions around its territories. The most significant pattern of military intervention in the nineteenth century related to the expansion of territorial United States at the expense of Native American tribes, Mexico, and colonies of European powers in North America.

This continental focus began to change at the end of the nineteenth century. The United States annexed Hawaii and developed a new more assertive orientation toward countries in its hemisphere, especially Latin America (but of course included the Philippines as well). In the 1890s to 1917 period the United States developed new extensions of the Monroe Doctrine. One

was known as the Olney Corollary: “Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.”⁵⁴ President Theodore Roosevelt claimed that the Monroe Doctrine permitted US intervention in American countries that were unstable and could not pay their debts. The United States also projected political influence into these regions in a number of ways other than direct military intervention.

The most substantial deviation from past US practice was the American intervention in World War I—violating the sacred American totem against entanglement in Europe’s squabbles. Indeed with the decline of the European powers in the war, the United States emerged as the most powerful global actor. And the United States helped win the war. Were power the driving force behind US ideas, this should have unleashed a new era of interventions abroad and a marked change in US views of other-sovereignty. But this did not occur for two reasons.

First, Wilson at least wanted to lead the United States in a much more internationalist direction implying greater activism abroad. Yet his plan for postwar order also favored self-determination where people in particular territories would have a say over who would have authority without outside pressure.⁵⁵ Opposition to imperialism tempered extraterritorial impulses.

The second reason was that the United States was reacting to the disappointment of its World War I intervention. Despite victory, Americans were disillusioned that the war did not advance democracy abroad or change the imperial nature of European diplomacy. More “entanglement” did not make sense to many Americans.⁵⁶ The Senate rejected Wilson’s League of Nation plan, and support for other interventions seemed to dial back. One key example was Franklin Roosevelt’s subsequent Good Neighbor Policy of 1933 that denounced US intervention in the domestic affairs of Latin American states.

International Norms and Hegemonic Power

In the wake of World War II, the Charter of the United Nations reinforced the norm of sovereignty and the sanctity of territorial borders. The United States generally supported the decolonization movement. There was however one big and increasingly important exception to general US respect for sovereignty: the threat of the spread of communism gave the United States a new and significant interest in political developments in foreign countries. The United States wanted to prevent countries from political shifts that favored communism or strong relationships with Communist countries.

Given the norms against overt intervention in foreign countries, US activities to shape the internal affairs of other states became focused on this mission, but were often implemented through nonmilitary means or covert force.⁵⁷ There were notable exceptions to this record. The most prominent was the war in Vietnam. Backtracking on the earlier Good Neighbor policy, there were also significant US interventions in Latin American

countries (Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Cuba, Nicaragua, Grenada, Panama)—most in the name of anti-communism. Finally, the United States took a growing interest in the developments in the oil-rich Middle East as the American economy and military became more dependent on energy imports.

US attitudes toward other-sovereignty made another shift in the post-Cold War period, again in a direction that challenged the “equal sovereignty” norm. This would seem like a natural shift given the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a “unipolar” world dominated by US power. It is somewhat odd then, that the United States was initially hesitant to extend its power in that new world. US forces, however, soon engaged in two types of situations implicating the sovereignty of other countries.

The first involved a “responsibility to protect”—a new potential norm in world politics (supported by the United States) that encouraged multi-lateral intervention in countries where there is likelihood of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. Building on earlier humanitarian intervention practices, states increasingly acted to deal with situations where there were mass civilian deaths, typically in countries undergoing political upheaval.⁵⁸

Most countries had signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the post-World War II period, along with a number of other human rights agreements over the next 40 years. But those agreements had no enforcement mechanism and the Cold War and the nature of Soviet power meant that any consistent reaction to human rights would be difficult. Yet that changed with the end of the US-Soviet competition. Since then the United Nations or some other international organization has endorsed some form of intervention in the domestic affairs of a foreign country, usually without the consent of that country. This has involved operations in countries such as Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Cambodia, Liberia, and Libya.⁵⁹ The United States was a force, sometimes hesitant, behind these interventions.⁶⁰

The second category of US interventions since 1991 has its origins in the emergence of a new perceived threat to US security: terrorism. Terrorism seems to thrive in regions where there is unsettled or weak sovereignty. This in turn has led to a greater US interest in the domestic matters of foreign lands. Where terrorism can breed, the United States, especially after the 9/11 attacks, has paid close attention to, and attempted to influence events in, “failed” states. It may be that such efforts are misguided.⁶¹ Still, stabilizing foreign countries where US security is at stake has sometimes been a potent excuse for interventions.

Implications for US-China Relations

America’s defensive attitude toward own-sovereignty and assertive thinking about other-sovereignty is important for both US foreign policy and

its reception abroad. Moreover, the sources of such views in the past may be relevant for thinking about the future. US views are significant for US-China relations in several different ways. The most direct is that US thinking about sovereignty will mold US policy toward China in terms of US protectiveness about its own sovereignty or perhaps via an expansive notion of other-sovereignty that treads on Chinese toes. US views on sovereignty may also have an impact by setting a precedent or acting as a model for future Chinese sovereignty notions. Fei-Ling Wang's chapter details the heated debate in China over which notion of sovereignty to pursue and each side might try to use US attitudes to bolster its position.

Whatever the mode of influence, the likely impact of US attitudes on China-US relations will be contradictory in terms of conflict and cooperation. In some aspects, these views indicate that difficult times are ahead. Yet there also appear to be areas where sovereignty views could actually facilitate cooperation between the two sides.

It would seem that US views that favor protection of US traditions while requiring adaptation in other countries will be a source of tension in US-China relations. China is intent on achieving equal status and treatment as a great power. China has complained strongly against a perceived hypocrisy and double standard in US attitudes toward sovereignty. For example, China has begun to react sharply to US reports on human rights within China, which Beijing views as intervention in its domestic affairs. So in 2010 it issued its own report of US violations of human rights.⁶² For national security reasons, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) has rejected applications by Chinese entities to purchase businesses in the United States (e.g., Chinese National Oil Company's plan to buy Unocal in 2005 or Huawei Technologies Company's acquisition of California-based 3Leaf Systems assets related to cloud computing technology). In 2011, China instituted its own CFIUS process to control foreign direct investment.⁶³

As China's power increases relative to the United States, it may increasingly push for equal treatment in terms of being allowed the same privileges of protecting China's "own-sovereignty" notions while being able to shape the internal politics of other countries. In this sense, the American precedent may have recoil effects for US leaders in the future.

China has a history of having had its own sovereignty violated by Western powers (which also claimed asymmetric rights). One of the central grounds of legitimacy of the Communist Party today is that it restored China's independence after a "century of humiliation" from foreign intervention.⁶⁴ The United States intervened in China with military force to protect US interests many times in the decades before communist rule. From before the US Civil War to 1921, this occurred at least 12 times. From 1921 to 1941, US troops were almost continuously on shore in China involved in some action or another. US troops also helped evacuate US diplomats and citizens as the Communists came to power in 1948–1949.⁶⁵

Today, most Chinese believe the United States continues to assert asymmetric privileges in Chinese politics. US other-sovereignty notions that transgress what China considers to be its “core interests” are likely to generate significant conflict. The issue that raises most hackles is Taiwan. Despite recognition of “one China,” the United States often treats Taiwan as a sovereign polity, whereas the Chinese see it as their own national territory. More infuriating for the Chinese, the United States actively arms and protects Taiwan from direct Chinese efforts to “reunite Taiwan with the Motherland.” From the Chinese perspective, this position claims special advantages for US preferences at China’s expense. As Mao once proclaimed to the United States in 1970, “You have occupied our Taiwan Island, but I have never occupied your Long Island.”⁶⁶

A second point of tension concerns another core interest—separatist tendencies in Tibet. China of course considers Tibet its sovereign terrain. The United States has many times declared that it agrees that Tibet is part of China. Yet any sign of recognition for the Dalai Lama by the United States is a cause of significant irritation in China.⁶⁷ Similar attitudes are found with regard to US policies that might affect the turbulent Xinjiang region. Finally, there is an ongoing debate over China’s apparent effort to claim the South China Sea as a core interest comparable to Taiwan or Tibet. And Chinese leaders sometimes assert their development strategy, including its monetary policy, in the same category.⁶⁸ In response, the United States has signaled its interest in “freedom of the seas” in the South and East China Seas and it has often criticized Beijing for undervaluing its currency.

China deeply resents being an object of US efforts, armed or otherwise, involving regime change in China, that is, democratization. Beijing’s insecurities have been heightened by the Arab Spring—the variety of revolutions in the Middle East where long-time autocrats were threatened or thrown out of power. It is no surprise that China and the United States have found themselves on the different sides of UN resolutions involving intervention (political and/or military) in places like Libya and Syria. Intervention in or around China’s periphery or political intervention on domestic issues would generate significant conflict. It might also set a precedent for undesired Chinese meddling down the road in the politics of other countries.

Yet just as sovereignty views divide the United States and China, so too do they unite them as uneasy partners in the protection of their domestic autonomy. Both Washington and Beijing want to limit the impact of globalization on their domestic political orders. In their desire to retain control over the efforts of transnational activists and the emergence of new global norms, they may find themselves in similar shoes. On issues such as the ICC, prohibitions on small arms, and a ban on landmines, the United States and China tacitly support one another.⁶⁹ China is much more suspicious of others efforts to shape (or perhaps undermine) its domestic political order, and perhaps including encouraging separatists sentiments in areas such as Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan, which China considers its own terrain. The United States is more concerned with avoiding dilution of its exceptional

and superior polity. Still, there is potential for collusion between the two here in terms of avoiding global efforts seen as intrusive, for example, the ICC or the Kyoto Protocol

US views of sovereignty are likely to change in the future in ways that are more conducive to cutting deals with China. First, we can anticipate that as US power declines in relative terms it is less likely to intervene as much in the affairs of other countries—at least those outside its hemisphere. US attitudes inside the Western hemisphere is another question—a defensive United States may be more likely to exert its power in the region. The downside will be that rising Chinese power may lead to an expansion of Chinese sovereign claims.

Second, as the pressures of complex global problems grow, we can anticipate Washington's increased acceptance, however hesitantly and haltingly, of limitations on US freedom of action in order to deal with these problems. This could be a particularly important dynamic in encouraging US-Chinese cooperation in an increasingly interdependent relationship. Such a development also depends on the future course of international norms of sovereignty and a global process/structure conducive to collective action. The US-China dialogue will play an important role in both those areas.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to explore the sources of US ideas of sovereignty and their variation over time. It appears that much of the time US ideas about sovereignty are a source of their own durability; they are traditions integral to US identity and do not change easily in the short run, even as the factors that gave rise to them change. Nonetheless, over longer stretches sovereignty ideas have adapted to external threats and opportunities.

No comprehensive assessment of the sources of US ideas on sovereignty is possible in one essay. Yet with some back-of-the-envelope generalizations, two types of comparisons illuminate the nature and dynamics of US attitudes. The first involves different types of sovereignty attitudes, the second, change in each type over time.

There is not just one type of sovereignty idea because sovereignty itself has different dimensions. Here I have focused on the rough divide between US ideas about its own sovereignty versus its thinking about the sovereignty of others. In the past the United States has also been more protective of its own sovereignty. And US leaders have not always held the views they do today about the appropriateness of intervening in other states.

One might think that both, own- and other-sovereignty are driven by the same basic causes but it appears there are different factors that induce and constrain change for each one. Own-sovereignty ideas are themselves significantly affected by basket three factors, that is, basic conceptions of US identity that mandate a particular attitude toward protecting tradition as well as, more arguably, influencing the domestic politics of other countries.

These ideas have evolved in response to functionalist pressures to adapt to changed world conditions featuring US power and greater economic interdependence that has bred greater domestic interests in making compromises on sovereignty to enhance economic prospects. Other-sovereignty ideas, in contrast, have been more influenced by growth in US power that facilitated US actions in other countries, threats from beyond US borders, and broader international norms on sovereignty (themselves influenced by US action).

US conceptions of own- and other-sovereignty are rife with significance for US-China relations. The overall impact is cross-cutting. In some areas there will be enhanced cooperation from the fact that both countries are protective of their sovereignty and sometimes have shared interests in jointly fending off demands both perceived as intrusive. Yet US notions of sovereignty that reject any limitation on autonomy will inhibit collaboration with China that might otherwise occur. And if US other-sovereignty thinking transgresses China's expanding set of core interests, then the potential for conflict rises significantly.

Notes

1. See, for example, Janice E. Thomson, "State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Empirical Research," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (1995): 213–233; Robert Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Robert Keohane, "Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the United States," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2002): 761 notes that attitudes on sovereignty are like a "canary in a coal mine."
2. Stephen Krasner, "Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States," *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004). Sarah Kreps, *Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions after the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
3. For example, see Fei-Ling Wang's chapter.
4. Efforts to address this question with regard to particular issues include Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Michael Mastanduno, eds., *US Hegemony and International Organizations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1–23 and Andrew Moravcsik, "The Paradox of US Human Rights Policy," in Michael Ignatieff, ed., *American Exceptionalism and Human Rights* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 147–197.
5. Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929–39* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
6. Stephen Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 9, offers four different notions. One is "domestic sovereignty" or the form and extent of political authority within a state. "Interdependence sovereignty" refers to the control of borders, while "international legal sovereignty" is about recognition by other states and international actors. Finally, "Westphalian sovereignty" relates to the autonomy of domestic authority from outside actors.

- One can of course imagine other dimensions as well. Robert Keohane, "Ironies of Sovereignty," for example, mentions "pooled" (p. 748) sovereignty where state authority is transferred to a broader community (as European states have to the European Union for some issues). Sovereignty is a term "prone to redefinition" (p. 743). For other definitions and concepts, see Robert Jackson, *Sovereignty: The Evolution of an Idea* (Cambridge, UK: Polity 2007) and F. H. Hinsley, *Sovereignty*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
7. This is a variation on a basic web definition <http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&biw=1266&bih=622&q=sovereignty&tbs=dfn:1&tbo=u&sa=X&ei=GuW2TfLHFSGTtwfS8b2cAQ&ved=0CBkQkQ4> (accessed April 26, 2011).
 8. *Charter of the United Nations*, Article 2.7, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml> (accessed April 26, 2011).
 9. Alex J. Bellamy, *Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities* (Cambridge: Polity, 2009).
 10. "Responsibility to Protect: The Lessons of Libya," *The Economist*, May 19, 2011, <http://www.economist.com/node/18709571> (accessed March 25, 2012).
 11. John M. Owen IV, *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change, 1510–2010* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).
 12. For a sense of how the ebb and flow of this debate and how the emergence of dominant ideas occurs on issues of centralized government, see Aaron Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2000), 18–33; on foreign policy, see Jeffrey W. Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).
 13. The loss/gain of one type of sovereignty does not mean the loss/gain of another. See Stephen D. Krasner, "Problematic Sovereignty," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities* (New York: Columbia University Press 2001), 2.
 14. Consider, for example, the various "corollaries" to the Monroe Doctrine in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, or the US view of the "open door" in China.
 15. Lipset, *American Exceptionalism* and Samuel Huntington, *American Politics: Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1981).
 16. Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons" *Science*, May 1, 1968, 682–668.
 17. Abraham D. Sofaer, *War, Foreign Affairs, and Constitutional Power: The Origins* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1976).
 18. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/DETOC/toc_indx.html (accessed May 18, 2011); Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace 1955); Huntington, *American Politics*.
 19. See Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: the American Encounter with the World Since 1776* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 38, 15–37.
 20. They were of course far from idealists in pursuing their goals. See Norman Graebner, "The Pursuit of Interests and a Balance of Power," in Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy, vol. 2, Since 1914*, 5th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), 23–26. Robert Kagan, *Dangerous Nation: America's Place in the World from Its Earliest Days to the Dawn of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 112–126.

21. *Washington's Farewell Address to the People of the United States*, 106th Congress 2nd Session Senate Document No. 106–21 (Washington, DC: GPO 2000), <http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/farewell/sd106-21.pdf> (accessed May 2, 2011).
22. Gordon Silverstein, *Imbalance of Powers: Constitutional Interpretation and the Making of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press 1997); Foot, MacFarlane, and Mastanduno, eds. *U.S. Hegemony and International Organizations*, 1–23; Andrew Moravcsik, “Why Is U.S. Human Rights Policy So Unilateralist?” in Shepard Forman and Stewart Patrick, eds., *The Cost of Acting Alone: Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 350–352, 358–359.
23. Keohane, “Ironies of Sovereignty,” 751–752.
24. John Ikenberry has termed this strategy “self-binding.” See G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
25. See Jeffrey W. Legro, “Whence American Internationalism,” *International Organization*, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Spring 2000): 253–289.
26. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State*.
27. See Legro, *Rethinking the World*.
28. Stewart Patrick, *The Best Laid Plans: The Origins of American Multilateralism and the Dawn of the Cold War* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), xxvii.
29. Keohane, “Ironies of Sovereignty,” 753.
30. Quoted in Edward Luck, *Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organization, 1991–1999* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 41.
31. See Peter J. Spiro, “The New Sovereignists: American Exceptionalism and its False Prophets,” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 79, No. 6 (November/December 2000): 9–15; Harold Hongju Koh, “Bringing International Law Home,” *Houston Law Review*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Fall 1998): 623–681; Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, *The Limits of International Law* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
32. Enforcement of WTO rulings however, is not done via domestic courts, but instead by retaliation by those damaged. Keohane, “Ironies of Sovereignty,” 754.
33. The European Union, for example, has a common market that exceeds the size of the United States. And the Chinese economy is rapidly growing in size and sophistication.
34. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State*.
35. Mark Philip Bradley, “The Ambiguities of Sovereignty: The United States and the Global Human Rights Cases of the 1940s and 1950s,” in Douglas Howland and Luise White, eds., *The State of Sovereignty: Territories, Laws, Populations* (Bloomington IN: University of Indiana Press, 2008), 125–132. On President Eisenhower, see *US Standing in the World: Causes, Consequences, and the Future*. APSA Task Force Report, (American Political Science Association 2009), http://www.apsanet.org/media/PDFs/APSA_TF_USStanding_Long_Report.pdf (accessed May 19, 2011).
36. Bradley, “The Ambiguities of Sovereignty.”
37. Diane Orentlicher, “Unilateral Multilateralism: United States Policy toward the International Criminal Court,” *Cornell International Law Journal*, Vol. 36, No. 415 (2004): 415–433.
38. Moravcsik, “Why is U.S. Human Rights Policy So Unilateralist?” 368.
39. John Gerard Ruggie, “American Exceptionalism, Exemptionalism and Global Governance,” in Michael Ignatieff, ed., *American Exceptionalism and Human Rights* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
40. See Stewart Patrick's chapter in this volume.

41. Ibid.
42. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
43. See Adriana Sinclair and Michael Byers, "When US Scholars Speak of 'Sovereignty,' What Do They Mean?" *Political Studies*, Vol. 55 (2007): 318; Luck, *Mixed Messages*, esp. 16–23; Moravcsik, "The Paradox."
44. For example, Moravcsik, "Paradox," 147 suggests that US attitudes on sovereignty stretch from "support for revolutionary France in the first years of the republic to the intervention in Haiti in the 1990s."
45. Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the World-Wide Struggle for Democracy* (expanded edition, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Mark Peceny, *Democracy at the Point of Bayonets* (State College, PA: Penn State University Press, 1999).
46. Michael Krenn, *The Color of Empire: Race and American Foreign Relations* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2006). For a critique, see Eric T. L. Love, *Race over Empire: Racism & U.S. Imperialism 1865–1900* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).
47. Indira A. R. Lakshmanan, "Pakistan Wants U.S. Drones Out," *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, March 13, 2012, <http://www.startribune.com/world/142566135.html> (accessed March 28, 2012).
48. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, "The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations," *International Organization*, Vol. 48 (Winter 1994): 107–130; Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2003).
49. Richard E. Welch, Jr., *Response to Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine-American War, 1898–1902* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1987); after World War I, see Legro, *Rethinking the World*.
50. Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention*.
51. *Washington's Farewell Address*, 27–29.
52. James Sofka, "American Neutral Rights Reappraised: Identity or Interest in the Foreign Policy of the Early Republic," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 26 (2000): 599–622; cf. Mlada Bukovansky, "American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the War of 1812," *International Organization*, Vol. 51 (1997): 173–208.
53. For example, the United States intervened abroad to protect the commerce of its ships or its citizens (or exact retribution for attacks thereupon), such as in the Barbary wars or during unsettled political periods often involving physical violence in foreign countries. These interventions tended to be in Latin America, East Asia and the Pacific Islands, and North Africa. Richard F. Grimmett, *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–2009*, RL32170 (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service Library of Congress January 27, 2010), <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32170.pdf> (accessed May 25, 2011).
54. George B. Young, "Intervention under the Monroe Doctrine: The Olney Corollary," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 57, No. 2 (1942): 252.
55. "President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points," delivered in a Joint Session of Congress, January 8, 1918, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp (accessed May 5, 2011).
56. Legro, *Rethinking the World*.
57. Gregory F. Treverton, *Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World* (New York: Basic Books, 1987); John Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA*

- and *Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II through the Persian Gulf* (Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1996).
58. Alex J. Bellamy, "The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On," *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 24 (2010): 143–169.
 59. Daniel Philpott, "Sovereignty," in Edward N. Zalta, ed., *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2010 ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/sovereignty/> (accessed May 5, 2011).
 60. Some US interventions did not receive UN endorsement such as the Iraq 2003 invasion and NATO's actions against Kosovo.
 61. See Stewart Patrick, *Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security* (New York: Oxford University Press 2011).
 62. See *Full Text of Human Rights Record of the United States in 2010* (China's Information Office of the State Council, 2011), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010/china/2011-04/10/c_13822287.htm.
 63. "China to Vet Inward M&A Deals for National Security," *Reuters*, February 12, 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/12/china-ma-idUSTOE71B00L20110212> (accessed March 28, 2012).
 64. Suisheng Zhao, *A Nation State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
 65. Richard F. Grimmett, *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–2009*, RL32170 (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service Library of Congress January 27, 2010). <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32170.pdf> (accessed May 25, 2011).
 66. As quoted in Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tonnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung, and James G. Hershberg, eds., *77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–1977* (Washington, DC: Cold War International History Project 1998), 135.
 67. Jaimie FlorCruz, "China Urges the U.S. to Tread Carefully on 'Core Interests,'" *CNN U.S.*, March 6, 2012, http://articles.cnn.com/2012-03-06/asia/world_asia_china-foreign-minister_1_yang-china-nuclear-energy?s=PM:ASIA (accessed March 26, 2012).
 68. Michael D. Swaine, "China's Assertive Behavior—Part One: On 'Core Interests,'" *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 34 February 22, 2011, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/article/67966> (accessed March 26, 2012).
 69. Thanks to Iain Johnston for this thought.

From *Tianxia* to Westphalia: The Evolving Chinese Conception of Sovereignty and World Order

Fei-Ling Wang

Introduction

A nation's foreign policy is foreknowable through a good understanding of its power position in the world, its domestic interest groups and political process, and its conception of world order and strategic pursuits.¹ In the People's Republic of China (PRC), there is now a spectrum of ideas and preferences about world order, competing to guide the rising Chinese power.² They range from seeking to restore a millennia-old *tianxia* (all under the heaven) system of autocratic empire-world order or at least a Pax Sinica (Peace under Chinese Rule) hegemony, to striving for more power to reshape the current world order in accordance to the rising Chinese strength and interests while upholding state sovereignty under the classic Westphalia system, to advocating a peaceful and fuller integration into the post-Cold War, American-led liberal world order, which features human rights-defined national sovereignty, growing role of international and trans-government regimes and institutions, and globalizing values of democracy and rule of law.

Like the Americans, the Chinese often exhibit a dichotomist view with a double standard when dealing with issues of national sovereignty, harboring deep suspicion and ambivalence about international institutions such as the United Nations.³ Unlike the United States where there is a dualist but essentially still Westphalian view of "own-sovereignty" and "other-sovereignty,"⁴ the Chinese conception features a bipolar choice between the imposed but useful Westphalian notion of absolute national sovereignty, pro tempore, and the lasting ideal value of a Sinica *tianxia* of singular sovereignty for the whole known world, *finis ultimus*. Whereas the United States has been adapting to and defending the evolving nation-state system

especially its post–Cold War version, the PRC is struggling between the reviving traditional ideas of *tianxia* and the practically beneficial but politically undesirable reality of the post–Cold War Westphalia.

Diverse and uncertain as it really is, Chinese conception of sovereignty and world order implies serious challenges to current world order and peace as the Chinese power and ambition grow, but it also promises intriguing opportunities for a peaceful rise of China under the deepening globalization of the post–Cold War world order.

This chapter traces and analyzes China’s past political experience and its conception of sovereignty and world order, an ideation framework that is historically constructed and still evolves. I will first present the Chinese legacy of singular sovereignty or world government, an imperial political order that governed much of the whole Chinese world as a united and centralized, albeit rarely complete, *tianxia* system for millennia till the mid-nineteenth century. I call it Qin-Han *tianxia* system or Qin-Han empire-world order, named after the two empires of Qin (221–207 BCE) and Han (202 BCE–9 CE and 25–220 CE) that lay down the foundation of Chinese political order and worldviews. This recurring system that maximizes the interest and power for the autocratic and aristocratic rulers has been deeply legitimized and popularized till present day.

The real Chinese experience with political governance and world order is much richer and more diverse than the singular linear chronology of dynasty-cycles of *tianxia* empire-world order presented in the Chinese official accounts of history. There was the Pre-Qin era (prior to the 3rd century BCE), under a world order akin to an uncoded Westphalia system, which gave the Chinese civilization its glorious ideological and cultural foundation. There was also the golden era of the Song (10th–13th centuries) that had a lasting, codified Westphalia-like world order for China. But the state-monopoly of the writing and teaching of history after the Song has discounted and dismissed those varieties and experiments, effectively constructed and enshrined the Qin-Han *tianxia* system as *the* Chinese political tradition and worldview.

This officially mandated “Chinese character” has shaped the Chinese mind and affected Chinese foreign policy. In the first half of the PRC, Mao Zedong renamed his *tianxia* pursuit with the imported phraseology of world communist revolution. Only repeated grand failures forced him and his successors to grudgingly stop “liberating the whole world.” Instead, Beijing has wisely and skillfully retreated to self-empowerment and diplomacy in an undesirable but unavoidable Westphalia system of international relations, for now. Consequently, the PRC has greatly moved away from the *tianxia* pursuit and into the existing Westphalia system. China has embraced a conformist and integrationist approach toward the current world order and has become a defender of (rather than merely accepting) the classic notion of national sovereignty and absolute independence and immunity of the state, and has increasingly participated in the post–Cold War version

of the Westphalia system. China's acceptance of the current world order is especially striking in economic arena, where it has become a champion of capitalism, albeit with strong mercantilist and statist flavors. Other than the vague aspiration of becoming a world-class power (*shijie qiangguo*) that many may interpret as to replace the United States, the PRC now promotes little ideological challenge.⁵ Beijing's repeated pledges of "peaceful development" further demonstrate China as an integrationist power rather than a revolutionary challenger by choice or by default.⁶

However, old ideas hardly die (especially in China) and the ruling autocratic CCP (Chinese Communist Party) has recently embarked on a strong effort of revitalizing and reusing old Chinese ideas to enhance its political legitimacy, symbolized by its massive effort to reenshrine Confucianism that it once sought to eliminate even physically. Past experiences and ideas now profoundly shape the path on which China moves forward. The deeply harbored and now reviving *tianxia* ideas have made many in the PRC to view the Westphalia system as an anomaly and a transitional phenomenon, very much like the "chaotic" and hence highly undesirable Warring States Era (5th–3rd centuries BCE).

In reality, the PRC has yet to become a full-fledged member of the post-Cold War world community by subscribing fully its values and rules and by shouldering proper shares of obligations. China has worked very creatively and effectively to pursue some of the most strikingly isolationist measures in the world today. Even the supposedly highly integrated cyber space has been carved into two along the PRC borders. Moreover, the track-record of Beijing's foreign policy leaves much to be desired in terms of long-term credibility and reliability: in the relatively short history of the PRC since 1949, Chinese foreign policy made U-turns several times, not to mention the great change in the past quarter century from promoting communist revolution anywhere to making capitalist deals with anyone. Beijing's integration into the international community and its embrace of the Westphalia system, therefore, remains selective and potentially reversible.

China: A State and a World

Chinese views about sovereignty and world order start with some geographic and ethnolinguistic peculiarities, and are shaped by the long experience of political life of China as a state and a world of itself.

The word "China" comes from the Qin (or *Chin*, 770–207 BCE), a feudal state of many in today's western China that became an empire and united the bulk of East Asian continent in 221 BCE. Conquering the Warring States with superior force and superb diplomacy, Qin created the basic mode and pattern of political governance for the subsequent Chinese rulers. However, the name "China" has nothing to do with the name Chinese people use today for their country in Chinese: *Zhong Guo*, which simply means "Centralia,"⁷ or Middle Country. To call China *Zhong Guo*

instead of the name of the ruling-dynasty (such as Tang or Qing) is a political decision made after the nineteenth century. The concept of Centralia, though, dates back to the pre-Qin era referring to the central of *tianxia* (the whole known world) on East Asian continent, which is physically isolated and insulated from the rest of the planet by the Pacific, Siberia, Gobi and Taklimakan, the Tibetan Plateau, and the malaria-infested tropical jungles. It describes the heartland of an agrarian civilization, mostly along the Yellow River and later also the Yangtze River. It is often used to call the location of the imperial court, wherever it may be.

This geo-historical isolation has led to significant predispositions affecting the Chinese worldviews. The world is often (or should be) united under one ruler as a singular *tianxia*. Other than limited maritime and overland explorations and scorned emigrations, the Chinese have been largely land-based and self-locked, with external threat and challenge almost always coming from the northern nomadic tribes on the harsh Asia Steppes that in fact did repeatedly invade, loot, conquer, and even rule the whole of China as the Central—sometimes for centuries like the Yuan and the Qing.

Unification and singularity of the Chinese world are reflected in and also strengthened by China's cultural and ethnolinguistic experiences. Repeated external invasions and influences, numerous conquering and rulings by the ungoverned "peripheral" nations who were first racially and linguistically alien, and the merges of many distinctive tribes, ethnicities, and races have constructed and transformed a shared linguistic and cultural common bond to make China a lasting, boiling at times, melting pot of many peoples and cultures over the millennia. The imperial *tianxia* government is instrumental in exerting the powerful assimilation over the many peoples in the Chinese world through the state control of education and sociomobility. Classic ideologies originated from the pre-Qin era became the foundation of the Chinese culture, of which Confucianism and Legalism have been the moral coating and the inner core of the Qin-Han *tianxia* political system. Were there no centralized imperial power to forcefully maintain it, the Chinese (Han) language and culture would have long ago evolved into several branches, making China more like Europe on the ethnolinguistic map.

Under a united world order, the Chinese not only accept rigid Confucian hierarchies among themselves, but they also tend to view the ungoverned "outsiders" as categorically different, mostly inferior. Yet, the melting-pot politics of the empire-world has maintained a strong tradition that if the "others" accept or succumb to the Central's rules and norms, they all could become and must become the one and the same under the singular, the "only," sociopolitical hierarchy for the whole known world. This ethnosocial duality and its inherent contradiction have constituted a major cornerstone for the peculiar Chinese worldview that rigidly ranks peoples and cultures but also practically enables cultural submissions and assimilations, often by force.⁸

A key factor that has contributed to the construction and preservation of the traditional *tianxia* conception of world order has been the paramount

role of history and the long state-monopoly of writing and teaching history. History is both a substitute for and an euphemism of the superior authority or deity that records and judges human behavior perpetually and eternally. To write history is the way to form and change memories and shape and alter worldviews and preferences. Therefore, “history” functions as the de facto national and state religion in the Chinese world. Inevitably, political rulers who are above all other restrictions and confines routinely try to censor, rewrite, distort, and falsify the records and the presentation of history in China.⁹

Reinterpreting or revising history for contemporary political purposes are neither rare nor exclusively Chinese.¹⁰ However, the kind of effort made by the imperial rulers in the Chinese world has been unparalleled as the state monopolizes history for the *whole* world, whereas the divided polity in the post-Rome European-Mediterranean World, by definition, has alternatives and external checks to mitigate and minimize the singular distortion of history. The lasting political motivation and spiritual needs have, therefore, combined to give China the world’s longest continuously kept historical records in the same written language, with the same principles and criterion, which started in the 5th century BCE when Confucius himself was credited for editing the history book of *The Annals*. State censorship and standardization peaked after the 8th century when writing history became the exclusive enterprise of the imperial court. Later, such as in the last dynasty of the Qing (1644–1911), nongovernmental keeping and writing of history were banned, by the death penalty at times, and the imperial state systematically destroyed the books it did not approve. The Chinese memory of the past and the Chinese worldview are therefore rooted in and shaped by such a singular, political construction of history.

Qin-Han *Tianxia* System: The Chinese World Order

In the 3rd century BCE, the Qin Kingdom succeeded in its grand “world unification” and created a “*tianxia yitong*” (all united under the heaven) empire-world order or a *tianxia* system. The new “world” government practiced one of the pre-Qin political ideologies, the Legalism for governance based on a centralized, hierarchical, and harsh use of force and fear. The emperor became the one and the only center of power and the ultimate legal and moral arbiter. As the son of heaven, his singular and personal sovereignty is from the heaven-father (literally *shangdi* or “the emperor above” or the God). In reality, the exclusive son-of-heaven sovereign status is always determined by wining brutal power politics. All imperial officials and bureaucrats are appointed top-down to govern the people at the pleasure of their superiors (ultimately the emperor). No political dissention and opposition are allowed nor are other political forces or uncontrolled socio-political and economic organizations or religious groups.¹¹

The concept of *tianxia* in China dates back to early pre-Qin era—a notion that the known world ought to be united under one single ruler, the

son of heaven, who provides stability and legitimacy for political order and governance for all. His sovereignty is absolute, singular, and indivisible. The best-known description of this concept is the famous verses from China's first collection of ancient poems (believed to be edited by Confucius in the 5th century BCE): "all land under the heaven belongs to the king, all people on the land are king's subjects."¹² Yet in the feudal and divided pre-Qin China, such a poetic ideal was often compromised and never fully implemented. Even its nominal existence declined to the point that the Zhou Son of Heaven, the "common ruler" of the feudal states, was reduced to be a small lord dependent on the goodwill of the much more powerful warring states for survival, very much like the Papal State in the Mediterranean World but with next-to-none religious power or moral authority. In 249 BCE, the Qin Kingdom simply abolished and annexed the tiny state of the Zhou Court.

The Qin Empire, the first real *tianxia* system for the Chinese world, was short-lived for only 13 years. It was far too imperfect a world government as it relied almost exclusively on a totalitarian control by harsh force,¹³ which, with the pre-industrial-age technology over a vast world, was hardly sustainable. In its place, the Han Empire tried royal-family feudal system and Taoist passive governance. Soon, Emperor Wu Di (156–87 BCE) fundamentally enhanced and improved the Qin *tianxia* system and its Legalist governance through establishing Confucianism as the main imperial ideology.

Thus, by the 1st century BCE, the Qin-Han empires firmly established an authoritarian political order for all subsequent Chinese rulers as a near-perfect form of governance and *the* political ideal. The long ruling of the vast Han Empire deeply legitimized the *tianxia* system of a Confucian-coated Legalist (Realist) singular sovereignty. The Sui-Tang (581–907 CE) empires later greatly perfected the system through key reforms (periodical land reallocation, a meritocracy of imperial exam system, and professional bureaucracy) to make it perhaps the best governance and political order an autocratic ruler could ever dream to have.

A worldwide mixing and melting of ethnolinguistic groups of the Chinese world continued ever since. When the Central collapsed, the many empires would have life-or-death competitions to regain the mandate of heaven to rule the whole *tianxia*—some were just in pretention and self-deception with practices of a bribery-like tributary (*chaogong*) practices of a symbolic empire-world order.¹⁴ The appeal and staying power of the Qin-Han *tianxia* system clearly transcend ethnical boundaries. When the Mongols conquered the whole Chinese world in 1271 and enslaved the entire Han nation,¹⁵ they simply created a Qin-Han style Sinicized Mongol empire-world order, the Yuan. Similarly, when the Manchu nation invaded and destroyed the last Han-Chinese empire, the Ming, it simply reestablished another non-Han Qin-Han *tianxia* world order of the Qing Empire. In fact, the great success of Qing's conquering and long rule made it a bonafide Chinese empire deeply attractive to the Han elites: A diligent and careful

Legalist ruler who worked hard to manage the empire and a well-tailored Confucian façade to pacify people effectively.¹⁶

The Qin-Han *tianxia* system of singular sovereignty is ideal for the rulers and ruling elite, representing an apex of human political order and governance. It is simple and effective, accumulates and centrally utilizes massive wealth and talents, delivers order and peace to a vast land for long periods, even with the incurable corruption of the officialdom, inept (even crazy) emperors, and constant rebellions. It provides the ruler with extraordinary staying power and super stable institutional continuity for the whole known world.¹⁷ Over time, the conception of *tianxia* world order has propelled just about all of the Chinese rulers and intellectuals toward the building of a singular and harmonious Qin-Han empire-world system, at the great expenses of human rights, social justice, technological innovation, and economic efficiency.

The life of the ordinary people in a Qin-Han world-empire is at best substandard and at worst hellish. The Qing, for example, was highly anti-intellectual and anti-human rights. The brutality of mind control reached a peak and the falsification of history was also unprecedentedly massive and meticulous. The arbitrary use of Legalist methods of violence and tricks and the constant indoctrination of the well-decorated Confucian humane rituals and slogans were both pushed to the extreme, creating a deep and extensive culture of hypocrisies and fakes that have lasted till this day. As a result of the imperial world order and the family-based Confucian values, the population grew steadily even at only a very low subsistence living standard and suffered periodical mass deaths due to the ever-present famine and violence. In desperation, people rebelled frequently, only to be put down in some of the cruelest ways imaginable.

The Non-*Tianxia* Experiences: The Pre-Qin and the Song

Other than the officially kept and promoted traditions, there are significant unorthodox ideas about sovereignty and world order that date back to the dawn of the recorded Chinese history. There are also profound and lengthy experiences of non-*tianxia* world orders in China as late as in the 14th century. Indeed, Chinese conception and practice of sovereignty and world order are much more colorful and diverse than the dull, singular official story of the often pretended Qin-Han *tianxia* system.

Official accounts that dominate the writing and education of Chinese history have traditionally asserted that the best times of the four-millennia old Chinese civilization are those under a mighty empire-world governance like the Han and the Tang when the whole known world is firmly united. In fact, the real golden eras in Chinese history have been the few centuries before Qin's unification of the Chinese world, and the Song Era when the Chinese departed from the Qin-Han *tianxia* system of empire-world order.

The pre-Qin era is a defining time for China from 685 BCE when Lord Huan Gong was crowned in the State of Qi and appointed Guang Zhong as his prime minister to start the Qi Hegemony to 241 BCE when the last joint resistance war against the Qin Kingdom by four sovereign states (Chu, Zhao, Wei, and Han) failed, opening the door for Qin to finally conquer all feudal states in the subsequent two decades. This 438-year era, started with more than 100 mutually autonomous “sovereign” states, exhibits key characteristics of Westphalia system-like international relations, indicating that it is both feasible and practical to have a non-*tianxia* world order in the Chinese world.¹⁸ It stands out as the most glorious and consequential era in Chinese history, by far the most creative time that clearly rivals the golden eras of the Hellenic World and the Roman World, suggesting that a Westphalia-like world order is also desirable to the Chinese. Almost all of China’s native ideologies and philosophies are from this period to form the foundation of Chinese civilization.¹⁹ In the following 2,300 years, there were no more major ideas to emerge from under the Qin-Han empire-world; other than some offshoots of the pre-Qin ideas, all “new” ideas were to be imported (from Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Marxism, nationalism, to modern sciences, capitalism, and democracy).

Despite the name of Warring States for the bulk of this era (indeed there were many wars), peace was by no means more lacking than in other periods. The average frequency of wars or major violent conflicts in China from 685 BCE to 1949 is 1.4 a year. It was 1.2 during the Warring States era, but 2.5, 2.1, and 1.6 during the three most recent runs of the Qin-Han *tianxia* system: the Yuan, Ming, and Qing.²⁰ The death toll and destruction of the international wars among the warring states were also lower than that of imperial, all-out civil wars or desperate rebellions during the later eras. Just one Taiping Rebellion in 1851–1864, for example, led to the unimaginable loss of 70–100 million lives (or one-fourth of the total Chinese population).²¹

Qin’s victory to end this uncoded Westphalia system in the Chinese world was a historical choice that resulted from human efforts and mishaps, not something necessarily inevitable.²² But Qin’s establishment of an empire-world created the precedence that, after the Han’s crucial reform, acquired an unshakable legitimacy in the Chinese world because of, chiefly, the extinguishment of alternatives and competition, and the maximum staying power and benefits the system generated for its rulers and elites.

Even more interesting to our understanding of China’s evolving conception of sovereignty and world order is the illuminating experience of the Song, a golden era that promised new path and new norms for the Chinese world but has been largely discounted and dismissed by the Chinese official history books.

Created by a bloodless coup in 960, the Song Dynasty was another Qin-Han empire in its structure. But its rulers never managed to unite the known world and then gave up, however grudgingly, the traditionally mandated *tianxia* pursuit. The Song, still needing to pretend to be a *tianxia* ruler,

had to, in reality, live with powerful “foreign” sovereign states in the same Chinese world. The Chinese for the first time actually departed legally and even ideologically from the *tianxia* system. Unable to crush the external competitors and unwilling to blindly militarize the country, the Song rulers choose diplomacy, cumulated in the Chanyuan Treaty (*Chanyuan Zhimeng*) of 1004 between the Song Empire and the competing Liao Empire that ruled much of northern China including today’s Beijing.²³

The Chanyuan Treaty for the first time granted a peer equal status to an external empire in the same known Chinese world—to have more than one sovereign sons-of-heaven who were mutually recognized and legitimized. A combination of annual tribute (only about 0.5 percent of Song’s annual tax revenue or about 5 percent of the annual military budget), ad hoc gifts and bribery, frequent diplomatic missions (over 300 in one century), demilitarized border, mutual extradition agreement, and favorable trade agreements brought lasting peace to the two Qin-Han empires in coexistence.

The Song also applied the spirit and even details of the Chanyuan Treaty in its dealings with other states in the Chinese world. As a result, it brought century-long peace and prosperity to the East Asian continent under an international system that contained several empires or kingdoms of varied sizes and power: the Song (mainly Han nation), the Liao (ruled by Qidan or Kitan nation but with large Han population), the Xi Xia (Dangxiang or Tangut nation), the Dali (Bai nation), the Tibetans, the Koreans, and later the Jin (ruled by Juchen nation). These states were more or less, however deferentially recorded by the *tianxia*-minded historians later, equal in their sovereignty with well-defined and well-maintained territorial boundaries. Diplomacy, trade, and, of course, wars maintained this system for generations. The accumulated knowledge and technology were dissimilated to far corners of the Chinese world; External, non-Han, technology and culture also deeply penetrated and affected the Centralia of the Yellow River and Yangtze valleys. The Song alone had 130 million people, the most populous country on the planet (about one-third of the humankind).²⁴ Its capital Kaifeng was a huge metropolis of millions of people, full of artists and musicians, hosting Arabic merchants, Southeast Asian businessmen, Japanese visitors and students, and Jewish settlers.

Unlike many truce or peace agreements before and since in Chinese history that were made as expedient and tactical plots and maneuvers, the Chanyuan Treaty was held for 121 years until 1125 when the Song rulers were tricked by the newly risen Jin Empire, to the north of the Liao Empire, to break it in the hope of eliminating Liao and gaining Liao’s land. History proved that was a fatal move that doomed both Liao and Song as the new Jin Empire quickly destroyed Liao and then devastated the Song by the next year.

The Song fled South to continue as the Southern Song (1127–1279) with only half of its former territory, but managed to keep the Chanyuan system through diplomacy with Jin and Xi Xia, earning itself lengthy survival and great prosperity despite its continued misfortune of incompetent

leadership. Even when faced with the invincible Mongol calvary that conquered much of the Eurasian continent, Song managed to fight the longest war (1235–1279) resisting the Mongols anywhere and was the last state succumbing to Mongol rule in Eurasia. Had not the Song rulers forgotten the historical lessons and once again destroyed the Chanyaun system by forming a tempting but only tactical alliance with the Mongols to eliminate the Jin Empire (which indeed had delivered the humiliating defeat to the Song one century earlier), the Mongol's final victory over the Song might have been delayed or even avoided. The Song, once again undermined the Chanyuan system for shortsighted objectives (and was also intoxicated by the ideal of *tianxia* pursuit), destroyed itself and brought an end to classic Chinese civilization.

Without a *tianxia* system of a singular son of heaven to rule the whole known world, Song's Chinese world had coexisting sovereign states. This unorthodox political order was a codified pre-Qin system, reduced wars and created unprecedented prosperity and progress, and became a golden era of Chinese civilization with unrivaled achievement in commerce, technology, and culture. It has been hailed as "the best era," the "highest peak" of Chinese civilization, the "most admired" and the "the most valuable" time of China, and "the highest achievement of Chinese culture ever."²⁵ Of the four best-known technologies from China, three were invented in this era,²⁶ a "Chinese Renaissance" in science and technology.²⁷ It is highly unfortunate for all peoples in the Chinese world, except for perhaps the Mongol conquers, that the Chanyuan Treaty, China's Westphalia Treaty only 600 years earlier, was a major turning point of political history that the Chinese eventually did not (or could not) follow through.

But this great golden era has been grossly discounted and dismissed by the subsequent imperial rulers and their court historians and educators till this day.²⁸ The Song rulers have been commonly described as spineless and unambitious, and its people corroded by excessively sumptuous lifestyle especially since the nineteenth century when the Han-Chinese started to form their own modern national identity in resisting foreign aggression as well as opposing the Manchu Qing Empire, the descendants of the Jin. The epical departure from the Qin-Han *tianxia* world order is too short to change history and mind.²⁹ The Westphalia system, on the contrary, had 1,000 years of de facto existence before its codification in the European-Mediterranean World. It still took the system another 300 years to gain a now seemingly unshakeable legitimacy.

The Modern Era: China Under the Westphalia System

The Chinese world order of the Qin-Han *tianxia* system came to a fatal clash with the expanding Westphalia system in the mid-nineteenth century. With the loss of millions of lives, nearly one-third of its vast territory, and a great deal of Chinese pride and self-esteem, the last Qin-Han *tianxia* empire-world of the Qing collapsed by 1912.

Like in the past cycles of Chinese political history, chaos, death, and destruction were accompanied by the rise of ambitious leaders and warlords contending for the mandate of heaven to rule the whole known world of China, which is now in fact only a part of the real world. The *Kuomintang* (Nationalist Party) regime of the ROC (Republic of China) under Chiang Kai-Shek almost reunited China by force and bribes in the mid-1930s. Then the Japanese Imperial Army invaded full-scale to mortally weaken the new China, which led directly to the takeover by the CCP to create the PRC in 1949. In fact, the militarist Japan was possessed by its own version of the Qin-Han style *tianxia* pursuit, the so-called *hakkō ichiu* (eight cords, one roof) idea of conquering and ruling the whole world.

The ROC is a Han nation-state that absorbed many imported ideas.³⁰ The vital external ties, especially American, and the exhausting struggle against the Japanese invasion and the Soviet subversion rendered the restoration of Qin-Han Empire futile, let alone a Qin-Han *tianxia*. Foreign-induced and foreign-imposed institutional and ideational changes nudged and pushed the ROC to give up the Qin-Han *tianxia* worldview and “joined the right side twice” during both world wars to finally enter the post-World War II Westphalia system led by the United States as one of the Big Five.³¹

The imposed Westphalia system forced the Chinese to see a much bigger real world that their rulers were simply unable to keep or assume away. Constant foreign influence has affected just about every aspect of Chinese life. All political forces and groups were under foreign influences and often directly financed by foreign sponsors. An unprecedented marketplace of ideas, mostly imported or cloned, developed in China. Mao Zedong himself, for example, went through (all imported) social Darwinist, nationalist, and near-anarchist ideas (calling for dividing China into 27 independent sovereign republics in 1920),³² to finally become a founding member of the CCP in 1921.

The CCP, a Chinese nationalist movement and a tool of subversion created by the former Soviet Union in the name of world communist revolution, grew native and strong during World War II under the leadership of Mao,³³ who was a shrewd Legalist practitioner of power politics. Mao’s successful peasant rebellion replaced the ROC with a “New China” (the PRC) that was in fact a leap backward, a new “son-of-heaven plus meritocratic bureaucracy” or a reincarnation of Qin-Han Empire with new trappings of the imported Marxism.³⁴ Mao, the self-proclaimed new Qin Shi Huang (the first Qin Emperor), instinctively knew the need to work toward a *tianxia* world order to preserve and govern his Qin-Han polity, and to realize his ambition for fame as the ruler of all under heaven. A “real” Qin-Han Empire can hardly be peaceful and content when there are other uncontrolled and undeniable sovereign powers in coexistence and competition. The Moscow-centered world communist revolution was first a great fit to Mao. The death of Stalin and the clumsiness of Nikita Khrushchev by the mid-1950s gave Mao the opportunity to dream of leading a world revolution to create a new Qin-Han *tianxia* under the banner of communism or

simply “the East Wind,” with him as the new leader, the exclusive “great savior of the people” as he was portrayed for decades.

However, Mao quickly realized that he was in fact very weak in comparison to the great powers beyond his control. The new emperor had little new ideas and only limited resources.³⁵ His theatric maneuvers to capture the whole “socialist camp” including the former Soviet Union (a technology and resource giant) failed with a costly Sino-Soviet split ten years after he signed an alliance treaty with Moscow. With a burning desire, Mao harshly fired up the economy to “catch up with the West” with little knowledge of modern science and economics. The mad campaign of the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961) collapsed, with the worst peacetime loss of human lives (over 30 million) in world history. His absurd push for world revolution and world leadership (and personal power), made “inevitable” by the inner logic of the Qin-Han *tianxia* mandate, soon led his regime and the country into the very dangerous position of opposing both superpowers by the late-1960s, with little more than a showy power of “people’s war” in the nuclear age.

Interestingly, the same West-dominated Westphalia system that blocked Tokyo’s effort of creating a Japanese *tianxia* in China earlier (hence saving China and empowering CCP) and then frustrated Mao’s *tianxia* dream, now worked to save Mao’s Qin-Han Empire. Thanks to the shrewd geopolitical realists in Washington who were eager to get out of the quagmire of Vietnam and gain an upper hand in the Cold War against Moscow, Mao and his successors survived their *tianxia*-building blunders and acquired a membership in the international community of sovereign states. The US shielding and the access to Western technology, capital, and market, at the expenses of forcing Beijing to abandon its ideological and treaty allies and comrades all over the world, saved and enriched the PRC. Beijing was subdued by the reality and grudgingly retreated to the safety of being just a sovereign state out of many, rather than struggling as a center or leader of world revolution, joining a US-led quasi alliance against Moscow.

After the Tiananmen uprising in 1989 and especially the ending of the Cold War in 1991, Beijing managed to continue its crucial access to world market despite the sharpened odds of political difference with the West. The CCP retreated further. Not only did Beijing give up any pretention of world revolution, it deliberately went low-key to follow Deng Xiaoping’s order of *taoguang yanghui* (laying low hiding and biding for time): “To keep low profile, be good at pretending and hiding, never take the lead, act out selectively, preserve ourselves, and gradually and quietly expand and develop.”³⁶ China made greater efforts to cooperate and integrate by opening more but selectively to the outside, culminating in it joining the World Trade Organization in 2001.

Thus the PRC went through its “natural” impulses of seeking a world revolution (for its traditionally believed “security” under a *tianxia* world order) to enduring great frustrations in its first 30 years of existence. Then it went realistic and pragmatic by accepting the rules of the current world

order. Its politically low-key foreign policy and extensive economic reform that allowed capitalism to roar very fortunately met with great cooperation from the West that has been in search for profit, power-balancing against Cold War enemies (and later international terrorists), or the reasonably persuasive goal of sociopolitically transforming China through trade, investment, and exchanges.

The rewards of integrationist moves have been extremely handsome. China has risen greatly over the past three decades to be a world-class economic power in terms of the size of GDP and the lucrative foreign trade. The PRC state has become a financial superpower at home and abroad. Thus, the tenacious Qin-Han polity of the PRC not only survived the post-Mao and post-Cold War cataclysms, but also emerged as a prominent world power in the making. Just like in the pre-Qin, the Song, and the ROC eras, today's China, once again just one sovereign state under the Westphalian world order rather than a singular sovereignty of empire-world, is not only prosperous but also secure.

Chinese Worldviews Today: Diverse and Statist

After three decades of integrating into the current world order, however selectively and reluctantly but nonetheless so far largely happily, many Chinese elites, often regionally based, have acquired new perspectives about current world order and enjoyed growing vested interests in it, especially economically.³⁷ Countless and complex flows of people and information have also brought many new ideas to China.³⁸

A rethinking about political order, governance, and sovereignty has grown since the 1980s. Under the general label of liberalism, many Chinese intellectuals including retired CCP-PRC officials have criticized the Qin-Han sociopolitical system. Absolute state sovereignty and immunity have also been questioned. Human rights, global community, and international institutions and norms are gaining popularity. The Qin-Han polity, rather than one leader (Mao), is viewed as the root cause of not only the disasters in the PRC, but also the long stagnation of the Chinese civilization and the many irrationalities and failures over the many centuries in the Chinese world. Sovereignty as a state right based on universal values of human rights, democracy, and rule of law and a sense of global community have become some of the influential ideas taking roots. Globalization, “universal values,” or “world perspectives” are increasingly competing with the Qin-Han political ideas, Sino-centric *tianxia* beliefs, and the classic Westphalia crude realism centered on power and power struggles among sovereign states.³⁹

The emergence of a real dynamic marketplace of ideas in China is still quite arduous. Many Chinese liberal and un-Qin-Han thinkers and writers are routinely excluded, harassed, marginalized, and even jailed by the government, exemplified by China's Nobel Peace Prize winner (2010) Liu Xiaobo who was sentenced to jail in 2009 for 11 years. Unlike in the past

of the imperial and even Mao eras, however, the PRC seems to no longer physically execute those dissenting critics.

Less confrontational but highly influential are the liberal-leaning scholars and officials who advocate integrationist views in nuanced and sophisticated language. China has become a “quasi status quo country.”⁴⁰ The current world order and even its American leadership are viewed fundamentally beneficial, even though the prevailing norms “have now moved from focusing on state sovereignty to emphasizing the principles of people’s sovereignty and democracy” thus complicated the life for the CCP-PRC.⁴¹ China should continue its post-Mao policy of peaceful rise to become a well-rounded great power, utilizing the opportunities and resources available but avoiding conflicts. It is wise to join in, rather than confront, the current world order and to play a bigger role of modification, even reconstruction in it, to “actively participate in the adjustment of international rules and norms,” as argued by the PRC foreign minister in 2008.⁴² The key to China’s long-term security and prosperity actually lies in China’s internal (political) reform and development. The future of China has already become inseparable from the fate of the global community as they face the same social, economic, and ecological problems. China’s grand strategy should be to increasingly play a “global role” so as to best address China’s core interests of sovereignty, security, and development simultaneously yet peacefully and constructively.⁴³

Due to their positions in and connections to the government, these scholars and officials often use coded words and delicate writings to convey their liberal views but rather openly call for more embracing of the post-Cold War world order so to have a win-win “convergence and community of shared interests” with the West.⁴⁴ Premier Wen Jiabao openly wrote that China should also take ownership of the “universal” values and concepts of democracy and human rights albeit giving them new meanings so to avoid becoming an international outcast.⁴⁵

On the spectrum of ideas, there is also the argument for hegemonic power struggle. The West is viewed as having “deeply structural and institutional” conflicts with China, and Washington has been working to strangle Beijing. China should thus strive by all means to overpower the United States and to accomplish a new round of power transition.⁴⁶ “To reform and replace the unfair, irrational, and unequal world order” with a “new world order” of justice, certainty, and harmony is the mission for the rising China.⁴⁷ More sophisticated theorists argue that China could successfully rise up under the Westphalia system to win its inevitable “zero-sum game” against the United States by utilizing Western ideas and technology including democracy as a new kind of superpower.⁴⁸ If it is not the current world order’s fault, clearly it is the problem of the current leadership, which is waiting to be grabbed by the better and stronger China in due time.

At the same time, the powerful tradition and ideation of imperial politics are reviving. In fact, wrapped under imported nationalism and Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, old Chinese ideas have always been there. Precisely

because of the development of a diverse spectrum of ideas and its political implication, the CCP has been working hard in recent years to restrengthen its traditional control of the Chinese mind. The officially declared ideology of the CCP has become an expedient patchwork that resulted from the poverty and bankruptcy of ideas and the ad hoc compromises, as enshrined in the CCP charter.⁴⁹ Like the many rulers before who fully appreciated the utility and benefits of the Qin-Han Confucian-Legalist polity, the CCP has now gone backwards to resuscitate traditional Chinese ideas, in the name of “rejuvenating Chinese civilization” and upholding “Chinese characters.” Consequently, the current Chinese views on sovereignty and world order are powerfully influenced and even redefined by a statist and manufactured dichotomy of “the universal world” versus “the special China.”⁵⁰

Rejuvenation of the *Tianxia* Ideas

Amid the rise of Confucian-coated Legalist ideas, the *tianxia* conception has made a strong rearticulation in China. A representative work is that by Zhao Tingyang, a Beijing-based philosopher. He describes a Chinese worldview of *tianxia* that “is entirely different from” and opposing to the dominant Western worldview of nation-states that imply national sovereignty, competition, and balance of power. The rise of China simply provides the appropriate opportunity and the needed resources and evidence for the advancement and implementation of this idea all over the world.⁵¹

Zhao presents a highly Sino-centric view of the world with conscious effort to make it “universal” but labors hard to separate this idea from Kantian ideas of “cosmopolitan commonwealth” and perpetual peace under a “federation of free (sovereign) states.”⁵² He dismisses Kantian ideas as only a simplistic liner thinking with “irreconcilable incompatibility” between laws enshrining individual rights/interests and a worldwide “harmonious” political order. Zhao argues that the *tianxia* idea emphasizes the oneness, all-inclusiveness, unity, centrality, and totality of the whole world. It advocates a singular sociopolitical system and thought-system as well as a set of values and norms that should cover and govern the whole world uniformly to ensure order, harmony, and maximize “world interests” and “world rights” rather than the inherently divisive and conflicting individual human and group/sub-unit/nation-state rights and interests. The optimal hierarchy of political priority should be *tianxia* (the world) -> country/nation -> family; not the current, undesirable order of individuals -> community -> country/nation. *Tianxia* is further elaborated to treat the “whole land of the world” and oceans as the “common property of all”; the people of the world as a whole with a “general heart” and “general will”; and “a world institution” for order and governance that is the opposite of the chaotic, conflicting, and divided polity under the Westphalia system. Such a *tianxia* worldview is the precondition for a new, better, more harmonious, and rational world order. As China’s fundamental contribution to the world, the *tianxia* idea will help

to reorganize, reorder, and transform the whole world from a “bad world” to a “good world.” In short, the ancient Chinese “idea of *tianxia* can be viewed as the prelude of a perfect world institution, it allows (us) to move forward to manage the whole world and achieve *tianxia* (order), or to retreat to (at least) safe-keep China in a chaotic world.”⁵³

Similarly, a self-anointed hermit-scholar and noted voice of neo-Confucianism calls for a dreamily superior *wangdao* (king’s way or a restored ideal *tianxia* system under a Confucian, benevolent son of heaven) as the “Chinese way of governance” and order to remake and replace, in China and the whole world, the “unethical Western” governance and order of democracy based on “inferior ways” of social contract, rule of law, and individual rights. The history record edited by Confucius, *The Annals*, is viewed as the “Grand Charter” and “eternal law” for all human political activities.⁵⁴

Many take the *tianxia* idea as a viable and superior alternative to the Westphalia world order and a better way of life. Some Chinese anthropologists and sociologists argue that the *tianxia* idea represents a cosmological view that offers a great model of inclusiveness and tolerance to be appreciated in a world experiencing conflict-prone globalization.⁵⁵ Some PRC political historians discuss the *tianxia* idea in connection with a reexamination of the Chinese empire-world order of “tributary system.”⁵⁶ Others argue for reintroducing the *tianxia* idea with more emphasis on Sino-centric and Sino-unique values based on Han-Chinese nationalism and active defenses of the Qin-Han *tianxia* systems practiced in the past. Both “Old Left” and “New Left” populists have turned to openly advocating for unchecked and unlimited sovereign power for the CCP-PRC state, in the name of rejuvenating Chinese civilization.⁵⁷

The resurgence of the *tianxia* idea has also colored the discourse about foreign policy and world politics. Foreign policy analysts have presented the rejuvenated *tianxia* idea as a legit alternative to and powerful critique of the dominant Westphalia world order.⁵⁸ A *tianxia* world system is viewed as idealist, based primarily on hierarchical order of authority derived from righteousness, rituals, and differentials, not based on power and sovereignty-equality, thus separating the Chinese view of world order from the “Western” Westphalian view and provides a much-needed valuable vision to help formulate a new and harmonious world order, despite that the idea does denote structured hierarchy and inequality of individual sub-units and thus will be in conflict with the currently dominant worldviews valuing national equality, independence, and sovereignty.⁵⁹

Influential authors have further repopularized a Sino-centric *tianxia* idea and its implied “inevitable civilizational showdown with the West,” as a general puts it in his version of “going West,” a geostrategic blueprint for capturing the “world island” of Eurasia and then competing with the “American Empire.” He interestingly prescribes Western democracy as a good way to develop China’s power and world leadership.⁶⁰ A best-seller glorifies civilizational confrontations and race/ethnic conflicts, with overt

praises for brutal force and wolf-like wild spirit of predators as the way to rejuvenate the glories of the Han, Tang, Yuan, and Qing so as to remodel China and the world.⁶¹ Others unsobly prescribe a new Qin-Han Legalist recipe for the PRC.⁶² China ought to repeat the success of the Qin—"to establish a new clean world modeled after Chinese ways and laws" that are the (superior and invincible) "way of the heaven versus the West's acting out of the (disastrous and undesirable) way of humans."⁶³

Criticisms of the resurgence of the *tianxia* idea, however, have already emerged in the PRC, calling it "an interesting and perhaps exceedingly beautiful utopia."⁶⁴ Liberal thinkers have started to warn that a populist PRC statism, as a mutated Qin-Han authoritarianism, would lead the Chinese nation into catastrophes just like the Nazi and Militarist statisms did before in Germany and Japan.⁶⁵

Non-PRC critiques have scathingly pointed out that the rejuvenation of the *tianxia* idea amounts to promoting the notion that the whole world should be united and governed like an orderly and harmonious family with layers and ranks under one centralized ruler, a benevolent dictator rather than rule of law. It pretentiously repackages the long stagnation and despotism under the Chinese world order before thenineteenth century as China's alternative to the Westphalia system.⁶⁶ The resurgence of the *tianxia* utopia in the PRC has revealed much about what a rising Chinese power might do to the existing world order. It is an official party line to portray and praise the current Chinese governance and politics as harmonious and superior, thus enhancing "China's soft power as a source of a universally valid model of world politics." It fuels the international debate about clashes of civilizations and arouses fears and worries about the rise of China. It "shows that there is a thirst in China for 'Chinese solutions' to world problems, and a hunger for nationalist solutions to global issues, especially when they promote a patriotic form of cosmopolitanism." And "tianxia presents... a new hegemony where imperial China's hierarchical governance is up-dated for the twenty-first century."⁶⁷

The Chinese Conception and Its Policy Implications

The Qin-Han Confucian-Legalist empire-world order, with its many refinements, long lasted in the Chinese world for strong reasons: It repeatedly proved itself as a superior even ideal governing structure for the aristocratic and autocratic rulers in terms of effectiveness and resilience. The fact that for most part of the past two millennia the whole known Chinese world was more or less, sometimes mainly perceived and pretended, united under one *tianxia* order has made it appear to have no alternative, no external competition, and no realistic exit. The grand departures from that world order such as the Song Era and the Chinese history since the nineteenth century have been systematically distorted and dismissed by the official history books in China.

To many Chinese, the Qin-Han *tianxia* system thus represents penetrating wisdom about governance, sovereignty, and world order—an essence of the much-treasured “Chineseness.” It yields political efficacy and long periods of “world” peace and stability, contributing to the growth of the world’s largest ethnolinguistic population, the Han. The *tianxia* idea was thus time-formed and time-tested, always *the* choice for Chinese rulers, Han or non-Han, until the mid-nineteenth century when powerful external forces started to end the Chinese world order. Still, the ROC (1911–) and the PRC (1949–) rulers have all “naturally” gravitated toward a restoration of a Qin-Han *tianxia*. The ineffective ROC effort failed to sustain a Qin-Han polity and it eventually generated peacefully the first non-Qin-Han Chinese political system in Taiwan: a democracy with freedom of speech and human rights under the rule of law. Whether the PRC will also depart from the Qin-Han *tianxia* politics remains an epic but uncertain question.

In reality, the Qin-Han political system, especially when it achieves a *tianxia* world order, has been thoroughly repressive and stagnating. It is fundamentally incompatible with market economy, equitable human rights and civil rights, and rule of law. It is highly antagonistic to invention and innovation, discouraging explorations of new land, seas, and knowledge. The system inevitably has costly cyclical implosions and collapses resulting in mass deaths and destructions. Only external forces can force it to change, hence all Qin-Han *tianxia* rulers seek to preclude, control, or exclude “external” competition and alternatives—only natural barriers such as oceans and mountains and the limit of their forces could stop a Qin-Han empire from following its destiny of trying to conquer or convert the whole known world. Or it must expensively and uncomfortably keep (or assume) away the competitive, ungoverned, and ungovernable world in order to survive.

For the past century and a half, China has been forced and induced to change chiefly by external forces and ideas. China has been brutalized yet salvaged, struggling and prospering under the Westphalia system. Rising from the ruins of the Qing *tianxia* order, the Chinese have accomplished a great deal of nation-building and state-building under the Westphalian world order. The grand Chinese transformation has now elevated China to the rank of a great power, although not quite the center of the whole world yet. Increasingly many Chinese have enjoyed the experience and now believe in the Westphalia system while developing growing vested interests in it.

However, China’s success of national security and prosperity under the Westphalia system has now been powerfully used for a rejuvenation of the *tianxia* ideas that question fundamentally the post-Cold War Westphalia system. This is partially due to the revival of Chinese traditional “mandate of heaven” now wrapped in rising national confidence and patriotism, but mostly caused by the state monopoly of history-writing and education for the political purpose of safeguarding a Qin-Han style autocratic regime, which can only find its peace as a *tianxia* system or has to

creatively, however hard and pretentiously, assume or keep the real world away. Realism-leaning scholars who believe the Westphalia system but advance power struggles for a new Chinese hegemony also tend to quickly slip over to advocating an “alternative” Chinese world order and falling back on the Qin-Han *tianxia* ideas. Thus a basically content, integrationist China is incongruously experiencing powerful surges of the *tianxia* norms, amid alternative ideas. China now literally struggles between *tianxia* and Westphalia.

As a result, there now seems to be profound disjointedness in Chinese foreign policy about the current world order. Officially since the 1980s, the PRC has been “anti-hegemon” for a multipolar world to protect an absolute national sovereignty sanctioned by the Westphalia system. Beijing argues for a more equal and “harmonious” world, so long as the sovereign PRC state is the player, rather than the Chinese people individually or self-organized. Meanwhile, many PRC elites view the post-Cold War Westphalia system transitional, suboptimal, and undesirable, which should be reformed and replaced somehow someday—China just has to wait and work hard for its day to reorder and perfect the world. Persistent and growing liberal and globalist voices and actions have to often take political covers or face political repressions and societal hostilities.

Greatly rewarded and secured as a nation, China thus often tends to paradoxically take the current world order as abnormal—a “New Warring States” era that is conflict-filled and threatening.⁶⁸ Of course, a key reason for such a mismatch between preferences and reality is that the CCP-PRC regime’s political interests are not exactly in good union with China’s national interests. The Chinese people, including many elites, now have growing stakes in the current world order. But they have yet to seriously debate and meaningfully decide on whether the PRC is the same as China and whether the government represents the Chinese people or chiefly advances itself. Whether such debate and discourse can take place timely before politically motivated *tianxia* worldviews take full charge in Beijing has enormous insinuations for world peace.

While the United States carries a dualist view of sovereignty and acutely feels and reacts to the global balance of power so as to preserve the current world order with implied modifications and evolution, China’s is a different struggle with basically three strategic options: it could further assimilate and integrate to help uphold the post-Cold War Westphalia system as a weightier but content stakeholder; it could actively seek to replace the United States as the new world leader under a Pax-Sinica hegemony but still preserve the Westphalia system, however un-Western; it could also use its new power concertedly and patiently to forge a new world order of singular sovereignty (or world government) resembling that of a Chinese *tianxia* system.⁶⁹ These are three uncertain but integral acts for the same purpose of safeguarding Beijing’s Qin-Han style polity in the era of globalization. The first option appears most uncomfortable to PRC leaders as long as they refuse to politically reform internally. The second and third options are

likely to deteriorate US-China relationship with the latter threatening the current world order..

Yet, the Chinese conception of *tianxia* displays an intriguing silver lining: it offers real possibilities for the post-Cold War world order to peacefully incorporate the rising Chinese power. The actual Chinese experience of political governance and world order is rich and diverse, allowing ample room traditionally and conceptually for China to move from *tianxia* to Westphalia, as it has done so rewardingly before in the Song Era and over the past century, if the Chinese press and education could be open and free.⁷⁰ The Chinese *tianxia* conception of singular sovereignty of world governance, if striped off its Confucian-coated Legalist Qin-Han autocratic polity and its imbedded Han-Chinese ethnocentrism and chauvinism, implies a racially and ethnically blind globalism, which could smoothen a Chinese peaceful acceptance of the prevailing, universal rules and norms of our time.⁷¹ Instead of a Qin-Han *tianxia* of an empire-world order, the whole known world this time may share a “neo-*tianxia*-ism,”⁷² based on democracy, human rights, and rule of law. Such a new world order could very well become acceptable and even desirable to a reformed new Chinese leadership.

For the time being, however, calculated expediency rather than grand strategy probably describes Beijing’s foreign policy the best. In practice, there is little sign for an all-out Chinese effort to repeat the Qin Kingdom’s grand mandate of heaven to unite the whole known world. Beijing’s official strategy is still “peaceful development” and “laying low,” as the leading motivation of Chinese foreign policy remains to be trouble-avoidance for the regime’s self-preservation through economic growth.⁷³ Predictably shunning alliances, multilateral and transnational institutions, and collective security as many have described so in this volume, Beijing has nonetheless joined many international organizations. The deeply held resentment and unhappiness about the politically destabilizing Western values and norms associated with the post-Cold War Westphalia system manifest in Beijing’s anti-hegemon exertions to fend off the ungoverned and ungovernable and its construction of a Chinese world rather than seeking the control of the whole world.

Beijing still seems to want the Westphalia system that protects a fearful regime in the name of national sovereignty despite its growing power and self-confidence, but it does not advocate a systemic revision of the world order, just yet. China’s opposition to the responsibility to intervene is thus fully expected and likely to continue.⁷⁴ The rising China may have already been perceived as a real and “chief” threat to the power and world leadership position of the United States,⁷⁵ and the bilateral relationship is poised to endure more hardship.⁷⁶ Yet even an intensified Sino-US rivalry could be just a familiar game of international competition the world has known for many centuries. Managed well, such a competition could still be reasonably virtuous without necessarily becoming an all-out confrontation of systemic challenge like the Cold War or worse.

In the long run, given China's resilient tradition of the *tianxia* ideation, its currently diverse and fluid but powerfully state-led worldviews, its mighty rise of power, its transitional economic and social structures, and its tenaciously Qin-Han autocratic polity, what will emerge as China's guiding strategy remains an open question suggesting great challenges but also intriguing opportunities. The pivotal choice seems to be whether the world would repeat the political history of the Chinese world in the past or China would leave behind its mold of Qin-Han politics for good.

Notes

For valuable comments and revision suggestions, I want to thank the coeditors, fellow chapter authors, and the participants of the international workshop "U.S., China and Visions of World Order" held at Princeton University in April 2012.

1. Jeffrey Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). Please see the chapter by Michael Mastanduno in this volume.
2. David Shambaugh "Coping with a Conflicted China," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2011): 7–27.
3. Chapters by Stewart Patrick and Jianwei Wang in this volume.
4. Chapter by Jeffery Legro in this volume.
5. To be sure, the CCP still enshrines that "the highest ideal and the ultimate objective of the Party is to realize Communism" (*CCP Party Charter*. Beijing, 2007), however hollow that may ring in today's PRC even among the 80 million plus CCP members.
6. G. John Ikenberry, "The Future of Liberal World Order," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90, No. 3 (May/June 2011): 57.
7. I am indebted to Thomas Bartlett for using this term.
8. Chen Shangsheng, ed., *Rujia ernming yu zhongguo chuantong duiwai guanxi* (Confucian civilization and China's traditional foreign relations) (Jinan: Shandong University Press, 2008), 12–15.
9. Ann Anagnost, *National Past-Times: Narrative, Representation, and Power in Modern China* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books, 1997). David Scott, *China and the International System, 1840–1949: Power, Presence, and Perceptions in a Century of Humiliation* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2008).
10. Homi K. Bhabha, ed., *Nation and Narration* (London: Routledge, 1990).
11. Burton Watson, *Basic Writings of Mo Tzu, Hsün Tzu, and Han Fei Tzu* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).
12. Confucius et al., eds., *Shijing-Xiaoya-Beishan zhishi* (*Books of Odes-Xiaoya-Decade of Northern Hill*) (Beijing: High Education Press, 2010 [5th century BCE]).
13. At its beginning, a Qin-style governance often would resemble totalitarianism (Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* [New York: Schocken Books, 1951]), but would usually quickly become a more sustainable governance of aristocratic authoritarianism.
14. The practice of tributary started with the Han Empire and was used by many subsequent *tianxia* rulers to symbolically rule the remote peoples in East, Southeast, and Central Asia. Ying-Shi Yu, *Trade and Expansion in Han China* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1967).

15. The Mongol executions and destructions were so great that many later think classic Chinese civilization was forever lost, the so-called *yashan zhihou, zaiwu zhonghua* (No more China after the Yashan Battle of 1279 when the Song army was finally annihilated by the Mongol army mostly staffed actually by Han-Chinese). Zhou Liangxiao and Gu Juying, *Yuandai shi* (History of Yuan) (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Press, 1993). Preface. Huang Zongxi, *Mingyi daifang lu-Yuanfa* (Mingyi Notes-On Law) (Hangzhou: Guji Press, [1666] 1985).
16. The Manchu had only three million people originally yet conquered and ruled the Han nation of about 200 million for nearly three centuries. Ge Jianxiong/Cao Shuji, *Zhongguo renkou shi* (Chinese demographic history), Vol. 4, *Ming shiqi* (Ming Era), (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2000). Ge Jianxiong, "Tan fudan ban zhongguo renkoushi" (On the Fudan edition of Chinese demographic history), *Wenhui dushu zhoubao*, February 26, 2009, Shanghai.
17. John King Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973). Wang Gungwu, *Tianxia and Empire: External Chinese Perspectives, Inaugural Tsai Lecture* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2006). Lucian W. Pye, *Spirit of Chinese Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).
18. Yan Xuetong et al., *Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). Chen Shangsheng ed., *Rujia ernming yu zhongguo chuantong duiwai guanxi* (Confucian civilization and China's traditional foreign relations) (Jinan: Shandong University Press, 2008).
19. Fung Yu-Lan, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy* (New York: Free Press, 1997).
20. Editing Team, *Zhongguo lidai zhanzheng nianbiao* (Time table of wars in Chinese history) (Beijing: PLA Press, [1985] 2003).
21. Ge Jianxiong and Cao Shuji, *Zhongguo renkou shi* (Chinese demographic history), Vol. 5, *Qing shiqi* (The era of Qing) (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2001).
22. Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, *War & State Formation In Ancient China & Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
23. For the basics of this treaty, see Zhang Xiqing et al., *Chanyuan zhimeng xinlun* (New study on Chanyuan Treaty) (Shanghai: Shanghai Remin Press, 2007).
24. Ge Jianxiong and Wu Songdi, *Zhongguo renkou shi* (Chinese demographic history), Vol. 3, *Liao Song Jin Yuan shiqi* (Era of Liao, Song, Jin, and Yuan) (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2000).
25. Chen Yingque "Zeng Jiang Bingnan xu" (Preface to Jiang Bingnan's), in *Chen Yingque Wenji* (Works of Chen Yingque) (Shanghai: Guji Press, [1981] 1997). Deng Guangming, *Songshi shiguanzhi kaozheng* (Study of bureaucracy in Song history), in *Deng Guangming quanji* (Complete works of Deng Guangming), Vol. 11 (Shijiazhuang: Hebei Jiaoyu Press, 1995 [1943]).
26. Gunpowder, the compass, and block printing. Song also invented the world's first paper money, used petroleum, dissected human body, made fine porcelain, and employed mechanical devices.
27. Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilisation in China*, Vol. 1 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1954). Jacques Gernet, *A History of Chinese Civilization* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
28. Yuan Zhipeng, "Shangyuan zhimeng yanjiu sulun" (Review the study of Shangyuan treaty), *Hengshui xueyuan xuebao* (Journal of Hengshui college), Vol. 12-13, (June 2010): 67-70.
29. Jiang Fucong, "Shangyuan zhimeng de yanjiu" (Study on Shangyuan treaty), *Songshi yanjiu ji* (Studies of Song history), No.2 (1963): 54.

30. The *Sanmin Zhuyi* (San-min doctrine) by the Western-educated father of ROC, Dr. Sun Yet-Sen. Sun Yet-Sen, *Sanmin zhuyi* (San-min doctrine) (Guangzhou: KMT Central Committee, 1924).
31. Qin Hui, “Minzu zhuyi de shijian: zhongguo zhanqilai liao de licheng” (Practice of nationalism: history of China’s standing up), *Nanfang zhoumu* (Southern weekend), Guangzhou, January 19 and February 2, 2012.
32. Mao Zedong, “Hunan jianshi de genben wenti-hunan gongheguo” (Key to the construction of Hunan-Republic of Hunan), *Dagong bao* (Dagong daily), Changsha, September 3, 1920.
33. Kerry Brown, *Friends and Enemies: The Past, Present and Future of the Communist Party of China* (London and New York: Anthem Press, 2009). The creation of the CCP is now being recast as “the beginning of the great revival” of the Chinese nation/civilization as depicted by the English title of a major propaganda movie celebrating the CCP’s 90th birthday in 2011.
34. Fei-Ling Wang, *Institutions and Institutional Change in China: Premodernity and Modernization* (London and New York: Macmillan Press and St Martin’s Press, 1998). Yuan Jian, *Zhongguo: qiji de huanghun* (China: The end of a miracle) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Wenhua Yishu Press, 2008), p. 155. Ross Terrill: *The New Chinese Empire: And What It Means for the United States* (New York: Basic Books, 2004).
35. Mao sighed in 1955 that he could never relax until his country “finally catches up and surpasses the United States” (as the world’s top power). Zhang Yihe, *Shun changjiang, shuiliu canyue* (Waning moon over the Yangtze river) (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.8.
36. Leng Rong et al., eds., *Deng Xiaoping nianpu* (Chronicles of Deng Xiaoping), Vol. 2 (Beijing: Central Documents Press, 2004), p. 1346. Jiang Zemin, *Jiang Zemin wenxuan* (Selected works of Jiang Zemin) (Beijing: Renmin Press, 2006), p. 202.
37. Chapters by Weixing Hu and Yang Yao in this volume.
38. Su Changhe, “Heyue, guojia lilun yu shijia zhixu” (Contract, theory of the state, and world order), *Guoji wenti luntan* (Forum on international issues), No. 47 (Summer 2007): 128–143.
39. Qin Xiao, Commencement Speech at Tshingua University’s Business School, July 19, 2010. Mao Yushi, “Yi shijie lichang chongsu zhongguo daguo diwei” (To remake China’s great power status with world perspectives), *Financial Times*, -Online in Chinese, February 1, 2012.
40. Peng Zhongyi, “Zhongguo zai shijie zhixu zhong de canyu, shouyi, he yingxiang” (China’s participation, benefits, and influence in world order), *Shijie zhengzhi yu jingji* (World politics and economy), No. 3 (2007).
41. Zhang Xiaoming, “The Rise of China and the change of international norms” (Zhongguo de jueqi yu guoji guifan de bianqian), *Waijiao pinglun* (Diplomatic review), No. 1 (2011).
42. Yang Jiechi, “2007 nian guoji xingshi yu zhongguo waijiao gongzuo” (International situations in 2007 and China’s diplomacy work), *Qiushi* (Seeking truth), No. 1 (January 1): 2008.
43. Wang Jisi, Essays on aisixiang.com, including “Zhongguo de guoji dingwei wenti” (On China’s position in the world), Beijing, September 17, 2011, and “Bawo zhen-shi de shijie” (To understand the real world), Beijing, October 21, 2011. Wang Jisi, “Dangdai shijie zhengzhi fazhan qushi yu zhongguo de quanqiu jiaose” (Trends of contemporary world politics and China’s global role), *Beijing daxue xuebao* (Journal of Peking University), No. 1 (2009): 11–14; “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way,” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April, 2011.

44. Zheng Bijian, "Guanyu liyi huihedian he liyi gongtongti de rugan sikao" (Some thoughts on "converging points of interests and community of interests"), keynote speech at the 2012 *Global Times* Annual Conference, Beijing, December 17, 2011.
45. Wen Jiabao, "Guanyu shehui zhuyi chuji jiaduan de lishi renwu he woguo duiwai zhengce de jige wenti" (Historical missions of the early stage of socialism and a few issues of our foreign policy), *Renmin Ribao* (*People's daily*), Beijing, February 27, 2007.
46. Yuan Peng, "Zhongguo yu xifang de jinzheng shi shen cengci de" (Sino-Western rivalry is deeply structured), the 2012 *Global Times* Annual Conference, Beijing, December 17, 2011.
47. Ni Shixiong and Zhao Shuguang, "Guoji xingshi de bianhua yu shijia zhixu de chongjian" (Changes of international situations and the reconstruction of world order), *Jilin University Journal*, No. 1 (2010); Wang Shuang, "Pingheng, ronghe yur yingdao—shixi xion shijie zhixu chongjian zhong zhongguo de zuoyong" (Balancing, merging, and leading—on China's role in the reconstruction of a new world order), *Dangdai Yatai*, No. 2 (2011).
48. Yan Xuetong et al., *Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 99–100 and 219.
49. *Preamble of the CCP Charter*, Beijing, 2007.
50. Xiang Biao, "Xunzhao yige xin shijie" (Looking for a new world), *Kaifang shidai* (*Opening era*) No. 9 (2009); Xu Jilin, "Pushi wenming haishi zhongguo jiazhi?" (Universal civilization or Chinese values), *Asixiang.com*, June 4, 2010.
51. Zhao Tingyang, *Tianxia tixi: shijie zhidu zhixue daolun* (*Tianxia system: a philosophical discourse on a world institution*) (Nanjing: Jiangsu Education Press, 2005), esp. 17 and 23.
52. Immanuel Kant, *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View* (1784) and *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1795).
53. Tingyang, *Tianxia tixi*, i–25 and 123–124.
54. Jiang Qing, "Wangdao zhengzhi shi dangjin zhongguo zhengzhi de fazhan fangxiang" (Wangdao politics is the direction of Chinese politics today), in Jing Haifeng ed., *Chuangxing ji* (*Collection of firewood*) (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2004). *Zhengzhi ruxue* (*Political Confucianism*) (Beijing: Sanlian Press, 2003). *Zailun zhengzhi ruxue* (Another treatise on political Confucianism) (Shanghai: Huadong Shida Press, 2011). "Wo suo lijie de ruxue" (Confucianism as I understand it), *Rujia Zhongguo* (*Confucian China*), September 11, 2004.
55. Wang Mingming, "Tianxia zuowei shijie tushi" (Tianxia as a model of the world), *Niandu xueshu* 2004 (*Annual academics* 2004) (Beijing, Renmin University Press, 2004). Zhao Xuedong, "Shijiexing, sihai yijia, tianxia datong (Cosmopolitanism, the four-seas as one family and the great commonness), *Dushu* (*Reading*), No. 12 (2003). He Xinhua, "Tianxia guan: yizhong goujianshijie zhixu de quyuxing jingyan" (*Tianxia* idea: a regional experience for constructing international order), *Ershiyi shiji* (21st century) No. 32 (2004).
56. Zhang Feng, "Rethinking the 'Tribute System': Broadening the Conceptual Horizon of Historical East Asian Politics," *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 2–4 (2009).
57. Li Zhaojie, "Traditional Chinese World Order," *Chinese Journal of International Law*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2002); Xue Lishan, "Wang Hui Gang Yang yuanshi guojia zhuyi zhe" (Wanghui Ganyang are statist after all), *Kaifang*, No. 4 (2011).
58. Qin Yaqing ed., *Guoji zhixu* (*International order*) (Beijing, New World Press, 2007). Qin Yaqing, "Guoji gaunxi lilun zhongguo pai xingcheng de keneng he biran" (Chinese school of international relations theory: possibility and necessity), *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi* (*World economy and politics*), No. 3 (2006).

59. Qin Yaqing, "Quanqiu shiye zhong de guoji zhixu" (International order in a global vision), preface to Qin Yaqing ed., *Guoji zhixu (International order)* (Beijing: New World Press, 2007). Zhou Fangyin, "Zhongguo de shijie zhixu lilun yu guoji zhiren" (China's understanding of the world order and international responsibility), *Guoji jingji pinglun (International economic review)* No. 3 (2011).
60. Liu Yazhou, *Xibu lun (Treatise on the West)*, 2004. Excepts in *Fenghuang zhoukan (Phoenix weekly)*, Hong Kong, August 5, 2010.
61. Jiang Rong, *Lang tuteng (Wolf totem)* (Wuhan: Changjiang Wenyi Press, 2004) 378–401.
62. Pan Wei, *Fazhi yu mixin-yige fazhi zhuyizhe yanzhong de zhongguo xiandaihua yu shijie zhixu* (Rule by law and superstition of democracy: a legalist view of Chinese modernization and world order) (Hong Kong: Shehui Kexue Press, 2003).
63. Qu Yuzhong, *Daofa zhongguo: 21 shiji zhonghua wenming de fuxing* (Ways and laws of China: the rejuvenation of Chinese civilization in the twenty-first century) (Beijing: Central Bianyi Press, 2008) and *Zhongguo zhengjiu shijie: yingdui renlei weiji de zhongguo wenhua* (China saves the world: Chinese culture deals with the crisis of the humanity) (Beijing: Central Bianyi Press, 2010).
64. Zhang Shuguang, "Tianxia lilun he shijie zhidu" (Tianxia theory and world order), *Zhongguo shuping (Chinese book review)*, Beijing, No 2 (October 2006); Feng Zhang, "The Tianxia System: World Order in a Chinese Utopia," *Global Asia*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (January 2010): 112.
65. Xu Jilin, "Jin shinian lai zhongguo guojia zhuyi sichao zhi pipan" (A critique of the surge of Chinese statism in the last ten years), *Aisixiang.com*, July 6, 2011.
66. Fei-Ling Wang, "Heading off fears of a resurgent China," *International Herald Tribune*, April 21, 2006.
67. William A. Callahan, "Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony?" *International Studies Review*, No. 10 (2008): 749–761, 759.
68. To call the Westphalia system a "new Warring States era" is not new in China. See, for example, the noted anti-Communist and statist writer and politician Chen Qitian, "Xianqin fajia de guojialun" (Pre-Qin legalist view on the state) *Guolun (On state)*, No. 8 (1935). Recently, this perception is being popularized in China. For example, Wang Jian and Qiao Liang et al., *Xin zhanguo shidai* (New Warring States era) (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 2004). Cheng Yawen, "Xin zhanguo shidai yu zhongguo waijiaoxuan xuanze" (New Warring States era and China's diplomatic choices), *Huanqiu* (Global) Beijing: Xinhua, October, 2004.
69. Yu Xilai, "Shijie zhixu de sanzong jiegou" (Three structures of world order), *Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and management)*, No. 2 (1998). William A Callahan, *China: The Pessoptimist Nation* (Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 2010).
70. Increasing number of Chinese scholars such as Qin Hui, Gao Hua, Wu Si, Yang Jisheng, and Yang Kuisong have already impressively started the endeavor of critically reexamining Chinese history books.
71. Peter J. Katzenstein ed., *Sinicization and the Rise of China: Civilizational Processes Beyond East and West* (London: Routledge, 2012). In fact, Mencius described long ago the ideal political value of "people first, country second, monarchy third"—a human/civil rights-based sovereignty. *Mencius-Jin Xin Shang*, (Shandong: Renmin Press, 2009 [4th century BCE]).
72. Huang Xiaofeng and Ding Xiongfei, "Xu Jilin tan xin tianxia zhuyi" (Xu Jilin on neo-tianxia-ism), *Dongfang zaobao (Oriental morning news)*, Shanghai, January 14, 2012.
73. Fei-Ling Wang, "Preservation, Prosperity, and Power: The Motives behind China's Foreign Policy," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 14, No. 45 (November 2005): 669–694. At the 2012 *Global Times* Annual Conference of "World Change, China Strategy" in Beijing, other than a few militant PLA officers, the three dozen

speakers (leading officials, scholars, and analysts) all basically spoke the need of continuing “lying low” and “strengthening ourselves,” although many of them have already called for assertively “acting out selectively” with varied set of demands and actions. December 17, 2011.

74. This explains, for example, why Beijing joined Russia to veto the popular UN Security Council resolution on Syria’s internal humanitarian crisis on February 4, 2012.
75. James Clapper, director of National Intelligence, the top US intelligence official, testified so before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC: US Senate, March 10, 2011.
76. Please see the chapters in this volume by Dan Drenzer, Michael Mastanduno, and John Owen.

Part II

Collective Security and the United Nations

The United States, the United Nations, and Collective Security: Exploring the Deep Sources of American Conduct

Stewart Patrick

Introduction

Analysts of US policy toward the United Nations confront an immediate paradox. No country has a greater claim to paternity of the world's premier collective security organization, has invested more resources in it, or has sought so frequently to marshal its coercive capabilities to defend international peace. And yet, few nations have harbored as many misgivings about the UN's global role or sought so vigorously to defend themselves from perceived UN incursions on their own prerogatives.

America's ambivalent and selective approach to collective security derives not simply from the massive power of the United States and its pursuit of material self-interest, but from the ideational and societal phenomena that the editors of this book label "basket three." The category encompasses historical legacies, identity commitments, enduring beliefs, lessons learned, and domestic institutions. As they have over the past century, these variables continue to influence how US officials perceive (and come to terms with) American power, how they define US national interests, and select and justify their policy preferences. It is this interpenetration of power, interests, identity, ideas, and institutions that explains both the enduring attraction to collective security as a basis for world order and US resistance to being bound by its implied or perceived constraints—as well as the turbulence in US-UN relations in the post-Cold War era. This distinctive US attitude toward the United Nations may also complicate US-Chinese cooperation within the world body as the twenty-first century proceeds.

This chapter first explains the wellsprings of US attitudes toward collective security. It then examines how these factors influenced US foreign

policy debates—particularly about the benefits of isolationism versus internationalism, and unilateralism versus multilateralism—between the nation’s founding and the beginning of the Cold War. This historical review analyzes the debate over the League of Nations; the US embrace of security multilateralism and sponsorship of the United Nations during World War II; and the shift in the early Cold War from collective security to collective defense, a posture the United States would maintain for the next 40 years.

The chapter then briefly examines oscillations in US policy toward the United Nations in the first two post-Cold War decades, showing how various basket three variables influenced the “new world order” vision of George H. W. Bush, the “assertive multilateralism” of William Jefferson Clinton, the unilateral reassertion of George W. Bush, and then the multilateral restoration under Barack Obama. The chapter closes with reflections on the implications of these basket three variables for Sino-American relations, particularly with respect to the United Nations and broader multilateral security cooperation.

Wellsprings of US Conduct: Power, Identity, Historical Lessons, and Domestic Institutions

For the past century, US attitudes toward collective security have reflected a complex interplay among four variables: contemporary perceptions of relative US power; enduring convictions about America’s exceptional global role; evolving beliefs about the requirements of US national security; and shifting relations between the executive and Congress. These material, normative, ideational, and institutional factors have influenced official US national interest calculations and policy preferences regarding multilateral cooperation.

Power

All countries resist encroachments on their freedom of action. But rule-based cooperation—based on principles of equal treatment and self-restraint—is generally thought to be more attractive to smaller countries, since it constrains greater powers and provides the weak with diplomatic leverage, which is lacking in conventional bilateral negotiations and frameworks. Collective security, by contrast, should be less compelling for a globally dominant power like the United States, which possesses extensive unilateral, bilateral, and “mini-lateral” options, as well as a plausible justification to be exempt from constraints binding on others in fulfilling its self-perceived role as the custodian of world order. And indeed, insistence on freedom of action is a venerable American tradition. During debates over the League, opponents of the draft Covenant rejected any “automatic” commitment to defend the independence and territorial integrity of other countries, while insisting on the right to act alone in the Western Hemisphere under the Monroe Doctrine. Seventy years later, the abrupt end of the Cold War and

the advent of a fleeting “unipolar moment” made the United States even more sensitive to external constraints.

And yet as this chapter’s historical review suggests, perceived national power has been an uncertain predictor of US multilateral security cooperation. Indeed, the American republic pursued a unilateralist and insular posture for a century after its founding, when it was relatively weak. By contrast, it championed the creation of the United Nations during World War II, when it became clear it would emerge as the world’s most powerful nation, and once again embraced the United Nations during the early post-Cold War years, when it stood triumphant as the world’s sole superpower. Therefore, we need to look well beyond the US power position to understand US attitudes toward multilateral security cooperation.

Identity

Liberal identity commitments have long shaped how US decision makers define the nation’s foreign policies, design strategies, and justify these choices at home and abroad.¹ For, contrary to what rational-choice theory suggests, states do not respond simply to the *logic of consequences* to maximize their expected utility in the pursuit of given, consistently ordered preferences. States also respond to the *logic of appropriateness*, adopting behaviors consistent with their understanding of what is a proper role according to their identity.²

A nation’s foreign policy preferences are shaped, at least in part, by the dominant, socially constructed sense of collective purpose that permeates that society.³ Within the United States, an “absolute and uncritical attachment” to Lockean liberalism has long helped define US national identity. The elements of this founding creed, enumerated in the Declaration of Independence and the US Constitution, include constitutional liberty, representative government, the rule of law, freedom of speech and religion, private property, commercial liberty, and equality of opportunity. This liberal dogma is so taken for granted that it has become synonymous with the “American way of life.”⁴

The tight grasp of Lockean liberalism on the US national psyche underpins the tradition of American exceptionalism—a pervasive faith in the uniqueness, universality, and superiority of the country’s founding political values, democratic institutions, and constitutional traditions. US conservatives and liberals alike have consistently embraced the doctrine of exceptionalism, disagreeing only about its implications for America’s global role. Conservative nationalists have often invoked it to insulate the United States from international commitments and protect US sovereignty.⁵ Progressive idealists, meanwhile, have used it to justify exporting American values.

Indeed, the most distinctive aspect of American hegemony has been its liberal nature. The administration of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, given unprecedented opportunities to recast world order, drew heavily on American liberalism in designing a world based on multilateral institutions.

An illiberal nation would have likely forged a very different world order after 1945—organized not around multilateral security and economic institutions (including the United Nations), but rather around great power spheres of influence, imperial systems, and exclusive economic blocs.

Lessons of Experience

Conventional rational choice theory assumes that only power and wealth define interests, but national interests are neither objective nor self-evident. They are “concepts and therefore ideas.”⁶ Thus, they are susceptible to transformation—even abrupt change—in response to new experiences. The lessons of experience have repeatedly inspired changes in US public opinion and official calculations about multilateralism.⁷

Until World War I, the reigning orthodoxy held that the United States could best preserve its national security by pursuing a detached, unilateral global posture in political-military affairs. Woodrow Wilson challenged this orthodoxy in advocating the League of Nations, but after his failure, the nation retreated into insularity. The litany of disasters that followed—including the world’s descent into depression, the march of fascist aggression, and the outbreak of a second devastating global conflagration—discredited American isolationism and unilateralism, resulting in the triumph of liberal internationalism. US plans for the United Nations and postwar multilateral institutions to govern the global economy reflected hard-won understandings about the institutional requirements for global peace and prosperity.

The United Nations, alas, never enjoyed a golden age envisioned by the postwar planners. As the world fractured into two, the United States abandoned the vision of universal collective security, adopting a strategy of collective defense of a narrower, free world community.⁸ With a few exceptions, such as the Korean War and the Congo Crisis of 1960–1964, the United Nations was essentially marginalized from the paramount security crises of the day.

The end of the Cold War generated a new period of euphoria for the United Nations, which began a period of unprecedented activism, notably in the field of peacekeeping. At the same time, the ensuing two decades—and particularly the events of September 11, 2001—revealed the UN’s limitations.

Domestic Institutions

The fourth major factor in explaining US ambivalence toward collective security is the unique constitutional structure of the United States, and specifically the separation of powers. Although the president enjoys considerable leeway in the conduct of foreign affairs, Congress retains impressive powers over the purse (in terms of appropriations and overall budget approval); over treaties (given its advice and consent prerogatives); and in conducting oversight, (including hearings and investigations).

This independent legislative role—absent in parliamentary democracies—provides Congress with multiple avenues to shape US policy toward, and indeed membership in and commitments to, multilateral institutions. This is particularly true when it comes to international treaties, the ratification of which requires a two-thirds supermajority in the Senate. From the Senate's failure to pass the Treaty of Versailles (including the League Covenant) to its rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 80 years later, Congress has frequently vetoed obligations favored by the White House.

While the competition between executive and legislature can provide creative tension, it can also complicate the US commitment to credible multilateralism. This is especially challenging for international partners, who negotiate with the president, but recognize that his word is not final.⁹

Executive-legislative bargaining over US multilateral commitments have been most fraught in highly charged political environments, particularly when different branches are controlled by different parties (as in 1919–1920 and the mid-1990s). They have been smoothest when a single party controls both branches or, as in the 1940s, executive and legislative officials nurture bipartisan comity—in contrast to the toxic partisanship that has dominated Capitol Hill in the early twenty-first century.

The Founding Legacy

From the republic's establishment through the early twentieth century, unilateralism dominated US foreign and security policy. This meant avoiding entanglements abroad and preserving untrammelled sovereignty at home. This posture reflected a combination of strategic calculation and political culture.

US leaders recognized America's relative weakness vis-à-vis the European powers and feared foreign meddling might endanger its fragile internal liberties. As early as 1775, John Adams warned that "We should be the sport of European intrigues and politics."¹⁰ His fellow revolutionaries worried that outsiders would exploit America's sectional differences and centrifugal forces, causing the loose confederation of former colonies to disintegrate.¹¹ These concerns provided one impetus for replacing the weak Articles of Confederation (1781) with a federal Constitution (1787), according new powers to the federal government in diplomacy, national defense, and commerce. Still, political authority remained decentralized until the Civil War. This early experience with constructing a federal state to balance order and liberty would offer inspiration and a model for twentieth-century US efforts to recast the world along multilateral lines.¹²

American political culture reinforced the early US preference for non-entanglement in foreign affairs. The founding generation regarded the United States as a unique political community founded on liberal principles and authority vested in the people. It seemed only proper that it

should adopt a global role distinct from the corrupt and warlike Old World monarchies.¹³

On both idealist and strategic grounds, therefore, the early United States set a unilateral, at times isolationist course. The trade-dependent nation insisted on nondiscrimination rather than mercantilist rules that denied equal treatment to US exports, but, consistent with Washington's Farewell Address, it rejected "permanent alliances." America's fortuitous geographic position made detachment a viable strategy.¹⁴ Thomas Jefferson reaffirmed this stance in his first inaugural address: "Peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none."¹⁵

Still, early US statesmen embraced the "law of nations" as the foundation of world order. Article VI of the Constitution recognized international treaties as the "supreme Law of the Land." Americans also understood the special value for a weak nation of international law that emphasized "right" rather than might.¹⁶ Nor did nonentanglement prohibit acquiring territory through negotiation, conquest, or purchase—as of Louisiana (1803), which doubled the nation's size. But the republic avoided alliances and institutional commitments to protect its national experiment from foreign invasion or contagion. Even when it abandoned neutrality in 1812, it did so to vindicate a principle: the defense of neutral rights.

For most of the nineteenth century, US national security policy remained isolationist with a unilateralist thrust. The motives were partly "Jeffersonian"—meant to preserve US liberties while serving as "a standing monument and example." But they were also "Jacksonian"—calculated to preserve national sovereignty, while retaining the freedom to lash out unilaterally, with "don't tread on me" ferocity, if provoked.¹⁷ Abroad, the United States maintained open trade but avoided participation in the global balance of power. Closer to home, it moved toward continental dominion and then regional hegemony.

In 1823 President James Monroe extended the range of US unilateralism. Responding to rebellions in Latin American colonies, he declared the Western Hemisphere off-limits to new European colonies, prohibited the transfer of existing colonies, and insisted that imperial rule not be reimposed where it had been thrown off. Still, US leaders disavowed intervention to support democracy—on the grounds that liberty must be earned. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams explained in 1821, America "is the well-wisher of the freedom and independence of all...the champion only of her own."¹⁸

As US power and confidence swelled, American officials invoked the Monroe Doctrine as sword as well as shield, to rebuff European meddling and also to expand their continental domination through the annexation of Texas, war with Mexico, territorial adjustments with Britain, and the purchase of Alaska from Russia. By the 1890s, the Monroe Doctrine had evolved into an assertion that the Western Hemisphere was a US preserve. In 1895, Secretary of State Richard Olney declared: "Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent."¹⁹

In 1898 the United States became a global power in fact, by defeating Spain in both the Atlantic and Pacific. In its first and only foray into formal imperialism, the nation acquired the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico, as well as a Cuban protectorate. The next year, Secretary of State John Hay issued his Open Door note on China, insisting that the imperial powers preserve that country's territorial integrity and open their concessions there to trade and investment on equal terms. An interesting hybrid, the policy signified at once a unilateral extension of the Monroe Doctrine to Asia and a multilateral vision of an open economic order in which all, in principle, could benefit.

The Great Debate over the League of Nations

America's rise to power presaged a momentous domestic debate over the US role in the world. By the early 1900s, three schools of US foreign policy had emerged: great power internationalism, liberal internationalism, and isolationism. The debate culminated in the titanic struggle over the proposed League of Nations—with all sides invoking American exceptionalism. Ultimately, the rival internationalisms canceled each other, permitting the temporary interwar ascendancy of isolationism.

Isolationists favored a structure of peace that kept the United States in splendid isolation, with occasional recourse to unilateralism to protect US sovereignty. They were impatient with globalism, regarding extra-hemispheric events as none of America's business, and they held a classically Jeffersonian attitude toward self-determination and democracy: the United States should inspire others, rather than remake the world in its own image. Finally, isolationists abhorred militarism and imperialism.

Great power internationalism implied upholding the balance of power while maintaining US freedom of action. Theodore Roosevelt, both as president and thereafter, was its most forceful voice. He insisted that the United States maintain order in its natural US sphere of influence in the Caribbean Basin, and participate in the global balance of power by joining great power councils and building military capacity to project power abroad. During the League debate, great power internationalists focused on the creation of a postwar concert among the victorious great powers, rather than a more comprehensive collective security organization, as the basis for a stable peace. Such an arrangement would permit collective management of major issues, while preserving the Monroe Doctrine and US diplomatic flexibility.

Liberal internationalism, meanwhile, expounded most prominently by Woodrow Wilson, envisioned US leadership in a new collective security arrangement, grounded in international law. This vision emphasized the indivisibility of peace, defended by a "universal association" of nations. As Wilson explained, this would not be "a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized, common peace."²⁰

Audaciously, he linked his proposal to US diplomatic tradition, promising to make the Monroe Doctrine the “doctrine of the world,” so that “no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people.” Wilson’s offered his most sweeping blueprint for peace in the Fourteen Points (January 1918), the last of which called for “a general association of nations” to defend political independence and the territorial integrity of great and small states alike.²¹

Wilson’s thinking about world order was grounded in assumptions, drawn from US domestic experiences, about the interrelationship among democracy, commercial liberty, and peace. Collective security could work only if a majority of states (and all great powers) were self-determining democracies, if they enjoyed nondiscriminatory access to markets and resources, and if formal institutions governed political, security, and economic relations among nations. Moreover, countries must be prepared to cede some freedom of action and even sovereignty.

Opposition was strong. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R-MA) dismissed Wilson’s vision of a global Monroe Doctrine, retorting, “If we have the Monroe Doctrine everywhere, we may be perfectly certain that it will not exist anywhere.” Great power internationalists were particularly troubled by Article 10 of the League Covenant, which included a sweeping commitment to guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of *all* countries, regardless of their location or importance to the United States. But Wilson was adamant that diluting Article 10 would reduce the League to a “debating society.” Republicans objected that Article 10 implied an automatic commitment to respond militarily—an extreme interpretation, since Article 5 required Council unanimity for any enforcement action, giving the United States a veto. Moreover, Article 10 clearly considered military action just one possible response. Still, Lodge declared that the “tremendous promise” to guarantee the independence of every nation would repudiate America’s historic freedom of action, entangle the country in military adventures, and trample Congress’s constitutional prerogatives. Philander K. Knox, GOP senator (and former secretary of state), dismissed Wilson’s League as “a world State or . . . a catalogue of unnatural self-restraints.”²²

Any collective security system must strike a balance between the principle of equal treatment and the necessity to accord special privileges to those shouldering disproportionate burdens. Wilson’s draft Covenant envisioned a League Assembly, where all nations would enjoy equal representation. But it vested primary responsibility for peace in a League Council, composed of five permanent members (the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States) and four rotating ones. The Covenant also envisioned an arbitration system, as well as mechanisms to deter and respond to aggression.

The League fight in the United States is often framed as a straightforward clash pitting utopian progressive reformers against cynical practitioners of *realpolitik*.²³ But this conventional narrative obscures the moral unanimity of the US participants. All considered the United States predestined to

bring about a more just and peaceful world. Their disagreement centered on means to advance both its *real* and *ideal* means. The League's champions had no "monopoly on idealism," Lodge noted. "Our first ideal is our country... We would not have our country's vigor exhausted or her moral force abated, by everlasting meddling and muddling in every quarrel, great and small, which affects the world."²⁴

Furthermore, the League fight was also a partisan-tinged struggle between executive and legislative branches to define the terms of US global engagement. Wilson exacerbated this dilemma by treating the League—and foreign policy in general—as a sphere of exclusive executive competence. Rather than nurturing bipartisanship, moreover, he made a starkly partisan appeal for the League prior to the November 1918 midterm elections. This backfired when the GOP won narrow control of the Senate and increased its margin in the House. Finally, Wilson omitted prominent Republicans on the delegation to the Paris Peace Conference that drafted the Covenant.

In the end, Wilson's unwillingness to compromise on his vision of collective security, by accommodating concerns of great power internationalists, led the Senate to reject the League Covenant. On July 10, 1919, he presented the draft Versailles Treaty, including the Covenant, to the Senate for its advice and consent. Defiant Republicans depicted the League as a threat to US sovereignty. A more effective America's strategy, said Knox, should be "to reserve complete liberty of action either independently or in conjunction with other powers in taking such steps as we determine wise for preserving the peace."²⁵ On October 24, 1919, Lodge offered his own 14 reservations to League membership, designed to "release us from obligations which might not be kept, and to preserve rights which ought not to be infringed."²⁶ The Senate approved 12 reservations on November 17. Wilson then instructed League supporters to vote against the Versailles Treaty with Lodge reservations, which they did on November 19, sending it to defeat. The treaty suffered the same fate on second and final ratification vote four months later.

America in Isolation

The ironic outcome of the League fight was that isolationists, though few in number, triumphed because the two versions of internationalism negated each another.

America's postwar retreat limited foreign political and security entanglements. However, leaders would still pursue economic nationalism.²⁷ The administrations of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover supported cooperation in matters of trade, finance, cultural exchange, and humanitarian assistance. What they resisted was any responsibility for ensuring stability in Europe. Isolationist sentiment was strongest in Congress, where it attracted a number of progressive idealists opposed to imperialism, militarism, and alliances. It stemmed from the belief that events outside the

Western Hemisphere, even the collapse of the European balance of power, would have minimal impact on US national security.

Coolidge captured this sentiment of splendid isolation in his fourth annual message to Congress, on December 7, 1926: "We have no traditional enemies... We have no possessions that are coveted by others; they have none that are coveted by us. Our borders are unfortified. We fear no one; no one fears us."²⁸ Fifteen years later to the day, Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor would shatter these assumptions.

To be sure, Republican administrations from 1921 to 1933 did not entirely ignore international peace and security. During 1921–1922, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes hosted the Washington Naval Conference, a multilateral negotiation culminating in the most serious international arms control agreement to date (though they lacked enforcement mechanisms). In 1928, Washington also cosponsored the Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing aggressive war. It proved enormously popular at home and abroad, winning overwhelming Senate support and attracting the signatures of 62 countries (though critics derided it as a purely symbolic and empty gesture).

The League of Nations, meanwhile, suffered from weaknesses inherent in collective security, which requires participants to treat peace as indivisible and oppose aggression regardless of the identities of the aggressor and aggrieved. In practice, states take action depending on the perceived stakes, interests, and risks. Beyond this generic dilemma, the League lacked universal membership. With steadfast US support, the League might have deterred more aggression and mediated major crises in the 1930s. Compounding America's absence, other major powers also stood apart, undercutting its legitimacy and effectiveness. The League's fatal shortcoming was its lack of effective peace enforcement measures. These became glaring during the 1930s, as it confronted revisionist demands from Germany, Italy, Japan, Hungary, and the Soviet Union.

As peace deteriorated in Asia and Europe, the United States neither shored up the balance of power nor reinvigorated collective security. Domestically, isolationist sentiment rose dramatically. The prevailing view held that distant developments little affected US interests and that neutrality best protected US security. Economic difficulties during the Depression reinforced isolationism, particularly after the United States enacted protectionist measures and other nations responded in kind.

Running for president in 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt was cautious, repudiating the objective of joining the League of Nations. From 1933–1937 his administration was on the defensive, fighting a rearguard action against isolationist measures emanating from Capitol Hill—to little avail. The Neutrality Act of 1935 prohibited the sale or transfer of arms to *all* belligerents, regardless of the cause of war or identities of combatants. Isolationist ranks swelled as the League failed to curb Japanese aggression in China or Nazi Germany's rearmament. FDR's instinct to intervene, demonstrated by his "Quarantine" speech of October 5, 1937—calling on peace-loving peoples to stem an "epidemic of world lawlessness"—generated a domestic uproar.

The ground began to shift in mid-1938, as Axis aggression undermined isolationism's central premise. Far from protecting the nation, isolationism had actually hastened global economic fragmentation, exacerbated political instability, and brought threats closer to US shores. Growing numbers of elite and ordinary Americans agreed that rejecting the League had been a mistake. Domestic debate intensified following the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939. Although the immediate public response was to take refuge in isolation, the fall of France in June 1940 shocked the US polity. The presidential campaign of 1940 hinted at a changing tide when the GOP nominated the internationalist Wendell Willkie. FDR handily defeated him, and used his maneuvering room to launch the Lend Lease program, to assist Great Britain, in particular, in its struggle against the Axis powers. And well before the United States entered World War II, the Roosevelt administration began planning for a new international peace and security organization. The next section explains this startling turnaround.

Explaining US Liberal Internationalism

Few developments shaped twentieth-century world politics as fundamentally as the two major foreign policy pivots between 1940 and 1950. First, during World War II, the country abandoned isolationism to embrace internationalism and multilateral cooperation. Second, responding to the onset of the Cold War, it adopted a policy of containment, deferring its One World ambitions to defend a more circumscribed Free World community.

There was nothing inevitable about postwar US multilateralism. The United States could have established a hemispheric sphere of influence; pursued relentless unilateralism; imposed unequal bilateral arrangements on weaker states; or resurrected the classical multipolar balance of power. Instead, it promoted international institutions to advance common security and legitimate its leadership. Neither this choice nor the persistence of this orientation during the Cold War can be attributed solely (or even primarily) to the distribution of global power (as realists contend) or to the enlightened self-interest of a hegemonic state. Rather, a combination of enduring US political culture and the lessons of recent cataclysmic events shaped calculations of interest and policy preferences of US decision makers.

At first glance, the US turn to multilateralism seems counterintuitive. After all, such an egalitarian orientation risked reducing US diplomatic leverage and maneuvering room, entangling the United States in international institutions on which others could free ride, and creating a situation in which others might make rules for the United States itself. Despite these potential costs, rational choice theorists contend, multilateralism was the best strategy for a hegemonic country embroiled in a bipolar confrontation and seeking to "lock in" the advantages of its (presumably transient) dominance.²⁹ First, multilateralism allowed the United States to share burdens, responsibilities, and risks, and thus achieve goals otherwise unreachable or achievable only at great cost. Second, multilateral institutions reduced

the transaction costs of multiple bilateral arrangements, making it easier to consult, share information, resolve differences, coordinate action, and monitor and enforce compliance. Third, the Cold War gave Washington a geopolitical incentive to pursue multilateralism, since it helped cement the Free World coalition.³⁰ Finally, by treating weaker states as partners rather than subordinates the United States transformed its ephemeral dominance into legitimate leadership, reducing the likelihood that disgruntled rising powers might one day seek to overturn the US-sponsored order.³¹

These standard accounts are compelling but incomplete. First, the value of multilateralism depends on the challenge, the number of relevant actors, and the availability of other policy instruments. Accordingly, one might have predicted heavier US reliance on unilateral action, bilateralism, and ad hoc coalitions. Nor can bipolarity explain the US commitment to multilateralism, which *antedated* the Cold War. Finally, the argument ignores that relative US power changed as much between 1900 and 1919 as between 1919 and 1945, and yet the United States turned to isolationism after World War I. At the very least, one must account for the time lag in the US embrace of multilateral security cooperation.

The fundamental problem is the assumption that US multilateralism can be deduced simply from the country's dominant power position and strategic environment. The corollary is that *any* country in similar circumstances would have behaved the same way. In fact, alternative hegemons would likely have pursued quite different visions for world order and leadership styles. The Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, militarist Japan, or even imperial Great Britain would have undoubtedly ordered the world differently if they possessed such unrivaled power after World War II.³² Multilateralism appealed to FDR and senior officials in his administration because it was consistent with American principles—and promised to recreate abroad an open “American” polity. Given the opportunity, US officials sought to remake the world in their own image, and thus “Lockeanize a hitherto Hobbesian world.”³³ Administration officials believed that only a universal system of collective security, backed by US power, would both resonate with domestic political values and preserve the postwar peace.

The actual *timing* of US policy shifts toward multilateralism derived from recent lessons. The searing experiences of the Great Depression and World War II eroded the intellectual and political underpinnings of economic nationalism and isolationism.³⁴ The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor dealt the final blow. It convinced the Roosevelt administration, most members of Congress, and the general public that national security and prosperity demanded new international institutions for political and economic cooperation backed by military power to ensure global stability. In sum, a combination of enduring American ideals and new ideas shaped how US officials calculated national interests and preferences.

The objective of US policy was to create an *open world*—a rule-based global order in which peace-loving countries could cooperate. American officials believed that such a world would rest on three pillars:

collective security, economic multilateralism, and political self-determination. Balances of power, spheres of influence, and secret alliances would give way to a universal organization for peace and security, grounded in international law and supervised by a concert of great powers. Disastrous policies of economic nationalism, bilateralism, and imperial preference would yield to a liberal, nondiscriminatory system of trade and payments in which all countries would engage in commerce on equal terms. A world of empires would evolve into one of self-governing nations.

To realize this vision, the Roosevelt and Truman administrations had to overcome longstanding domestic ambivalence toward international cooperation. They needed also to persuade political elites and the public that US interests were best served by cooperation with others and that US global leadership embodied—rather than contradicted—American exceptionalism. Simultaneously, the United States had to win support from overseas partners through persuasion, material inducements, and efforts to legitimate its global dominance. Compromises would be required at both levels.

Planning the Postwar World

Beginning with the 1941 Atlantic Charter, the Roosevelt administration championed an open postwar world based on principles of liberal internationalism, including sovereign equality, self-determination and self-government, collective security and international law, and equal commercial rights. These statements projected outward the liberal values governing American political life, including equal treatment under the law, self-restraint, and peaceful cooperation. They also reflected lessons drawn from recent disasters: the slaughter of the Great War, the inconclusive peace, the worldwide depression, and political factors that dragged countries into a second, even more destructive global conflagration.

Once engaged in the war, the United States expanded its war aims well beyond the defeat of the Axis to recast world politics. Administration officials were determined not to repeat the 1918–1919 mistakes, when—as Sumner Welles said—the United States had won the war but “made no effort to win the peace.”³⁵ By creating and embedding the United States within standing multilateral institutions, they hoped to forge a stable, open community of nations amenable to collective undertakings. Just as the framers of the US Constitution had sought a more perfect union among the 13 original states, postwar planners designed new multilateral institutions to encourage sustained cooperation among independent countries. American principles—including rule of law, sovereign equality, equal treatment, and checks and balances—would guide the new global institutions.³⁶ This project of global reform also derived from America’s New Deal experience, with domestic regulatory agencies serving as a model for new multilateral organizations.³⁷

The most momentous wartime deliberations concerned international peace and security. Roosevelt believed that a postwar security organization,

open to all countries but dominated by the great powers, was “the only device that could keep the United States from slipping back into isolationism.”³⁸ Significantly, FDR rejected alternative approaches. Americans, he knew, had an instinctive aversion to the balance of power, regarding it as immoral and a recipe for recurrent conflict. Explicit spheres of influence were similarly objectionable, being contrary to self-determination and redolent of imperial despotism, economic exclusivity, and unending rivalry. Standing alliances, similarly, were anathema, dividing the world into camps and widening the scope and intensity of conflicts that erupted.³⁹

This was not simply Wilsonianism redux. Chastened by a decade of fascist aggression, US internationalists recognized that world order was the product of power, imaginatively organized and robustly deployed. Pure collective security was unfeasible, since (as the League had shown) permanent organizations needed real teeth, not moral injunctions, to enforce decisions.

Whereas Wilson had sought to replace the balance of power with collective security, FDR aimed to reconcile the two. Consistent with sovereign equality, lesser powers would have a universal forum to air their views. But global order would ultimately rest on collective action among a directorate of great powers. In FDR’s words, he envisioned “Four Policemen” to stand guard against aggression.⁴⁰ Its Achilles heel, of course, was the possibility that the policemen would clash. Who would supervise if one or more “policeman” abused its position?

One critical decision concerned universal versus regional collective security. Washington rejected British proposals for separate regional councils for several reasons. First, FDR doubted that the American public would accept arrangements that might compromise the postwar organization. Second, the administration feared that a regional council would allow isolationists to restrict US postwar engagement to the Western Hemisphere. Regionalism was also vulnerable to “abuses,” by “set[ting] up a special relationship between one or two great powers and the small states in the region.”⁴¹ Finally, it might pit regional blocs against one another. Washington’s universalist impulse had enduring implications.

At the Moscow conference on November 1, 1943, the United States, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom endorsed a postwar international organization for peace and security. Cordell Hull was jubilant. No longer, he told Congress, would there be any need “for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power, or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or promote their interests.”⁴²

At home, the administration persuaded both Congress and the public of its desirability and feasibility of an international organization. On September 17, 1943, the House handily passed the Fulbright Resolution, endorsing “participation by the United States...through its constitutional processes,” in new “international machinery...to establish and maintain a joint and lasting peace.” A majority of prewar isolationists voted in favor.

“I shall never be for any commitment that gives away one iota of our national sovereignty,” avowed Karl Mundt (R-SD), but, “Within its [the resolution’s] boundaries is haven for the most ultra-isolationist in the country as well as the most ‘super-duper’ internationalist.”⁴³

Cognizant of Wilson’s failure, Hull held regular consultations with a bipartisan committee of eight senators, reassuring them throughout the Dumbarton Oaks deliberations that the United States would retain sovereignty and freedom of action. A key point of executive-legislative contention concerned war powers under the US Constitution: The two sides eventually compromised by requiring separate approval from the Senate to provide troops to enforce any Council decisions.

Meanwhile, negotiations revealed differences between the United States and the Soviet Union. They had agreed on an executive council where great powers would have permanent seats but clashed over the nature of their veto. The Soviets insisted it be absolute, applying to procedural as well as enforcement resolutions. FDR refused, saying it violated the “American concept of fair play [dating] back to the days of our Founding Fathers.” Ultimately, the Big Three agreed on a General Assembly based on sovereign equality—empowered to debate international disputes but not take action—but vested real authority over war and peace in the Security Council. Each Council member possessed a veto, the precondition for great power solidarity and continued cooperation among the wartime allies.

After FDR’s reelection in November 1944, the administration launched a massive campaign to build domestic support for the UN, stressing that the United States would sacrifice no sovereignty in the new body. Administration officials repeatedly invoked the touchstones of American exceptionalism, contending that the war had vindicated American values and institutions.⁴⁴ The president, vice president, and congressional allies delivered many speeches likening the struggle of the Founding Fathers to their effort.⁴⁵ The challenge, pronounced Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Grew, was “not unlike the problem which confronted our forefathers in 1789: the necessity of creating an effective organization for the maintenance of peace.”⁴⁶ By early 1945, 80–90 percent of Americans supported a postwar international organization. In Congress, Senator Arthur Vandenberg’s conversion to internationalism was telling. “I have always been frankly one of those who has believed in our own self-reliance,” he declared in January 1945, “But I do not believe that any nation hereafter can immunize itself by its own exclusive action.”⁴⁷

US support for collective security contrasted with Soviet and British approaches to world order. Throughout the war, US officials refused to negotiate spheres of influence or discuss political and territorial settlements. Both FDR and Hull regarded great power arrangements reached in the shadows as fundamentally *un-American*, a betrayal of the country’s liberal principles, and liable to undermine US public support for a postwar international security organization.⁴⁸ The Soviet Union and Great Britain, however, had no qualms about wartime horse trading, most infamously in

the so-called 1944 “percentages” agreement, in which Churchill and Stalin defined the share of influence each party would enjoy in several countries of southeast Europe. Churchill cautioned Stalin about communicating this arrangement to Washington, “because the Americans might be shocked.” US officials were indeed aghast—and denounced the agreement.⁴⁹

As the Red Army advanced, US officials grew indignant at Moscow’s evident intention to expand its influence in (or even conquer) Central and Eastern Europe. Vandenberg thundered in the Senate, “We cannot tolerate unilateral privilege in a multilateral peace.”⁵⁰ In February 1945, the Big Three met in Yalta, releasing a Declaration on Liberated Europe that ostensibly bound its signatories to “the principle of the Atlantic Charter” and the universal “right of peoples to choose the form of self-government under which they will live.” An exultant Roosevelt described Yalta as “a turning point” in “the history of the world. It ought to spell the end of the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliance, the spheres of influence, the balances of power, and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries—and have always failed.”⁵¹ It soon became clear that Moscow had no intention of upholding its commitments.

In April–June 1945, 50-odd nations assembled in San Francisco to negotiate the final details of the United Nations Organization (UNO). As Washington intended, the Charter promised both a more robust response to aggression and greater freedom of action than the League Covenant had provided. Gone was any open-ended commitment, to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of other states. Such weighty decisions would be decided by the Security Council. Article 2(7), moreover, included protections for national sovereignty, which pleased congressional conservatives: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”⁵² The UN’s fortunes would depend on the fidelity of its most powerful members and their self-restraint in pursuit of national advantage. As the new US president, Harry S. Truman, underlined in the closing session at the San Francisco Opera House, “We all have to recognize—no matter how great our strength—that we must deny ourselves the license to do as we please.”⁵³

Seeking prompt US ratification, the Truman administration reassured legislators that the UN Charter would neither reduce US freedom of action nor subvert congressional prerogatives, including in deployment of US troops to UN enforcement operations.⁵⁴ The entire Senate approved the Charter on July 28, 1945.

The Cold War: The United States Embraces Collective Defense

In the early postwar years, superpower confrontation fractured dreams of an open, one world. In response, US grand strategy pivoted to unite the

“non-Soviet world” and safeguard a narrower Free World community.⁵⁵ But rather than abandon liberal multilateral principles, the United States adapted them to new circumstances, shifting from universalist internationalism to multilateral coalition building.

The US framers of the UN Charter had presumed that the Soviet Union, if given a stake in the postwar system, would abide by Atlantic Charter principles. The Kremlin, however, found Washington’s open, rule-bound conception of international society deeply threatening to Soviet communism. The depth of ideological clash and emerging bipolar competition ruined the Security Council as a forum for great power concert, forcing the United States to seek alternatives to universal collective security.

Unlike Moscow, which adopted a domineering stance toward its “satellites,” Washington pursued containment through consensual leadership. The strategic objective was not enduring US hegemony but the consolidation of “independent centers of power capable of balancing each other as well as the Russians.”⁵⁶ America’s coalition approach evolved several components in the early postwar years. First came economic assistance, starting with the Marshall Plan of June 1947. Next, a network of defensive alliances began to emerge with the Atlantic Pact discussions in May 1948. The administration then initiated a program of mutual aid, enshrined in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of October 1949. Finally, the United States commenced a program of development assistance, proposed as Point Four of President Truman’s second inaugural address of January 1949 and realized in the Act for International Development of May 1950. By 1950, wartime dreams of collective security through the United Nations had yielded to a policy of collective defense, authorized by Article 51 of the UN Charter. Overcoming historical isolationism and skepticism of peacetime alliances, the United States organized a vast coalition committed to “collective effort and mutual obligations.”⁵⁷

Multilateral institutions, generous US aid, and shared liberal values cushioned US dominance, allowing Washington to nurture a community of nations based not just on interest (much less repression) but also on common sentiments. In return for providing armed protection and promoting economic growth, Washington enjoyed legitimate leadership. Still, to prevent European dependency, the United States launched initiatives and sponsored multilateral organizations, from the Marshall Plan to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which gave weaker parties significant autonomy.⁵⁸

To be sure, there were tensions between this egalitarian ethos and the US desire to shape Free World policies around *American* preferences. Still, the overall outcome was unprecedented: By the late 1950s, the industrial democracies constituted a security community within which war seemed unimaginable, united by faith in US leadership, opposition to Soviet expansionism, and economic multilateralism.

In place of global collective security through the UN, the United States adopted a policy of *collective defense*, most prominently within NATO. When European economic and political weakness drew the United States

into a more formal, dominant role than it wanted, Washington insisted that the Western alliance take a multilateral form—even though other viable models certainly existed. Washington could have negotiated or even imposed unequal bilateral deals on individual Western European states. Alternatively, it might have forged an alliance between two free-standing European and North American pillars, as George Kennan advocated during 1947–1948.⁵⁹ Finally, it might have unilaterally extended the Monroe Doctrine eastward, declaring external meddling in Western Europe off-limits—and subject to a US response. Instead, Washington demanded—at times over European objections—that countries on both sides of the Atlantic treat their security as indivisible.

Conventional rational choice sheds only modest light on US multilateralism in NATO. Neorealism predicts states will ally to counterbalance perceived threats, but says little about how alliances coalesce, the institutional form they take, or the mode of interallied relations. Given global bipolarity and US structural dominance over the West, neorealist logic might have expected the United States to impose unequal bilateral treaties on allies. But when European leaders practically clamored⁶⁰ for institutionalized subordination to the United States, Washington declined, urging Europeans instead to form a multilateral regional defense pact. The “all for one and one for all” ethos prevented the United States from discriminating against allies based on material or geopolitical importance, and it created collective action problems, including disputes over burden sharing.

Neoliberal institutionalism provides a more compelling but still incomplete account. Multilateralism did yield efficiency gains over multiple bilateral agreements, and promised to boost the legitimacy of US leadership. Ikenberry, for instance, regards NATO as part of a broader “institutional bargain whereby a hegemon pursuing enlightened self interest assumes some short-term constraints to maximize ‘downstream’ benefits.”⁶¹ The limitation of this account, again, is its tacit reliance on the identity of a specific hegemon and its perceived self-interest, as viewed through the prism of dominant ideas.

American multilateralism in NATO reflected a combination of ideational and material factors: To begin with, multilateralism resonated with American political liberalism and perceived role as a constructive global force. Second, multilateralism promised to discourage prolonged allied dependence on the United States, while reducing imperial temptations to take bold, imprudent risks and indulge in reckless crusades. Third, US officials calculated that a consensual approach to US hegemony would bring long-term legitimacy and stability to the US-led Western coalition. Treating partners as equals and providing collective goods made American leadership more attractive, particularly when contrasted to the heavy-handed Soviet Union.⁶²

Finally, US officials regarded NATO as a unique transatlantic community that united the United States with democracies that shared political and cultural values. This common political heritage bred a distinctive pattern

of interalliance relations, which generally evolved into codetermination of alliance policy. When intraalliance conflicts arose, democratic norms delegitimated references to material power and threats of force during negotiations, while justifying the invocation of domestic political constraints on diplomatic maneuvering room.⁶³

Negotiating the Atlantic pact required painstaking bargaining, both internationally and domestically. The Truman administration had to persuade anxious Europeans that the US security guarantee would be firm, while simultaneously reassuring US congressmen that the pact in no way implied an “automatic” US commitment. The final version softened the commitment, declaring that in the event of an armed attack, each ally would take military action if necessary for “the security of the North Atlantic area.” In deference to Congress, the treaty also contained important caveats dictating that this response should be “carried out in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.”⁶⁴

The North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) was signed on April 4, 1949, by the United States, Canada, and ten European nations. Wartime visions of a universal system of collective security had yielded to a circumscribed multilateral alliance uniting industrial democracies. Remarkably, nothing in the initial NAT provided the United States any special status within the alliance’s military or political structure.⁶⁵

However, US dominance became increasingly apparent following the creation of an integrated force under an American supreme commander. Still, despite hopes to see Europe emerge as a strong pole capable of defending itself, the United States wound up entangling itself in a highly structured alliance, providing billions of dollars in military aid, and adopting a forward strategy (including tens of thousands of ground troops) to defend allies in Europe. Far from “recruiting” client states as a security buffer—like a traditional great power—the United States actually assumed new burdens at great risk to itself, including the provision of a nuclear umbrella.

Washington’s multilateral commitment was strongest in transatlantic relations, of course. In the Asia-Pacific, geographic distance, cultural diversity, colonial struggles, and distrust of Japan complicated the creation of a single defense system (beyond a toothless Southeast Asia Treaty Organization). Most countries were also poor, traditional, agrarian societies, and Washington feared communist subversion more than an external attack on its interests there. But the main factor may have been the lack of common civilizational identity to provide a normative underpinning for a new community.⁶⁶

Within the Western Hemisphere, the United States and other American nations negotiated the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. This Rio Treaty bound signatories to consult with each other before responding to aggression from within or outside the hemisphere, but did not automatically commit the use of armed force or create a military capability for the alliance. Along with the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), which committed the United States to institutional cooperation

within the region, the arrangement softened American domination over southern neighbors.

The overall global result was a loose coalition of groupings, backed by American resources and commitments. Ultimately, the early 1950s found the United States at the core of a worldwide alliance system involving more than 40 countries, with 450 military bases in some 36 of them.

US Security Multilateralism after the Cold War

The abrupt end of the Cold War gave the United Nations a new lease of life. The reversal of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991, in an enforcement action under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, elicited widespread euphoria in the United States. President George H. W. Bush hailed the advent of a “new world order” of multilateral security cooperation under benevolent American hegemony.

The Clinton administration, similarly, took office in 1993 committed to “assertive multilateralism.” By working with foreign partners and international institutions, the United States could garner material and diplomatic support for its objectives, legitimate its leadership, and enlarge “the world’s free community of market democracies.”⁶⁷ Consistent with this new vision, the early 1990s witnessed an unprecedented expansion of UN peacekeeping, including new multidimensional operations.

Such euphoria proved short-lived. American ambivalence toward the United Nations quickly reasserted itself, thanks to four familiar factors. First, the UN’s disappointing performance in many crises undercut US optimism about its potential to address threats to international security. The body proved unable to keep the peace or respond effectively to violence in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia. Russia and China, possessing vetoes within the Security Council, could easily block enforcement action. Meanwhile, stale postcolonial mindsets exacerbated North-South tensions within the UN General Assembly and other large-membership bodies, often producing outcomes at odds with US liberal ideals. Second, a newly assertive Congress after the 1994 midterm elections launched a sustained assault on UN peacekeeping and began withholding assessed (and legally binding) contributions to the UN in order to force management reform. More generally, congressional Republicans set themselves up as defenders of US sovereignty, which the world body allegedly put at risk.⁶⁸

Third, many US leaders perceived the United States’ unchallenged military dominance in the 1990s—which pundits dubbed the “unipolar moment”—gave the United States unique responsibilities and privileges to sidestep frameworks binding on others, such as the International Criminal Court or nonproliferation treaties. The fourth factor—American exceptionalism—reinforced these tendencies. In the words of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the United States was the world’s “indispensable power,” one that “stands taller and sees farther” than others. America’s military dominance and unique role coexisted uneasily with rules enshrined in the UN Charter

governing the collective legitimation of armed force.⁶⁹ This came to a head in the case of Kosovo (1999), when the United States, finding itself blocked in the Security Council, turned to NATO as a surrogate (if controversial) source of multilateral legitimacy for collective enforcement action (in this case, reversing ethnic cleansing by Serbia).

George W. Bush: "The Mission Determines the Coalition"

American ambivalence toward multilateral security cooperation reached its apogee under President George W. Bush. No president, of course, had ever placed America's fate in the hands of universal collective security, nor defined multilateral cooperation as being limited to the United Nations (or indeed NATO). And yet from FDR to Clinton, successive US administrations had promoted international institutions as foundations for US global leadership. Bush, in contrast, presided over an administration deeply skeptical of the capacity of the United Nations, alliances and treaties to confront new security threats, particularly terrorism, rogue states, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The Bush administration's skepticism stemmed from several convictions. First, multilateralism needed to further concrete foreign policy ends, rather than merely legitimize US power.⁷⁰ Second, standing international institutions, including the UN, were hopelessly dysfunctional, unaccountable, and at odds with US interests and ideals. Third, the expanding reach of international law posed a growing threat to domestic American sovereignty and the supremacy of the Constitution. Fourth, in the post-Cold War world, growing asymmetries in military and technological capabilities reduced the value of traditional multilateral alliances like NATO. Fifth, the Administration was convinced that unilateralism—or its threat—could sometimes catalyze collective action.⁷¹

Most fundamentally, the Bush administration argued that multilateralism came in many forms and was most successful when it reflected a true convergence of interests and values. Rather than relying primarily on the cumbersome United Nations and standing alliances, the United States should adopt a selective, "à la carte" approach, by assembling opportunistic and flexible "coalitions of the willing" composed of like-minded, capable countries that coalesced to perform discrete tasks and address specific challenges.⁷²

The 9/11 attacks accentuated these instincts.⁷³ In an age of unpredictable catastrophic threats, US officials concluded, the nation could not accept limits on its military freedom of action or tolerate time-consuming multilateral diplomacy.⁷⁴ The shock of the attacks also aroused a "Jacksonian" outburst among the American public and, within Congress, removed virtually any legislative constraints on a new, revolutionary foreign policy.

The greatest crisis in US-UN relations, of course, occurred over Saddam Hussein's Iraq. When the Security Council declined to authorize military action against Iraq for failing to prove it was not pursuing weapons of mass

destruction (WMD), the United States and its coalition partners proceeded with Operation Iraqi Freedom without a UNSC imprimatur.

Still, obituaries for US-UN relations proved premature. Notwithstanding its rhetoric, the Bush administration would return repeatedly to the UN to advance US objectives, not only in Iraq and Afghanistan but also to respond to crises from Haiti to Lebanon to Darfur. Washington also relied on UN agencies—from the International Atomic Energy Agency to the World Health Organization—to grapple with transnational threats ranging from WMD to avian flu.

While the Bush administration's strategy was sometimes labeled forthright "unilateralism," its common preference was for more flexible and selective "coalitions of the willing."⁷⁵ Unlike large, formal bodies that would constrain US options and result in bland consensus, such selective arrangements would exclude those with little to offer, as well as potential spoilers. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), for example, was an innovative partnership of like-minded countries designed to intercept illicit maritime, air, and land shipments of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and ballistic missiles and their related technologies. By the time they left office, senior Bush administration officials were touting PSI as a model of collective action that might be extended to other global threats.

The Bush administration's approach carried certain advantages. In an age of diverse, complex transnational problems, no single institution—whether a reformed Security Council, NATO, the G20, or (as some proposed⁷⁶) a Concert of Democracies—could possibly address all international challenges. Instead of casting its lot entirely with formal organizations, the United States will inevitably mix and match among multilateral vehicles—ad hoc as well as formal, regional as well as global, transitory as well as permanent. At the same time, the tumultuous Bush years suggested that marginalizing global institutions could squander legitimacy for US leadership and actions, forfeit opportunities for burden sharing, and erode world order.

The Obama Administration: A "Return" to Multilateralism?

Upon assuming office in January 2009, President Barack Obama trumpeted a "new era of engagement" for the United States. The central components of this strategy included the collective management of transnational problems; peaceful accommodation of rising powers; and reform of international institutions to reflect the new global agenda and shifting power dynamics. Obama's vision placed less emphasis on American primacy—and insisted that other global powers assume new responsibilities. Still, there was continuity with the Bush administration. The Obama administration did not rely solely on international organizations, but rather, adopted a pragmatic multilateralism, combining formal institutions and flexible partnerships.⁷⁷

To place US-UN relations on a more constructive footing and improve the UN's functioning, the Obama administration engaged in labor-intensive

diplomacy with UN members. There were clear dividends. These included the stiffest Security Council sanctions ever imposed on Iran, and sanctions on North Korea (though these were weaker than the United States had sought). The administration's vision of a "multipartner" world also included heavy reliance on regional organizations to help manage conflict around the world. A case in point was the UN-mandated AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM), whose 12,000 troops receive logistical and other support from the US Africa Command (AFRICOM). The Obama administration appointed the first US ambassador to the African Union (AU), as well as the first permanent US envoy to ASEAN.

For the United States, the challenge was to think soberly about the trade-offs among the United Nations, ad hoc arrangements, and regional organizations. Generally speaking, coalitions of the willing bring flexibility, agility, and exclusivity. They are most compelling when international frameworks do not exist or are paralyzed, or when bureaucracy slows responses to immediate threats. But the United States cannot afford to ignore the standing capacity, legitimacy, and legal status of the UN, or to imagine that these can be reproduced through ad hoc arrangements. The UN offers advantages when: there is no time or will to create a new coalition; the task requires specialized expertise available only in permanent organizations; the challenge is enduring and will likely outlive any coalition; the task implies heavy burden-sharing over a protracted period; or the requirements of international or domestic legitimacy require formal frameworks to give political cover to wavering states.

Regional organizations, meanwhile, offer other trade-offs. Their members are likely to be most invested in solving the crisis, they may bring unique understandings and capabilities to its resolution, and their endorsement can be critical in providing access and local support. Regional organizations can also be less expensive. At the same time, placing the onus on regional organizations—particularly ones in which the United States is not a member—reduces US control of the outcomes.

Where possible, the United States should seek to combine the best of all three strategies, by aligning its forays into "minilateralism" with parallel diplomacy at the United Nations and with regional organizations. Although achieving this trifecta is no mean feat, the 2011 UN-authorized, NATO-led, and Arab League-endorsed intervention in Libya, which occurred under UN Security Council Resolution 1973, provided a textbook case.

American Ambivalence and US-China Relations

As this chapter has argued, the United States is deeply ambivalent about multilateralism. This is ironic. After all, no country has done more since 1945 to weave the institutional fabric of world order. And yet few countries have been as sensitive to perceived restrictions on their freedom of action or so vigilant in guarding their sovereign prerogatives. This dissonance arises from four main sources: America's massive power; its "exceptionalist"

political culture; the lessons of experience; and the unique US constitutional structure.⁷⁸

How are these factors likely to affect US behavior toward the United Nations and cooperative security in the coming years? And what will be the implications for Sino-American relations?

First, as the unipolar moment yields to a more multipolar era, the scope, rationale, and justification for US unilateral action will presumably fade. World order will hinge on a wider array of emerging and established powers—including not only China but also Russia, India, Japan, Brazil, Turkey, and the European Union. To be sure, this transition will be protracted. As the world's only truly global power, the United States will retain maximum flexibility. But as the National Intelligence Council observes in *Global Governance 2025*, "Such a selective approach [to multilateral cooperation] is...running into trouble because those powerful enough to afford picking and choosing are growing more numerous."⁷⁹ Already, we have seen China, for example, promote mini-lateral groupings of its own, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).

Second, American exceptionalism will increasingly collide with the realities of global integration. As a practical matter, the United States regularly pools sovereign functions and voluntarily accepts restrictions on its policy autonomy to cope with deepening economic and security interdependence. The rise of transnational catastrophic threats made such measured, voluntary delegations of sovereignty critical.⁸⁰ And yet it remains a political suicide in the United States to speak of "global governance"—given the widespread impression, reinforced by conservative activists,⁸¹ that unaccountable global institutions and haphazard trends in international law are running roughshod over the US Constitution.⁸² At the same time, the United States is hardly the only nation with an "exceptionalist" view of its role in the world—or vigilant in preserving its sovereignty. China, Russia, and India similarly bristle at perceived encroachments.

It is more difficult to predict how the third factor that has shaped US ambivalence toward collective security—the lessons of experience—will evolve in the future. Just a few years ago, the fallout from the US misadventure in Iraq appeared to bolster the case for security multilateralism. Indeed, US public opinion polls suggest that American citizens prefer a cooperative international system under the rule of law and multilateral institutions, in which other countries do their fair share. At the same time, the public remains dissatisfied with the actual performance (though not the idea) of the United Nations.⁸³

Finally, the frequent disagreement between the executive branch and Congress on US global commitments will almost certainly persist. During World War II and the early postwar years, the Roosevelt and Truman administrations took pains to nurture bipartisan support for the UN and NATO. Alas, any similar effort to reach across the political aisle today would confront toxic levels of partisanship and a fraying political consensus

on the value of the United Nations. The world body has once again become a partisan football, excoriated by Republicans.

Implications for US-Chinese Relations

Given divergent views about the role of the UN in world affairs and in advancing their national interests, Sino-American cooperation at the United Nations will remain complicated.

After initial estrangement from and then diffidence toward the United Nations, China has become vigorous and sophisticated in its multilateral engagement. By the early twenty-first century, as Jianwei Wang's contribution to this volume attests, Chinese officials had long ceased to regard the United Nations as a potential agent of Western imperialism, conceiving it instead as a valuable framework for advancing security cooperation, for nurturing developing world solidarity, and for constraining unilateral action by the United States. At the Seventeenth Party Congress, former president Hu Jintao directly linked "the tenets and principles in the Charter of the UN" to the Chinese vision of a "harmonious world" and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.⁸⁴ As Gao Zugui of the Chinese Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) writes, China believes that the United Nations "represents common expectations and goals of the international community, especially of developing states." Accordingly, at least, then it comes to external (as opposed to internal) policies, "All activities in which China participates should be approved, authorized, or supported by the UN."⁸⁵

In contrast, US support for the United Nations remains implicitly conditional. Americans are inclined to support it only when it can address concrete challenges and new security threats and advance fundamental values embedded in its Charter, including those related to human rights. More generally, the United States regards the United Nations as just one useful multilateral tool among many. American presidents—including President Obama—have also insisted US investment in the world body must yield a tangible return. This includes increased contributions from the world's emerging nations, including China, whose share of the UN's regular and peacekeeping budgets remains far below their growing capabilities.

Sino-American frictions at the United Nations remain most fraught regarding involvement in internal affairs of member states, and on whether the Security Council should use its coercive tools to sanction or intervene against repressive or genocidal regimes. In the recent past, these disagreements have come to the fore in cases ranging from Myanmar to Zimbabwe, Sudan to Syria. Contemporary Chinese officials, who possess a traditionally Westphalian perspective on state sovereignty, believe that the Charter's purpose is to *limit and control* (not enable) external intervention. Beijing was particularly alarmed by Washington's willingness both in Kosovo and Iraq to bypass a blocked Security Council and act through coalitions of the willing. As Feng Zhongping of CICIR writes, "the UN Security Council

is the only body with the right to make decisions on the use of force and should be regarded as the core of a common security regime” under international law.⁸⁶ At a grand strategic level, China also appears to value the UN partly as a framework for limiting US unilateralism and constraining US power, while facilitating China’s continued peaceful rise. (Whether China will itself begin to chafe under UN constraints as its own power rises is an open question).

The United States and China continue to differ in their definitions of threats to international peace and security, and in their readiness to authorize Chapter 7 activities under the UN Charter. The United States has been a forceful advocate for strong Council action to prevent so-called rogue states like North Korea or Iran from developing WMD, whereas China remains cautious about sanctions, considering them counterproductive and potentially destabilizing.

China is also wary of so-called humanitarian intervention and skeptical of the US (as well as UK and French) tendency to treat internal conflict, atrocities, and gross human rights violations as threats to international peace and security. Despite its public endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect, China’s defense of sovereignty and nonintervention often dilute Security Council involvement, leaving victims, in the US view, at the tender mercies of their oppressors. To be sure, in March 2011, Beijing abstained on UNSC Resolution 1973, authorizing the establishment of a no-fly zone and “all necessary means” to protect civilians threatened by the Libyan regime of Moammar al Gaddafi.⁸⁷ Still, the Chinese (and Russians) subsequently objected that NATO had transformed a civilian protection mandate into a license for regime change. The bitter aftertaste complicated subsequent multilateral efforts to end the atrocities of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, including several “double vetoes” by China and Russia opposing any forceful UN action against that regime.

In stark contrast to the United States, China places at least as much emphasis on the UN General Assembly as it does on the Security Council. Whereas the United States regards UNGA primarily as a nuisance, where irresponsible delegations often play to the galleries, China sees a useful forum to marshal backing of developing countries. Within the United Nations, China can be *both* a great power *and* a card-carrying member of the global “South.” (As China deepens its own role in the G20, it may find it hard to balance its espoused role as a spokesperson for the developing world and its new position within the inner sanctum of global economic collaboration).

One promising area for expanded US-Chinese cooperation is in strengthening UN peacekeeping. Today, the UN fields the world’s second largest deployed military, with more than 100,000 personnel serving in 16 peace operations.⁸⁸ But the Security Council continues to saddle the UN with unrealistic and underresourced mandates. China and the United States both recognize weaknesses in the current system, and China’s profile in such operations is growing. As of January 2010, China was contributing

2,131 military and police personnel to UN missions—making it the largest contributor to peace operations among the permanent five members of the Council.⁸⁹ But its financial contributions remain modest, providing just over 3 percent of the UN's peacekeeping budget (and 2.5 percent of its regular budget), compared to 26 percent (and 22 percent) for the United States.

Perhaps the biggest long-term challenge China and the United States face at the United Nations is reaching an agreement on the complex and politically explosive topic of UN Security Council enlargement. Beijing's rhetorical position is to support additional elected candidates from the developing world, especially from Africa, envisioning a Council of perhaps 25 members. But in practical terms, China's policy is strongly invested in the status quo. It is especially opposed to any new *permanent* members, demonstrating fears about adding Japan and emerging regional rival India. As long as the United States does not press the enlargement agenda, Beijing is happy to remain quiet. For their part, US officials recognize that the UNSC needs to be updated to reflect global power shifts and preserve legitimacy and viability of the United Nations as the guarantor of world order. Yet, US officials generally refrain from seriously advocating enlargement because of fears that it might become unwieldy or less receptive to US interests. (Tellingly, there was little US follow-up to President Obama's surprise November 2010 endorsement of an eventual permanent seat for India.)

The demand for UN Security Council enlargement will only grow, however, as power diffuses to the developing world. The United States and China should accordingly endorse modest Council enlargement according to a set of defined criteria that are commensurate with the weighty obligations and responsibilities of membership.⁹⁰ Such a solution would help the United States to secure emerging power support for an international order under law. It would also offer a powerful signal about China's investment in the effectiveness of the United Nations as a bedrock for global security—and reassurances about its strategic intentions.

Notes

Stewart Patrick is senior fellow and director of the international institutions and global governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations. He wishes to thank the editors and his CFR colleague Isabella Bennett for constructive feedback on this chapter.

1. Byron Shafer, ed., *Is America Different? A New Look at American Exceptionalism*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 49–51, 63. Robert Dallek, *The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), xiv. Samuel Huntington, "America's Ideals versus America's Institutions," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 97 (Spring, 1982).
2. James G. March and John P. Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders," *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998): 943–969.
3. Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998): 171–200. Peter

- J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
4. Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution* (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1955), 6, 11.
 5. Jeremy A. Rabkin, *The Case for Sovereignty: Why the World Should Welcome American Independence* (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2004); Peter Spiro, "The New Sovereignists," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 6 (November/December 2000).
 6. Robert H. Jackson, "The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in International Relations," in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 112.
 7. Great powers have often embraced new grand strategies in response to calamity, when existing belief structures no longer provide credible guidance. Jeffrey W. Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).
 8. Stewart Patrick, *The Best Laid Plans: The Origins of American Multilateralism and the Dawn of the Cold War* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009).
 9. The 1940s offers an example. During transatlantic negotiations over US global and financial matters, John Maynard Keynes reminded his British colleagues, "One can take nothing whatever for settled in the U.S.A." Whereas UK negotiators could make binding commitments for Britain, whatever US executive branch officials promise "can and does bind no one," since Congress would have the last word. Cited in Randall Bennett Woods, *A Changing of the Guard: Anglo-American Relations, 1941–1946* (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1990), 55–56.
 10. Cited in Charles Kupchan, *The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy after the Cold War* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2002), p. 165.
 11. David C. Hendrickson, *Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2003).
 12. Daniel H. Deudney, "The Philadelphia System: Sovereignty, Arms Control and the Balance of Power in the American States-Union, Circa 1787–1861," *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring 1995): 191–228; Hendrickson, *Peace Pact*.
 13. David M. Fitzsimmons, "Tom Paine's New World Order: Idealistic internationalism in the Ideology of Early American Foreign Relations," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 19 (1995): 569–582.
 14. See Washington's Farewell Address, "Avalon Project at Yale Law School," http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp (accessed April 13, 2015).
 15. First Inaugural Address of Thomas Jefferson, March 14, 1801, "Avalon Project," http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau1.asp.
 16. Cited in Niko Krisch, "Weak as Constraint, Strong as Tool: The Place of International Law in U.S. Foreign Policy," in David M. Malone and Yuen Foong Khong, ed., *Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: International Perspectives* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 44.
 17. Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World* (New York: Century Foundation/Alfred A. Knopf, 2001). Jefferson cited in Daniel Boorstin, *The Lost World of Thomas Jefferson* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 228.
 18. John Quincy Adams cited in Walter MacDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 36.
 19. Cited in Edward Weisband, *The Ideology of American Foreign Policy: A Paradigm of Lockian Liberalism* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973), 29–30.

20. Woodrow Wilson's "Peace without Victory" speech to Congress, January 22, 1917 <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/www15.htm>.
21. Cited in H. W. Temperley, ed., *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, Vol. I (London: Oxford University Press, 1920), 173, 179, 192–194, 203.
22. John Milton Cooper, *Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 18. As Lodge himself explained, "I want to keep America as she has been—not isolated, not prevent her from joining other nations for these great purposes—but I wish her to be master of her fate. I want her left in a position to do that work and not submit her to a vote of other nations... Let her go on in her beneficent career... strong and alive, triumphant, free." Cited in Edward C. Luck, *Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organization 1919–1999* (New York: Century Foundation, 1999), 62–63.
23. Robert S. McNamara and James G. Blight, *Wilson's Ghost: Reducing the Risk of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21st Century* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001); Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Year's Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London: Palgrave, 2001).
24. Cooper, *Breaking the Heart*, 135.
25. *Ibid.*, 137.
26. Cited in Thomas J. Knock, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 266. These provisions insisted that the United States: be the sole judge of whether it had fulfilled its obligations to the League; retain the right to withdraw at any time; assume no obligation to go to war under Article 10 or deploy military and naval forces abroad without prior congressional approval; determine for itself what matters were within its own internal affairs; brook no interference with the Monroe Doctrine; accept no commitment precluding national military preparedness; reject any League sanctions that overrode US economic sovereignty; and reject any terms of the Versailles Treaty that restricted the individual rights of US citizens.
27. Kathleen Burk, "Economic Diplomacy between the Wars," *Historical Journal*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (1981): 1003–1015.
28. Coolidge's Fourth Annual Message to Congress, "The American Presidency Project," <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29567#axzz1zUmzXIOM>.
29. Lisa L. Martin, "The Rational State Choice of Multilateralism," in John Gerard Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Friedrich Kratochwil, "Norms versus Numbers: Multilateralism and the Rationalist and Reflexivist Approaches to Institutions—a Unilateral Plea for Communicative Rationality," in *Multilateralism Matters*, 443–474, 445.
30. Martin, "The Rational State Choice."
31. G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order," *International Security* Vol. 23, No. 3, (Winter 1999): 43–78.
32. John Gerard Ruggie, "The Past as Prologue: Interests, Identity, and American Foreign Policy," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997): 89–125. Ruggie, "Multilateralism, the Anatomy of an Institution," in *Multilateralism Matters*.
33. Anton DePorte, *Europe Between the Superpowers: The Enduring Balance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 80.
34. Jeffrey Legro, "Whence American Internationalism," *International Organization*, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Spring 2000): 253–289, 254, 262–263.
35. Welles, "Post-War Commercial Policy of the United States," *Department of State Bulletin*, April 3, 1945, 285.

36. Hendrickson, "In Our Own Image"; Hendrickson, *Peace Pact*.
37. Anne-Marie Burley, "Regulating the World," in *Multilateralism Matters*.
38. FDR view, according to Charles Bohlen, cited in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "FDR at Yalta," *Times Literary Supplement*, May 25, 2005.
39. Craig and George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 106–112.
40. Robert C. Hildebrand, *Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 16. Craig and George, *Force and Statecraft*, 106–112. Woods, *A Changing of the Guard*, p. 105.
41. Harley Notter, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1950), 112; Hildebrand, *Dumbarton Oaks*, 45; Warren Kimball, *The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 96; Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), Vol. 2, 1643–1646.
42. "Address by the Secretary of State before Congress Regarding the Moscow Conference," *Department of State Bulletin*, November 20, 1943, 342–343.
43. Robert A. Divine, *Second Chance: The Triumph of Liberal Internationalism in America During World War II* (New York: Atheneum, 1967), 63–73, 109–110, 130–134, 143–148, 182.
44. Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the UN* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 168–169.
45. As Vice President Harry Truman explained, "The only rational alternative to existing international anarchy lies in some reasonable form of international organization among so-called sovereign states. This is merely an extension of local and national practices to an international plane." Truman cited in Stephen C. Schlesinger, *Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003), 7.
46. Joseph Grew, "Pioneering the Peace," *Department of State Bulletin*, January 28, 1945, 119.
47. Cited in Walter MacDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, 153.
48. Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 1170, 1452; John Lewis Gaddis, "The United States and the Question of a Sphere of Influence in Europe, 1945–1949," in Olav Riste, ed., *Atlantic Security: The Formative Years* (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1985), 63.
49. Kimball, *The Juggler*, 159–162.
50. Vandenberg, "American Foreign Policy," January 10, 1945, <http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/VandenbergSpeech.pdf>.
51. Roosevelt, "Message to Congress Regarding the Yalta Conference," *Department of State Bulletin*, March 4, 1945, 321–326. Divine, *Second Chance*, 270.
52. In addition, Chapter 8 of the Charter provided for regional frameworks to address matters of peace and security. Along with Article 51's blanket endorsement of the right of individual and collective self-defense, Chapter 8 would be critical in permitting multilateral security pacts in the postwar world.
53. Address at San Francisco at the Closing of the United Nations Conference, June 26, 1945, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=12188#axzz1zUmzXIOM>.
54. Schlesinger, *Act of Creation*, p. 273.
55. If there were in fact "two worlds instead of one," US grand strategy must seek to unite the "non-Soviet world...politically, economically, and in the last analysis militarily." Charles Bohlen, August 30, 1947, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1947*, Vol. I, 763–764.
56. "PPS 13", November 6, 1947, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1947*, I (Washington, DC: State Department, 1972), 770.

57. William Reizel, Morton A. Kaplan, and Constance G. Coblenz, *United States foreign Policy 1945–1955* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1956), 244–245. Arnold Wolfers, “Collective Defense versus Collective Security,” in Arnold Wolfers, ed., *Alliance Politics in the cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1959), 59.
58. Charles S. Maier, “Analog of Empire: Constitutive Elements of United States Ascendancy after World War II,” Woodrow Wilson Center paper, May 30, 1989, 1–6; Charles S. Maier, “Alliance and Autonomy: European Identity and US Foreign Policy Objectives in the Truman Years,” in Michael J. Lacey, ed., *The Truman Presidency* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989), 273–298.
59. George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925–1950* (London: Hutchinson, 1967), 407–409.
60. Patrick, *The Best Laid Plans*, 271–274.
61. Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 205–210.
62. Steve Weber, “Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO,” in *Multilateralism Matters*.
63. Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO,” in Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security*.
64. At home, the Truman administration reached a critical bipartisan deal under the Vandenberg Resolution, endorsing “association of the United States with such regional and other collective defense arrangements as are based on self-help and mutual aid, and affect its national security.” Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance*, 89–93.
65. Weber, “Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power in NATO.”
66. Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why Is there No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” *International Organization*, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Summer 2002).
67. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, DC: The White House, 1994), <http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-1994/> (accessed April 13, 2015).
68. Barbara Crossette, “Helms, in Visit to UN, Offers Harsh Message,” *New York Times*, January 21, 2000.
69. Ruth Wedgwood, “Unilateral Action in a Multilateral World,” in Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman, eds., *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 167–190.
70. Condoleezza Rice, “Campaign 2000—Promoting the National Interest,” *Foreign Affairs*, 2000.
71. Adam Garfinkle, “Alone in a Crowd,” *The American Interest*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring 2006): 132–140.
72. Thom Shanker, “White House Says the U.S. Is Not a Loner, Just Choosy,” *New York Times*, July 31, 2001.
73. This section draws on Stewart Patrick, “‘The Mission Determines the Coalition’: The United States and Multilateral Cooperation after 9/11,” in Bruce D. Jones, Shepard Forman, and Richard Gowan, eds., *Cooperating for Peace and Security: Evolving Institutions and Arrangements in a Context of Changing U.S. Security Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 20–44.
74. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2002), <http://georgewebush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/> (accessed April 13, 2015).
75. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld captured this ethos in an interview with CNN’s Larry King, describing the global war on terror: “There is no coalition. There are multiple coalitions...It’s the mission that determines the coalition,” <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2603>.
76. See Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, “Democracies of the World Unite,” *The American Interest* (January–February 2007); Robert Kagan, “The Case for a League of Democracies,” *Financial Times*, May 13, 2008; G. John Ikenberry and

- Anne-Marie Slaughter, *Forging a World of Liberty under Law: U.S. National Security in the 21st Century*, Final Report of the Princeton Project on National Security, September 27, 2006.
77. Deputy Secretary of State James B. Steinberg, remarks to Council on Foreign Relations, May 19, 2010, <http://www.cfr.org/iran/panel-iii-keynote-address-james-steinberg/p22194>.
 78. Stewart Patrick, "Multilateralism and Its Discontents: The Causes and Consequences of U.S. Ambivalence," in Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman, eds., *Multilateralism and U.S. foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 1–44.
 79. National Intelligence Council, *Global Governance 2025*.
 80. For a thoughtful treatment of how to balance US sovereignty with the need for multilateral cooperation to confront the WMD threat, see Michael Chertoff, "The Responsibility to Contain," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2009).
 81. John R. Bolton and John Yoo, "Restore the Senate's Treaty Power," *New York Times*, January 4, 2009; John Fonte, *Sovereignty or Submission: Will Americans Rule Themselves or Be Ruled by Others?* (New York: Encounter Books, 2011).
 82. Senator John Kerry, for example, was pilloried during his bid for the presidency in 2004 for allegedly submitting US national security decisions to a "global test." Dana Milbank, "Bush Says Kerry Will Allow Foreign Vetoes," *Washington Post*, October 3, 2004, A08.
 83. See 2011 digest compiled by CFR and the Program on International Policy Attitudes, *Public Opinion on Global Issues*, <http://www.cfr.org/thinktank/iigg/pop/>.
 84. See Hu Jintao's political report on the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Collection of Files of the 17th National Congress of the CPC, 45
 85. <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/05923.pdf>.
 86. "International conflicts should be solved through peaceful negotiations, as defined in the UN Charter and in the framework of international law." https://www.ciaonet.org/wps/wcu/0018018/f_0018018_15445.pdf.
 87. Stewart Patrick, "A New Lease on Life for Humanitarianism," *Foreign Affairs*, March 24, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67674/stewart-patrick/a-new-lease-on-life-for-humanitarianism>.
 88. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/>.
 89. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2010/jan10_2.pdf. "China's Changing Attitude to UN Peacekeeping," Pang Zhongying, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Spring 2005), 87–104
 90. While these criteria would obviously be subject to painstaking negotiations, such criteria could include: relevant military and civilian capabilities, to be placed at the disposal of the United Nations or deployed pursuant to UNSC resolutions; financial contributions to the UN's regular and peacekeeping budgets; demonstrated willingness to authorize the coercive tools reserved for the UNSC under Chapter 7 of the Charter (including governing sanctions and the use of force); a track record of international leadership, including in brokering global or regional solutions and contributing to collective action; and a strong record of conforming to global security regimes. See Kara C. McDonald and Stewart Patrick, *UN Security Council Enlargement and U.S. Interests* (Washington DC: Council on Foreign Relations Special Report), 21–22.

China's Evolving Attitudes and Approaches toward UN Collective Security

Jianwei Wang

Introduction

Since the 1970s, China's perceptual and behavioral orientations toward UN multilateralism in general and collective security in particular have experienced sea changes—from initially viewing UN collective security as unwanted interference in another country's affairs and as a manifestation of Western imperialism hence illegitimate to a great extent to becoming more tolerant but looking on unconcerned at the collective security measures of the UN to not just accepting the legitimacy of UN collective security measures, but also participating selectively in these operations. With China's increasing involvement in UN multilateralism and collective security, Beijing's views on national sovereignty, the legitimacy of use of force, and the role of UN in global order and governance, the boundary between international and intranational conflicts has been evolving more toward international norms. While initially Beijing's changing orientation toward UN collective security might have been largely dictated by circumstances and practical necessity, in the long run, its UN multilateral diplomacy is not just an ad hoc or short-term reaction to outside stimulus. It does not merely serve the traditional function of external balancing or utility generating, but also indicates Beijing's growing interest in establishing a less instrumental and more rule- and norm-based international order.

Needless to say, just like other major powers, China's policy and behavior toward the United Nations in general and its collective security in particular are heavily influenced and shaped by its consideration of power and interest. In terms of international relations (IR) theories, China's foreign policy has long been characterized as “hard-core realism”¹ and its behavioral pattern dubbed as “maxi-mini realpolitik.”² While China does advocate its vision of what the world should be like, its policy often contains

instrumental elements that are more closely related to what the perceived world is and to China's own specific foreign policy objectives. Beijing's approaches to UN collective security are still strangled by its tangible and intangible political and economic interests, and delicate power balance among the major players involved. However, equally importantly, China's cognition and preferences are also informed and conditioned by its unique cultural heritage, historical experience, foreign policy tradition, and ideological legacies.

Collective Security as a Concept

China's cultural heritage and foreign policy tradition have influenced its understanding and acceptance of collective security as a concept in the context of international order in general. Collective security is very alien in light of traditional Chinese thinking of diplomatic affairs for several reasons. First of all, the traditional Chinese culture of Confucianism is often characterized by its pacifism that emphasizes such things as “和为贵” (peacefulness is prized), “和” (peace and harmony), and “合” (cooperation and concordance). This approach attaches great importance to nonviolence and subduing the enemy without fighting. More specifically, it favors compromise rather than confrontation. This obviously runs against the enforcement nature (sometimes with violence) of collective security. Second, there is a tendency of passivity and selfishness in the Chinese traditional culture as reflected in idioms such as “事不关己，高高挂起” (Let things drift if they do not affect one's own interest) and “各人自扫门前雪，莫管他家瓦上霜” (Each one sweeps the snow from his own doorsteps and doesn't bother about the frost on his neighbor's roof). This tendency prevents China from being proactive in its foreign policy strategy, often making it reactive to what is happening elsewhere.³ It also implies that China is less willing to provide public goods such as collective security for maintaining international order. It goes against the core principle of collective security: one for all and all for one. In addition, as some Chinese scholars point out, while in the traditional Chinese culture and philosophy, there were schools of thought that were similar to various Western international relations theories, the Chinese tradition nevertheless often stresses different things. For example, as a whole, the Confucian concept on interstate relations is quite similar to the Western theory of idealism—what an ideal world should be rather than what it is. Nevertheless they put their figures on different things to serve the same analytic purpose. Confucianism emphasizes that countries should use “humaneness” and “benevolence” to guide their relations with other countries and should put benevolence above interest. However, what traditional Confucian scholars wanted to use to accomplish their ideal world order were morality and ethics rather than international law, international organization, and the related mechanism of collective security as emphasized by the Western theory of idealism after World War I.⁴

That thread of cultural heritage clearly colored the attitude of the People's Republic of China (PRC) toward collective security and related international order in general and helped shape its own foreign policy doctrine. The pacifist and self-centered nature of traditional thinking on foreign policy, coupled with the suffering of "the century of humiliation" (1840–1949) at the hands of the Western powers, made the Chinese foreign policy elites extremely sensitive about the national sovereignty issue and strongly opposed to any interventionist policy of other countries with which collective security was implicated. Here traditional Chinese culture once again plays a role in conceptualizing China's diplomatic approach. The Chinese saying "己所不欲，勿施于人" (Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire) is often cited by Chinese leaders as indicating China's respect for the internal affairs and autonomy of other countries. The implication is that if China does not want other countries to interfere into its internal business, it had better not do the same with respect to other countries.

As some Chinese scholars have pointed out, since the downfall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, China's ability to maintain its sovereignty over its internal and external affairs has become the *raison d'être* of every Chinese government regardless of its ideological persuasion. From the Chinese perspective, sovereignty is "the basis of the contemporary international relations and the cornerstone of the entire international law." For a long time, such sovereignty-centered thinking made the Chinese reluctant to talk about the term "world order."⁵ It is therefore no accident that the first foreign policy doctrine articulated by PRC leaders was the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (FPPC) in the 1950s.⁶ Among other things, the principles include mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual nonaggression, mutual noninterference in each other's internal affairs, and peaceful coexistence. Since then, for a long time, the FPPC guided the Chinese foreign policy written into China's communiqué of establishing diplomatic relations with more than 160 countries. For the Chinese, the FPPC are considered "the most important basic norms governing international relations."⁷ The principle of noninterference prevented China from formally endorsing the concept of collective security, at least in official statements and documents, for long time.

In the early 1990s, China's thinking on international security affairs began to gradually evolve and move closer to international norms. Starting from the late 1990s, Chinese leaders and officials began to call for the articulation of the so-called new security concept on many occasions⁸ with the purpose of coming up with a nontraditional security concept that went beyond one-sided security and could achieve mutual security.

Yet it seems that in the process of articulation of a new security concept, China still wants to keep a distance from the notion of collective security and to differentiate its new security model from the more traditional conceptualization.⁹ Compared to "collective security," the Chinese are more in

favor of using “cooperative and common security.”¹⁰ Among other reasons for China’s preference, probably the most important one is the discourse of cooperative or common security, which emphasizes less on the use of enforcement action compared to collective security. As former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans put it, “The term of cooperative security tends to connote consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than correction, and interdependence rather than unilateralism.”¹¹ This, in the eyes of the Chinese, makes collective security and cooperative security quite different in nature and the latter more attractive. However the Chinese way to define cooperative or common security often contains connotations similar to collective security. As Chinese foreign minister Li Zhaoxing put it, “The security of one nation is closely related with that [of] the region and the world as a whole. Only through international co-operation can we effectively address the common security problem.”¹²

Apparently Chinese foreign policy elites have not forged a strong consensus on the issue of collective security. Some Chinese scholars still have reservations about this concept. According to them, collective security is not a very clear concept. It was very ambiguous from the beginning and subject to many different interpretations. It has failed in practice most times. Due to dissatisfaction with the notion and practice of collective security, new security conceptions have emerged to substitute or supplement collective security, such as cooperative security and common security.¹³ On the other hand, some other Chinese scholars began to think of collective security as a useful means to meet China’s foreign policy challenges. For instance, some argue that for China and Asian countries to overcome the die-hard security dilemma, the most effective way is to form an inclusive collective security system in which China, United States, and other smaller players belong to one system, rather than two different systems just as the situation in the Cold War period. In this regard, the traditional bilateral arrangements and exclusive security alliance cannot do the job anymore.¹⁴ In short, while at the official level, collective security is an acceptable, but not preferred discourse, some Chinese scholars are more receptive and positive in using the term in their analysis.

Historical Experience Decoded

China’s wariness about the notion of collective security is closely related to their experience with and memory of the practice of collective security by international organizations such as League of Nations and United Nations. Unfortunately its experience of collective security of international organizations was neither positive nor pleasant. China’s first experience of the collective security was with the predecessor of United Nations—the League of Nations. After the World War I, the first serious attempt to provide

collective security was the establishment of League of Nations in 1919. The Covenant of the League of Nations was supposed to be based on the principle of collective security in which an armed attack on one member of the League was a concern for all members and therefore asked for a collective response from all members. In reality, however the collective security of the League did not work effectively, particularly when the conflicts involved major powers. One example of the failed collective security was the Japanese invasion of China's Manchuria in 1931. Taking advantage of China's dividedness and weakness and attempting to control the rich natural resources in the region, Japan invaded and occupied Manchuria. As a member of the League of Nations, China turned to the international body for intervention to stop the Japanese aggression. To China's dismay, the League of Nations was unable to do much but send a fact-finding mission to the area. The Lytton Report that emerged out of the mission condemned Japanese aggression. But other than that, the League did not do much to stop Japanese advances in China thus paving the way for a Japanese all-out invasion of China in 1937. The impotence of the League of Nations made China lose confidence in international organizations to exercise collective security.

China's cognition of the United Nations and its related security mechanism was more complex. Compared to the League of Nations in which China had very little say, Franklin Roosevelt insisted that China should be one of the "four world policemen."¹⁵ For this, Roosevelt took a series of measures to "make China a great power," resisting pressure from other major powers such as Russia and Great Britain.¹⁶ This move was to make China a permanent member of the Security Council of United Nations. Roosevelt's blueprint of the world international order in general and Far East international order in particular was heavily influenced by his thinking on the importance of collective security in maintaining peace and stability in East Asia as well as in the world. Under this scheme of collective security, unity of the four major powers would deter and prevent any aggressors from launching another world war. The motivation behind his willingness to bring China into the game was to make it a part of the new international order and integrate this huge country into the international system. As Roosevelt put it, it was true that China was very weak at that time; however, this was a country of 400 million people—treating her as a friend rather than making her a potential source of trouble was in the interest of the United States. Moreover, China's participation in the United Nation could increase the legitimacy of this international organization, making it more representative.

This generous political gesture largely determined the fundamental attitudes of China toward the United Nation, no matter which party ruled the country. Chinese officials, particularly the then Chinese leader Chiang Kai-Shek, although somewhat suspicious about the motives of America, welcomed this move. The Chinese communists too shared this sentiment. The

CCP representative Dong Biwu joined the Chinese delegation to attend the UN San Francisco conference in April 1945. This was the first time a CCP senior leader appeared on the world stage. This historical experience significantly influenced Chinese attitudes toward the United Nations. From the very beginning, China did not perceive itself as an ordinary member of the United Nations but rather a founding member of the United Nations that enjoyed an equal status with other major powers at the Security Council. According to Chinese analysts, the UN Charter, for the first time, listed China as a major power along with the other four powers in an important international document. In this sense, China has vested interests in the UN Charter.¹⁷ Among the existing international mechanisms, only the United Nations gives China great importance, making it, at least on surface, an equal to other world powers and giving it the same say on major global issues. China does not enjoy the same status in other international organizations.¹⁸ In other words, for the Chinese, communists included, the United Nations realized their dream of restoring China's status as a major power in international system in a no trivial way.

This explains why when the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, Mao initially was quite eager and optimistic about China taking a seat in the United Nations. He personally wrote a telegraph to the UN secretary general and demanded the dismissal of the Chinese nationalist (KMT) representative from the United Nations and to accept PRC as the sole representative of China. He and Zhou Enlai even appointed the Chinese delegation to attend the UN conference.¹⁹ However things did not turn out as easy as he thought. The draft resolutions introduced by India and Soviet Union were defeated by pro-America member countries. After the breakout of the Korea War and China was fighting the "UN army" in Korea and thus was labeled by UN as an "aggressor," Mao's hope of joining the United Nations quickly evaporated. He began to reevaluate China's strategy to join the United Nations. China was not in hurry to join the United Nations and could wait. He pointed out that it would be better for China to join the United Nations later when China became more powerful and influential.²⁰ During the 1960s, his thinking on the United Nations further evolved. Now he argued that China did not need to enter the United Nations. In his words, "It is fine not to enter the United Nations. For the last 15 years, China was not part of the United Nations, it still survived. Fifteen years, thirty, even one hundred years without being part of the UN, China still can survive." He even thought of establishing a world revolutionary organization to replace the United Nations. In other words, he was ready to make a fresh start with a new international organization.²¹ His thinking was also reflected in China's foreign policy. When the president of Indonesia proposed to establish a different United Nations, the Chinese foreign ministry issued a statement expressing China's support for such an idea.²² Another consideration underlying Mao's lukewarm attitude toward the United Nations was related to his views about the existing international order. He once argued that entering the United Nations meant that China

had to be bound by its rules and norms. This would reduce China's freedom. Hence, it was more favorable for China to remain outside of the UN system. As a result, anything passed by the United Nation was not binding for China.²³

Overall during the 1950s and 1960s, Chinese cognition of the United Nations was negative, resulting from its experience with the international body. Many regarded the United Nations largely as a tool of American foreign policy. The United States could manipulate the majority of UN members to serve its selfish foreign policy interest.²⁴ This perception, however, began to change soon. With the global decolonization movement reaching its peak during the 1960s, a large number of the newly independent third world countries became member states of the United Nations, changing the composition of the United Nations. Developing countries with anti-imperialist and anticolonial traditions soon constituted the majority of the United Nations, which was getting increasingly difficult for Washington to manipulate. Beijing once again saw some hope for China's return to the United Nations. Mao's idea of creating a revolutionary international organization to compete with the United Nation was soon dropped. China resumed its serious efforts to return to the United Nations.

On October 25, 1971, at the 26th session of the UN General Assembly, Resolution 2758 for restoring China's seat in the UN and expelling the representative of the KMT government in Taiwan ROC from the UN and all its subordinated organizations was passed by an overwhelming majority. Next day, the then UN Secretary-General U Thant sent a message to the Chinese government asking China to send a delegation to attend the session. The Chinese were caught off guard by this long-overdue but sudden good news. Initially, within the Chinese foreign ministry, there were disagreements about whether China should immediately send a delegation to attend the UN session. After heated debates, leadership of the foreign ministry decided to skip the session citing unpreparedness as a reason. This policy recommendation was quickly rejected by Mao, who insisted that China should send a delegation to the United Nations right away instead of waiting for another year. He said, "It is our black brothers in Africa who lifted us into the United Nations. If we do not go, we will alienate them." He added, "So many countries in the United Nations welcome our return, there is no excuse that we do not go." Therefore he literally reversed the decision made by Zhou Enlai and the foreign ministry. He personally appointed Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guahua, a talented veteran Chinese diplomat, to head the Chinese delegation. On the eve of the delegation's departure, Mao suddenly decided to receive all members of the delegation. He was very happy that night and told the delegation that there were two big victories in 1971, one was the death of Marshall Lin Biao and the other was China's return to the United Nations. He requested that all senior party and government officials go to the airport to see the delegation off.²⁵ Next day, all senior Chinese leaders except Mao appeared in the Capital International Airport.

On November 15, 1971, Qiao Guanhua, head of the Chinese delegation, delivered a speech at the session of the UN General Assembly. After his speech, representatives of 57 countries lined up in the corridor and came forward to express their congratulations to him, and his speech was considered “a heavy bomb.”²⁶ Qiao’s speech expressed China’s feeling of pride and elation. In his instruction to Qiao on how to write the speech, Mao Zedong had told him that China’s first speech at the UN General Assembly was the most important one. He had instructed that the speech should aim at upholding justice, greatly boost the morale of the people of the world, and deflate the superpower’s arrogance. It had to touch upon three aspects. First, China had to get even with the United States who had not allowed China to enter the UN for so many years. The Chinese people had been absolutely exasperated. Second, the speech had to talk about the change in the world situation since the establishment of the United Nations. Third, the speech was to elaborate China’s basic attitudes toward international issues including its opposition to the hegemony of the superpowers and China’s support to the struggle of all the suppressed people for democratism.²⁷ From Mao’s discussion, it is easy to decipher that he intended to use the United Nations as a platform to challenge the existing US-dominated international order and restore China’s dream as a major power as was originally designed by the founding fathers of the United Nations.

Largely because of the role of the United States, China’s experience with UN collective security was also negative. After the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, unfortunately China became the first target of UN collective security. After the Korean War broke out in June 1950, taking advantage of the absence of the Soviet Union in the Security Council, the United States and its allies unanimously passed a resolution in the Security Council to condemn the DPRK invasion of South Korea and to authorize military intervention by the United Nations. A military force of about 20 countries under the name of the United Nations was sent to the Korean Peninsula to carry out the mission of collective security. In the meantime, the American government also sent the US Seventh Fleet to “neutralize” the Taiwan Strait, which was criticized by China as armed aggression on Chinese territories. After China entered the war in October 1950, the United States pushed the UN General Assembly to pass a resolution to label China as an aggressor since it was unable to do so at the Security Council because of the veto power of the Soviet Union and recommended that all states embargo strategic and military material to China. It was the first time since the United Nations was founded in 1945 that it had condemned a nation as an aggressor. It has so far been the only resolution in UN history that condemned China. This experience with the UN collective security left a bitter taste in the mouth of the Chinese, certainly hardening its negative attitude toward the United Nations as a shaper and keeper of the international order.

The Changing Perception of the UN Role in World Affairs

The above-discussed cultural, historical, and normative tradition and legacies certainly have had a lasting impact upon China's attitude and approach toward UN and its collective security. For a long time, China had deep misgivings about the legitimacy of UN multilateralism and collective security.²⁸ Since entering the United Nations in 1971, however, China's perception of the United Nations, particularly its function of collective security in international and domestic conflict resolution, has experienced some significant changes, from being very suspicious and nonparticipatory to being passively involved with reservations²⁹ to more actively and consciously advocating the course of UN multilateralism in security matters. One indicator for this change is China's strong advocacy of the "core role" of the United Nations in the post-Cold War international order and conflict resolution.³⁰

Although China's restoration of its seat in UN in 1971 was considered a major diplomatic victory, conceptually Beijing was still skeptical about the role of United Nations in international affairs in general and its exercise of collective security in particular. This is by no means surprising. As discussed earlier, China's memory of the UN collective security was not positive to say the least and it can be said that China was among the first victims of such a collective security. Understandably, collective security measures taken by the UN, in Beijing's view, were often synonymous with imperialist aggression and intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign nation states. During 1960s, China condemned almost all collective security measures taken by United Nations and labelled it as an instrument of Western imperialism led by the United States.³¹

The change in China's attitude toward the UN and its collective security came with the adjustment of its foreign policy in 1982. That year, during the Tenth Party Congress, Beijing declared that it would pursue a foreign policy of independence to replace the previous strategy of aligning with the United States against the Soviet Union. As part of this strategic shift, China intensified its activities in the United Nations. Premier Zhao Ziyang's report on the government work in 1986, for the first time, clearly defined multilateral diplomacy as an integral part of China's foreign policy of independence.³² In this respect, UN diplomacy is "the core and foundation" of China's multilateral diplomacy.³³ By the end of 1986, China had been involved in almost all important domains of UN intergovernmental multilateral diplomacy.³⁴ Concurrently China's evaluation of the role of UN in international affairs, including maintaining international peace and security, has become more positive. In various speeches by Chinese leaders in and outside the United Nations, China acknowledged that although the United Nations had various weaknesses and had erred in the past, overall it had contributed to the peace and prosperity of mankind in an important way. As the most universal and authoritative intergovernmental

organizations (IGO) of sovereign nation states, its status and influence in international affairs were “indispensable.” China also felt that in the post-Cold War era, the function of UN should be increased rather than reduced. It was the best forum to practice multilateralism and an effective platform for collective actions to cope with various threats and challenges.³⁵

Chinese leaders in more recent years, particularly after September 11, have repeatedly emphasized the critical position of the United Nations in international affairs. They called for further consolidation of the authority of the United Nations Security Council in dealing with international crisis.³⁶ In his speech at the meeting to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations in 1995, Chinese president Jiang Zemin argued that UN’s position and influence in the world was irreplaceable by any other international organization or state bloc.³⁷ In his speech to the Australian parliament in Canberra in October 2003, Chinese president Hu Jintao urged the world to extend full support to the United Nations in solving security issues.³⁸ Chinese foreign minister Li Zhaoxing described the United Nations as “the most universal, most representative and most authoritative international organization in the world today,” and “the hope of the world rests on a strong UN.”³⁹ In 2008, China’s position paper at the sixty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly defined UN as an important platform to practice multilateralism and pledged its firm support for UN to play a central role in international affairs and for its efforts to uphold and strengthen the effectiveness and authority of the UN.⁴⁰

With such a positive evaluation of the UN role in international affairs, in principle, China began to endorse the idea of collective security within the UN framework, considering it “the soul of the UN Charter and the basis of the UN institutions and their activities.”⁴¹ Beijing supported the UN Secretary-General’s proposal concerning collective action against security threats and challenges. Collective security was largely considered consistent with China’s proposal for a new security concept that featured “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination.”⁴² To establish an effective, efficient, and fair collective security mechanism, the key lay in, among other things, adhering to multilateralism and safeguarding the centrality of the Security Council to the collective security system.⁴³ Some Chinese scholars went even further to argue that China’s effort to actively participate, maintain, and strengthen the UN collective security mechanism was of great strategic significance for creating a favourable security environment for China’s domestic development.⁴⁴ In reality, however, China’s support for UN collective security in various forms was not unitary. Rather it depended on the nature, target, issue, and means of collective security. In other words, Beijing’s position on collective security was contingent upon the specific circumstances involved. Some other Chinese scholars also reminded people of the limitation of the current UN collective security system. They warned that China should not bet entirely on the collective security. Rather it should be aware of the various pitfalls of the

collective security. On sensitive issues such as Taiwan and South China Sea, the collective security mechanism could be used to “hitch” China.⁴⁵

Peacekeeping Operations

Among different forms of UN collective security measures, Beijing has the least problems with UN peacekeeping operations. This of course was not the case in the early period of China's involvement with the United Nations. As related to its historical experience, Beijing had particular reservations about the legitimacy of UN peacekeeping operations. Most of such actions taken by the UN were seen as interference in the concerned countries' internal affairs and as undesirable results of US-Soviet hegemonic power competition. Therefore China kept a distance from dispatching troops in the name of the UN under any form. Since China did not want to appear to be obstructionist, it either did not participate in or absented from voting on almost all UN peacekeeping operations in the 1970s. Overall, during its early time in the United Nations, China took a rather passive, if not hostile position on UN actions on peacekeeping. It invented “nonparticipation” in the voting process in the Security Council. The rate of its nonparticipation was very high. For example, of the 101 resolutions adopted by the Council between November 24, 1971, and December 22, 1976, China had a 39 per cent abstention and nonparticipation.⁴⁶

China also did not commit any financial obligations to the peacekeeping operations, partially responsible for the financial difficulties in the United Nations.⁴⁷ For instance, China opposed UNEF II (United Nations Emergency Force) in the Middle East in 1973 and dissociated itself from all related votes and discussions in both the Security Council and General Assembly.⁴⁸ It also refused to pay its share of financial costs for UNEF II and UNDOF (United Nations Disengagement Observer Force).⁴⁹ China did not contribute to the UN peacekeeping forces in Lebanon in 1978 either.⁵⁰ In other words, its attitude toward UN peacekeeping operations at that time can be summarized by three “no’s”: no support, no participation, and no voting.

Starting from the 1980s and reflecting China's more upbeat evaluation of the UN and more proactive diplomacy in the system, its attitudes regarding UN peacekeeping operations also underwent a noticeable change. In 1981, it voted to support the extension of UN peacekeeping forces in Cyprus. This was the first time that Beijing explicitly supported a UN peacekeeping operation.⁵¹ In 1982, China paid its dues for the UN peacekeeping operation in Lebanon. It also sent a fact-finding mission to the Middle East to study the UN peacekeeping operation.⁵² China started to view the UN peacekeeping operations through a more functional and less ideological lens. In 1988, the year UN peacekeeping forces were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, China officially became a member of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations.

In 1989, China also began to send military observers to peacekeeping operations in Middle East such as the Kuwait-Iraq borders and in Damascus.⁵³ This was the first time that China had the boots on the ground. In 1991, China suffered its first casualty in peacekeeping operations. In the same year, China's national defense ministry established an office of PKO affairs. In 1992, China sent its first "blue helmet" troop to participate in the UN peacekeeping mission in Cambodia. In 1997 China in principle agreed to join the UN peacekeeping standby arrangement advocated by the UN Secretary-General. Then in 2002, it formally participated in the Class-A standby arrangements mechanism for the UN peacekeeping operations and agreed to provide the UN peacekeeping operations with engineering, medical, transportation, and other logistical support teams at appropriate times. China promised to provide these operations with one UN standard engineering battalion, one UN standard medical team, and two UN standard transportation companies.⁵⁴ In January 2000, the Chinese government dispatched 15 civilian policemen to the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor. This was the first time that China sent civilian policemen to UN peacekeeping operations indicating the expansion of Beijing's willingness to get involved in the internal affairs of sovereign countries.

To summarize China's participation in the UN peacekeeping operations, by 2013, China had dispatched 22,000 military personnel to 23 UN peacekeeping operations. The Chinese force suffered nine casualties. China is the biggest troop and police contributor among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. It also contributed the most numbers of troops for engineering transportation and medical support among all the 115 contributing countries. China also pays and contributes the largest share of UN peacekeeping costs among all developing countries.⁵⁵ This is in sharp contrast with its negative and passive attitudes toward peacekeeping in the 1970s.

These behavioral changes on the part of China were accompanied by conceptual changes regarding the peacekeeping operations. As mentioned earlier, China initially did not recognize the legitimacy of peacekeeping operations. In the 1970s, Beijing perceived the UN peacekeeping as "paving the way for superpower international interference and control." In the early 1980s, Beijing began to reconsider its position on the UN peacekeeping. Chinese diplomats in the UN declared that due to the changing international environment, the changing role of the UN peacekeeping and out of its sense of responsibility to the UN organizations and to world peace and the progressive cause of mankind, Beijing was ready to take more flexible stands to support some peacekeeping operations under the condition that these operations would be established according to the UN Charter and would be conducive to international peace and security as well as to maintaining national sovereignty and independence. Gradually Beijing took a more positive stance toward UN peacekeeping operations that has now in Beijing's eyes become an effective instrument to maintain international peace and security, reduce regional conflict, and resolve disputes.⁵⁶

Entering the twenty-first century, China further affirmed the usefulness of peacekeeping operations in maintaining international peace and security. In the words of a senior Chinese diplomat, although peacekeeping was not in the UN Charter, it was completely in accordance with the goals and principles of the UN Charter and had become "the most important and effective" means of materializing collective security. Blue helmet was the symbol of peace and the most wanted hope for millions who were suffering from conflict. Peacekeeping, according to him, had produced huge peace dividends with minimum investment and therefore it had to be further strengthened.⁵⁷ In short, in the Chinese view, the UN peacekeeping operation was an important component of the international collective security mechanism.

The evolution of China's perceptions and practice regarding the UN peacekeeping operations has gone a long way in the last four decades. Initially Beijing strongly opposed such actions out of ideological considerations. Then the public opposition turned into quiet nonparticipation in authorizing peacekeeping operations by the Security Council. Gradually nonparticipation was replaced by "reluctant participation." And finally reluctant participation became a more enthusiastic embrace of peacekeeping operations as a useful tool in maintaining international peace and security. As a result of these changes, China has become a leading major power in contributing to the legitimacy and effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations.

These perceptual and behavioral changes of course were brought about by a complex set of factors. Among other things, with an increase in China's national power and influence, China's articulation of its identity in the United Nations has been evolving.⁵⁸ When China was restored its seat in the United Nations, it tended to define itself as the spokesperson for the third world countries to fight against the domination of the two superpowers in the United Nations. Beijing considered the UN as a forum to publicize China's views on international issues and to criticize both the United States and Soviet Union. In other words, although China was already inside the United Nations, it still regarded itself as an outsider. Then the 1980s witnessed an all-out openness of China to the outside world. Western developed countries became critically important to the success of China's modernization drive. Consequently its role in the United Nations changed from fighter on behalf of the third world to a bridge between the South and North. China also began to participate more in the UN activities including peacekeeping, acting more as an insider rather than outsider. Entering the 1990s, China began to acquire a "double identity," that is, a developing country and a responsible major power at the same time. Beijing no longer indiscriminately opposes major powers playing leading roles in UN affairs, particularly in collective security.

These identity changes clearly found its influence in China's attitude toward UN peacekeeping operations. As a permanent member of the Security Council, China could no longer just sit doing nothing. With the

end of the Cold War and superpower rivalry, international community's demand for new peacekeeping missions was on a rise and Beijing did not want to be perceived as obstructionist in the eyes of UN members. The historical negative memory of the UN collective security gradually faded away with China's new role as one of the key decision makers and power brokers. Related to its overall increased positive evaluation of the United Nations, Beijing's support for peacekeeping operations also became stronger. As a result, China was more willing to make material and human contributions and provide moral support to peacekeeping operations. Over years, Beijing also discovered another advantage in supporting peacekeeping operations: showcasing that China was a responsible major power and was willing to make contributions to world governance in security areas. Moreover, the discipline and dedication of Chinese soldiers helped nurture a positive image of China on the world stage.

Nevertheless, while China's attitudes toward UN peacekeeping has changed from being negative to positive, from nonparticipation to active participation, its cognition and behavior are still constrained by historical and ideational baggage, displaying some uneasiness and reservations from time to time. For example, in the 1990s, China worried about the overreach and militarization of the UN peacekeeping operations. Then Chinese foreign minister Qiang Qishen noted that over years the UN peacekeeping operations had not only increased in quantity and scale, but also in power and responsibility. He held that in preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, and postwar peace building, the UN should strictly follow the principle of the UN Charter of respecting national sovereignty and noninterference in the internal affairs of another country. He opined that otherwise peacekeeping operations would not have positive results. He also cautioned about the limitation of peacekeeping operations. As he put it, the sources of conflict in the world were very complicated. It was unrealistic for the UN and Security Council to solve all the problems in the world. Therefore peacekeeping operations needed to take into consideration the resources of UN and try to be more selective in dispatching peacekeeping forces.⁵⁹ In other words, peacekeeping operations should be used as a supplementary for political solution and should not and cannot substitute political solution. Related to this, China also worried about the militarization of UN peacekeeping, expressing concerns about the practice of authorizing a small number of countries to monopolize peacekeeping operations.⁶⁰ During the 1990s, China was quite concerned with the monopoly of peacekeeping forces by a small number of pivotal states such as the United States.⁶¹ This probably served as another motivation for Beijing to increase its involvement in peacekeeping. Beijing held that peacekeeping operations should be genuinely multilateral and should not be hijacked by some major powers or military blocs for their own foreign policy agenda. Also peacekeeping should not be expanded at the cost of other UN mandates such as economic and social development.

China's embrace of peacekeeping operations is also constrained by its traditional concerns about the use of force and intervention in domestic

affairs. By far, China is more comfortable with the traditional Chapter VI or first generation of peacekeeping operations in which use of force is not allowed unless for self-defense and with the consent of the parties involved. Whenever there is an opportunity, Chinese officials always emphasize the importance of adhering to the three traditional principles of peacekeeping: consent of the parties, impartiality, nonuse of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate.⁶² China is often torn apart between the sensitivity of national sovereignty and noninterference in the domestic affairs of other countries and the necessity of regional and global governance. Although China is now more willing to get involved in other countries' internal affairs as compared to the past, it is still uncomfortable with any prospect of imposing economic and military enforcement in peacekeeping operations. Thus China often has difficulties in endorsing the so-called Chapter VII operations in which force can be used or second generation operations that have much broader mandates not just for peacekeeping but also for peace building that involve organizing, overseeing, and managing nation building process of the target country.

In comparison, however, Beijing is more willing to endorse peace building than peace enforcing in peacekeeping operations. For instance, the United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) established during 1992–1993 was one of the largest and the most intrusive peacekeeping operations in UN history as far as UN involvement in a sovereignty country's internal affairs is concerned. For more than a year, UNTAC actually ruled an independent sovereign country. In this sense, UNTAC was clearly a “second generation” operation. Beijing nevertheless was willing to throw its weight behind this mission. For the first time, China dispatched its blue-helmeted troops—a military unit of 800 PLA engineers to Cambodia and suffered its first casualties in peacekeeping operations. But all along, Beijing wanted to make sure that UNTAC was a Chapter VI operation rather than otherwise. Even after Khmer Rouge began to use violence to disrupt the election process and some UN officials suggested changing UNTAC from Chapter VI to Chapter VII, China did not want to go along.⁶³ One study shows that between 1988 and 1998, China voted for all traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping missions and all peace-building missions, but abstained from most Chapter VII peace enforcement missions.⁶⁴ But overall, entering the 1990s, China became more selective in voting on Chapter VII UN operations, supporting some missions while abstaining from others. Particularly since 1999, China voted in favor of almost all new United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs), many of which were mandated under Chapter VII with the authorization to use “all necessary means” to accomplish their missions.⁶⁵ Nevertheless Beijing still displays a tendency to take its support for Chapter VII operations as exceptions under special circumstances rather than rules.⁶⁶

Further reflecting China's reluctance in using force in peacekeeping operations, until very recently it had restrained from sending regular combat troops to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. This of course is related to China's conviction that such combat forces are not needed in

peacekeeping operations as Chinese understand them. From its perspective, sending in combat troops would inevitably change the nature of China's participation in peacekeeping missions and cause unnecessary and unpredictable complications. In addition, such a self-imposed restriction also indicates that Beijing could be haunted by its own rhetoric. Traditionally, in order to differentiate its foreign policy from other major powers, Beijing often boasted that it has no single soldier abroad and will not do so in future. Sending combat troops abroad, needless to say, will break this promise. Relatedly some also attribute this no-combat-troops tendency to its conservative attitude regarding Westphalia norms.⁶⁷ But some Chinese analysts argue that if China wants to maintain its high profile in peacekeeping, sending combat troops abroad might be inevitable.⁶⁸ There indeed have been some signs that this taboo might be beginning to break. It is reported that in the recent missions to Sudan and South Sudan, China already dispatched some infantries to protect the safety of noncombat forces.⁶⁹ More recently China dispatched 700 combat troops to South Sudan as part of the UN peacekeeping there. This is considered a first time for China.⁷⁰

Furthermore China's idiosyncratic national political and economic interests could come in the way of their intention of peacekeeping operations serving the broader interests and concerns of the international community. When the two are not on the same page, more often than not, China's national interest takes priority. Two typical examples are its decisions to veto the Security Council resolutions to send UN military observers to Guatemala in 1997 and to extend the peacekeeping troops in Macedonia in 1999. In both cases, China denied the Security Council mandate due to these countries' relations with Taiwan. Once again, this had to do with sovereignty. As a Chinese statement put it, a country could not do something that harms China's sovereignty and territorial integrity while asking for its support in the Security Council.⁷¹

Finally, China is still in the early stages of embracing the concept of global governance, particularly when such governance encroaches the boundaries of domestic governance of a sovereign state. Beijing strongly believes that in the final analysis, internal conflicts need to be sorted out by the people of that country themselves. Outside forces can help, but cannot substitute the indigenous solution to the problem. In this regard, what peacekeeping operations can accomplish is limited. In other words, it can only be used as a supplement to political solutions and cannot substitute political solution *per se*.

Sanctions and Use of Force

Related to China's uneasiness in endorsing Chapter VII peacekeeping operations discussed above, when it comes to more coercive enforcement of collection security, while Beijing does not reject such actions categorically as before, it is much less enthusiastic and more reserved in general as it

was once the victim of such actions and they run against China's normative preferences. Yet its thinking and practice on these issues, just like its attitudes toward the UN peacekeeping, has not been static and is moving closer toward the international norms. In terms of sanctions, it is fair to say that China supported UN sanctions under certain circumstances from the very beginning. For examples, as early as in the 1960s and the 1970s, Beijing strongly supported UN sanctions against the apartheid systems in South Africa and Rhodesia. It even asked for stronger sanctions against these countries. At that time, economic sanction was a seldom-used device and until 1990, South Africa and Rhodesia were the only two cases of economic sanctions authorized by the United Nations. In the post-Cold War period, however, collective economic and military sanction has become a more frequently used measure of collective security against the so-called rogue states. China has all along maintained that sanctions should be applied with prudence and only after all peaceful means have been exhausted. Beijing believes that the sanction mechanism of the UN should be improved. The UN should set stricter criteria for sanctions, make it more focused, establish more explicit time limits, and minimize the possibility of humanitarian crisis resulting from sanctions and its impact on the third country. However, once the Security Council decided to impose sanctions, all countries were obligated to strictly comply.⁷²

In the post-Cold War practice, China seldom supported the UN Security Council resolutions to impose economic sanctions against member states. To minimize the impact on China's relations with the countries that sponsored sanction resolutions, very often China abstained from voting. This behavioral pattern, however, began to change in recent years. With China's power and influence increasing in international affairs and its global interests ever expanding, Beijing's behavior of fence-sitting has been questioned more and more and the pressure on Beijing to take more clear positions on important security and governance issues are mounting. For example, nuclear proliferation issue has become a key item on the agenda of the Security Council in recent years, and as a result, China has to modify its stands on sanctions. Although unenthusiastically, China supported the Security Council resolutions to impose economic sanctions against Iran and Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) for their nuclear programs. In these cases, almost without exception, Beijing bargained at the negotiating table to reduce the severity of sanctions. Equally important, for Beijing the imposition of economic sanctions does not close the doors on diplomatic efforts to strike a deal with the target country. Moreover, China often insisted that sanctions should be focused on well-targeted items and should not affect normal economic and trade relations with the targeted countries. All these caveats for sanctions are described by China as the so-called double-track strategy. Economic sanctions, diplomatic dialogue, and normal trade relations could be carried out simultaneously.⁷³ By the same token, after China voted in favor of the Security Council Resolution 1874 to sanction DPRK in 2009, its ambassador hurried to tell the international

community that the Security Council resolution should not adversely affect North Korea's civilian welfare and development and should not affect humanitarian assistance to DPRK.⁷⁴ Yet in the meantime, Beijing declined to endorse economic sanctions against domestic situations such as civil wars, violence, human right violations, and the like. Beijing voted against the Security Council resolutions on Burma, Zimbabwe, and Sudan arguing that what happened in these countries was basically their internal matter and did not constitute a threat to international peace and security.

With regard to the direct use of force, Beijing is even more cautious. As discussed earlier, China holds that peaceful settlement of international disputes and nonuse of force in international relations is the most fundamental principle of the UN Charter and a basic norm of international law. It should not be compromised in any way. For this reason, Beijing considers that the current mechanism in the UN Charter on this issue is adequate and therefore does not need major changes. To this effect, Beijing holds that Article 51 of the Charter should remain as it is, neither being amended nor reinterpreted. For Beijing, the Charter lays down explicit provisions on the use of force: it should not be resorted to without authorization of the Security Council and only with the exception of self-defense under armed attack. Whether an urgent threat exists or not should be determined and handled with prudence by the Security Council in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter, taking into consideration of specific situations. Beijing believes that given the varying causes and nature of crises, it is both unrealistic and hugely controversial to formulate a "one-fits-all" rule or criterion on the use of force. Therefore whether to use force or not should be decided by the Security Council in light of the reality of conflicts on a case-by-case basis. Beijing also stresses that the only body that can decide the use of force is the Security Council and nothing else. For regional arrangements or organizations to take enforcement action, they must obtain Security Council's authorization.⁷⁵

Under the influence of mainstream traditional culture of pacifism, on balance China does not have a whole lot of faith in the effectiveness of using force in international affairs, pointing out that the enforcement or coercive actions cannot address the deep-rooted causes of international conflict.⁷⁶ In the post-Cold War and post-9/11 circumstances, the development of new rationale for the use of force against a sovereign state for domestic violation of human rights, development of WMD, and terrorist activities has frequently tested China's bottom line for supporting collective enforcement action. For example, the new issue of so-called humanitarian intervention emerged in the 1990s. Although Beijing so far has not officially endorsed this concept, Chinese scholars began to accept this notion. Some point out that the protection of human rights has experienced a change from domestic protection to international protection. Human rights protection should be the unison of domestic and international protection. Consequently international humanitarian intervention has its legitimacy. Therefore the problem does not lie in the humanitarian intervention per

se, but rather how it should be done. Chinese scholars strongly oppose the “unilateral humanitarian intervention.” Rather they argue that such intervention should be integrated into the UN collective security institution to avoid possible abuses by some major powers,⁷⁷ and therefore it is necessary to create a mechanism of humanitarian intervention under the UN collective security.⁷⁸

With regard to the new concept of the so-called responsibility to protect (R2P), Beijing holds that protection of its own population first and foremost should be the responsibility of any state government. Very often internal unrest in a country is caused by complex factors. United Nations needs to be very prudent in judging whether a government in question has the ability and the will to protect its citizens. No reckless intervention should be allowed. On the other hand, Beijing recognizes that when a massive humanitarian crisis occurs, it is the legitimate concern of the international community to ease and defuse the crisis. It falls on the Security Council to take decisions based on the UN framework, considering specific circumstances that would lead to a peaceful solution of the conflict. Moreover decisions of enforcement actions should be authorized on a case-by-case basis with prudence.⁷⁹ China insists that R2P should be strictly applied to four situations: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The implementation of R2P should not contravene “the principle of state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference of internal affairs.” After all, R2P is only a concept, and does not constitute a rule of international law yet. The international community is yet to form a consensus on this issue.⁸⁰

These cognitive orientations regarding collective enforcement actions of the UN have reflected in China's actual behavior in the UN practice of collective security. For example, for a long time, Beijing did not support the UN Security Council to use force against a sovereign country. The furthest that Beijing was willing to go in authorizing direct use of force was abstention, as exemplified by China's voting on the Security Council resolution to authorize the use of force in the first Persian Gulf War in 1991. The first time China explicitly supported the Security Council authorization to possibly use force against sovereign states was a series of antiterrorist resolutions passed by the Security Council after the 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001, which provided legal justifications for the United States to launch military attack against Afghanistan. On the other hand, China has not supported any collective security measures of using force against a sovereign country by any non-UN authorities. For example, China strongly opposed the NATO bombing of former Yugoslavia in 1998, which was considered by China as having done a serious damage to the authority of Security Council to maintain international peace and security. Beijing also did not support the American unilateral military campaign against Iraq and threatened to veto a possible Security Council resolution to give the United States such an authority.

To summarize, China's attitudes toward more coercive measures of UN collective security remain conservative and lukewarm, particularly when

it comes to dealing with the domestic situation of a sovereign state. Yet Beijing is not as rigid and doctrinaire as it was in the past and has modified its position when necessary. China's recent voting behavior seems to suggest this delicate situation. Initially the Chinese voting on the Security Council resolution against Libya in March 2011 seemed to indicate an interesting change in the Chinese behavior toward taking collective actions against a sovereign country because of its domestic situation. Beijing tacitly agreed to impose economic sanctions against Libya for the ill-treatment of its citizens, moving "it further away from its longstanding foreign policy based on non-intervention."⁸¹ This is in clear contrast to Beijing's determination to block economic sanctions against Sudan where human rights violations were arguably much worse than in Libya. Although the Chinese ambassador declared that China all along opposed the use of force in international relations and therefore had difficulties supporting the Security Council resolution 1973 on Libya, Beijing, by abstaining from voting, did not do much to prevent the Western air strike against Libya. However, Beijing apparently very soon regretted what it did, as consequently its abstention gave Western countries a green signal to take military actions against Libya with the Gaddafi regime toppled within months. Beijing obviously learned a lesson from the Libyan experience when it came to voting on the Syria issue. Together with Russia, Beijing vetoed three times the Security Council resolutions to impose economic sanctions under Chapter VII against Syria.⁸² Evidently China has not fundamentally changed its position on intervention in domestic affairs and use of coercive means against a sovereign state. If one looks at the veto record of China on substantial issues since its seat was restored in the United Nations in 1971, it has used vetoes nine times. Among those nine times, more than half of them are related to coercive actions of collective security to be authorized by the UN Security Council indicating that taking enforcement actions remains China's main concern as regards collective security.

Implications for Sino-US Cooperation

The above cursory review of Chinese orientation toward UN multilateralism in general and collective security in particular indicates that China and the United States greatly narrowed their perceptual and behavioral gap in managing international peace and security issues broadly defined within the framework of the United Nations. Both China and the United States now regard the United Nations as a useful and sometimes effective institution in maintaining international order in peace and security. Particularly in the post-Cold War era, China and the United States cooperated more than collided in the United Nations. This can be seen from the high percentage of voting convergence at the Security Council between the two countries. The interaction between China and the United States is certainly no longer a zero-sum and confrontational game as was between Soviet

Union and the United States during the heydays of the Cold War. However, in some aspects, China's conceptualization of the United Nations and its approach toward UN multilateralism and collective security still displays some distinct features that often make the two countries not see things eye to eye on the same issues.

Among other things, compared to the United States, China at least rhetorically emphasizes more the leading role of the United Nations in international affairs and centrality of UN in multilateralism and collective security. Beijing insists that any solution to major international issues should be sought within the framework of the United Nations. It opposes any unilateral or multilateral enforcement actions bypassing the United Nations.⁸³ For the United States, while the UN multilateral diplomacy is very important, it evidently is not the most important component of American foreign policy. Instead, America's non-UN security arrangements such as bilateral and multilateral security alliances are more crucial in maintaining the US-preferred international security order. For Washington, where important US interests are involved, it is legitimate for the United States to take unilateral or non-UN multilateral enforcement actions against rogue states. Indeed there has been a constant debate within the United States about the usefulness of the United Nations. For some Congressmen and politicians, the United Nations is a rat hole that sucks in the American resources without doing much good to US interests. They advocate that the United States should reduce its financial support to the United Nations and its action of freedom should not be in anyway restrained by the United Nations. In China, however, there is no such debate. Most Chinese hold positive views about this organization. As mentioned earlier, from the historical perspective, China very much cherishes its major power status given by the UN. China also detects a utility-oriented orientation in American approach toward the United Nations. Some Chinese analysts believe that for the United States, the United Nations is more an instrument or tool rather than a purpose per se. Very often the United States attempted to use the UN as a cover for its hegemonic or unilateral actions. To echo this sentiment, former Chinese president Jiang Zemin made a pointed criticism of those countries that adopted a "use it when it is needed and abandon it when it is not" approach to the United Nations.⁸⁴

Constraining the American hegemony in particular and Western dominance in international affairs in general is exactly the role some Chinese hope the United Nations could play. One of the major Chinese foreign policy objectives in the post-Cold War era is multipolarization. While multipolarization in the past was often regarded as a function of shifting balance of power, China now has more closely associated multipolarization with multilateralism on a global scale. In other words, multilateralism is instrumental to the formation of multipolarization because multilateralism is often associated with another term China has used very frequently in foreign policy statements—democratization of international relations. Multilateralism is useful in promoting democracy in international relations

in a sense that it could “bring about a new regime in which all countries are equal and no country has the right to impose its will on others.”⁸⁵ The political implication for China is quite clear: while the post–Cold War unipolar power structure in which the United States enjoys a privileged status as a sole superpower may continue in the foreseeable future, multilateralism might put some checks and balance on American power. In a multilateral system, China’s freedom of action might be constrained, but so would that of the United States. Therefore, particularly after the Bush administration came to power, China increasingly defines its diplomatic strategy as multilateral to contrast with the perceived US unilateralism.

In other words, UN multilateralism is increasingly perceived as a more effective tool to counterbalance US hegemonism. Some analysts and officials regard UN collective security as the only, if not always an effective, check on unilateralism represented by the United States. They point out that in today’s world, the United States is the sole superpower that is exercising unilateralism in many areas. No single power is able to restrain American unilateral impulse. Relatively speaking, United Nations is the most effective mechanism to put some limitations on American unilateralism although it is not the perfect one. The United Nations is the best venue for developing countries to criticize Washington and stop its excesses. Without the United Nations, American unilateralism will run even more rampant.⁸⁶

In addition, Beijing is often at odds with Washington regarding the nature, scope, and utility of the UN collective security. As discussed earlier, philosophically and culturally China does not have much faith in the effectiveness of coercive means to resolve international conflict. Chinese leaders and diplomats have often pointed out that the use of force can only bring short-term and temporary relief to the situation, rather than a long-term solution to the problems. In Chinese president Hu Jintao’s words, “coercive measures alone will not solve the problem for good. What is achieved through dialogue and negotiation may last much longer.”⁸⁷ Therefore they often called for prudence and caution for the UN to authorize coercive actions against member states. Chinese officials and scholars intrinsically dislike American and to a lesser extent Western countries’ tendencies to easily sanction and to use threat of force against other countries. Beijing endorses enforcement action in collective security only to a very limited number of situations, such as clear-cut aggression against or invasion of another country and massive scale of humanitarian crisis, narrower than what the United States is willing to do in terms of using force.

After the 9/11 terrorist attack, the Bush administration put out a new doctrine of using force against a sovereign country—preemptive strike, which Beijing strongly opposed. According to some Chinese observers, this doctrine is a manifestation of America’s new imperialism, violation of international law, and a challenge to the authority of the United Nations. In a nutshell, preemptive strike is not self-defense, but crude aggression without any morality and legitimacy.⁸⁸ Together with other major powers,

Beijing thwarted the US attempt to use UN as a cover for its preemptive strike against Iraq.

In recent years, however, China and the United States gradually came to a fragile consensus on applying collective security measures to another international security issue area—nuclear nonproliferation. It is a breakthrough that China agreed to the Security Council resolution of imposing sanctions against North Korea and Iran, two close allies/friends of China, even though Beijing made efforts to water down the content of sanctions to make them less intrusive and painful for the target country. But even when Beijing supported sanctions against Iran and North Korea, Beijing held a firm line on how far the UN should go. In cases of both Iran and North Korea, Beijing made it very clear that under any circumstance, use of force was out of question.⁸⁹ In contrast, Washington has never ruled out the possibility of using force against Iran and North Korea.

Yet when it comes to the application of coercive means of collective security to influence other countries' domestic situations, China and the United States went apart again. China normally did not support economic sanctions against countries for their poor domestic governance, and in most cases opposed the use of force in civil wars unless these conflicts presented a clear and present danger to regional and international peace and security. Even for the form of collective security that Beijing favours most, that is, UN peacekeeping operations, China feels more comfortable with the Chapter VI operations where no use of force was allowed unless for self-defense. It is more reluctant to support the Chapter VII peacekeeping operations, which authorizes use of force when necessary. This force-averse orientation is once again in contrast with the American approach, which emphasizes punitive aspect of collective security. Hence, while the United States has a tendency to rely upon external coercive means to bring about "regime change" within a country, China strongly opposes such a usage of coercion to interfere into a country's domestic political development. As discussed earlier, recent episodes in Libya and Syria further illustrate the divergence between the two countries on UN collective security. Of course, as discussed throughout this chapter, China's stands on collective intervention of domestic affairs has become "softer" compared to its traditional pattern and deviation can be detected from time to time. In this regard, some Chinese scholars point out that increasingly Beijing may pursue a double standard on international intervention of domestic affairs opposing the UN collective security in some cases while being more tolerant in other cases depending on its assessment of China's overall interest involved.⁹⁰ If that is the case, China will become a lot like the United States, a country Beijing often accuses of having a double standard in international affairs.

Conclusion

China's perception and practice regarding UN collective security today is vastly different from what it believed and preached when it just joined the

United Nations in the 1970s. Collective security was once perceived as a “great scourge,” a synonym for imperialist intervention and superpower domination. Now collective security is a legitimate word in the international vocabulary of Chinese leaders and elites, although for historical reasons, they still prefer other discourses such as cooperative security and common security.

China’s perceptual and behavioral evolution regarding UN collective security in a fundamental sense resulted from its changing interest, power status, and identity in the United Nations in the last few decades. When collective security was largely a game of superpowers and Western powers, Beijing tended to view it negatively. Now that China enjoys a privileged status as a permanent member of the Security Council and has an equal say at the decision-making table, collective security could be a positive endeavour for Beijing. However, interest and power alone cannot completely explain Beijing’s preference in defining and exercising collective security in particular and in the related world order in general. While Beijing’s policies toward UN collective security, just like other major powers, are basically interest-driven, its cultural tradition, historical legacy, and normative concerns have played powerful roles in conditioning China’s acceptance and support of UN collective security.

Heavily influenced by its historical experience in modern times, overall China’s approach toward UN collective security is still largely sovereignty-sensitive and state-centric. As a result, Beijing’s policy toward UN collective security is often troubled by its worry about intervention in domestic affairs and use of force and other coercive means in addressing international security concerns. This, from time to time, sets Beijing apart from the United States and other Western powers in their policy preferences, causing friction and even conflict and reducing the effectiveness of the UN collective security. China has been reactive rather than proactive in initiating collective security measures in the United Nations. Even though it has become more actively reactive recently, it is nevertheless still reactive.⁹¹ It is still reluctant to send combat forces to get directly involved UN enforcement actions. However, Beijing’s conception and practice on these issues are by no means static but evolving with time. The general trend is that it has been moving toward the international mainstream. While conceptually and rhetorically Beijing has to stick with its traditional and often internalized discourse, in practice, it often demonstrates more flexibilities. Indeed some senior Chinese diplomats also noticed the increasing gap between the reality of China’s interventional behavior under the banner of the United Nations and the diehard conception of nonintervention in internal affairs.⁹²

China’s basic approach toward UN collective security does have serious implications for Sino-US relations. The two countries are often at odds over the goals and means of UN collective security measures as most recently demonstrated by their discord over Syria. But more profoundly, the two countries do not always see eye to eye on the international order pertained in the UN collective security. For China the United Nations Security

Council is the sole source of legitimacy for collective security.⁹³ For the United States, however, the United Nations is only one of the legitimate mechanisms for practicing collective security.

Notes

1. Thomas Christensen, "Pride, Pressure, and Politics: The Roots of China's Worldview," in Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang, eds., *In the Eyes of the Dragon, China Views the World* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 240.
2. Samuel Kim, "China and the United Nations," in Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, eds., *China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), 42–89.
3. Zheng Yongnian, "Asia's Security Dilemma and the Building of Asian Collective Security System," *Peace and Development*, No. 5 (2011): 2–3.
4. Ya Zicheng and Wang Rihua, "Schools of Diplomatic Thought during the Period of Spring and Autumn and Warring Parties," *Science of International Politics*, No. 2 (2006): 118–120.
5. Li Zhaojie, "Legacy of Modern Chinese History: Its Relevance to the Chinese Perspective of the Contemporary International Legal Order," *Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law*, No. 5 (2001): 318–319.
6. "Backgrounder: Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence," [www.chinaview.cn](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-04/08/content_2803638.htm), April 8, 2005, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-04/08/content_2803638.htm (accessed April 13, 2015).
7. Dai Bingguo, "Remarks at the opening ceremony to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the declaration of FPPC," June 27, 2014, <http://www.cpifa.org/q/listQuarterlyArticle.do?articleId=222> (accessed April 14, 2015).
8. "China's Position Paper on the New Security Concept," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, August 6, 2002.
9. Zheng Yongnian, "Sino-American Relations and the Future of Asian Collective Security," [zaobao.com](http://www.zaobao.com), October 18, 2011, <http://www.zaobao.com/special/report/politic/sino-us/story20111018-98355> (accessed April 15, 2015).
10. For example, "common security" and "cooperative security" were mentioned in the white paper, "China's Peaceful Development," Information Office of the State Council, The People's Republic of China, September 2011, Beijing, http://english.gov.cn/official/2011-09/06/content_1941354_2.htm (accessed December 28, 2014).
11. Gareth Evans, "Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1994, 7.
12. Li Zhaoxing, "Peace, Development and Cooperation—Banner for China's Diplomacy in the New Era," August 22, 2005, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t208032.htm>.
13. Ren Xiao, "From Collective Security to Cooperative Security," *World Economic and Politics*, No. 4 (1998): 10–12.
14. Zheng Yongnian, "Sino-American Relations and the Future of Asian Collective Security," [zaobao.com](http://www.zaobao.com), October 18, 2011.
15. James M. Burns, *Roosevelt, the Soldier of Freedom*, Book club edition (New York: History Book Club, 2006), 404.
16. Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *China-Burma-India Theater: Stilwell's Mission to China* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1953), 357, 362.
17. Pu Ping, "The Features and Limitations of China's UN Diplomacy," *Teaching and Research*, No. 6 (2009): 84.

18. Wang Jie, *On International Mechanism* (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 2002), 459.
19. Liu Xiong, "A Preliminary Analysis of the Evolution of Ma Zedong's Thinking on Restoring China's Legal Rights in the United Nations," *Party History Research & Teaching*, Supplementary Issue No. 1 (2001): 81–82.
20. Li Caiyi, "An Explanation why Mao Advocated that China is in no Hurry to Enter the United Nations," *Party History Research & Teaching*, No. 6 (2001): 38.
21. Xiong, "A Preliminary Analysis," 81–82.
22. "Chen Jian: United Nations and China," <http://hi.baidu.com/sfsw/biog/item/622549606083b65feb8a9.html> (accessed March 20, 2012).
23. Caiyi, "An Explanation why Mao Advocated that China is in no hurry to enter the United Nations," 37.
24. Ibid.
25. "Days and Nights before China's Return to the United Nations, Chairman Mao Gave Instructions Personally," http://www.china.com.cn/international/txt/2011-10/20/content_23678640.htm (accessed March 22, 2012).
26. "Resumption of China's Lawful Seat in United Nations," *People Daily*, September 16, 2009, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/SpecialReports/2009-09/16/content_4088504.htm (accessed March 22, 2012).
27. "Zhou Nan Remembers inside Stories about China's Return to UN," *Communist Party Members*, No. 18 (2007): 47.
28. A Chinese scholar of international relations mentioned an interesting anecdote in his article on multilateralism. A general of the Chinese Defense University warned him: "China should not get involved in multilateral diplomacy. It is not suitable for China. You scholars could do a lot in other areas, but don't touch this subject. In any case, for China, multilateralism will do more harm than good." Wang Yizhou, "China in the New Century and Multilateral Diplomacy," *The Pacific Journal*, No. 4 (2001): 3.
29. See my discussion in "Managing Conflict: Chinese Perspectives on Multilateral Diplomacy and Collective Security," in Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang, eds., *In the Eyes of the Dragon*, 75–81.
30. "Chinese Foreign Policy after the 16th CPC National Congress," China.org.cn translated by Zheng Guihong, December 18, 2002.
31. "The Evil Record of the United Nations in Asian and African Region," *People's Daily*, November 19, 1965.
32. Han Nianlong, ed., *China Today: Diplomacy* (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Science Press, 1987), 384. Chinese scholar Yan Xuetong observed that the multilateral orientation in China's diplomacy gained momentum in mid-1990s with 1996 as a watershed. Since 2000, multilateralism, according to him, has become a dominant aspect of Chinese diplomacy. See "Multilateralism and Chinese Diplomacy," *Teaching and Research*, No. 8 (2005): 14.
33. Zhang Guihong, "A Preliminary Exploration of China's UN Diplomacy," *Forum of International Issues* (Summer 2008), http://www.21ccom.net/articles/qqsww/zlwj/article_2010072614162.html (accessed April 14, 2015).
34. Nianlong, *China Today: Diplomacy*, 384.
35. "Qian Qichen Delivered a Speech at the UN conference," *People's Daily*, September 28, 1995; "China's Position Paper on UN Reforms," *Xinhua*, June 8, 2005.
36. "Chinese, Russian Leaders Call for Strengthened UN Authority," *Xinhua News Agency*, September 25, 2003.
37. Jiang Zemin, "Let's Work Together to Build a Better World," October 24, 1995, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-03/15/content_2700416.htm (accessed December 17, 2014).
38. "Hu Urges more support for U.N.," CNN.com, October 24, 2003.

39. "To Enhance the Role of the United Nations, in Promotion of Peace and Development," statement by Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing at general debate of the 58th session of the UN General Assembly, <http://un.fmprc.gov.cn/leng/56633.html> (accessed March 25, 2012).
40. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Position Paper of the People's Republic of China at the 63rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly," September 16, 2008.
41. Guihong, "APreliminary Exploration of China's UN Diplomacy."
42. "China's Position Paper on the New Security Concept."
43. "China's Position Paper on UN Reforms."
44. Chen Dongxiao, "The UN Collective Security Mechanism and China's Security Environment," *Contemporary International Affairs*, No. 9 (2004): 13.
45. Chui Lei, "The Dilemma of Collective Security and China's Countermeasures," *Leadership Digest*, No. 3 (2003): 20.
46. Samuel S. Kim, *China, the United Nations, and World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 209.
47. Tang Jiayu and Hong Minfu, "The Retrospect and Prospect of PLA's Participation in the International Peacekeeping Operations," *Party History Survey*, No. 4 (2010), 5.
48. Kim, *China, the United Nations, and World Order*, 219, 232.
49. Ibid.
50. Bennett A. Leroy, *International Organizations, Principles and Issues* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1995), 100.
51. Zhou Qi, "China's Attitudes towards UN Peacekeeping Actions: Change and its Causes," <http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=49167> (accessed March 25, 2012).
52. Nianlong, *China Today: Diplomacy*, 385.
53. Xiao Yu, "China and UN Peacekeeping Operations," *Beijing Review*, October 2–8, 1995, 16.
54. The above information is provided by China's *National Defense in 1998*, *China's National Defense in 2000*, and *China's National Defense in 2002*. Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Beijing, 1998, 2000, and 2002.
55. *The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces*, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, April 2013, Beijing.
56. Zhou Qi, "China's Attitudes towards UN Peacekeeping Actions: Change and its Causes."
57. Assistant Foreign Minister Shen Guofang, "We Come for Peace," November 3, 2004, <http://hi.baidu.com/%CD%F5%BF%AA%E5%B0/blog/item/962c3ffac607e51ea8d311c1.html> (accessed March 26, 2012).
58. Chen Jian, a veteran UN diplomat and former undersecretary of the United Nations presented a very interesting discussion about China's identity change in the United Nations in his book, *Diplomacy—Making the World towards Harmony* (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2012), see "Chen Jian Talks about the World Diplomacy: China's Diplomacy in the United Nations," http://cul.china.com.cn/2012-07/24/content_5186689_2.htm (accessed January 2, 2015).
59. *People's Daily*, September 28, 1995.
60. *People's Daily*, April 14, 1997.
61. Stefan Stahle, "China's Shifting Attitude towards United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," *China Quarterly*, September 2008, 643.
62. Chinese representative Counselor Tian Ling spoke on the issue of peacekeeping at the Fourth Committee of the 66th UN General Assembly, October 26, 2011, <http://>

- www.china-un.org/chn/zgylhg/jjalh/alhzh/whxd/t871088.htm (accessed March 26, 2012).
63. See Jianwei Wang, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia* (United Nations: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996).
 64. Yin He, "China's Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations," *Asia Paper*, July 2007, Institute for Security & Development Policy, 26, http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2007_he_chinas-changing-policy.pdf (accessed January 5, 2015).
 65. *Ibid.*, 26, 39.
 66. Qi, "China's Attitudes towards UN Peacekeeping Actions: Change and its Causes," 58.
 67. Yin He, "China's Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations," 67.
 68. "China's Sending of Combat Troops to Participate Peacekeeping Operations Is Imperative," http://www.jundao360.com/topic_5749128.html (accessed December 15, 2014).
 69. "Defense Department Responds to the Report that China Sent Infantries Overseas for the First Time: Self-Protection," http://www.guancha.cn/Science/2012_02_24_66472.shtml (accessed December 15, 2014).
 70. "Chinese combat troops will be sent overseas for peacekeeping for the first time and 700 soldiers will be deployed in Southern Sudan," <http://www.19lou.com/forum-289-thread-3691411686659161-1-1.html> (accessed April 14, 2015).
 71. "China Vetoes use of UN Personnel to Supervise Peace Agreement in Guatemala," *Washington Post*, January 11, 1997.
 72. "China's Position on UN Reform," *Xinhua*, June 8, 2005.
 73. "Well-Informed Chinese Officials Talks about Four Reasons why China Voted to Support Resolution to Sanction Iran," *Xinhua*, May 18, 2010.
 74. "Ambassador Zhang Yeshui: The Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Issue Should Never Be the Use of Force or the Threat of the Use of Force," June 12, 2009, <http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/chinese/detail/126790.html> (accessed March 28, 2012).
 75. *Ibid.*
 76. "Uphold the Authority of the Security Council and Strengthen Collective Security Mechanism," statement by President Hu Jintao at the UN Security Council Summit, September 14, 2005.
 77. Mu Yaping and Xiangling, "Realistic Dilemma Caused by Humanitarian Intervention and the Rules of International Law," http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?db=art&gid=335575585 (accessed March 28, 2012).
 78. Xu Chuxu and Lu Meili, "On the Necessity of Establishing a Mechanism of Humanitarian Intervention under the UN Collective Security System," *Article.chinalawinfo.com*, http://article.chinalawinfo.com/Article_Detail.asp?ArticleID=42783&Type=mod (accessed December 20, 2014).
 79. "China's Position Paper on UN Reforms."
 80. "Statement by Ambassador Liu Zhenmin at the Plenary Session of the General Assembly on the Question of 'Responsibility to Protect,'" July 24, 2009, Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China, <http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t575682.htm> (accessed December 22, 2014).
 81. "China takes new tack in Libya vote," *Wall Street Journal*, March 20, 2011.
 82. "Friction at the U.S. as Russia and China Veto another Resolution on Syria Sanctions," *New York Times*, July 19, 2012.
 83. Guihong, "A Preliminary Exploration of China's UN Diplomacy."
 84. "Statement by H.E. Jiang Zemin, President of the People's Republic of China, at the Millennium Summit of the United Nations," September 6, 2000.

85. "US Policy Reeking of Unilateralism," *China Daily*, April 1, 2003.
86. "The United Nations Has Made Great Contributions to the Maintenance of World Peace and Global Development," <http://chinese.dwnnews.com/news/2011-06-03/57776036.html> (accessed March 28, 2012).
87. "Statement by President Hu Jintao of China at the UN Security Council Summit," New York, September 14, 2005.
88. Wang Fuchun, "Four Points about Bush Jr.'s Strategy of Preemption," <http://cssm.gov.cn/view.php?id=1021> (accessed March 29, 2012).
89. "Ambassador Zhang Yeshui: The Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Issue..."
90. "China Takes New Tack in Libya Vote," *Wall Street Journal*, March 20, 2011.
91. As a veteran Chinese UN diplomat admitted, China has almost never made initiatives in the United Nations. No single agenda item and no resolutions were put forward by China, "Chen Jian: United Nations and China," op. cit.
92. "Chen Jian Talks about the World Diplomacy: China's Diplomacy in the United Nations," http://cul.china.com.cn/2012-07/24/content_5186689_2.htm (accessed December 22, 2014).
93. Chinese leaders and officials very often emphasize the United Nations as the core of the collective security mechanism. "Written Speech by H. E. Hu Jintao President of the People's Republic of China at the High-Level Plenary Meeting of the United Nations' 60th Session," September 16, 2005, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t213091.htm> (accessed December 25, 2014).

Part III

Global Economic Governance

Is There an Exceptional American Approach to Global Economic Governance?

Daniel W. Drezner

Introduction

Over the past two decades, the People's Republic of China has entered into a dense web of international economic institutions.¹ The United States, in turn, has attempted to exploit China's turn toward the multilateral to advance its own interests. On issues ranging from intellectual property rights to climate change to macroeconomic surveillance, the United States has simultaneously welcomed China into multilateral structures while pressuring Beijing to embrace the spirit of global economic norms.² This has been part and parcel of US foreign economic policy since the beginning of the post-1945 international economic order.³

This American perspective on world economic order often appears to be cast in stone. Since the United States was the progenitor of current global economic governance structures, it would not be surprising to observe Washington adopt a firmly multilateralist position in its foreign economic policy. Another look at the empirical record, however, reveals multiple, overlapping American approaches to global economic governance. Interlaced with multilateralism has been a US willingness to create, manipulate, or threaten to exit multilateral structures in order to advance particular interests. In modern parlance, this approach would be called forum-shopping,⁴ or as Fukuyama⁵ phrased it, "multi-multilateralism." There is also a historical legacy, stretching back to the nineteenth century, of assertive unilateralism in American foreign economic policy.⁶

How can these different strands of American foreign economic policy be reconciled? What are the implications of these strands for American cooperation with China? This chapter assesses the American approach to global economic norms and regimes for the past century and a half, with close

attention to the role that power, interests, and “basket three”—traditions, ideas, and historical legacies—play in shaping America’s approach to the rules, regulations, and institutions that govern the global economy. While power and interest clearly affect the broad contours of the US approach to global economic governance, a historical institutionalist approach—which stresses the role of traditions and historical legacies—is necessary to explain both continuity and change in US policies. With an initial posture toward mercantilism in trade and cooperation in monetary affairs, the evolution of American foreign economic policy has been toward greater openness and multilateralism over time. What is distinctive about the American approach, however, is that US deviations from global governance structures have been justified with the logic that these defections have been committed to reinforce core multilateral norms. If historical institutionalism is the primary explanatory driver behind both American and Chinese approaches to global economic governance, then Sino-American economic conflicts will not be reconciled anytime soon.

The rest of this chapter is divided into five sections. The next section examines the competing theoretical explanations for a great power’s approach to global economic governance and sets up contrasting hypotheses. The third section provides a stylized history of American engagement with global economic norms and regimes. The fourth section evaluates the performance of these theoretical takes. The fifth section concludes with a prospective look at the future of US engagement with global governance structures, and how this will shape, define, and limit Sino-American relations in the future.

Explaining American Foreign Economic Policy

There are three prominent paradigmatic approaches to explaining American engagement with global economic norms and global economic governance. A *power-based approach* assumes that the American state retains autonomy from societal forces and can guide foreign economic policy through calculations of national interest.⁷ According to realists, power is the guiding factor behind US foreign economic policy.⁸ The more powerful the United States, the more willing it should be to embrace global governance structures—because, realists argue, Washington can translate its economic power into influencing the rules within these governance structures.

A power-based approach predicts that US engagement with global economic governance is a function of its position in the global distribution of power. As a rising power, the United States had minimal input into the extant global economic order—and therefore less incentive to adhere to global economic norms. As one great power among many, the United States had a greater interest in pursuing relative gains rather than investing in global public goods.⁹ When US power reached hegemonic status, it had the ability to remake the international economic order in its own image.¹⁰ Realists posit that the United States should be more willing to adhere to

multilateral economic norms when Washington manages the rules and regulations of the international system. If American power begins to wane, realists would predict a renewed emphasis on relative gains concerns. Only when the United States holds a preeminent hegemonic position should it wholeheartedly embrace global economic norms.

An *interest-based approach* assumes that pluralistic interests are the starting point for US policy preferences.¹¹ In adopting a reductionist view of the workings of markets and politics, this approach builds up national policy preferences by assessing the constellation of domestic interests and institutions, using models like Stolper-Samuelson and Ricardo-Viner to derive policy preferences.¹² The key is determining which coalition is preeminent at a particular moment in time. A coalition is dominant if it can exercise majoritarian control over key policymaking structures. The material interests of dominant coalitions that capture key policymaking institutions will therefore determine US engagement with global economic governance structures.

This interest-based approach predicts engagement or disengagement with global economic norms based on the relative factor mobility of labor and capital—as well as the competitiveness and productivity of different economic sectors. Hiscox¹³ observes that after 1920, intersectoral factor mobility in the United States started to decline, with a precipitous decline starting after World War II. Using the logic of pluralism, prior to 1920, class-based coalitions should have dominated foreign economic policy, whereas after World War II sector-specific interests should predominate. Given the relative productivity of different sectors and factors of production, this approach posits that prior to 1920, labor—as the locally abundant factor—should have preferred more integrationist policies, whereas capital should have preferred more protectionist policies. Given the relative size of these classes, labor preferences should have won out during the pre-1920 period. Because of America's preeminent economic position after World War II, the more competitive sectors should have overwhelmed import-competitive sectors and pushed for greater openness and integration. Over time, however, as more sectors became import-competing during the latter half of the twentieth century, a larger collection of interest groups policies should have pushed for greater protection, driving US policy toward disengagement from global economic governance.

Consistent with Ikenberry and Wang's introduction, a *historical institutionalist approach* emphasizes the role that American traditions, ideas, and historical legacies play in creating policy feedbacks and path-dependent policies.¹⁴ According to this logic, policymaking institutions embody the founding ideas of their creators.¹⁵ In contrast to an interest-based approach, a basket three approach argues that policymaking traditions shape the preferences of interest groups, which in turn reinforce the stability of the original set of policy preferences.¹⁶ As time passes, the reinforcement between actor preferences and the rules that bind them make it increasingly unlikely that policies will be changed endogenously.

The only sources of profound change are shocks to the system. These kinds of shocks can either be truly exogenous—like a global power shift—or the endogenous buildup of contradictions that triggers a crisis—like the accumulation of policies that triggered the Smoot Hawley Tariff of 1930. Crises of this magnitude will sweep aside institutional barriers or entrenched interests with a stake in the policy status quo. It is at these junctures when governments exploit the crisis to create new expert policymaking institutions that supersede or supplant existing ones.¹⁷

To precisely determine the role that traditions and historical legacies play, the starting point for historical institutionalists would be to observe the ambiguous relationship between founding American ideas and US engagement with multilateral economic structures. Starting with Alexander Hamilton's¹⁸ famous report on manufactures, a fledgling United States adopted a mercantilist approach to foreign trade.¹⁹ In his report, Hamilton concluded: "Not only the wealth but the independence and security of a country appear to be materially connected with the prosperity of manufactures. Every nation, with a view to these great objects, ought to endeavor to possess within itself all the essentials of national supply."²⁰ Hamilton's approach was wary of the invisible hand as a guide for economic development.²¹ American exceptionalism enhanced this aversion to economic multilateralism. A fear of "entangling alliances," combined with a belief in the superiority of domestic arrangements to international ones, left the United States reluctant to embrace or adhere to global economic rules and regulations.²²

Historical institutionalists would predict a path-dependent American hostility to economic multilateralism. US policies and institutions empower interest groups supportive of founding American ideas. Only an exogenous shock—such as war or depression—would cause a dramatic shift in the US approach. At a moment of crisis, new ideas and new institutions can supplant existing policies.²³ American policy elites increasingly warmed to economic globalization and liberal internationalism as the twentieth century wore on.²⁴ Each successive shock during that century would be expected to nudge the United States into greater cooperation with global economic governance.

Table 5.1 outlines the predictions each approach would make during the different eras of American history. Obviously, not all theoretical approaches fit neatly into these categories.²⁵ Nevertheless, as a first approximation, these three contending theoretical approaches best represent the current state of play in explaining American approaches to global economic governance. The key periods that provide contrasting predictions are the first era of globalization, the interwar period, and the post-Bretton Woods era. It is during these eras that either a power- or interest-based approach would stress a more radical shift in policy preferences. The basket three approach, however, would stress greater continuity with the legacy of past policies.

Table 5.1 Predicting US engagement with international economic norms

<i>Historical Era</i>	<i>Power-Based</i>	<i>Interest-Based</i>	<i>Basket Three</i>
First era of globalization (1860–1914)	Mercantilism and unilateralism	Openness and multilateralism	Mercantilism and unilateralism
Interwar period (1919–1939)	Strong shift toward openness, multilateralism	Weakening preference for openness and multilateralism	Conflicting preferences: old preferences for closure fade in favor of openness, multilateralism
Bretton Woods (1941–1971)	Multilateralism and openness	Multilateralism and openness	Multilateralism and openness, with past exceptions grandfathered in
Post-Bretton Woods (1971–1991)	Moderate shift toward selective closure	Increase in sectoral exceptions to multilateral norms	Multilateralism and openness with fewer exceptions
Washington Consensus (1991–2008)	Multilateralism and openness	Further increase in sectoral exceptions	Multilateralism and openness

A Stylized History of US Approaches to Global Economic Governance

To examine the relative validity of these contrasting theoretical takes, this section offers a stylized historical overview of US engagement with international economic norms from 1860–2008. The year 1860 is chosen as the starting point, rather than 1776, because both technological and policy constraints restricted cross-border exchange between sovereign states prior to that date.²⁶ It was not until the mass liberalization of the European economies that nonmercantilist global economic norms really existed. This section segments the past 150 years into clearly defined eras, as consistent with prior macrohistorical work on the global political economy.²⁷

The First Era of Globalization: 1860–1914

The 1860 Cobden-Chevalier trade treaty between France and Great Britain is the starting point for talking about global economic governance. That treaty, combined with a rash of technological innovations that dramatically lowered the transaction costs of cross-border exchanges, triggered a plethora of international economic arrangements that were negotiated among the major European economies.²⁸ The most-favored nation clause led to a wave of economic liberalization across Europe.²⁹ The British-led

gold standard became a global monetary norm by 1880.³⁰ The 1883 Paris Convention and the 1886 Berne Convention codified understandings on international intellectual property rights.³¹ Although the European states veered toward policy closure between 1880 and 1914, the overall norms of the international economic system nevertheless sustained a bias toward openness.³² The principal exception to this bias toward openness was the expansion of colonial and imperial preference systems. As the major European economies and Japan expanded their colonial dominions, they also ensured that the imperial center would retain preferential access to these economies.

During this same period the United States dramatically augmented its industrial and manufacturing power, yet remained a very minor actor in the global economy.³³ Consistent with its pre-1860 approach, Washington by and large rejected established global norms on economic openness during this first era of globalization. The US government did not sign any trade treaty during this period, and let its sole existing treaty with Canada expire. As Krasner observes: "The United States was basically protectionist throughout the nineteenth century. The high tariffs imposed during the Civil War continued with the exception of a brief period in the 1890's. There were no major duty reductions before 1914."³⁴ Indeed, the US government rejected the very idea of "most-favored nations" clauses in trade treaties until the 1920s.³⁵

As an importer of technology during the late nineteenth century, the American position on intellectual property rights also emphasized free-riding. The United States did not sign the Berne Convention, and domestic US law rejected the "national treatment" standard enshrined in both property rights conventions.³⁶ With a few exceptions,³⁷ the United States refrained from colonial expansion during this period and rejected a "spheres of influence" approach to economic relations with emerging markets. Secretary of State John Hay's "Open Door" notes with respect to China exemplified this policy during the late nineteenth century.³⁸

The sole exception to American rejection of global economic norms was on monetary diplomacy. The United States participated in the myriad monetary conferences of the era.³⁹ In 1879 the United States adopted the gold standard and remained on it throughout the entire era. This decision, however, was nearly reversed in the mid-1890s due to powerful domestic interests. The deflationary spiral of that period led to strong domestic pressures to switch back to bimetallism. The Bland-Allison Act of 1878 and the Sherman Act of 1890 created a limited obligation for the government to coin silver, and financial markets were wary of further steps toward bimetallism.⁴⁰ William Jennings Bryan's famous "Cross of Gold" speech epitomized the Midwestern populist pressures for the United States to abandon the global standard and allow for inflating the price level. In their *Monetary History of the United States*, Friedman and Schwartz observe, "The silver forces were strong enough to obtain concessions that shook confidence in the maintenance of the gold standard, yet they were not

strong enough to obtain the substitution of silver for gold as the monetary standard. The monetary history of this period is therefore one of repeated crises and of legislative backing and filling.”⁴¹ Barry Eichengreen observes that “doubts about the depth of the US commitment to the prevailing dollar price of gold were prevalent until the turn of the century.”⁴² Only the post-1897 cluster of gold discoveries (in combination with the high 1897 Dingley Tariff) eased this political pressure, as it had the same desired effect of inflating the currency.⁴³ With the 1900 Gold Standard act, doubts about the American commitment to gold were erased.

The Interwar Era: 1919–1939

The interwar period could be characterized as one of “organized hypocrisy” in the global economy. On the one hand, this period saw the creation of the first significant multilateral economic institutions, including the League of Nations, International Labor Organization, and Bank of International Settlements. A series of international monetary conferences were also held to resuscitate the prewar gold standard, and collaboration among the central bank presidents was relatively high.⁴⁴ Ostensibly these regimes and organizations were devoted to restoring economic openness and financial stability and pursuing policies that would prevent another world war from occurring.

In practice, however, the world experienced far higher levels of economic closure and dysfunctional global economic governance.⁴⁵ During the 1920s, the major economies failed to resurrect the pre-1914 norms that governed the global political economy. In the wake of World War I, most of the great powers had high tariff levels and entrenched interests with a stake in high levels of protectionism. Robust economic growth led to a revival in trade volumes, but by every other metric this period was one of economic closure.⁴⁶ A gold exchange standard was resurrected, but it lasted only five years. The onset of the Great Depression triggered a collapse of international trade and financial cooperation. Practically every major economy raised tariff levels and eventually abandoned the gold standard. In general, those countries that stayed on the gold standard the longest erected the highest trade and investment barriers as a compensating policy measure.⁴⁷

The United States was a primary contributor to this state of affairs. On the global governance front, the United States Senate famously rejected membership in the League of Nations despite President Woodrow Wilson’s preeminent role in its creation. Because United States law forbade official representation at myriad monetary conferences during the 1920s, leading private financiers represented US interests.⁴⁸ At the 1933 London Monetary and Economic Conference designed to restore faith in the global financial system, the United States unilaterally refused to make any commitments to temporary exchange rate stabilization.⁴⁹ The tragedy of the non-coordination was that, by 1936, most countries had taken the necessary macroeconomic

steps—expansionary monetary and fiscal policies—in response to the Depression. By doing so haphazardly, however, the governments involved wreaked much more financial damage than if they had acted jointly five years earlier.⁵⁰

With respect to trade, US foreign economic policy led the way toward closure. In response to a sharp recession and a decline in import prices in 1920, the United States passed an emergency farm tariff in 1921 that raised agricultural duties on wheat, corn, meat, wool, and sugar. The 1922 Fordney-McCumber Tariff made these tariff hikes permanent, expanded their coverage to include manufacturing products, and instituted the first antidumping provisions. The French Foreign Ministry declared the tariff the “first heavy blow directed against any hope of effectively restoring a world trading system.”⁵¹ The most notorious blow during this period was the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff, which raised import duties to their highest levels in American history and sparked a wholesale collapse in global trade.

American involvement in international financial issues was marginally more cooperative. The United States pursued contradictory policies on this front during the 1920s. On the one hand, the United States was keen to see the Allied powers repay American loans made to them during World War I. On the other hand, prohibitively high tariffs made it difficult for Great Britain and France to earn the necessary foreign exchange to repay the United States.⁵² American bankers recognized the conundrum and lobbied fiercely for more accommodating policies toward Europe.⁵³

The US Federal Reserve did try to assist European countries out of their macroeconomic strictures by keeping US interest rates low during the mid-1920s, boosting domestic consumption and preventing the flight of specie from Europe to America. Europe’s balance of payments improved, but this comity led to accusations at home that the Fed was fomenting a stock market bubble by keeping interest rates too low for too long. Benjamin Strong, the Fed chairman at the time, explained the limits of US cooperation when he warned his British counterpart that, “there would be times when speculative tendencies would make it necessary for the Federal Reserve Banks to exercise restraint by increased discount rates, and possible rather high money rates in the market. Should such times arise, domestic considerations would likely outweigh foreign sympathies.”⁵⁴ The Fed’s decision to raise interest rates was the proximate trigger for the 1929 stock market crash.

Five years into the Great Depression, the United States began to take steps toward greater liberalization. The 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act transferred authority from the legislative branch to the executive branch to negotiate trade agreements. It further enshrined the most-favored nation clause into US trade law. Over the next five years the United States negotiated 22 separate trade deals.⁵⁵ In 1936, the Tripartite monetary agreement with Great Britain and France added greater certainty to global finance. Still, the damage to the global political economy was extensive. Jeffry Frieden, echoing Charles Kindleberger,⁵⁶ concludes that the US refusal to

contribute to global economic governance was the key problem: “American capital and markets dominated the world economy in the 1920s as much as their British counterparts had before 1913, but the US government was almost wholly absent whereas that of Britain had been ever present.”⁵⁷

The Bretton Woods Era: 1945–1971

During and immediately after American policymakers were bound and determined not to repeat the mistakes of the interwar era. Secretary of State Cordell Hull firmly believed that increased trade would reduce the appetite for war. Treasury department economist Harry Dexter White believed that a return to fixed exchange rates was necessary to prevent the beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the 1930s.⁵⁸ In the 1941 Atlantic Charter, the United States committed to a postwar order, “to further the enjoyment of all states . . . of access on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world.”⁵⁹

The United States led the way in erecting a series of multilateral economic institutions designed to promote “embedded liberalism”—liberalized trade, fixed exchange rates using the dollar as the key reserve currency, and domestic policy autonomy to permit full employment policies.⁶⁰ Within a span of three years, the United Nations, International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (also known as the World Bank), and General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) were in place to ensure a world of progressive economic liberalization. The IMF ensured a system on fixed exchange rates pegged to the dollar, which was in turn convertible to gold. GATT pledged to abolish quotas and other quantitative restrictions while enshrining principles of most-favored nation status and national treatment of goods. The effects of these structures were powerful—during this era, the average tariff on nonagricultural goods fell to nineteenth-century levels and exchange rate volatility dropped dramatically. Currency and banking crises also ebbed dramatically.⁶¹ Economic output in the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) economies more than tripled.

Liberal internationalists like John Ikenberry have long argued that in creating these global governance structures, the United States engaged in “self-binding” as a means of demonstrating its credible commitment to multilateralism.⁶² This has been a dominant theme in the institutionalist paradigm for some time.⁶³ The American embrace of multilateralism in global economic governance was genuine—but there were a few noteworthy exceptions. American unilateralism still put constraints on the global economic order. Past experiences with the vicissitudes of the free market caused American policymakers to exempt agriculture from the GATT regime.⁶⁴ In 1948, Congress rejected the Havana Charter, which would have created an International Trade Organization wider in scope than the GATT agreements. Republicans thought the ITO was too liberal and Democrats did not feel it was liberalizing enough.⁶⁵

The more interesting trend was for the United States to act outside existing multilateral arrangements during times of crisis as a means of preserving the global economic order that these institutions ostensibly enshrined. As the economic situation in Western Europe and Japan deteriorated in the late 1940s, the IMF and World Bank should have been the default institutions to cope with the balance of payments and development crises. Instead, the United States addressed the situation by acting outside multilateral economic institutions. In the Far East, the Dodge Line and boost in defense expenditures during the Korean War helped to stabilize and then reverse Japan's ailing fortunes. In Europe, the Marshall Plan was designed to boost economic growth, promote intra-European trade, and encourage greater European acceptance of the American model.⁶⁶ The Marshall Plan was the progenitor of the OECD, but its creation nevertheless undercut the power of the World Bank and IMF. These latter institutions remained too small to handle systemic crises. As Foot and Walter conclude, "the developments in the early Cold War period were...indicative of a general tendency for the United States and its allies to deal with international economic issues outside of the formal framework of IMF-based surveillance, which inhibited its further development."⁶⁷

As the Bretton Woods era matured, the United States consistently used a combination of unilateral, multilateral, and "multi-multilateral" approaches toward global economic governance. On the multilateral front, the United States led six rounds of GATT negotiations during this period and encouraged the formation of the European Economic Community despite the trade diversion it created. The United States supported the IMF's creation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) as an alternative to the dollar as a reserve currency instrument. Washington was also broadly supportive of the World Bank's shift in lending from Europe to the newly decolonized countries in the Third World.

At the same time, as America's ability to maintain the Bretton Woods system waned, the United States also developed new forums to advance their interests if existing fora were found wanting. As gold reserves dwindled in the 1960s, both the G-10 and the OECD's Working Party Three were created in order to manage the pressures on gold reserves and keep the Bretton Woods system viable. In theory, these arrangements could have been done within the IMF, but the United States clearly preferred having multiple fora in which to engage these issues. In telecommunications, the United States and its European allies created INTELSAT as a means of bypassing the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and gaining greater control over the regulation of satellite communications.⁶⁸

The end of the Bretton Woods era was an example of American unilateralism. The Nixon administration found itself unable to pursue its preferred set of expansionary macroeconomic policies without creating downward pressure on the dollar. European countries had previously responded by buying up dollars, but the growing "dollar glut" created worry within European central banks about the value of their foreign exchange reserves. When both the Bundesbank and the Bank of England informed the United States that

they would no longer intervene in currency markets, President Nixon took unilateral action.⁶⁹ Without consulting any other allies, he announced in August 1971 that the United States would close the gold window, delinking the dollar from gold. He also announced a 10 percent surcharge on all imports. The first action violated the IMF Articles of Agreement, and the second action flatly contradicted the multilateral norms of GATT.

The Post-Bretton Woods Era: 1971–1991

The post-Bretton Woods era was dominated by expectations of US decline.⁷⁰ The OPEC oil shock of 1973, combined with the formal end of the Bretton Woods arrangement that same year, was viewed as the beginning of the end of American hegemony. Both Japan and the European Community were seen as challengers to US economic primacy. At the same time, the system of global economic governance adapted to new circumstances relatively well. GATT completed the Tokyo Round and started the Uruguay round during this period. The IMF shifted its purpose from managing exchange rates between developed countries to offering loans to developing countries facing balance of payments crises. The third world began to challenge the liberal norms at the heart of the global economic system, proposing a New International Economic Order with greater UN involvement. The United States, with the support of its allies, successfully resisted this campaign, which dissipated after the 1982 debt crisis.⁷¹ The net effect was a period that led to further liberalization, but at a slower pace than the Bretton Woods era. Trade levels grew only half as fast as during the previous generation.

The United States continued to embrace multilateralism, while exercising a mix of unilateralism and multi-multilateralism during this period to advance its interests. This was particularly true on trade matters. On the unilateral front, trade policymakers began talking about “fair trade” exceptions to “free trade.”⁷² The use of antidumping and countervailing duties grew from 35 cases in 1980 to 125 in 1984.⁷³ The Carter administration created a Trigger Price Mechanism to protect American steelmakers. The Reagan administration pushed Japan to accept “voluntary export restraints” on automobiles. The 1988 Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act created additional provisions of US trade law—including Super 301—that permitted retaliatory action against countries judged to be “unfair” traders.

Many commentators perceived these unilateral actions as undercutting the GATT system.⁷⁴ A key source of US influence within the GATT/WTO, however, was its ability to act outside of the multilateral trade rules.⁷⁵ Beginning in the 1980s—another moment when US standing in the world was thought to be on the wane—the United States pushed for a stronger international trade regime by engaging in unilateral enforcement of domestic US trade rules as a substitute for compliance with multilateral rules. The United States certainly “provoked the resentment of the international trading community” in 1989 by using Super 301 provisions against Japan, Brazil, and India.⁷⁶ Washington’s willingness to act unilaterally, however,

was one factor that triggered the creation of the WTO.⁷⁷ Other scholars have pointed to the tactic of pursuing regional trade integration as a way to either complement or substitute for the multilateral pathway to trade liberalization.⁷⁸ One tactic that may have contributed to the completion of the Uruguay round was negotiating regional deals, such as NAFTA or APEC, as a potential substitute to the WTO.⁷⁹

On the financial front, the switch to a floating exchange rate system reduced the demands placed on global financial governance. The globalization of capital markets, however, offered a countervailing trend, generating greater exchange rate volatility. The United States created the Group of Seven (G7) to attempt the necessary forms of macroeconomic policy coordination.⁸⁰ G7 efforts at policy coordination displayed a recurring pattern for the two decades after the initial 1975 summit. Other G7 countries would pressure the United States to scale back its fiscal deficits. In turn, the United States would pressure Japan and Germany to expand their domestic consumption in order to act as alternative engines of global growth. Not surprisingly, these policy debates boiled down to which country would absorb the adjustment costs necessary to ensure policy coordination.⁸¹

The aggregate effect of the G7 process on policy coordination was mixed. The most common outcome was a stalemate. As surplus countries, Japan and Germany were well situated to resist external pressure to adjust.⁸² As the country responsible for the world's reserve currency, the United States was able to borrow more cheaply than other countries, blunting economic pressure to change policy.⁸³ At most of the meetings, domestic interests proved to be a powerful constraint on the ability of the great powers to cooperate.⁸⁴ Communiqué after communiqué pledged the G7 countries to pursue "prudent fiscal and monetary policies"—at the same time as the United States was running record budget deficits and pursuing a tight monetary policy. The acme of the G7's success came in the mid-1980s, when the member governments agreed to intervene to bring down the dollar's value. The 1985 Plaza Accord and the 1987 Louvre Accord helped to bring the dollar down and ensure a "soft landing" at the same time. On the whole, however, these efforts were not coordinated with the IFIs and generally less successful than actions on the trade front.

The Washington Consensus Era: 1991–2008

The end of the Cold War restored the United States to its position of undisputed hegemony. With communism discredited as a viable economic alternative, and Europe suffering from slow growth, the United States vigorously advocated the "Washington Consensus."⁸⁵ These policies included trade liberalization, prudential macroeconomic policies, deregulation, and privatization. Global economic governance structures were the primary instrument for advancing these policies.⁸⁶ Capital account liberalization became an emergent norm in the global economy during this period.⁸⁷ During this period all the multilateral economic institutions expanded their

scope to become truly universal membership organizations. The Uruguay round transformed the GATT into the World Trade Organization, and expanded its membership roster to include China and the transition economies of the former communist bloc. At America's urging, the enforcement of international intellectual property rights was shifted to the WTO, enhancing the ability of the United States to protect trade-related intellectual property.⁸⁸ The IMF and World Bank continued and expanded their operations as financial crisis swept through Latin America, East Asia, Russia, and Turkey in the late 1990s.⁸⁹

The US government played an active role in promoting its preferred variety of capitalism through these institutions. Within the World Trade Organization, Sen observes that, "it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that the WTO bureaucracy is sensitive to the views of the US."⁹⁰ A similar story can be told with the international financial institutions. A host of econometric studies demonstrate considerable US influence over IMF lending practices.⁹¹ The United States exploited the Asian financial crisis to extend neoliberal policies into the Pacific Rim.⁹² Similar studies demonstrate the same kind of influence in World Bank lending⁹³ as well as the regional development banks.⁹⁴ Ngaire Woods⁹⁵ examines both formal and informal levers of influence in the World Bank and IMF and finds considerable US influence, ranging from the distribution of loans to the training of staff economists.

There was minimal economic unilateralism during this period. Despite the burgeoning US trade deficit, successive US administrations blunted congressional protectionist pressures. The Bush administration, with its penchant for unilateralism,⁹⁶ represents a tough test for this argument. It is true that the administration slapped a 30 percent tariff on steel in early 2002, and later raised farm subsidies to all-time highs. One can argue, however, that the steel tariffs were temporary and necessary evils to secure congressional backing for trade promotion authority.⁹⁷ The Bush administration complied with a WTO dispute settlement body's ruling that the steel tariffs contravened world trade law, and made multiple offers of cuts in agricultural subsidies to break the Doha deadlock.⁹⁸ As Judith Goldstein and Lisa Martin point out, "the use of legal rule interpretation [in the WTO] has made it increasingly difficult for governments to get around obligations by invoking escape clauses and safeguards."^{99,100} As trade deficits widened by the mid-2000s, congressional pressure to label China as a "currency manipulator" and slap retaliatory tariffs on Chinese imports was on the rise. The Bush administration refused to accede to such pressure, however, choosing to create the Strategic Economic Dialogue instead.

Indeed, the Bush administration invested diplomatic capital into reallocating power within the multilateral economic institutions to properly reflect shifts in the underlying distribution of power.¹⁰¹ Its March 2006 National Security Strategy explicitly stated, "The potential for great power consensus presents the United States with an extraordinary opportunity...these relations must be supported by appropriate institutions, regional and

global, to make cooperation more permanent.”¹⁰² Toward that end, the Bush administration pushed hard to alter the distribution of voting quotas within the International Monetary Fund to give greater influence to China, South Korea, Turkey, and Mexico. At the fall 2006 Singapore meetings, the International Monetary and Finance Committee of the IMF agreed to begin reallocating quotas to reflect this shift in the balance of economic power. In response to this agreement, Assistant Treasury Secretary Clay Lowery articulated the US position: “We came to the view awhile ago that if we do not take action to recognize the growing role of emerging economies, the IMF will become less relevant and we will all be worse off.”¹⁰³ Washington approved Chinese participation in the Inter-American Development Bank, and also endorsed Chinese and Indian membership in the International Energy Agency.

While US unilateralism was on the wane, forum-shopping among different governance structures increased during this period. The United States was adroit in relying on different dispute settlement mechanisms in different trade venues to avoid making concessions.¹⁰⁴ As the Doha round slowly ground to a halt, US trade representative Robert Zoellick consciously pursued the tactic of “competitive liberalization” in an effort to mimic the trade strategy of the 1980s and jumpstart multilateral progress. This strategy led to new free-trade agreements with more than ten countries—including Australia, Singapore, Morocco, Peru, and Central America—which included provisions that closely mapped American preferences on trade in services and intellectual property rights.¹⁰⁵

Similarly, on finance, the United States was willing to engage in rule-making outside the purview of the international financial institutions. Simmons¹⁰⁶ and Drezner¹⁰⁷ demonstrated how market power enabled the United States to act outside of existing international financial institutions to advance their preferred set of financial codes and standards. In response to the Asian financial crisis, the United States and other G7 countries created a new institution, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), to coordinate rules for financial regulation and supervision outside the purview of the IMF. The FSF was constituted as a club of clubs, with most of the clubs, like the OECD or the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, already dominated by the G7 economies. Not surprisingly, the FSF heavily tilted toward the representation of G7 interests.¹⁰⁸ In the end, the United States was able to create a set of key codes and standards outside the international financial institutions, and then have the World Bank and IMF conduct monitoring and surveillance of the FSF-endorsed standards. For example, the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering developed a “naming and shaming” scheme to successfully coerce countries into ratcheting up their anti-money laundering standards.¹⁰⁹

The US use of club structures and forum-shopping extended to other areas of international market regulation. When the United States had supporters in the developed world, it was able to rely on club governance structures to ensure its influence over key decision-making structures. For example, the

United States and its allies created the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) in response to pressures from the developing world to transfer controls over Internet protocols to the ITU.¹¹⁰ When the United States conflicted with powerful actors in the developed world, it would resort to forum-shopping in order to block policy developments in unfriendly fora. The United States refused to join the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety because that regime endorsed the European Union's "precautionary principle" on regulating genetically modified foods. Instead, the United States pressed for the WTO and the Codex Alimentarius Commission to regulate the issue based on "sound science." On climate change, the United States explicitly rejected the Kyoto Protocol. Instead, the Bush administration launched the Asian Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate in July 2005 with Australia, China, India, Japan, and South Korea. The arrangement was supposed to facilitate energy efficiency and environmentally sustainable growth—but it was also clearly designed to develop a regime that sidestepped the Kyoto Protocol.

While forum-shopping activity increased, its utility decreased somewhat. The Doha round collapsed despite multiple US efforts to inject momentum into the talks.¹¹¹ US efforts to negotiate a Free Trade Area of the Americas fizzled out in 2003, as the United States would not concede on agricultural subsidies. In contrast to the late 1980s, the strategy of competitive liberalization provided no impetus for the Doha Round or the FTAA.¹¹²

In the financial realm, Stone¹¹³ argues that because the United States insisted on repeated deviations from IMF practices to help out key allies during the late 1990s, the credibility of the IMF as an institution was badly eroded. The more the United States was tempted to use its informal levers of power to affect IMF policy outputs, the more the legitimacy of the organization as a whole is eroded. The behavior of the Pacific Rim economies buttresses this observation. After the strictures placed on those seeking protection from the IMF during the Asian financial crisis, governments across the Pacific Rim cried "never again." These economies consciously began to amass sizeable foreign exchange reserves—so as to avoid having to go to the international financial institutions ever again during a future crisis. This tactic abetted the growth of the macroeconomic imbalances that eventually led to the 2008 financial crisis.¹¹⁴ By 2005, the IMF was nicknamed the "Turkish Monetary Fund" because of the absence of countries interested in borrowing from it.¹¹⁵

Assessing the Paradigms

Table 5.2 offers a concise summary of US engagement with multilateral economic norms and regimes. Each of the contending paradigms offers some explanatory leverage for US engagement with global economic norms and regimes. The interest-based approach helps to explain why financial and monetary affairs tended to be more cooperative than trade policies over the course of history. Domestic interests also explain the shift to fair

Table 5.2 The pattern of US engagement with global economic governance

<i>Historical Era</i>	<i>Trade</i>	<i>Finance</i>	<i>Other</i>
First globalization era (1860–1914)	Mercantilism; Strong unilateralism; Minimal multilateralism	Gold standard Moderate unilateralism; Moderate multilateralism	Free-riding on IPR; Strong unilateralism Minimal multilateralism
Interwar period (1919–1939)	Mercantilism; Strong unilateralism; Minimal multilateralism	Gold standard until 1933; Moderate unilateralism; Moderate multilateralism	 Strong unilateralism Minimal unilateralism
Bretton Woods (1941–1971)	Free trade; Minimal unilateralism; Strong multilateralism Minimal forum-shopping	Fixed exchange rates; Minimal unilateralism Strong multilateralism Moderate forum-shopping	Private investment; Minimal unilateralism Strong multilateralism Moderate forum-shopping
Post-Bretton Woods (1971–1991)	Free and fair trade; Moderate unilateralism Moderate multilateralism Moderate forum-shopping	Floating exchange rates Moderate unilateralism Moderate multilateralism Moderate forum-shopping	 Minimal unilateralism Strong multilateralism Moderate forum-shopping
Washington Consensus (1991–2008)	Free trade; Minimal unilateralism Strong multilateralism Moderate forum-shopping	Strong dollar Minimal unilateralism Moderate multilateralism Moderate forum-shopping	Washington Consensus; Minimal unilateralism Moderate multilateralism Strong forum-shopping

trade rhetoric and actions in the post-Bretton Woods era. Nevertheless, the interest-based approach is hard-pressed to explain the American rejection of multilateralism during the late nineteenth century. Neither can such an approach explain persistent US openness and engagement with multilateral economic institutions during the post-Bretton Woods era.

The power-based approach does explain the broad contours of American foreign economic policy. The logic of *realpolitik* accurately predicts the switch from closure to openness—and from free riding to an embrace of multilateralism—as the United States amassed more economic power. Nevertheless, *power-based* approach fails at two critical junctures. It cannot explain the unilateralism of the interwar period, when the United States

was already the economic hegemon according to almost every conceivable economic power metric.¹¹⁶ Indeed, the failure of the United States to provide global public goods during this period is both the inspiration for hegemonic stability theory¹¹⁷ and its greatest empirical anomaly. Krasner¹¹⁸ explained this period by using a “policy lag” variable that strongly resembles historical institutionalism. Neither can a power-based approach explain the persistent engagement with global economic norms as US relative power began to decline. While there was a modest shift toward closure in the late 1970s, the shift was not nearly as large as a *realpolitik* logic would have predicted.

The historical institutionalist approach appears to offer the greatest nuance in explaining the variations in American foreign economic policy. This approach does the best job of explaining why the United States has, in general, been globally engaged on finance more than trade. This would appear to be a function of both the different historical legacies as well as the different institutional traditions. Historically, the United States was less suspicious of foreign creditors than foreign exporters.¹¹⁹ Beginning with Alexander Hamilton’s decision to honor Revolutionary War debt at par value, the United States embraced foreign investment more than foreign trade. Even though the country was only a bit player in global trade, the United States was the chief capital importer of the nineteenth century.¹²⁰ The founding set of economic ideas was therefore friendlier to international finance. The policymaking institutions for finance were also far more insulated from populist pressures than in the case of trade.¹²¹ No American policymaking institution could stay completely independent of politics, as the Federal Reserve discovered during the interwar period. Nevertheless, the Fed and the Treasury Department had much greater policy autonomy than the comparable trade bureaucracies.

The interwar period and post-Bretton Woods era provides the greatest evidence in favor of basket three. Despite the material incentives for the United States to take a more multilateral approach, there was minimal post-World War I reform of existing economic policymaking institutions.¹²² As a result, on the trade front, US policymaking remained mercantilist in posture until the shock of the Great Depression led to the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Adjustment Act. On the financial front, the Federal Reserve was able to pursue a more internationalist set of policies until the Fed’s independence was threatened by political pressures in the late 1920s. Similarly, the failure of the United States to break from global economic institutions when its competitiveness seemed on the wane would also be consistent with historical institutionalism. With a few exceptions, Congress was largely unsuccessful in empowering more mercantilist-minded policymaking institutions during this period. Despite the shift in public opinion and interest group support toward protectionism,¹²³ successive US administrations supported multilateral economic institutions that promoted globalization.

Approaches that stress power and the significance of traditions and historical legacies also offer complementary explanations for the American turn away from unilateralism and more toward multi-multilateralism, even as the United States became the undisputed hegemonic power. The power-based

explanation for this tactic is that a state's willingness to act outside a particular institution enhances its influence within that institution. Gruber refers to this as "go it alone"¹²⁴ power. A plethora of scholars have modeled and observed the effect of forum-shopping on American approaches to bargaining in global governance structures.¹²⁵ Benvenisti and Downs observe, "[T]he existence of multiple contesting institutions removes the need for [great powers] to commit themselves irrevocably to any given one. This helps them to manage risk, and it increases their already substantial bargaining power."¹²⁶ If the United States can credibly threaten to exit or act outside a particular governance structure, then it is more able to advance its interests *within* that multilateral institution as well. Forum-shopping, rather than unilateralism, allows a great power to exercise *power-based* leverage while minimizing the opprobrium of explicitly violating international legal norms.¹²⁷

Historical institutionalists provide a complimentary explanation for the forum-shopping strategy. This approach would posit that global policy-making institutions would experience the same kind of policy feedbacks as domestic policymaking institutions. International regimes empower their own transnational lobbies that benefit from those policies. This means that changing policies within multilateral economic institutions should be increasingly difficult over time.¹²⁸ One way to bypass global policy sclerosis is to simply create new policymaking institutions to supersede existing ones. The creation of the Financial Stability Forum, or the explicit switch from the G7 to the G20 as the "premier economic forum" are examples of this strategy. Most important, the United States has used this tactic primarily to push for even greater openness in the international system, which is consistent with the ideas currently animate American foreign economic policymaking institutions.

Conclusion

This paper has surveyed the American approach to global economic governance over the past 150 years, and concludes that power-based, interest-based, and tradition-based approaches help to explain variation over time. Nevertheless, the historical institutionalist paradigm appears to do the best job in explain both continuity and change. Imbued with clear founding ideas, American financial policymaking institutions have generally embraced multilateral economic norms throughout the arc of American history. Trade policymaking institutions started off mercantilist and unilateralist. By the end of World War II, exigent circumstances and domestic policy reforms led to a liberal internationalist bent. The US embrace of multilateralism has always been functionalist in purpose; at key junctures, Washington was perfectly willing to forum-shop and act unilaterally. That said, to a surprising extent, even these deviations from global governance structures have been pursued to advance the norms that have animated the global economic order since 1945.

If a basket three approach can best explain US engagement with multilateral economic institutions, what does this say about the future of Sino-American economic relations? There are a range of flash points between the two countries on economic matters ranging from cyber security to sovereign wealth fund transparency to trade in rare earths. How will these issues be addressed or resolved?

On the US side, the historical institutionalist approach suggests that, despite any public or pluralistic sentiment for protectionism and isolationism, US foreign economic policy will continue to advance liberal economic norms. On the one hand, the 2008 financial crisis led to concerns that mercantilist sentiments, which have always resonated in the American body politic,¹²⁹ would spike. On the other hand, the institutional responses to the crisis—extraordinary Federal Reserve actions, the creation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), the passage of the Dodd-Frank banking bill, all reinforced the status quo economic policies of open engagement. The Obama administration has already used the presence of multilateral economic structures like the G20 to blunt unilateralist pressures. In early 2009, the administration used US membership in the WTO's Government Procurement Agreement to remove "Buy American" provisions from the emergency stimulus bill. In April 2010 Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner cited the G20 forum as "the best avenue for advancing U.S. interests" on exchange rate disputes with China.¹³⁰ Only unilateral and multi-multilateral approaches that reinforce those norms will pass muster with the executive branch.

The real question is the extent to which historical institutionalism can explain the continuity and change in *Chinese* foreign economic policy. The Chinese economic growth model has been built on a selective embrace of multilateral economic norms. Chinese policymaking institutions have embraced the rules of the WTO trading system, and after 2008 generally acted like a responsible stakeholder in supporting an open global economy.¹³¹ At the same time, China simultaneously argued in the G20 and IMF that exchange rate questions are matters of domestic sovereignty and should not be discussed.¹³² China has created or joined new institutional structures outside of America's reach, including the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Asian Bond Markets Initiative, Chiang Mai Initiative, Silk Road initiatives, BRICS Development Bank, and Asian Infrastructure Development Bank.¹³³ The behavior of Chinese state-owned enterprises at the domestic and international levels could suggest that China's recent embrace of new multilateral structures are designed to cement mercantilist norms rather than market norms, such as the direct control over vital raw materials.

As Yao's chapter also suggests, historical institutionalism would be pessimistic about China's ability to recast its foreign economic policymaking structures. The ability of China to alter its growth model to boost domestic consumption is far from clear.¹³⁴ China's response to the 2008 financial crisis was to double down on its investment-and-export growth model. Domestic and international criticism of this approach has grown,¹³⁵ but unless and until Chinese foreign economic policymaking institutions are

recast to permit consumption-friendly lobbies to thrive, substantial policy change is unlikely. Given the narrow selectorate that controls China's ruling institutions, however, such lobbies will have minimal sway over policy.¹³⁶ Regrettably, an analytic framework that stresses the role of tradition and historical legacies must predict continued Sino-American clashes over global economic norms in the years to come.

Notes

1. William W. Grimes, *Currency and Contest in East Asia: The Great Power Politics of Financial Regionalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); Andrew MacIntyre, T. J. Pempel, and John Ravenhill, eds., *Crisis as Catalyst: Asia's Dynamic Political Economy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); Rosmary Foot and Andrew Walter, *China, the United States, and Global Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
2. Daniel W. Drezner, "The New New World Order," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86 (March/April 2007): 34–46.
3. John Gerard Ruggie, *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).
4. Daniel W. Drezner, "Two Challenges to Institutionalism," in Alan Alexandroff, ed., *Can the World Be Governed? Possibilities for Effective Multilateralism* (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008).
5. Francis Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).
6. William Becker and Samuel Wells, eds., *Economics and World Power: An Assessment of American Diplomacy since 1789* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984); Jagdish Bhagwati, *Aggressive Unilateralism: America's 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990); Judith Goldstein, *Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
7. Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).
8. Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade," *World Politics*, Vol. 28 (April 1976): 317–347; Krasner, *Defending the National Interest*; David Lake, "International Economic Structures and American Foreign Economic Policy, 1887–1934," *World Politics*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (1983): 517–543.
9. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade," 317–347; Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (1988): 485–507.
10. Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation*; Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade," 317–347.
11. Jeffrey Frieden, "Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914–1940" *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (1988): 59–90; Jeffrey Frieden, "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance," *International Organization*, Vol. 45, No. 4 (1991): 425–451; Helen V. Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Michael J.

- Hiscox, *International Trade and Political Conflict: Commerce, Coalitions, and Mobility* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); David Lake, "Interest-based: A Critical Review," *Review of International Organizations*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (2009): 219–244.
12. Suzanne Berger, "Globalization and Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 3 (2000): 43–62.
 13. Hiscox, *International Trade and Political Conflict*, chapter 2.
 14. Goldstein, *Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy*; Daniel Carpenter, *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Paul Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
 15. Daniel W. Drezner, "Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 44 (October 2000): 733–749.
 16. Ronald Rogowski, *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Oona Hathaway, "Positive Feedback: The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Industry Demands for Protection," *International Organization*, Vol. 52 (1998): 575–612.
 17. Goldstein, *Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy*; Mark Blyth, *Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Jeffrey Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Daniel W. Drezner and Kathleen McNamara, "International Political Economy, Global Financial Orders and the 2008 Financial Crisis." *Perspectives on Politics* 11 (March 2013): 155–166.
 18. Alexander Hamilton, *Report on the Subject of Manufactures* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1791).
 19. Thomas Jefferson and James Madison contemporaneously evinced a view in favor of the United States remaining a pastoral republic, which did catch on in some regions of the country. The Civil War, however, safely extinguished this minority viewpoint.
 20. Hamilton, *Report on the Subject of Manufactures*, 33.
 21. Mercantilist attitudes toward trade have permeated American public opinion on the subject ever since. See Daniel W. Drezner, "The Realist Tradition in American Public Opinion." *Perspectives on Politics* 6 (March 2008): 51–70.
 22. Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1955); Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002); Michael Ignatieff, ed., *American Exceptionalism and Human Rights* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
 23. Goldstein, *Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy*; Blyth, *Great Transformations*; Legro, *Rethinking the World*.
 24. Goldstein, *Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy*; Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997); Mead, *Special Providence*; Richard Herrmann and Jonathan Keller, "Beliefs, Values, and Strategic Choice," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 66 (May 2004): 557–580; Lawrence Jacobs and Benjamin Page, "Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?" *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 99 (February 2005): 107–123.
 25. Neoclassical realism, for example, combines the *realpolitik* approach with elements of historical institutionalism. See Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: the Unusual Origins of America's World Role* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
 26. John Nye, *War, Wine, and Taxes: The Political Economy of Anglo-French Trade, 1689–1900* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Ronald Findlay and

- Kevin H. O'Rourke, *Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). Obviously, colonialism permitted intense economic exchange, but of a peculiar variety that did not affect the norms governing trade and exchange between sovereign nations.
27. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade," 317–347; Robert Gilpin, *Global Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Jeffrey Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006); Barry Eichengreen, *Globalizing Capital: A History of The International Monetary System*, 2nd ed. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2008).
 28. Kevin O'Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson, *Globalization and History* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999).
 29. Arthur Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, The United States, and the International Economic Order," *International Organization*, Vol. 38 (Spring 1984.): 355–386; David Lazer, "The Free Trade Epidemic of the 1860s and Other Outbreaks of Economic Discrimination," *World Politics*, Vol. 51 (Summer 1999): 447–483.
 30. Eichengreen, *Globalizing Capital*.
 31. John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, *Global Business Regulation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 58–61.
 32. O'Rourke and Williamson, *Globalization and History*; Frieden, *Global Capitalism*.
 33. According to Pletcher, in 1883, the United Kingdom supplied 37.1 percent of global trade in manufacturers; the comparable US figure was 3.4 percent%. David Pletcher, "1861–1898: Economic Growth and Diplomatic Adjustment," in Becker and Wells, eds., *Economics and World Power*, 12.
 34. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade," 325.
 35. Pletcher, "1861–1898: Economic Growth and Diplomatic Adjustment," 135–136; Goldstein, *Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy*, 148–149.
 36. Braithwaite and Drahos, *Global Business Regulation*, 58–61.
 37. See Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power* for these exceptions, such as the Roosevelt Corollary.
 38. George Kennan, *American Diplomacy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950).
 39. Pletcher, "1861–1898: Economic Growth and Diplomatic Adjustment," 137–138.
 40. Eichengreen, *Globalizing Capital*, 21.
 41. Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, *A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 8.
 42. Eichengreen, *Globalizing Capital*, 39.
 43. Milton and Schwartz, *A Monetary History of the United States*, 90–95.
 44. Liaquat Ahamed, *Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World* (New York: Penguin, 2009).
 45. John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Howe, 1920); Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade," 317–347; Frieden, *Global Capitalism*.
 46. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade," 317–347.
 47. Barry Eichengreen and Douglas Irwin, *The Slide to Protectionism in the Great Depression: Who Succumbed and Why?* NBER Working Paper 15142, 2009.
 48. Frieden, *Global Capitalism*, 146.
 49. Herbert Feis, 1933: *Characters in Crisis* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1966).

50. Eichengreen and Irwin, *The Slide to Protectionism in the Great Depression*.
51. Quoted in Frieden, "Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy," 78.
52. Ahamed, *Lords of Finance*.
53. Jeffry Frieden, *Banking on the World: The Politics of American International Finance* (New York: Harper & Row, 1987).
54. Quoted in Ahamed, *Lords of Finance*, 240.
55. Goldstein, *Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy*.
56. Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929–1939* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).
57. Frieden, *Global Capitalism*, 144.
58. Eichengreen, *Globalizing Capital*, 94–98.
59. Quoted in Frieden, *Global Capitalism*, 256.
60. John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," *International Organization*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1982): 379–415.
61. Michael Bordo, Barry Eichengreen, Daniela Klingebiel, and Maria Soledad Martinez-Peria, "Is the Crisis Problem Growing More Severe?" *Economic Policy*, Vol. 32 (April 2001): 51–83.
62. Ikenberry, *After Victory*; G. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter, *Forging A World Of Liberty Under Law: U.S. National Security In The 21st Century* (Princeton: Princeton Project for National Security, 2006); Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan*.
63. Lisa Martin, *Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," *International Security*, Vol. 20 (1995): 39–51.
64. Goldstein, *Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy*.
65. Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information*.
66. Raymond Aron, *The Imperial Republic* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1974); Diane Kunz, *Butter and Guns: America's Cold War Economic Diplomacy* (New York: Free Press, 1997); Foot and Walter, *China, the United States, and Global Order*.
67. Foot and Walter, *China, the United States, and Global Order*, 84–85.
68. Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," *World Politics*, Vol. 43 (April 1991): 336–366.
69. Joanne Gowa, *Closing the Gold Window: Domestic Politics and the End of Bretton Woods* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Kunz, *Butter and Guns*.
70. Susan Strange, "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony," *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 4 (1987): 551–574.
71. Stephen D. Krasner, *Structural Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press: 1985).
72. I. M. Destler, *American Trade Politics*, 4th ed. (Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2005); Daniel W. Drezner, *U.S. Trade Strategy: Free Versus Fair* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2006).
73. Goldstein, *Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy*.
74. Bhagwati, *Aggressive Unilateralism*.
75. Judith Goldstein and Stephen D. Krasner, "Unfair Trade Practices: The Case for a Different Response," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 74 (1984): 282–287; Thomas Bayard and Kimberly Elliott, *Reciprocity and Retaliation in U.S. Trade Policy* (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1994); Kishore Gawande and Wendy Hansen, "Retaliation, Bargaining, and the Pursuit of 'Free and Fair' Trade," *International Organization*, Vol. 53 (1999 Winter): 17–159.

76. Gautam Sen, "The US and the GATT/WTO System," in Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Michael Mastanduno, eds., *U.S. Hegemony and International Organizations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 138.
77. Warren Schwartz and Alan Sykes, "The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization," *Journal of Legal Studies*, Vol. 31 (January 2002): S179–S204.
78. Richard Baldwin, "The Causes of Regionalism," *The World Economy*, Vol. 20 (July 1997): 865–888; Fred C. Bergsten, "A Renaissance for U.S. Trade Policy?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81 (November/December 2002): 86–98.
79. Claire Turner Sjolander, "Unilateralism and Multilateralism: the United States and the Negotiation of the GATS," *International Journal*, Vol. 48 (Winter 1992/93): 52–79; Lloyd Gruber, *Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
80. Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne, *Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).
81. David Andrews, ed., *International Monetary Power* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).
82. Michael Webb, *The Political Economy of Policy Coordination* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Andrews, *International Monetary Power*.
83. Michael Mastanduno, "System Maker and Privilege Taker: U.S. Power and the International Political Economy," *World Politics*, Vol. 61, No. 1 (2009): 121–154; Eric Helleiner and Jonathan Kirshner, eds., *The Future of the Dollar* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).
84. Putnam and Bayne, *Hanging Together*.
85. John Williamson, "What Washington Means by Policy Reform," in John Williamson, ed., *Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990); Yergin and Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights*.
86. Jeffrey Chwieroth, "Normative Change from Within: the International Monetary Fund's Approach to Capital Account Liberalization," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52, No. 1 (2008): 129–158.
87. Beth Simmons, Frank Dobbin, and Geoff Garrett, "Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism," *International Organization*, Vol. 60, No. 4 (2006): 781–810; Beth Simmons and Zachary Elkins, "The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 98, No. 1 (2004): 171–189.
88. Susan Sell, *Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Daniel W. Drezner, *All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
89. Paul Blustein, *The Chastening* (Washington, DC: PublicAffairs, 2001).
90. Sen, "The US and the GATT/WTO System," 131.
91. Thomas Oatley and Jason Yackee, "American Interests and IMF Lending," *International Politics*, Vol. 41 (September 2004): 415–429; Axel Dreher and Nathan Jensen, "Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of U.S. Interests on International Monetary Fund Conditions," *Journal of Law and Economics*, Vol. 50 (February 2007); Martin Steinwand and Randall Stone, "The International Monetary Fund: A Review of the Recent Evidence," *Review of International Organizations*, Vol. 3 (June 2008): 123–149.
92. Blustein, *The Chastening*.
93. Thomas Barnebeck Andersen, Henrik Hansen, and Thomas Markussen, "US Politics and World Bank IDA-lending," *Journal of Development Studies*, Vol.

- 42 (July 2006): 772–794; Robert Fleck and Christopher Kilby, “World Bank Independence: A Model and Statistical Analysis of US Influence,” *Review of Development Economics*, Vol. 10 (May 2006): 224–240.
94. Christopher Kilby, “Donor Influence in Multilateral Development Banks: The Case of the Asian Development Bank,” *Review of International Organizations*, Vol. 2 (June 2006): 173–195.
95. Ngaire Woods, “The United States and the International Financial Institutions,” in Foot, MacFarlane, and Mastanduno, eds. *U.S. Hegemony and International Organizations*, 92–114.
96. G. John Ikenberry, “Is American Multilateralism in Decline?” *Perspectives on Politics* Vol. 3 (September 2003): 533–550.
97. Bergsten, “A Renaissance for U.S. Trade Policy?”.
98. Susan Schwab, “After Doha,” *Foreign Affairs* 90 (May/June 2011): 104–117.
99. Judith Goldstein and Lisa Martin, “Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note,” *International Organization*, Vol. 54 (Summer 2000): 619.
100. Daniel Kono argues that protectionist pressures shifted from explicit tariff hikes to increases in regulatory barriers. See Daniel Y. Kono, “Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency,” *American Political Science Review* 100 (August 2006): 369–384.
101. Drezner, “The New New World Order,” 34–46.
102. Executive Office of the President, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, 36, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf> (accessed May 1, 2009).
103. IMF-World Bank Plenary Remarks, September 19, 2006, <http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp116.htm>.
104. Mark Busch, “Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade,” *International Organization*, Vol. 61 (2007): 735–761.
105. Destler, *American Trade Politics*; Drezner, *U.S. Trade Strategy*; Drezner, *All Politics is Global*; Simon Evenett and Michael Meier, “An Interim Assessment of the US Policy of ‘Competitive Liberalization,’” *The World Economy*, Vol. 31 (January 2008): 31–66.
106. Beth Simmons, “The International Politics of Harmonization,” *International Organization*, Vol. 55, No. 3 (2001): 589–620.
107. Drezner, *All Politics is Global*.
108. Ibid.
109. William Wechsler, “Follow the Money,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 80 (July/August 2001): 40–57; Drezner, *All Politics is Global*.
110. Drezner, *All Politics is Global*, chapter 4.
111. Schwab, “After Doha.”
112. Evenett and Meier, “An Interim Assessment of the US Policy of ‘Competitive Liberalization.’”.
113. Randall Stone, “The Scope of IMF Conditionality,” *International Organization*, Vol. 62 (October 2008): 589–620; Randall Stone, *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
114. Michael Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau, and Peter Garber, “An Essay on the Revived Bretton Woods System.” NBER Working Paper no. W9971, September; Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick, “‘Chimerica’ and the Global Asset Market Boom,” *International Finance*, Vol. 10 (Winter 2007): 215–239; Nouriel Roubini and Steven Mihm, *Crisis Economics* (New York: Penguin Press, 2010).
115. Turkey was the only country to have a sizeable outstanding loan from the IMF at the time.

116. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Vintage, 1987).
117. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression*; Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation*; Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade."
118. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade."
119. Becker and Wells, *Economics and World Power*; Frieden, *Banking on the World*.
120. Frieden, *Banking on the World*, 16.
121. Peter Katzenstein, ed., *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Politics of Advanced Industrial States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).
122. Becker and Wells, *Economics and World Power*; Goldstein, *Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy*.
123. Benjamin Page with Marshall Bouton, *The Foreign Policy Disconnect* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); Drezner, "The Realist Tradition."
124. Gruber, *Ruling the World*.
125. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power," 336–366; Erik Voeten, "Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 95 (December 2001): 845–858; Leslie Johns, "A Servant of Two Masters: Communication and the Selection of International Bureaucrats," *International Organization*, Vol. 61 (Spring 2007): 245–275; Drezner, *All Politics is Global*, Drezner, "Two Challenges to Institutionalism."
126. Eyal Benvenisti and George Downs, "The Empire's New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law," *Stanford Law Review*, Vol. 60 (November 2007): 627.
127. Drezner, "Two Challenges to Institutionalism."
128. Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).
129. Drezner, "The Realist Tradition."
130. Statement of Treasury Secretary Geithner on the Report to Congress on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies, April 3, 2010, <http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg627.htm>.
131. Daniel W. Drezner, *The System Worked: How the World Stopped another Great Recession* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), chapter six.
132. Alan Beattie, "IMF in Discord over Renminbi," *Financial Times*, January 26, 2009; Keith Bradsher, "China Uses Rules on Global Trade to Its Advantage," *New York Times*, March 14, 2010.
133. Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner, and Steven Weber, "A World without the West," *The National Interest*, Vol. 90 (July/August 2007): 23–30.
134. Stephen Roach, "Manchurian Paradox," *The National Interest*, Vol. 101 (May/June 2009): 59–65; Jonathan Woetzel et al., *If You've Got It, Spend It: Unleashing the Chinese Consumer* (Shanghai: McKinsey Global Institute, 2009); Drezner, *The System Worked*, chapters five and six.
135. Yongding Yu, "A Different Road Forward," *China Daily*, December 23, 2010; World Bank, *China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-Income Society* (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2012).
136. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alistair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003); Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, *New Foreign Policy Actors in China*. SIPRI Policy Paper 26, Stockholm, Sweden, September 2010.

China's Approach to Economic Diplomacy

Yang Yao

Introduction

Economic growth has become the central theme of the Chinese government since reform began in the late 1970s. Consistent with this theme, China seeks to maximize its domestic gains and intentionally plays a low-profile and even passive role on the international stage. This domestically oriented approach is similar to the one adopted by the United States before World War II (Drezner, this volume) and has served well China's domestic needs. The international environment, however, is quite different today than a century ago. Several international organizations have been established to govern international trade and finance. The international economic order reflects the preferences of the advanced countries who, after having experienced a long history of turmoil and instability, insist on a rule-based and coordinated world system. As a result, China's approach has caused wide agony in the international community. China is frequently accused of not playing by the rule, evading international responsibilities, putting its own narrow interests over larger global priorities, and even exerting blunt imperialism when it comes to natural resource extraction in other developing countries.

From the Chinese perspective, however, these accusations are unfair and even groundless. One frequently evoked objection is that the advanced countries have forgotten what they did in the past. After achieving high levels of income, the advanced countries have reached a steady state in which intensive growth rather than extensive growth has become a driver of progress in the society. In China, however, a competition culture has just taken root and still dominates the society. In its extreme form, it contains a certain component of Darwinism. From a historical perspective, this is not surprising because it has been common for a rising nation. The competition view is not only reflected in China's economic diplomacy but also

widely spread among the Chinese population when it comes to domestic affairs, be it personal achievement or the distribution of wealth.

It is also noteworthy that some of China's moves are results of domestic politics instead of the Chinese government's intentional design. To many international observers, the Chinese government's moves are well coordinated and part of a grand plan for an ultimate aim, be it short-term gains or long-term international supremacy. Under the label "state capitalism,"¹ the Chinese system is often thought as being dominated by a few top leaders. However, this view ignores the tremendous changes that China has undergone in the last three decades. Economic decisions have been deeply decentralized; as a result, the Chinese society has become as diverse as any other developing countries. The political system, on the other hand, has become much more flexible to accommodate these changes. Government policies no longer reflect the exclusive views of a few top leaders, but are often the results of the domestic politics that is bound to produce compromises among different stakeholders. This is not only true for China's domestic policies, but also true for China's external policies, especially economic policies, because they increasingly affect ordinary people's daily life due to China's deep integration into the world economy.

Following the methodological theme of this volume, this chapter aims at explaining China's economic diplomacy from the three perspectives of power, interests, and pride. Those three factors are all important in shaping China's approach to international economic relations, but interests may have played a more prominent role in the current stage. In particular, this chapter emphasizes that China's seek for interests in the international arena is a combined result of the government's conscious pursuit and the country's domestic politics that is increasingly able to shape government policy. In doing so, I will also bring in history as another dimension to explain the formation of China's economic diplomacy.

The rest of the chapter is arranged as the follows: I will first introduce China's economic diplomacy, and then provide a summary of the international reactions. China's economic ascent has caused tensions in both the developing world and developed world. In the developing world, questions are posed as to whether China's rise has squeezed the development space of other developing countries and whether China's hunger for resources has contributed to environmental degradation in countries heavily relying on resource exports. In the developed world, China has been increasingly seen as a disequilibrium factor; a certain degree of anxiety has developed among Western elites as to whether China's rise would ultimately benefit the rest of the world. In the remainder of the paper, then I will try to explain China's economic diplomacy in three parts, the government, state capitalism, and domestic interest group politics. The government plays a key role in forming China's external policy. In particular, it relies on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and other state entities to implement the strategic goals set for its economic diplomacy. Therefore, it is important to understand its logic of behavior and the facts and myths behind China's state capitalism. But the Chinese government no longer operates with

absolute power; its decisions are increasingly being influenced by domestic interest group politics. It is thus helpful to bring this factor to the equation to understand China's economic diplomacy.

China's Economic Diplomacy and International Reactions

China's economic diplomacy has four distinctive features. First and foremost, it serves China's domestic economic development. Second, China intentionally plays a low-profile and even passive role when it comes to international public goods provision like agreements on climate change, WTO negotiations, and the reengineering of the global financial system. Third, China seeks to maximize its own gains in the current world system. It does not seek to change the system because it is benefiting from the current world order. Fourth, SOEs are often used as the handle of the Chinese government to fulfill some strategic goals such as resource acquisition. This approach is often labeled as "state capitalism."

The first feature is manifested by China's insistence of an orderly revaluation of the yuan, its resistance to the US attempt to rebalance the world economy by suppressing the current account, its ardent efforts to secure international energy and mineral supplies, and so on. All of them serve to boost domestic economic growth. This growth-centered strategy is deeply rooted in China's recent history. To most Chinese leaders, China's humiliating defeat by foreign powers in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century was due to China's economic backwardness. "Backwardness invites bullies." This has been a consensus of several generations of national leaders including Sun Yet-Sun, Chiang Kai-Shek, Mao Zedong, and Deng Xiaoping.

The second feature is consistent with Deng Xiaoping's strategy of *taoguang yanghui*. That is, the time is not ripe for China to assume a leadership role in world affairs. China's per capita income is still low although it has become the world's second largest economy. As a result, China does not want to overstretch its capability to areas that it does not have full control. In addition, keeping a low profile is also a result of China's own positioning in the current world. On the one hand, China's interests are moving toward those of the advanced countries; on the other hand, China does not want to alien itself from its traditional allies in the developing world. This was clear in China's reluctance in the Copenhagen Climate Conference. While signing a binding agreement would be in China's own interests—China has been the largest beneficiary of the clean development mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol—the contentious atmosphere between the developing world and the developed world put China in a conundrum. The West's accusation that China spoiled the event has failed to apprehend this complexity.

The third feature is first manifested by China's export-led growth model. Under the leadership of the United States, a set of international

arrangements aiming at freer trade has taken root in the current world. With the approval of the United States, China was able to join the World Trade Organization in 2001. Between then and 2008, China's export grew by an average annual rate of 29 percent. It is clear that China has benefited from the free trade arrangements engineered by the United States. In addition, the current rules of other international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, are also consistent with China's interests. For example, IMF's voting rights are roughly proportional to a country's size of economy. As China's economic size increases, China would then naturally gain more voting rights in the organization. Therefore, it has no intention to challenge the current global economic order. However, China does not want to take a more active role in the global multilateral architectures such as the G20 summits. Instead, it wants to maximize its own gains under the current system.

The fourth feature stems from a combination of the Chinese government's conscious pursuit of power, historical continuity, and SOEs' own lobbying. At the first level, the central government does hold the belief that SOEs are critical for China to catch up with the world technological frontiers and compete with international multinational companies. At the second level, the significant presence of the state in the economy is inherited from the era of command economy and a result of the fiscal decentralization happening in the 1980s. Fiscal decentralization has empowered local governments and created competition among them. To attract investment, local governments have to engage themselves in providing infrastructure, renovating the city, and seeking finance. At the third level, SOEs are becoming a strong interest group and their lobbying has become effective, thanks to their special connections with the government.

So far China's approach has worked relatively well to serve the country's internal economic growth. However, there are signs that this approach is causing greater tensions between China and its major economic partners.

In the developing world, two questions are frequently posed on China's economic diplomacy. First, consistent with the so-called fallacy of composition, a question is raised as to whether China's export-driven growth has come with a reduction of export growth in other developing countries. In principle, the net world trade has to be zero, so the fallacy of composition assesses when some countries become net exporters, other countries have to become net importers. If export is good for economic growth, then China's export-driven growth has to cause slower economic growth in some other countries. There is indeed evidence that when China exports more to the United States, other countries' exports to the United States decline.² However, evidence also shows that China's entire trade surplus comes from its trade with the United States, and China actually runs deficits with the rest of the world.³ The fallacy of composition may be true when different countries' exports to the United States are considered, but falls apart when China and the rest of the world are included. To a certain degree, China's export to the United States has served as a growth engine for the rest of

the world. However, this does not brush off the second concern among the developing countries. China's imports from the developing world are heavily concentrated in resources; its trade deficits with the rest of the world are likely to be caused by its resource imports. Several issues then naturally follow. One stems from the thesis of the "resource curse." It is well known that exporting resources is not always a good thing for a country because it often hurts domestic manufacturing. A related issue is whether resource exporters would develop a dependency on China. Hence from this issue comes the accusation that China's resource strategy is a new form of colonialism. A third issue is related to the environmental degradation potentially caused by China's hunt for natural resources. More broadly, China's increasing consumption of global energy and resources has raised the issue whether its rise would cause a global shortage of energy and resources. In addition, it is now the world's largest greenhouse gas emitter and its total volume of emission will likely continue to rise in the next 20 years. People are concerned about the climate consequences of this unprecedented scale of emission.

In the developed world, concerns are first concentrated in two inter-linked areas. One is that China does not play by the rules, and the other is that it does not contribute to the provision of global public goods. On the first count, China's state capitalism is often elicited as the root cause. Specifically, China has been accused of subsidizing its SOEs with cheap credits and favorable procurement policies. On the second count, it is believed that it often evades international responsibilities and only pursues its own narrow interests. This is no more evident in China's climate policy. To most Westerners, China should take a large part of the blame for the Copenhagen Climate Conference not reaching a binding agreement. In addition, China continues its loose enforcement policy toward environmental protection and does not promise a cap on its greenhouse gas emission. Moreover, the Western world is concerned that China's economic success would inspire other developing countries to emulate its authoritarian model of governance. For many Western elites, the memory of the capitalism-communism confrontation in the Cold War is still fresh and the world cannot afford a new form of confrontation between free capitalism and state capitalism.

The purpose of this chapter is not aimed at addressing all the above concerns. Instead, it is intended to provide an explanation for China's economic diplomacy from the perspectives of its pursuit of power, interests, and pride. In the course, I will pay particular attention to how history has played out in shaping the interplay of those three factors. I will try to argue that interests have played a more prominent role than the other two factors in shaping China's current economic diplomacy. In addition, its international interests have been increasingly shaped by the combination of intentional government moves and the country's domestic politics. In the section below, I will analyze the factors that shape the Chinese government's choices in economic diplomacy.

China's Economic Diplomacy from the Lens of the Government

History Matters

At the outset, the CCP is a Marxist-Leninist party whose ideology was transplanted from the West. This ideology had helped it to win the struggle of power over the Kuomintang (nationalists). However, when it comes to the fate of China as a united nation, the CCP's view is not different from the Kuomintang's. This view is rooted in China's historical primacy and its more recent decline and humiliation by foreign powers. It led the world for one-and-half millennia before it was taken over by Western Europe as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution. The long history and civilization have left China with a rich heritage of philosophy, moral teachings, literature, arts, political wisdoms, customs, social organizations, as well as production technology. Most Chinese people, especially intellectuals, have deep appreciation of China's great history. Because of that, China's defeat by foreign powers in the nineteenth century was particularly humiliating. In the early years after the Opium War, the mainstream view was that China's defeat was due to the lack of advanced technology that Western countries had. However, this view changed when the Chinese navy was defeated by the Japanese navy in 1895. On book, China had a stronger navy than Japan's, but the whole Chinese navy was destroyed by a single assault of the Japanese navy. This defeat started a period of opening to Western philosophy, political thinking, and institutions in general. The general lesson, especially the part put into practice, however, was a Darwinist idea: backwardness invites bullies. The purpose of learning from the West thus was to make China stronger and free of the aggression of foreign powers, not to make China a Westernized country. The CCP was organized around a foreign idea, but it was less important than to set China free of foreign aggressions. Hence when announcing the establishment of the People's Republic on October 1, 1949, Mao did not hail it as much a communist victory as a symbol that "Chinese people have stood up." For Mao's generation, the relationship between China and other countries was first and foremost a power relation, and the task of the CCP was to fill the deficit of power that China had left since 1840. The script Mao provided for the Monument of People's Heroes in Tiananmen Square made this clear.

The first 30 years of the CCP rule thus witnessed a power-dominated approach to economic diplomacy. This was clearly shown by China's eagerness to acquire the nuclear bomb, its competition with the Soviet Union for leadership in the communist world, its intervention in Southeast Asia, and its aids to African countries. However, this approach was abandoned by the new leadership under Deng Xiaoping when China began economic reforms at the end of the 1970s. This change was brought about by several factors. First, the power approach brought China some political influence, but on balances it brought more troubles than gains. China fought on two

ideological fronts throughout the 1960s and 1970s, one facing the United States and the other facing the Soviet Union. The world at the time, however, was clearly dominated by these two enemies of China, which already held opposing ideologies. This made it difficult for China to win friends purely on ideological grounds; it had to slice a handsome portion of its limited economic resources to spend on the international front. Second, Deng took a pragmatic approach to domestic affairs since he took control of the party at the end of the 1980s. Economic progress replaced political struggles to become the party's central task. Consistent with this shift, it no longer made much sense for China to spend precious economic resources outside China just to win political friends abroad. Third, China's view of itself in the world also changed dramatically. The fast growth of its East Asian neighbors including Taiwan was a wake-up call that the Mainland had lost the competition with capitalism in the previous 30 years, ending the euphoria of self-glorification inflicted by Mao's radicalism. Leaders and commoners alike realized that China was a poor country and, in Deng's words, "China would be deprived of the global citizenship" without economic progress. The power deficit was once again strongly felt in China. However, to close the gap, Chinese leaders would put economic progress above political influence as the goal of the country's economic diplomacy. Fourth, consistent with its self-repositioning in the world, China's view of the world system also changed. Capitalism was no longer viewed as evil; instead, the success of China's East Asian neighbors showed that capitalism could be something China should try. This made it natural for them to turn to the leader of the capitalist world, the United States. Acknowledging China's role of a follower in the American world system, Deng set *taoguang yanghui* as the tone for his country's foreign policy.

The reapproaching of the United States to China had provided a favorable international environment for all the above changes. The 1980s was a honeymoon for the Sino-American relations. It gave room for China to adopt a mercantilist approach to its external economic policy. It was during this period that China began the export-oriented growth model that had accompanied successes of the other East Asian economies. Export was heavily subsidized. In particular, a dual-track exchange rate regime was adopted. In the market track, the exchange rate was set by the Shanghai and Shenzhen swap markets. At the highest point, one dollar could be exchanged for 8.7 yuan. In the official track, the exchange rate was set by the government. The yuan was much more expensive than in the market track; one dollar could only buy 5.5 yuan even in 1994 when the two tracks were unified. Certified exporters were allowed to retain part or all of their foreign earnings and were free to sell them in the swap markets. In the meantime, approved imports were qualified to buy foreign currencies from the government at the official rate; other imports, however, had to obtain foreign currencies from the swap markets. As a result, this system subsidized exports, encouraged government-approved imports, and discouraged other imports.

Apparent mercantilist approach was terminated by the unification of the two tracks of exchange rates in 1994. But gaining immediate interests still dominated China's economic diplomacy. China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) was a critical step for it to fully integrate into the world system. One of the key reasons for China's eagerness to join the WTO was to obtain the universal MFN (most favorable nation) status with the WTO members. The United States started to grant China the MFN status in the early 1980s, but it was subjected to annual renewal that became very difficult after 1989. Joining the WTO would permanently remove this obstacle. The United States was critical of China joining the WTO because it required every member's consent to accept a new member. An agreement between the two countries fell through during President Clinton's terms, but President Bush moved quickly to sign the agreement with China in his first year of office.

China's export grew by unprecedented rates since the country joined WTO. Between 2001 and 2008, it increased five folds. In the meantime, China began to run large current account surpluses, most of which came from trade with the United States. The world began to feel the shocks of an emerging large country. China has not become more mercantilist since 2001; as a matter of fact, it has become more constrained by the WTO rules. It was China's abrupt growth of export that has made a difference.

In summary, China's economic diplomacy has experienced a shift from a power-centered approach to an interest-centered approach in the last 60 years. In the first 30 years, economic diplomacy served the political purposes of China's foreign policy; in the second 30 years, economic diplomacy has been mostly driven by economic interests. Nevertheless, a common thread through the 60 years has been the revival of China as an equal power among other nations. In the first 30 years China took a direct approach, that is, direct political confrontation, to fill the power deficit; in the second 30 years China has taken an indirect approach, that is, to build a materially strong country, to close the gap between itself and the advanced countries. By all observations, this latter approach will still dominate China's economic diplomacy in the foreseeable future. In the next several subsections, I will illustrate in detail the way Chinese government works and how it affects the country's current economic diplomacy.

Pragmatism

By international comparison, China's economic achievement between 1952 and 1978 was not bad; official statistics show that the average growth rate in this period was 6.4 percent. However, this achievement was shadowed by political turmoil and social failures, mostly inflicted by hysteric ideological campaigns, noticeably the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Most leaders of the reform era were victims of the Cultural Revolution; it was therefore not surprising that the first thing they did after regaining power was to direct the party to a more pragmatic path.

The Chinese society has a long tradition of merit-based bureaucracy. Mao tried to break this system but led the country to repeated chaos. One of Deng Xiaoping's great achievements was the restoration of the party apparatus. After the "three representations"⁴ were announced in 2002, the party apparatus has increasingly undergone another wave of change. The CCP is no longer a political party that one usually thinks of; instead, it has become a complex system with many roles to serve. As a whole, it rules China. This position cannot be challenged, just like any monarch in history and the contemporary world. At the organizational level, it serves the role of China's traditional bureaucracy, selecting government officials and through those officials, running the country. To accommodate an increasingly diverse Chinese society, the CCP also serves the role of opinion-aggregator through state apparatuses such as the People's Congress and the People's Political Consultation Conference. In short, the CCP has become the state. This is the starting point for one to understand the behavior of the Chinese government.⁵

In the Chinese context, pragmatism has been framed around the notion that *shi-jian*, or "practice," is the only criterion to measure truth. From this concept, two corollaries are ensured. First, there is no ultimate and fixed truth; the future is open to any possibilities. Second, the merits of practices should not be judged by an ultimate criterion applied to the practices themselves; rather, they should be judged by the outcomes generated by the practices. If the outcomes produce reasonable results, then the practices can be justified. These two corollaries have allowed the leadership to embark on bold steps of reform. For example, the 1982 Constitution stipulated that the state economy should be the dominant force in the Chinese economy. Before this clause was changed in 1997, a massive privatization program was initiated and the private sector was allowed to flourish. Indeed, China would not have had any reform if the party had followed the orthodoxies that it had held for a long time.

On the international front, pragmatism has led China to often emphasize reasonable results and downplay abstract principles. This is clearly manifested in its attitudes toward the Libyan revolution and the Syrian crisis. In both cases, China emphasized a political solution that would pacify the situation and downplayed the principles behind the uprisings in the two countries. In its economic diplomacy, China also places results above the underlying principles. For example, China has helped African countries building hospitals, schools, and other public facilities as well as production capacities although some of these countries are ruled by dictatorial governments who may use these facilities and capacities to boost their rules. Westerners often see China's moves as results of its political inclination, but in reality they may stem more from China's pragmatism than from its political motivation. Chinese overseas development aids (ODAs) may work more through African governments than Western ODA does. But this does not mean that China approves the way a particular government rules a country; instead, it is because the Chinese authorities believe that it

is more effective to work with the government than with private entities. In addition, this approach may have an unintended consequence to help state-building in Africa. As Fukuyama⁶ has realized, state-building is the first step for many African countries to embark on a road to economic growth. One central theme of state-building is to provide the state the necessary capacities to run the country including the capacity to raise revenues.⁷ By helping African governments, Chinese ODA may strengthen state-building and for that matter can have long-term effects to boost economic development on the continent.

The Production-Oriented Government

From the economic point of view, the Chinese government is best characterized as a “production-oriented government”—a government that focuses more on production than on redistribution—when it comes to its fiscal policy. In Bremmer’s⁸ version of state capitalism, leaders control businesses for their own gains. While there could be a flavor of it, self-motivation cannot fully explain Chinese leaders’ emphasis on production. Three other factors are more fundamental. One is China’s meritocratic tradition. Most Chinese officials and many intellectuals would believe that redistribution is bad for the country in the long run. They would prefer the government spend on infrastructure, R&D, and universities than spend on social security and health care. The second factor is the heritage of the planning era. In those days, only agriculture and manufacturing were regarded as “productive,” and services were regarded as auxiliary. People were forced to tighten their belts to save. At very low income level, capital formation accounted for 30 percent of GDP or more in most years. This “thrifty” tradition has been kept alive in the minds of many government officials. The third factor is limited participation of ordinary people in government budgeting process. People have diverse preferences, among which economic growth is but one of the goals worth pursuing. Without their voices, government spending naturally goes to the areas promoting economic growth because, as we discussed earlier, growth brings gains to the officials.

The Chinese government as a production-oriented government is clearly shown in table 6.1 that compares its expenditures with those of several other governments in the world. China is significantly different from other countries in three areas of expenditures. One is economic affairs. Here the Chinese government spends at least twice as much as most other governments do. Another is health care. Here the Chinese government spends much less than other governments. And the third is social security and employment. Here again the Chinese government spends much less than other governments.

When it comes to China’s external economic policy, a direct effect of the production-oriented government is to suppress domestic consumption. Because of the government’s low spending on health care and social security, people have to save for rainy days when they are sick or get old.

Table 6.1 Government expenditures in selected countries (%)

<i>Expenditure Items</i>	<i>United States</i>	<i>United Kingdom</i>	<i>Nordic Countries</i>	<i>Transition Countries</i>	<i>Japan</i>	<i>China</i>
General public services	13.5	11.0	12.2	14.0	15.1	15.4
Defense	11.5	5.7	3.4	2.6	3.4	6.4
Public safety	5.7	5.8	2.2	3.9	4.7	6.2
Economic affairs	10.0	6.3	8.1	9.9	11.0	20.1
Environment		2.3	1.1	3.4	1.6	2.2
Community services	1.9	2.1	1.3	1.8	2.4	6.5
Health care	21.1	16.0	14.6	19.6	11.8	7.4
Culture, sports, and media	0.9	2.0	2.5	0.4	2.8	1.7
Education	16.9	13.0	13.7	10.6	12.0	13.8
Social security and employment	18.6	35.9	40.9	33.9	35.2	20.3

Notes: Nordic countries include Sweden, Norway, and Denmark; transition countries include Hungary, Czech, and Poland. Most countries' data are for 2007; Chinese data are for 2008.

Source: Chong-En Bai, Dehua Wang, and Zhenjie Qian, "Several Issues Related to Public Finance's Role of Promoting Structural Transformation" (*gonggong caizheng cujin jigou zhuanbian de ruogan wenti*), *Comparative Studies (bijiao)*, No. 3 (2010).

However, household savings were not the primary cause for China's rising national savings in the last decade. Instead, rising corporate and government savings were the major forces. In fact, the government's saving rate has been higher than household saving rate in most years in the last two decades, as figure 6.1 shows.

There is also an indirect effect of government investment to suppress household consumption. Much of government investment is on infrastructure, roads, urban development, and facilities for industrial parks, and the like, which in many cases entail subsidies to producers. For example, local governments invest heavily in industrial parks to attract investors, yet the prices they ask for the land are often lower than they spend.⁹ As a result, capital-intensive industries grow fast and returns to capital increase. The consequence is that labor income as a share of GDP declines, so does the share of household consumption.¹⁰ That is, the production-oriented government has contributed to China's external imbalances.

Competition among Ministries

While regional decentralization empowers local governments, competition among ministries fragments decision making in the central government. Competition arises because of two reasons. The first is that government officials have to deliver performance in order to get promoted. In Chinese hierarchy, this is the only way to rise to the top because of the absence of direct elections. This is true even for the ministers. The second reason is



Figure 6.1 Government and household saving rates.

Source: NBS, *Financial Flows Table*. National Bureau of Statistics, 2014.

that the government's budget is not determined by the legislature, but by the government itself. As a result, ministries compete with each other to get larger budgets. Even if the money is not supposed to be spent on their own employees, ministries with larger budgets feel more powerful.

When it comes to China's external economic policy, three ministries are important players, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), and the People's Bank of China (PBoC), which may have diverse objectives. MOFCOM inclines to align itself with exporters because its performance is measured by the growth of exports. NDRC is supposed to take care of everything although employment and price stability are its top agenda. PBoC has a narrow mandate of price stability. That is, the objectives of these three ministries conflict with each other. As a result, they compete with each other to influence the premier's office.

To bolster their own performance, ministries also deliberately hurt other ministries' performance. In the Copenhagen Climate Conference, NDRC was designated as the ministry in charge of the negotiation. It then had to compete with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because international negotiations were traditionally one of the latter's mandates. The coordination

between the two ministries was poor. Much of the confusion in the negotiation was a result of the coordination failure between them. In addition, NDRC did not include the carbon capture to be contributed by China's increasing vegetation coverage when it formulated China's commitment to carbon emission target. Due to the "land for grass" and "land for forest" programs implemented in the last decade, China has become the country with the fastest recovery of vegetation coverage in the world. However, these programs are under the control of the Bureau of Forestry, and NDRC did not want to advertise its good performance in such a high profile target.

In summary, the Chinese government's approach to economic diplomacy is shaped by the long desire to fill China's deficit of power in the last one-and-half century, the CCP's recent shift toward a more pragmatic approach to domestic and foreign affairs and several features of the government itself, emphasis on production and competition among the ministries in particular. The search for an equal power in the world is still the ultimate goal, but the immediate steps are no longer direct power confrontation, but instead geared toward building a materially strong China. As a result, China's current economic diplomacy is clearly interest-driven. The current international environment gives ample space for China to take up this approach. As a result, China does not seek to engage in active rule-making; instead, it seeks to maximize its own gains within the current world order. The government's production nature only reinforces this tendency. In a sense, this is consistent with China's development stage and the prevailing social beliefs which, as I pointed out early in this section, contains a heavy dose of Darwinism. Finally, one also needs to keep in mind that competition among the ministries often hinders the government in adopting consistent policies. Further discussions show that interest group politics tend to reinforce this tendency.

State Capitalism: Facts and Myths

Beijing Consensus versus Washington Consensus

Until very recently, China had been seen by the West as a success story moving from state control to the market economy. But this has changed since the financial crisis. While there are still scholars who believe that China is "playing our game,"¹¹ many more have begun to see it as creating a new political and economic model that is distinctively different from the Western model. This is no more evident in the debate surrounding the Beijing Consensus and the Washington Consensus, the former being a model of authoritarianism and heavy state involvement in the economy, and the latter being a model of neoliberal and market-oriented doctrines. For example, this contrast has been clearly stated by Bruce Dickson¹² who believes that the Washington Consensus "asserts that state intervention is not conducive to economic development, and that economic freedoms require political liberties associated with democracy to flourish. This neo-liberal model has

been the cornerstone of international aid and lending programs for the past two decades.”¹³ In contrast, “the ‘Beijing consensus’ suggests that rapid economic development requires active leadership by political elites committed to growth and that authoritarian rule is necessary to sustain these pro-growth policies and limit demands for greater equity and social welfare. The Beijing Consensus therefore is antithetical to the Washington Consensus and has so far defied the logic that economic development inevitably leads to political change.”¹⁴ Despite the fallacy of these characterizations,¹⁵ the distinction of the Beijing Consensus and the Washington Consensus has been cemented by the political and casual academic discourse in international arena. It is also being advocated by some scholars, noticeably those in the left camp, inside China, who aspire a China that offers a competing value system distinctively different from the Western values.

However, China’s 30 years of reform have defied the distinction between the Beijing Consensus and Washington Consensus; China has been decisively moving from economic planning and state dominance to the market. Elsewhere,¹⁶ I have shown that what China has done is quite consistent with the Washington Consensus. On the fiscal front, the Chinese government has maintained a roughly balanced budget; pure redistributive programs have been kept to a minimum. The overall tax burden, measured by the ratio of taxes to GDP, declined dramatically from 31 percent in 1978 to 22 percent in 2014.¹⁷ On the international front, China has taken a road that decisively leads to the liberalization of trade and FDI. The special economic zones (SEZs) have served as windows for China to reach the outside world. The export-led growth model was adopted as a national development strategy in the mid-1980s. Joining the WTO in 2001 marked China’s full integration into the world economy. Since then, China’s trade dependence ratio, that is, the ratio of imports and exports to GDP, has been maintained at a level higher than 60 percent, one of the highest among the large economies. Domestically, two major themes of Chinese reform since the 1990s have been privatization and deregulation. After 15 years of privatization that started in the mid-1990s, a large number of China’s SOEs have been released into private hands, or transformed into publicly listed companies. The removal of price controls happened even before privatization. By the end of the 1990s, government reforms had removed many barriers to the entry and exit of individual firms in specific markets. Although protection of property rights is still weak in many arenas (especially intellectual property), China has made noticeable progresses in the last 30 years. Several amendments to the Constitution and the Property Law, have established a reasonable legal framework for property rights protection.

The Size of the Government Sector

To make no mistake, the state sector is still large in China. Table 6.2 presents data for the presence of SOEs in the industrial sector between 2002 and 2011. In 2011 SOEs still accounted for 29.2 percent of all industrial

Table 6.2 Shares of SOEs in industrial value-added and profits

Year	Value-Added (billion yuan)			Profits (billion yuan)		
	All	SOEs	Share of SOEs (%)	All	SOEs	Share of SOEs (%)
2011	18857.2	5510.6	29.2	5454.4	1498.9	27.5
2010	16003.0	4708.5	29.4	3882.8	1192.4	30.7
2009	13462.5	3908.4	29.0	2589.1	751.4	29.0
2008	12911.2	3851.6	29.8	2406.6	798.5	33.2
2007	10736.7	3319.5	30.9	2295.1	966.2	42.1
2006	9035.1	2839.6	31.4	1878.4	807.2	43.0
2005	7619.0	2606.3	34.2			
2004	6281.5	2321.3	37.0			
2003	5361.2	1940.8	36.2			
2002	4593.5	1663.8	36.2			

Notes: Value-added in column “All” is for all industrial firms, profit in column “All” is for above-scale firms (firms with annual sales larger than 5 million yuan) and SOEs. Value-added of SOEs after 2006 are estimated using the growth rates published by NBS adjusted by the PPI.

Source: www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb.

value-added and 27.5 percent of profits among firms with an annual sales volume of more than 5 million yuan. It is noteworthy that the share of SOEs in all industrial value-added declined steadily between 2002 and 2009, but went up slightly in 2010 and 2011 although the share of SOEs in profits of larger firms declined in these two years compared to previous years. That is, the size of the SOE sector stopped to decline after the financial crisis although its profitability declined.

The presence of government ownership is heavier in the financial sector; state-owned banks accounted for 50 percent total bank assets, and the four largest banks, all controlled by the government, took a lion's share of 60 percent in total bank credits in 2010.¹⁸ Moreover, local governments have set up 8,221 financial platforms, companies, or bundles of companies whose mandate is to attract finance for local urban development, which by the end of 2011 had accumulated 10 trillion yuan of bank debts.¹⁹ That is, the government is still a big player in the Chinese economy.

Local government debts have a lot to do with fiscal decentralization. China is one of the most fiscally decentralized countries in the world although it has a unitary system. Local governments account for 43 percent of total government budgetary income and 78 percent of total government expenditures. In comparison, the state governments in the United States account for 45 percent of total government revenues and 47 percent of total government expenditures.²⁰ One of the consequences of fiscal decentralization is competition among local government officials. Local governments compete for investment from private investors and the central government.

To attract investors, local governments provide lucrative terms, mostly concessions in land prices, infrastructure, and local taxes. This forces local governments to borrow heavily from commercial banks.

Over time, provincial officials have become more and more powerful in China's political life. Most of the top leaders have had local experiences. Before they move to the central government, they argue for local interests. When it comes to China's external economic policy, local governments constrain central government policies in two areas. One is that local governments always favor expansionary fiscal and monetary policies and do not care as much about inflation as the central government does. The other factor is export. Close to 90 percent of China's export comes from the nine coastal provinces/cities. Therefore, extraordinary trade surplus brings inflationary pressures to China, but the benefits of export go to a small number of provinces/cities. However, these provinces/cities have more say in the central government so their voices may dominate central government policies.

With the above evidence, can we conclude that the Chinese system is the kind of state capitalism defined by Bremmer?²¹ The answer is both "yes" and "no." It is "yes" because the Chinese government does want to use SOEs and control financial resources to advance intended goals; it is "no" because these goals are not to garner gains for a small group of elites, as Bremmer claims, but instead to push for the country's overall economic growth. This is not to say that the Chinese elites do not have their personal interests. It is just that the elites' interests are largely made consistent with the country's economic growth.²² In addition, one of the reasons for the heavy presence of the government is decentralization.

Causes and Consequences of State Capitalism

The Chinese government's keeping SOEs can be understood from all the three analytical perspectives adopted by this volume. From a power perspective, SOEs are believed to be necessary for Chinese companies to compete with foreign companies. Government officials and many scholars believe that Chinese private firms are not in a position to compete with multinational companies. To a large extent, this assessment has a lot of truth in it. Private firms only started to emerge in the early 1990s. They are technologically much behind foreign multinationals, and they do not have any advantage in marketing and financing over foreign companies. Large SOEs, however, have generally operated for much longer periods than private firms. They have accumulated considerable amounts of physical and human capital as well as technological capacities. Relying on them to compete with multinationals seems to be a rational choice. This is especially so if China wants to catch up with advanced countries on the technological front. In China's 12th Five-Year Plan released in 2010, the government announced that China's overall R&D spending would be increased from 1.7 percent of GDP to 2.2 percent of GDP by 2015. Most of this growth

will go to SOEs and public research institutes and universities. China's determination to become an innovation-based economy is apparent.

Seeking for power is one of the impetuses driving China's choice. Obviously, China has to command the most advanced technologies if it is to compete for power with other countries, especially the United States. It is not just about military technologies; civil technologies can also be a source of power. They can also be a source of pride; the development of the high-speed rail is but one example. SOEs are in a good position to carry out this kind of strategic tasks. They are also a source of national pride. For a country with both a glorious past and a recent history of defeat, this is not a surprising result.

When it comes to economic benefits, it is less clear, though, what the state-centered approach would bring to the country. First of all, China's technology-focused strategy needs to be tested against the development strategy of comparative advantage.²³ According to this strategy, a country should follow its comparative advantage—determined by its factor endowments—to decide which levels of technology to adopt. For China, this means that the country should not aim at adopting the technologies prevailing in the advanced countries because its capital endowment is still scarcer than its labor endowment when compared to the advanced countries. Therefore, there is a question whether China's approach to technological progress would bring real benefits to the country.

Theoretically, a strong objection to the comparative advantage thesis is that frog leaps of technology can create dynamic comparative advantages, namely, they may not bring immediate gains to the country, but will prompt the country to the forefront of the international technological frontier, which allows it to garner future gains. The comparison between Taiwan and Korea seems to support this objection. Taiwan can be seen as a perfect model of following the comparative advantage strategy; its economy is dominated by small and medium firms whose technologies have been upgraded gradually. In contrast, Korea began to support large companies as early as the 1960s, and the Korean government made several strategic moves to invest in key technologies (such as memory chips) that were beyond its industrial capacities at the time. It seems that this strategy has paid off. Korea has become the largest chip producer in the world and Samsung, Hyundai, and LG have become world-class companies. In contrast, Taiwan does not have any world-class company and its growth has slowed down dramatically since the Asian Financial Crisis.

When it comes to China, however, evidence is mixed. It should be an unmistakable fact that China's economic success since 1978 has been made possible by the state's retreat from the society and the economy. Some people may argue that this retreat is strategic: the Chinese government has wisely combined state control and the recommendations of the Washington Consensus. It then begs the question how state control has benefited China's economic growth. One of the often heard arguments for state control is that it helps concentrate resources so the country can achieve significant results.

This argument can be valid for a country in its early stage of development because capital is scarce and coordination is important in that stage. But resource concentration is no longer needed and may hurt growth in today's China. For example, the Chinese government wants to support a few large SOEs to conduct technological innovations. However, the success of an innovation is a random event whose realization follows the law of large numbers. Suppose that the underlying probability of success is 5 percent. Then if the government supported five SOEs, the overall rate of success would be only 25 percent. Now if the innovation were left to the market, then there could be many, for example, 20 companies trying to innovate, so it would be almost guaranteed that there is one success. That is, the market allows the law of large numbers to work. In the long run, it is probably the market, not the state, that will help China catch up with advanced countries on the technological front.

Even if the state-centered approach can achieve the goal of technological catch-up, it is still unclear whether it is the best way to promote China's overall welfare. For one thing, this approach exerts a significant crowding-out effect on private sector development. Entry to some of the sectors with heavy SOE presence is severely regulated. More importantly, private firms are severely disadvantaged in the financial sector. Private capital is still banned from setting up independent banks except in Wenzhou where a pilot reform is being carried out. The financial sector is overwhelmingly dominated by large and state banks. They tend to lend to large companies (mostly SOEs) and local governments because they can provide better collaterals. As a result, small and medium enterprises (mostly private firms) are rationed out. This contrast gives SOEs and large firms huge advantages when they compete in the domestic market. It also aggravates China's structural imbalance issue. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are more labor intensive than large enterprises. Their slower growth leads to a smaller capacity to absorb labor, thus reducing labor income in the national income. In the meantime, large firms are undergoing fast capital deepening, that is, growth of the capital-labor ratio, which increases the share of capital gains in the national income. Because Chinese firms tend to reinvest instead of distribute their profits, their increased share of the national income is transformed into a higher national saving rate.

In summary, the Chinese state capitalism is designed to achieve China's strategic goals, especially technological catch-up. This approach has brought some successes to the country, but it has a limit. The competition between the United States and Japan in the 1990s shows clearly that government-driven and concentrated innovations have smaller chances of success than market-driven and decentralized innovations. In addition, the state-centered approach crowds out private firms and may ultimately hurt the Chinese economy as a whole. China's better performance in the financial crisis is often thought of as a piece of evidence of the state-centered approach's advantages. This view is short-sighted because now we are seeing some of the downsides of China's strong fiscal expansion in the crisis; burgeoning

local government debts are one example. It would be even more wrong to extrapolate from China's performance in the financial crisis that the state-centered approach has been the key to China's overall economic success since 1978. As this section has shown, this success has been unmistakably brought about by deregulation, market liberalization, and the retreat of the state from the economy and society.

Interest Group Politics and China's Economic Diplomacy

In addition to the central government's conscious search for power, interests, and pride, interest group politics is playing an increasingly important role in shaping China's economic diplomacy. After 30 years of growth, the Chinese society has been made very diverse on both economic and social terms. For example, the Gini coefficient of income distribution has increased from 0.27 in 1978 to 0.48 in 2009.²⁴ The population is both vertically and horizontally stratified. On the other hand, the political control has become much weaker than before and interest groups have developed to influence government decisions.²⁵ In this section, I present three cases, the exchange rate, natural resource acquisition, and indigenous innovation, to show how domestic interest politics can combine with the central government's conscious design to affect China's external economic policies.

The Exchange Rate

Keeping an undervalued currency is often taken as the most obvious indicator for China's mercantilist approach to international trade. Many people in the West believe that China is harvesting unwarranted gains through this approach. The consensus among academic researchers is that the Chinese yuan is undervalued if we want to predict the yuan's value by some sort of "equilibrium exchange rates"—in effect it is no more than predicting a currency's value by a set of observable variables according to a relationship estimated for the world average. The question is by how much. While some people in the United States insist that the yuan is undervalued by 40 percent,²⁶ Wang and Yao²⁷ find that it was only undervalued by 6 percent as of May 2008. The magnitude depends on the underlying theory and the empirical method one uses to estimate the "equilibrium exchange rate."

Notwithstanding the debate, maintaining a fixed exchange rate imposes high financial costs on the Chinese authorities, among which wasteful accumulation of foreign reserves and constant inflationary pressures are the two most significant. Inflation poses a serious challenge to the Chinese government; the 1989 student movement received popular support mainly because of the high inflation in 1988. Allowing the yuan's value to rise will largely reduce inflationary pressures because it reduces PBoC's domestic money expansion. Then why is the Chinese government so reluctant to allow the yuan to appreciate fast?

The first reason is that Chinese leaders believe that China's high current account surpluses were a result of the hard work of Chinese people,

not because of undervalued currency. From a more academic perspective, one should notice that current account imbalances have historical precedents. Most significantly, Great Britain had a century of large amounts of current account surpluses between the early nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, and the United States itself had significant current account surpluses in most part of the period between the early twentieth century and 1970. It is noteworthy that both countries dominated world trade in those two respective periods of time. Current account imbalances may be a natural result of differential growth rates among large countries. Fast-growing countries tend to have higher saving rates than slow-growing countries; the former naturally become creditors and the latter naturally become debtors.

The second reason is employment. Just like an elected official caring about votes, an appointed official in China has to care about social stability; both are related to employment. A recent study by a research team at the China Center for Economic Research, Peking University, investigates the impacts of the yuan's appreciation on the Chinese and American economies in a cross-country computational general equilibrium (CGE) model.²⁸ The study finds that while appreciation does not significantly affect the US-China trade balances and the two countries' GDP, it does have substantial impacts on employment in China. When the yuan appreciates by 5 percent, 10 percent, and 20 percent against the dollar, China's employment will decline by 0.74 percent, 1.47 percent, and 3.03 percent, respectively. These percentages sound like small numbers, but when translated into jobs, they represent 5.18 million, 10.29 million, and 21.21 million jobs, respectively. The central government may not have exact numbers but does have a rough idea on how appreciation would hurt employment.

The third reason is exporters' lobbying. Exporters have strong lobbying power for several reasons. First, they are geographically concentrated and easy to organize. Second, they are often backed by local governments that see exports as a driver for local economic growth and do not care much about inflation in the country as a whole. Third, foreign-invested companies account for half of China's exports and 100 percent of China's trade surplus.²⁹ They are well organized and have rich experience of lobbying.

The fourth reason is fragmentation within the government. MOFCOM sees the growth of export as one of its core performance indicators, so it often plays the role of a *de facto* guardian of exporter interests. For example, when appreciation becomes a pressing issue, it conducts distress tests on exporters asking them how much appreciation they would tolerate. This kind of tests is seriously flawed because exporters have every incentive to exaggerate the negative impacts they would face with appreciation. MOFCOM does not have any incentive to care about the difficulty faced by PBoC in combating inflation; nor does it appreciate the pressures the Ministry of Foreign Affairs faces when it deals with other countries.

Chinese officials are often irritated when foreign leaders press them to allow the yuan to appreciate fast because they believe that foreign leaders

fail to appreciate the complexity of the issue inside China. China has been deeply integrated into the world economy. The exchange rate is the most important parameter bridging China with the rest of the world; a small change in it would affect a large portion of the Chinese population. The primary concern of the Chinese leaders is domestic politics when they conceive the exchange rate policy. Between inflation and employment, they believe that the former is easier to deal with because they have a rich set of means to keep the inflation rate low. This includes issuing central bank bonds, raising the reserve rate, and quantity control on bank credits. In the last decade, China's inflation rate has never exceeded 6 percent, giving the authorities confidence that inflation is a manageable issue. In comparison, creating jobs is a more challenging task. Before 2015, 10 million new jobs have to be created each year in order to absorb new university and high school graduates as well as migrants from the countryside. Keeping exports up is the most obvious way to sustain job growth. Against this background, it is easy to understand why the administration leans toward the interests of exporters.

Natural Resource Acquisition

China is expanding its acquisition of natural resources over the world. To acquire mining and drilling rights, China seems to be willing to work with any government, even one that is accused for rampant corruption or severe human rights violation, disregarding the dire living conditions of its people. Even in countries with more benign governments, resource export may not help ordinary people because it often leads to environmental degradation and the Dutch disease. China imports resources from these countries, and "dumps" cheap manufacturing goods on them. As a result, China's action is often labeled as "new colonialism."

Whether new colonialism is the right label for China's resource acquisition is a debatable issue. Perhaps Chinese resource companies are not different from resource companies of other countries except that Chinese companies often operate in more marginalized countries, mostly because the markets in more secure countries have been taken up by Western companies. The focus of this chapter, though, is how China's resource acquisition has been shaped by its domestic high politics.

The first thing one has to realize is that China's resource acquisition is part of the government's scheme to digest its huge foreign reserves. Outbound investment conducted by private companies is increasing, but cannot catch up with the growth of official foreign reserves. Most of China's private companies are small and do not have adequate know-how to invest abroad. A natural alternative is for the government to encourage large SOEs to invest outside China. Natural resources and fixed assets like ports have become the target because they are easier for Chinese SOEs to manage.

Second, China's natural resource acquisition is also determined by its domestic industrial policy. While the government has set the goal to lower

China's energy intensity by 40 percent in 2020 over the 2005 level, China's energy policy does not encourage progressive savings on energy consumption because energy prices are set lower than in most other countries. For example, gas prices are about the same as those in the United States and less than half of the European prices. But low energy prices are supported by companies and ordinary consumers alike; raising energy prices is a very unpopular move for the government. In addition to low prices, the growth of energy consumption is also supported by China's industrial structure. Beginning in the early 2000s, the share of heavy industries in the Chinese economy has been increasing; China produces more than half of the world's steel and cement output. The growth of heavy industries has been one of the major factors responsible for the growth in China's energy consumption. While the fast growth of China's real estate sector and infrastructural building increases the demand for cement, steel, copper, and other metals, the role of the production-oriented government cannot be ignored. By providing subsidies to manufacturing and capital, the government is effectively encouraging capital-intensive industries.

China's energy efficiency is only one-third that of the United States and one-fifth of Japan's. The room for improvement is huge. However, China's current domestic industrial policy, mostly determined by interest group politics and the government's own preferences, does not induce such improvement. As a result, there is a constant hunger for energy, which drives the government to search for resources all over the world.

Third, large SOEs themselves are active players in shaping the government's policy on resource acquisition. For example, consider the three big oil companies that have been on the forefront of China's drive of resource acquisition. The reason often cited to support their overseas purchases of oil fields is that equity oil is crucial for China's energy security. Chinese oil companies are newcomers in the global oil market and there is little room for them to enter politically stable countries. As a result, they have to invest in countries with less favorable political environments. The Chinese government plays a vital role in providing a guarantee for Chinese oil companies by entering country-to-country agreements with the recipient country governments. However, the truth is that equity oil cannot offer China much protection. In peaceful time, it really does not matter whether China imports equity oil or oil bought in the open market unless equity oil is set cheaper than the prevailing international prices. However, this is exactly what China should avoid—higher international prices should be taken as a signal for more energy conservation, not an impetus to push for more oil imports. In war time, the transportation of equity oil becomes a real issue and the Chinese navy does not have the ability to protect its oil tanks beyond its close waters.

The real story behind equity oil is that the three state-owned oil companies have lots of money that needs to find profitable investment opportunities to invest.³⁰ Because they have to invest in risky regions, they need government supports. In a sense, they have taken advantage of top leaders'

worry of energy security and have induced the government to endorse their own causes.

Indigenous Innovation

In February 9, 2006, the State Council released “China’s Medium- and Long-Term Plan for Science and Technological Development (2006–2020).”³¹ This plan made indigenous innovation one of the key guidelines for China’s research and development strategy. However, it had not caught up the concerns of foreign companies until October 2009 when the NDRC, the Ministry of Science and Technology, and the Ministry of Finance issued a joint document specifying the qualifications for government procurement of high-tech products.³² The most important qualification is that the product has to be certified as a National Indigenous Innovation Product (NIIP). In addition, the Chinese patent law had already required that foreign technologies be patented in China in order to get the protection of the Chinese law. Moreover, China has not signed the WTO Government Procurement Agreement that requires equal treatment to domestic and foreign firms in government procurement. Adding on these two existing constraints, the government’s new move was then usually interpreted as a step for the government to protect Chinese companies in the high-tech area. Both foreign companies and foreign governments have voiced high concerns of this new move. Under their pressure, the Chinese government has announced that foreign companies can also apply for NIIP as long as the product is designed and patented in China.

Notwithstanding the debate, one has to realize that indigenous innovation has been emphasized by the Chinese government for a long time, perhaps stretching back to the 1960s when self-reliance was proposed as a national strategy for technological development. It reemerged as a forefront government drive in recent years for several reasons. First and foremost, the idea of self-reliance is still deeply rooted in the government’s thinking, particularly in the high-tech area where China faces high barriers in the international market. Second, the government believed that technological upgrading is the key for China to escape the “trap” of exporting low value-added products, and for that matter, to change its export-oriented growth model. Third, the government budget has been increasing fast with a large portion sliced for technological innovation. Apparently, the government does not want to spend money on technologies owned by foreign companies that can easily be brought out of the country. Government procurement was used as a policy tool to promote certain industries including the hi-tech industry. The requirement of the NIIP status was then designed to achieve technological progress inside China. Finally, the 2009 government document was, in a way, a response to President Obama’s “Buy America” initiative.

In effect, government procurement often turns a blind eye on the origin of products. For example, it is required that governments can only buy

Chinese cars. This does not benefit indigenous car makers such as Cherry, but instead has benefited Audi whose sales of luxury sedans almost entirely depend on government procurement. In a way, however, this is consistent with the government's stand that its procurement does not exclude foreign high-tech products as long as they are originated and patented in China.

Conclusion

China's economic diplomacy turned from a power-centered approach to an interests-centered approach when the country started economic reform in the late 1970s. The pursuit of power is still there but has become a background goal. The central government's conscious design plays a major role in the formation of the country's external economic policies, but equally important are historical continuity and domestic interest group politics. China's century-long humiliation after the Opium War has taught Chinese leaders that backwardness invites bullies. Closing the power gap between China and the advanced countries has always been the ultimate goal. For this, China wants to build a materially strong country and its interest-centered approach serves to achieve this goal. It is noteworthy, however, that China has become a diverse country with many interest groups having their own agendas. The Chinese government has to take those groups seriously. In addition, China's economic ascent is happening in an increasingly tight international environment; some of the government's moves can be understood as responses to this changing environment.

The West's views on China contain both truth and myths. It is true that the Chinese government is consciously using SOEs to advance some strategic goals and has not continued to reduce the size of the SOE sector after the financial crisis started. However, the West has failed to appreciate the roles of history and China's domestic interest groups in shaping China's economic diplomacy. Seeing China's economic diplomacy as a coherent government policy will be detrimental to the West's relationship with China. For one thing, it could become self-fulfilling because China may take it as evidence for the West to be alert of China's rise. The Chinese system is quite different from the Western system, but some of the fundamental laws determining government policy in the West also apply to China. In particular, government policy is formed on the basis of a combination of national strategy and interest group politics. Treating China as a normal country will help the West form a rational and productive relationship with China.

Notes

1. Ian Bremmer, *The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War between States and Corporations?* (New York: Portfolio, 2010). Bremmer defines "state capitalism" as a system in which the state uses the power of markets primarily for the leaders' political gains. As we will see in this chapter, this is not a good characterization

of the Chinese system although Bremmer names China a primary example of state capitalism.

2. Robert Blecker and Arslan Razmi, "Export-Led Growth, Real Exchange Rates and the Fallacy of Composition," in March Setterfield, ed., *Handbook of Alternative Theories of Economic Growth* (Northampton and Cheltenham: Elgar, 2010), 379–396.
3. Yang Yao. "The Chinese Growth Miracle," in Steven Durlauf and Philip Agion, eds. *Handbook of Economic Growth*, forthcoming.
4. "Three representations" were proposed by the 16th CCP Congress as a new ideology for the party. Instead of claiming to be a party representing just the working class, now the CCP has three representations: representing advanced cultures, representing advanced productive forces, and representing the vast interests of most Chinese people.
5. One of the implications is that calling China a dictatorship or autocracy is inadequate. It is more appropriate to call China as electocracy—a regime that relies on a centralized agency to select government officials—if one has to give it a label.
6. Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).
7. Timothy Besley, "State Capacity, Conflict, and Development," *Econometrica*, Vol. 78, No. 1 (2010): 1–34.
8. Bremmer, *The End of the Free Market*.
9. The author's own fieldwork in Xiangtan city of Hunan province in the spring of 2010 found that local governments charged only half the costs they spent in preparing the land of industrial parks.
10. Binkai Chen and Yang Yao, "The Cursed Virtue: Government Infrastructural Investment and Household Consumption in Chinese Provinces," *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 73, No. 6 (2011): 856–877. Chen and Yao find strong evidence supporting this claim by studying the Chinese provinces for the period 1978–2006.
11. Edward Steinfeld, *Playing Our Game: Why China's Economic Rise Doesn't Threaten the West?* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
12. Bruce Dickson, "Who Consents to the 'Beijing Consensus'? Crony Communism in China." Manuscript, the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, 2010.
13. *Ibid.*, 1.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Joshua Ramo, "The Beijing Consensus: Notes on the New Physics of Chinese Power," Foreign Policy Centre, 2004, <http://www.fpc.org.uk>. The Beijing Consensus was coined by Joshua Ramo in 2004. According to Ramo, the Beijing Consensus is comprised of three elements, none of which is related to authoritarianism: (1) innovation; (2) equitable and sustainable development; and (3) self-determination. The Washington Consensus was proposed by John Williamson in 1989 as a summary of policy recommendations put forward by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the US government for the structural adjustment to be carried out in Latin American countries stranded by the sovereign debt crisis (John Williamson, "What Washington Means by Policy Reform?" in John Williamson, ed. *Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?* [Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1990]). It contains ten policy recommendations, which can be grouped into three broad categories, prudent fiscal policy, market liberalization, and protection of property rights. There is a heavy dose of liberal thought in those recommendations, but as Williamson himself often stresses, the Washington Consensus does not coincide with neoliberalism that advocates the

- completely unregulated market. See John Williamson, "The Strange History of the Washington Consensus," *Journal of Post Keynesian Economics*, Vol. 27, No.2 (2004): 195–206.
16. Yang Yao, "The End of Beijing Consensus—Can China's Model of Authoritarian Growth Survive?" *Foreign Affairs*, Online version. February 2, 2010. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65947/the-end-of-the-beijing-consensus>; Yang Yao, "The China Model and Its Future," in Ross Garnaut, Jane Golley, and Ligang Song eds., *China: The Next 20 Years of Reform and Development* (Canberra: The ANU Press, 2010).
 17. There were fluctuations in between. Tax revenues dropped to 12 percent of GDP in 1993, but local governments had large amounts of nontax revenues. The 1993 tax reform has centralized tax revenues and reduced the share of nontax revenues in total government revenues. All data come from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) website www.stats.gov.cn.
 18. Daniel Rosen, "The Role of the State in China's Economy." Peterson Institute of International Economics, March 2011.
 19. Ho-mou Wu, "Local Government Debts in China," *CCER China Economic Forum*, New York Stock Exchange, January 9, 2012.
 20. Shuanglin Lin, *Economic Development and Transition: Thought, Strategy, and Viability* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Lin, "The Composition of Central Government Transfers." Manuscript, College of Economics, Peking University, 2009.
 21. Bremmer, *The End of the Free Market*.
 22. Elsewhere, I argue that this is a result of the Chinese government's being a disinterested government in the sense that it takes a neutral stance when it comes to conflicts of interests in the society. That is, it is a government that does not represent the interests of particular social groups or is captured by any social groups. See Yang Yao, "The Disinterested Government: An Interpretation of China's Economic Success in the Reform Era." Paper presented at the "Country Role Models" conference organized by WIDER, United Nations University, June 2008, Helsinki. Also see Yao, "The End of Beijing Consensus" and Yao, "The China Model and Its Future."
 23. Lin, 2009.
 24. Hongpan Yin and Xulin Liu, "Trends of China's Overall Gini Coefficient" (*zhongguo zongti jinni xishu de bianhua qushi*), *China Population Science (zhongguo renkou kexue)*, No. 6 (2011): 11–20.
 25. Scott Kennedy, *The Business of Lobbying in China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008).
 26. See for example, Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick, "The End of Chimerica." Harvard Business School Working Paper 10–037, 2010.
 27. Zetian Wang and Yang Yao, "An Estimation of the Equilibrium Exchange Rate of RMB," *Jingrong yanjiu (Journal of Financial Research)*, No. 12 (2008): 22–36.
 28. Xin Li, Zhi Wang, and Dianqing Xu, "The Impacts of RMB Appreciation on the Chinese and US Economy—Results from a Cross-Country CGE Model." CCER, Peking University, 2010.
 29. Rosen, "The Role of the State in China's Economy."
 30. CNPC, SINOPEC, and CNOOC's profits in 2010 were, respectively, 139.8 billion yuan, 70.7 billion yuan, and 54.4 billion yuan. Most of the profits would be reinvested. See <http://news.sohu.com/20110318/n279878442.shtml>.
 31. See http://www.gov.cn/jrzq/2006-02/09/content_183787.htm.
 32. The document is "Announcement of the Certification of the National Indigenous Innovation Products in 2009." See <http://tech.sina.com.cn/it/2009-12-15/07053677791.shtml>.

Part IV

Trade and Resources

Still the Liberal Leader? Domestic Legacies, International Realities, and the Role of the United States in the World Economy

Michael Mastanduno

Introduction

The economic policies of major powers are critical to world order. The experiences of the 1930s taught that international economic relations are not merely “low politics,” but have a profound impact on great power relations and international stability. In that dark decade, economic scarcity and conflicts led to political extremism and eventually war, as enemies in the marketplace became enemies on the battlefield. Fortunately, the prospects of great power war are remote in the current international system. Economic policies are nevertheless critical determinants of national and global prosperity, and have significant impact on the potential for great power cooperation as opposed to conflict.

For the United States, trade and resource policies have been a key component of postwar grand strategy. During the Cold War, US commitment to multilateral free trade was part of an overarching strategy designed to cement an alliance of advanced industrial democracies and contain the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, under the guise of the Washington Consensus, US officials sought to extend commercial and financial liberalism more deeply into the former Soviet area and the developing world as a way to globalize the US-centered international order. The great financial crisis, however, has disrupted this US international economic project. In its aftermath, both progress in the multilateral trading system and US commitment to lead that system are clouded by considerable uncertainty.

After World War II external circumstances combined with US economic and security interests to thrust the United States into the unfamiliar role of liberal leader. The United States took on primary responsibility to

produce collective goods for the world economy—an open and multilateral trading system, an international reserve and exchange currency, and reliable access to energy at reasonable prices. Domestic politics in the United States adjusted to accommodate this new role; political power and initiative shifted from Congress to the executive to facilitate US leadership abroad. The rapid growth and unprecedented prosperity enjoyed by the global economy between 1950 and 2000 was due in no small part to the power and purpose exercised by the United States.

The United States, of course, was not simply an altruistic provider of collective goods. US policymakers took full advantage of this position as global economic leader and reserved special privileges for themselves. Great powers that determine the rules in international politics frequently strive to live above these rules, and the United States has been no exception. Much of the conflict that has taken place over the management of the postwar global economy, particularly among the advanced industrial countries, has revolved around US efforts to force other states to play by the rules of the liberal world economy, while other governments claim that the United States has not always followed those rules itself or has taken advantage of its privileged position in a way that forces the burden of adjusting to international economic change onto others.

The contemporary challenge to the liberal trading system, however, is more profound. Debates over who should adjust to global imbalances and whether the United States is taking unfair advantage of its privileged position will undoubtedly continue. But the more fundamental problem is over the core issue of liberal leadership itself. Does the United States still possess the capability and more importantly the political willingness to move the liberal world economy forward? This uncomfortable question has been lingering for some time, and the recent financial crisis has thrown it into sharp relief. To be sure, US policymakers continue to express their strong support for the liberal global order and multilateral trading system. Domestic politics, however, increasingly constrain the ability of the United States to serve as leader of that system, and in particular to continue to do the hard political work of promoting freer trade. Interest groups are divided over the desirability of expanding the liberal order further, and while elites continue to support liberal ideology, at the popular level, free trade is subject to skepticism if not outright hostility. Although the United States has neither formally nor rhetorically abandoned its role as liberal leader, there is greater uncertainty now—perhaps greater than at any time during the postwar era—over whether it still possesses the willingness and ability to play that role.

For somewhat different reasons, uncertainty similarly characterizes whether the United States will manage to play a second critical role—that of guarantor, for itself and others, of stable and predictable access to the energy supplies required for running modern industrial economies. Postwar US energy policy, like trade policy, has been market-oriented. US policymakers have sought to assure that firms and consumers in the industrial

and emerging economies primarily of North America, Europe, and East Asia enjoy reliable access to energy supplies at predictable prices. To achieve this outcome, the United States relied during the Cold War on special partnerships with typically nondemocratic leaders of key energy producers. It also developed and practiced an offshore balancing strategy to maintain stability in the region as a whole.

Today, these special relationships are under stress as political upheaval spreads across the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Moreover, over the last two decades the more prudent US offshore balancing strategy has been transformed into a more ambitious and controversial onshore balancing strategy, one that has caused and exacerbated turmoil in the region and has helped make the United States the target of terrorist attacks at home. In an ideal world, the United States might try to redirect the collective good of energy security around a different region and alternative sources of energy. Recent discoveries of natural gas in North America combined with improved technologies may place that objective within reach over time. But dependence on imported oil, and on the countries of the Middle East and Persian Gulf as the global suppliers of first resort, renders that objective infeasible in the short to medium term, particularly for US allies in Europe and East Asia. The loss of stability in the region, and continued reliance on the region, means that US energy policy and its ability to assure stable access for a growing world economy can no longer be taken for granted.

The current uncertainties associated with the US role in trade and energy policy have important implications for US-China relations and, since they are the two most important players, for global economic and security order. In the trade area, a leadership vacuum may be emerging similar to that which existed during the interwar era, when the United States and Britain neither individually nor collectively could organize effective leadership of the world economy. US leadership may be in doubt—but China is not ready to lead either. At the same time, both countries maintain large (and in China's case, rapidly growing) economies that are dependent on imported energy. Each naturally prefers stable access to supplies from the Middle East/Persian Gulf region at low prices; looking ahead, neither may enjoy that luxury.

This chapter explores the enduring and evolving preferences of the United States in trade and natural resource policies. In explaining those preferences I pay attention to relative power, national and parochial interests, and to the distinctive domestic political practices, historical traditions, and ideas that have characterized the US approach. The rest of the argument proceeds in four parts. The first substantive section spells out US preferences and the forces driving them in more detail. The second section examines the historical evolution and current dilemmas of US trade policy. The third takes up postwar US energy strategy and the challenges it faces today. The final section explores the implications of evolving US preferences and politics for US-China relations and world order.

Sources of US Foreign Economic Policy: Power and Interests, and Domestic Ideas and Traditions

Postwar US foreign economic policy has been characterized by preferences for openness, multilateralism, leadership, and privilege-taking. These preferences developed over 60 years and have become ingrained as what might be understood as historical habits for US policymakers.

The preference for *openness* means that US policymakers have favored liberal or freer trade policies for goods, services, technology, money, and finance. The commitment to liberal trade was an abrupt change in US policy after World War II, reversing an historical preference for protectionism that had characterized the US approach to trade since the country's founding. With some significant exceptions (e.g., controls on strategic technology exports and restrictions on imports in certain domestically sensitive sectors), postwar US officials have worked to open the home market to imports and to assure that other countries open their markets to US exports.

Second, US policymakers have preferred *multilateralism* as the organizational form of the liberal international trading system.¹ They have promoted the idea that trade should be nondiscriminatory as well as open; it should be driven globally by the economic needs of private actors rather than by the political needs of governments. Governments do have key roles to play in establishing the rules of the game and institutionalizing them in multilateral entities such as the GATT and WTO. In general, US policymakers have championed multilateral free trade over protectionism and over regional and bilateral free trade arrangements. The latter two are merely second-best outcomes because while bilateral and regional free trade arrangements may serve as "building blocks," contributing eventually to multilateral free trade, they may also prove to be "stumbling blocks," substituting for multilateralism and complicating efforts to advance it.²

Third, postwar US officials have preferred a *leadership* role. Rather than simply pursuing free trade at home, they have taken on the responsibility to assure that multilateralism and nondiscrimination characterize the global trading system as well. This, too, is a postwar reversal of America's traditional approach; through most of its history the United States was content to be a free rider, reaping the benefits of an open trading system organized by others while preserving protectionist policies for itself. As self-appointed leader of the liberal trading order, the United States has taken upon itself the tasks of integrating more and more countries into freer trade and urging all countries to allow liberal practices to penetrate more and more deeply into their domestic political economies. American's major trading partners have long acknowledged that the United States should play this leadership role and they have come to expect that it will play that role.

Fourth, as noted above, postwar US policymakers have had a strong preference for *privilege-taking*. To US officials, the burden of leadership—of rule-making—carries with it the privilege of rule-breaking, of using one's dominant position to make exceptions yourself.³ This penchant for

privilege-taking was evident early in the postwar era as US administrations demanded and won exceptions from GATT coverage in areas of US competitive weakness such as agriculture and textiles. Privilege-taking has also been evident in America's coercive market-opening practices (e.g., Section 301) that take place outside the formal rules of multilateral trade, and in the ongoing exploitation of the US dollar as the world's money. Although privilege-taking has generated resentment and accusations of hypocrisy among America's trading partners, US officials remain unapologetic and expect others to tolerate it in recognition of America's leading role.

What general factors account for this cluster of US preferences? Two sets of variables stand out: material power and interests, and domestic political practices, ideas, and traditions.

Power and Interests

There exists a general correlation between the relative economic power of a country and the extent to which it prefers a multilateral and open global trading order.⁴ Weaker, less dynamic economies (and sectors with economies) tend to prefer protection. Stronger and more dynamic economies (and sectors) prefer free trade. In more dynamic economies exporters mobilize and lobby governments to satisfy their interest in open markets abroad. The larger and more productive the economy, the more likely that import-competing industries will either be insulated from the effects of trade or will be able to adjust and move quickly into alternative areas of economic activity. In the first two decades after World War II, America's large, dynamic, and relatively competitive economy gave it a natural interest in multilateral free trade. The spread of US multinational companies, producing and marketing on a global scale, reinforced the US interest in an open and nondiscriminatory playing field.⁵

For postwar US policymakers, openness served national security as well as national economic interests. Free trade has been an instrument of statecraft.⁶ It has reinforced US political and security ties with its closest allies in Europe and East Asia. It has held open the possibility of pacifying the foreign policies of potential challengers, such as China after the Cold War. The denial of trade has been a weapon against actual adversaries such as the Soviet Union during the Cold War and Iran and North Korea today.

A preponderance of relative power matters for leadership as well. Leadership of the liberal world economy typically takes two forms, benign and coercive. Benign leadership involves the creation of public goods; in order to provide these goods leading states need disproportionate resources such as a strong and stable currency, a large domestic market, and ample financial resources to serve as lender or stabilizer of last resort.⁷ Coercive leadership requires military as well as economic power since leading states sometimes need to force others to embrace open trade. The United States used its formidable financial leverage right after World War II to compel France and Great Britain, desperate economically at the time, to abandon

regional preference systems and move toward multilateral freer trade with convertible currencies. The US Marines have been employed in Latin America and elsewhere to disrupt or overthrow regimes hostile to liberal international economic practices. Postwar US naval power has assured the free flow of energy resources from the Persian Gulf and elsewhere not only to the United States but also to other more energy-dependent advanced industrial economies.

A preponderance of relative power and the propensity for privilege-taking also go hand in hand. Ordinary powers tend to be rule takers rather than rule makers. Dominant powers not only make rules, they can get away with breaking them when it serves their interests to do so. The United States has run the postwar, liberal world economy in the spirit of Thucydides' famous dictum that the strong do what they can and the weak take what they must.

Domestic Ideas, Practices, and Traditions

A second set of variables that are more distinctively American also shape the US approach to foreign economic policy. These domestic ideas, practices, and traditions are enduring features of the US political landscape; they interact with US power and interests to produce both continuity and change in US foreign economic policy.

First, the United States has a decentralized domestic political structure that is independent of its relative power position in the international system. The US Constitution designed a political system that was intended to limit, rather than facilitate, the effective exercise of political power. America's founders, having been oppressed by the executive power of the English king, set up a system of shared powers and checks and balances, one that granted considerable power to Congress as the voice of the people. The executive branch and Congress generally share decision-making authority; by tradition Congress has more authority in the trade area than in many others areas, most notably national security policies. America's decentralized political system offers multiple points of access to private economic interests and is relatively sensitive to those interests.⁸

In this structural setting, the pursuit of multilateral free trade has required that export interests mobilize to counteract import-competing interests, and that the more parochial and inward-looking Congress delegate authority and defer politically to the generally more outwardly oriented executive branch. At the postwar peak of US economic power, domestic interests and practices lined up precisely this way.⁹ But that accommodating outcome for the pursuit of multilateral free trade is not guaranteed. During the interwar years the United States possessed the world's most powerful economy, but parochial protectionist interests overwhelmed any national interest in free trade and liberal leadership. As discussed below, in the current era domestic politics in the United States no longer provides the kind of enabling environment for the ready pursuit of multilateral free trade by any administration.

America's enduring political tradition of decentralization has profound consequences for US trade policy and international leadership. Central foreign policy decision-makers tend to look "outward" and focus on America's responsibility to provide stability for the global economy. Congress, the public, and import-competing groups tend to look "inward" at the parochial interests of the United States. This decentralized structure invites political actors to struggle over trade policy without any guarantee that the outcome will reflect consistently a US preference for the promotion of multilateral free trade.

Second, postwar US foreign economic policy has also been informed by a set of distinctively (though not uniquely) American ideas. After World War II, US officials learned the "lessons of the past"; shaken by the traumas of the 1930s, they embraced the classic liberal argument linking free trade, interdependence, and peace. They came to believe that enemies in the marketplace eventually become enemies on the battlefield, and that friends in the marketplace see no point in going to battle in light of the high costs of economic disruption. The specter of the destructive Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 continues to resonate in US political discourse, serving as an ideational bulwark against the return of a far-reaching protectionist coalition.

US officials have long believed that "all good things go together." Free trade is good for strong as well as weak countries and leads to national and global prosperity. Prosperity reinforces social stability and political democracy. Stable democracies have peaceful foreign policies. This virtuous cycle was locked in at home, and US policymakers seeking to spread the US economic model believe that it could be locked in elsewhere, thereby making the world safer for the United States. This distinctively American liberal ideology has reinforced the power and interest rationales for multilateral free trade, and these liberal ideas continue to resonate today.

The American ideological tradition, however, is not one dimensional. The postwar consensus in favor of openness and multilateralism competes with traditions that reach back further into US history and stress nationalism over globalism, insularity over openness, and a suspicion that engaging too fully in the global economy and international politics risks harm to American democracy and the American way of life.¹⁰ Ideas matter, but the marketplace of American ideas is a competitive one. Insularity and nationalism prevailed for most of US history, only to be vanquished by liberal internationalism after World War II. But the instinctive appeal of political insularity and economic nationalism did not completely die out. Their recent resurgence alongside postwar liberal ideology helps us to appreciate the current ambivalence of America's international economic leadership.

US Trade Policy: Historical Legacies and Current Dilemmas

Even though it is common to think of the United States as the natural champion of the liberal trading order, we should recognize that protectionism

and mercantilism are deeply embedded in the history of US commercial policy. Alexander Hamilton, among the most prominent of America's founding fathers, authored his famous "Report on Manufactures" shortly after American independence and with it made the intellectual and political case for the primacy of the state over the market in early US foreign economic policy.¹¹ Hamilton argued for protection rather than free trade, and for a national industrial strategy designed to safeguard American independence and knit together the manufacturing north and agrarian south. This argument reflected directly America's relative power position in the late eighteenth century—it was a weak and vulnerable nation-state in a multipolar world dominated by traditional European great powers. Hamilton surmised, in the spirit of mercantilist thought, that America would not be able to compete with the more developed European economies, in particular that of Great Britain, without infant industry protection and manufacturing subsidies. Like emerging economies today, the United States reasoned that state intervention was needed to nurture industrial and commercial capacity.

Hamilton's preferences came to characterize US trade policy for over a century. The idea of economic nationalism and accompanying protectionist policies grew out of America's relative power position and were reinforced by the decentralized political structure of the United States. Until the 1930s, Congress, exercising its constitutional authority to regulate commerce, was the main player in trade policy. Its business was to set tariffs on goods coming into the US market, both to protect US manufacturing and agriculture and to raise revenue for the federal government. On the external front, Britain's efforts during the nineteenth century to spread economic liberalism offered the United States the best of both worlds—free trade abroad, which reflected the interest of US grain producers, and protectionism at home, as desired by America's emerging manufacturing sector.¹²

By the end of the nineteenth century the two most powerful protectionist states were Germany, which unified and challenged British dominance militarily and well as economically, and the United States, which developed more quietly into a great economic and eventually military power on the periphery of Europe by taking what it needed from the world economy and remaining insulated (until the world wars) from balance-of-power politics in Europe. The United States, in effect, practiced its own version of "peaceful rise" to great power status.

The interwar era (1920–1939) was one of painful transition in US trade and foreign policy. America's relative economic power increased significantly as a result of World War I, a war that devastated the traditionally dominant economies of Europe while strengthening that of the offshore balancer, the United States. American power, however, did not go hand in hand with American leadership. Although the United States now possessed the resources and capacity to embrace the ideal of liberal leadership and play a stabilizing role in the world economy, it chose instead to continue to act as if it were a secondary international player pursuing its more narrow

particular interests. In Kindleberger's famous phrase, an exhausted Britain was no longer able to lead the liberal world economy while an emerging and now capable United States was not quite willing.

American decentralized political tradition helps to account for what in retrospect was a colossal failure of US economic diplomacy.¹³ During the interwar era, significant "nationalist" or inward-looking US business interests controlled Congress and some parts of the executive branch, including the Commerce Department. This coalition favored continued protectionism at home and was skeptical of US efforts to lend abroad in the interest of stimulating European recovery. An "internationalist" or outward-looking coalition, including export-oriented industry and agriculture and increasingly powerful financial interests, and represented in the executive by the State and Treasury Departments, proved not yet powerful enough politically to transform US commercial policy.

The Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 raised American protectionist barriers at precisely the time that the struggling world economy needed access to the large US market as an engine of growth. What began as an interest group lobbying effort to prop up the US agricultural sector evolved, after rounds of deal-making in Congress, into a law that raised tariffs on almost 1,000 US manufacturing products.¹⁴ Other countries retaliated and everyone, including the United States, lost. Between 1929 and 1932, American exports dropped a remarkable 49 percent as a result of slumping demand and the spread of "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies. The consequences were disastrous not just for the world economy but also for international security, as economic conflicts both caused and exacerbated the geopolitical conflicts among great powers that eventually led to World War II.

The story of postwar US liberal leadership has been told often and need not be repeated here.¹⁵ The key point for our purposes is that the key drivers of US foreign economic policy—preponderant power and domestic interest, on the one hand, and ideas and domestic political structure on the other—finally lined up in favor of a US leadership role. World War II was yet another great war that destroyed the territories, productive capacity, and populations of *other* great powers while leaving the United States virtually untouched. The war experience enhanced the relative economic power of the United States so much that by the end of the war the United States found itself in a position of unambiguous global superiority. American business and banking interests recognized that they now had such great competitive advantages that it was worth the effort for America to rebuild Western Europe and East Asia as markets for US goods, services, and investment. The internationalists finally prevailed over the nationalists. Liberalism crystallized as the dominant American economic ideology for both economic and geopolitical reasons. As the dominant national economy, US business and government perceived a natural interest in free trade and an open world economy. American policymakers perceived also a security interest; trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific economic interdependence was a key element in

bringing together an anti-Soviet coalition among the recovering yet still vulnerable countries of the advanced industrial world.

It is critical to recognize that domestic political structure lined up in support of multilateral free trade as well. The tragic miscalculation of Smoot-Hawley and the accompanying Great Depression convinced a majority in Congress that authority to conduct trade policy should be delegated to the executive branch, so that the president and his officials could negotiate directly with America's trading partners in order to open markets, multilaterally, for the benefit of the United States as well as the international system as a whole. This delegation actually began during the depression, with the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, but it reached its full potential during the 1950s and 1960s as successive US presidents used their authority to engage growing numbers of countries in rounds of negotiation to cut tariffs under the auspices of the GATT.

In this presumed "golden age" of US leadership, US policymakers did provide the necessary public goods to enable a global (more accurately, trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific) recovery and the reemergence of a liberal economic order. The United States linked its currency to gold, opened its markets to imports, and exported foreign capital in the form of dollars, factories, technology, and troops. It promoted institutions—primarily the GATT and IMF—that reflected liberal values and reinforced and legitimated liberal policies. American policymakers used their dominant military power—covertly against uncooperative governments, and overtly to maintain freedom of the seas—to reinforce an open world economy, and in turn used their economic power to promote military and geopolitical objectives.

US policymakers took advantage of their country's privileged position to make a series of "special deals" to protect political sensitive US interests from international competition.¹⁶ These included agriculture, which was exempted from the tariff-cutting negotiations in the GATT, and textiles, for which the United States promoted not free trade but market-sharing quota arrangements with increasingly competitive foreign suppliers. US policymakers also took full advantage of the special role of the dollar. The willingness of central banks to accumulate and hold the US currency meant US policymakers could simultaneously pursue guns, butter, and growth without having to make the kinds of trade-offs and domestic adjustments that countries with more ordinary currencies are forced to accept. When President Johnson faced a choice between either escalating the Vietnam War or expanding the US welfare state at home, he simply chose both—and he coerced America's loyal ally, West Germany, into continuing to hold American dollars of diminishing value by threatening to remove US troops from Europe if West Germany and others abandoned the dollar.¹⁷ When the pressure on the dollar became too great and existing institutional arrangements no longer suited US interests, US officials simply changed these arrangements and forced adjustment on to their trading partners. The dramatic closing of the gold window and the end

of the Bretton Woods system under the Nixon administration in 1971 is the most infamous example.

In retrospect, the 1945–1970 era was extraordinarily accommodating to US commercial leadership. There was a large gap in economic power between the United States and everyone else, American business was generally competitive, the executive branch controlled trade policy, and multilateral free trade was generally acknowledged to serve the national interest. However in historical terms 1945–1970 was more the exception than the rule. The historical pattern was economic nationalism followed by a transitional struggle between groups holding nationalist and internationalist interests and ideas. Liberalism never completely eliminated economic nationalism.

After 1970, US leadership became more complicated. Japan and the advanced industrial countries of Western Europe recovered and eroded the competitive position of US-based firms at middle and high levels of technology. Newly emerging economies such as South Korea and Taiwan proved more competitive than the United States at the lower, more labor-intensive end of the product cycle. Protectionist pressures mounted in the United States; in the early 1970s, for example, a key interest group, that is, organized labor, shifted from supporting free trade to opposing it. Key industries including steel, autos, and machine tools sought relief from intensified foreign competition. In response to this pressure, and to what it perceives as the failure of successive administrations to defend national economic interests, Congress reasserted its authority over trade policy. It demanded greater accountability from the executive, forced presidents to negotiate special protectionist deals (for example, “voluntary” quotas placed on Japanese autos and other exports), and passed new legislation (e.g., Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974) designed to force US policymakers to open foreign markets to US exports.

Until very recently, the executive branch, regardless of whether controlled by Democrats or Republicans, followed a strategy of deflecting protectionist pressures while continuing to push forward with multilateral free trade. During the 1970s and 1980s, and into the 1990s, US officials took the lead in expanding free trade through successive rounds of multilateral negotiations in the GATT. These rounds took longer to complete, and it became harder to make progress, as the key trade barriers to tackle shifted from quantitative tariffs at the border to an array of nontariff barriers—government procurement policies, health and safety regulations, and even “cultural” factors such as French support for its national film industry or Japan for its traditional rice farming—that were more deeply embedded in the domestic political economies of the countries around the negotiating table. The Tokyo Round began in 1973 and was not completed until 1979. Disagreements prevented the Uruguay Round from even beginning until 1986, and it was finally completed, and with it the creation of the World Trade Organization, in 1994.

US policymakers sought to deflect protectionist pressures at home by turning more aggressive abroad. The international trading community used the term “aggressive unilateralism” to capture the US tendency to use the threat of closing its large home market as a way to convince its trading partners in Asia, Europe, and elsewhere to open their own markets to US goods and services. These US measures, most prominently the Super 301 trade provision generally viewed as the “nuclear weapon” of the US trade arsenal, took place outside the GATT framework and generated considerable resentment abroad.¹⁸ US policymakers defended them as appropriate in a trading system in which other players were “unfair” and as necessary in order to maintain support at home, and generate cooperation abroad, for multilateral free trade. Other countries complained that the United States was abusing its leadership role by acting at the same time as accuser, jury, and judge in international trade disputes.

US Leadership in Crisis

It is ironic that with the end of the Cold War, US relative power has increased, but international economic leadership has become even more difficult. The difficulty was not fully appreciated during the 1990s, an era of revitalized US economic growth and technological dominance, and one characterized by a certain degree of American hubris. American officials were confident that the world economy (and world politics) was moving in their favor, and that the Washington Consensus reflected an actual consensus—a genuine and widespread belief that there was deep support for, and simply no alternative to, the particularly American version of private capitalism at home and open markets abroad.

Not far beneath the surface, however, the dilemmas of US leadership were readily apparent. In retrospect, we might say that the founding year of the WTO, 1994, was also the year of its high point. To be sure, the WTO has become an effective instrument for adjudicating trade disputes, and one more legitimate and less controversial than unilateral US action. But as a forum for the ongoing expansion of multilateral free trade, the WTO has been far less effective. We are approaching 20 years since the completion of the last round, and the work that was only begun in that celebrated Uruguay Round—meaningful progress on agriculture, services, intellectual property protection, and the greater integration of developing countries—remains unfinished. The Doha Development Round, named officially in recognition of the importance of that latter objective, never overcame political stalemates between developed and developing countries and for all practical purposes must be considered a failure. As former US Trade Representative Susan Schwab wrote recently, “it is time for the international community to recognize that the Doha Round is doomed.”¹⁹ For US policymakers, the possible failure of past multilateral trading rounds was a cause of high-level concern that prompted considerable diplomatic

intervention. This time, the reaction of US officials was less of urgency and more of quiet resignation. Some hope for optimism returned near the end of 2013, as negotiators agreed on some relatively modest trade facilitation steps. That agreement, however, was a far cry from the ambitious agenda with which the round was launched 14 years earlier, and did not resolve the negotiating stalemates that had prevented more fundamental progress.²⁰

The United States, ever so pragmatic, moved during the 1990s to regional and bilateral free trade agreements as second-best alternatives to multilateralism and ideally as building blocks that could contribute to multilateral expansion in the future. NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) was the showcase of that effort. But concluding even that agreement with America's heavily dependent neighbors, Canada and Mexico, proved challenging and required a considerable personal commitment from then president, Bill Clinton. Even with strong presidential support, the passage of NAFTA barely mustered a majority in Congress. Within US domestic politics, the NAFTA experience left a residue of suspicion and resentment about any free trade agreements. Presidents Bush and Obama had difficulty completing even relatively modest bilateral free trade agreements, much less more ambitious regional ones. Bilateral free trade agreements that concluded with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea took over five years to make it through Congress (and only in what the *New York Times* referred to as a "rare accord"), hung up between a president willing to offer only qualified political support for them and a Congress willing to tolerate them only if they included higher labor and environmental standards abroad and expanded adjustment assistance for displaced workers at home.²¹

America, in short, is far less willing or capable of taking the lead in the promotion of free trade multilaterally. In President Obama's second term, the executive defaulted to the second-best approach and launched major regional trade initiatives in Asia (the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP) and in Europe (the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, or TTIP). The TPP is a proposed free trade zone that as of 2015 was being negotiated by the United States and 11 Pacific countries. America's interest has been driven as much by the security objective of reinforcing the US political and military commitment to the Pacific as by the economic objective of pushing forward free trade. China is excluded from the TPP—unless it takes the politically costly steps of liberalizing its currency, accepting international property protection standards, and limiting subsidies to state-owned enterprises. US negotiators have taken an especially uncompromising stand in intellectual property protection, both with regard to China and more generally, leading some commentators to express skepticism over whether the TPP will actually be completed successfully, with or without China.²² President Obama would also need to overcome strong legislative opposition, mostly from within his own party, to trade agreements still perceived by many in Congress as helpful to big businesses but detrimental to the American middle class. As of early 2015, the Obama administration proved unable to strike a deal with its key Pacific partner, Japan, or to gain the

“fast track” trade promotion authority needed to move these anticipated regional agreements through Congress on an up or down vote.

What accounts for the significant decline in US leadership? Both sets of variables highlighted above—power and interests, and domestic ideas and practices—are relevant. International, institutional, and domestic factors no longer line up to facilitate US leadership as they did in the first several postwar decades. Internationally, the United States is far more dominant in relative military capabilities than in relative economic capabilities. US economic leadership is in some ways a victim of the success of the very liberal order that US officials spread and maintained. Other states have used that order, with US encouragement, to become stronger and less dependent on the United States economically, and thus less sensitive to US demands. Notwithstanding its financial troubles, the European Union, for example, has integrated into a collective actor—one that does not always share US preferences—with considerable clout in trade negotiations. Developing countries, led by large and emerging ones such as Brazil and India, have more bargaining power than in the past (e.g., in multilateral negotiations over agriculture) and are less susceptible to the type of “divide and conquer” strategies that may have worked more effectively for the United States in an earlier era. China of course is developing into a formidable economic actor within the confines of the liberal order, yet without necessarily sharing the US conception of how domestic and foreign economic policies should be governed within that order.

Institutionally, the US-inspired entities—the GATT/WTO and IMF—no longer command the legitimacy and influence they once enjoyed as authoritative venues for determining trade policies and domestic adjustment measures. US officials used to be able to rely on a G3 (United States, West Germany, Japan) or G7 of advanced industrial countries to steer the world economy. Today they must work within the context of a G20 that is too large and diverse to be effective, while perhaps hoping for a G2 (United States and China) that has not yet materialized.

On the domestic front, ideas and institutional practices less accommodating to economic liberalism have reasserted themselves. Trade policy has become more politicized and a victim of the polarization that now characterizes US politics more generally. What might be called the “responsible middle” in the US political spectrum used to embrace a commitment to advancing free trade even with due recognition of its adjustment costs. The middle has all but vanished, and both the left (in support of organized labor and environmental interests) and the right (in defense of US borders and the average less-educated American male who can no longer find a traditional yet high-paying manufacturing job) are skeptical if not outright hostile to any further expansion of free trade.²³ Today Congress considers trade policy too important to be left in the formerly capable hands of the executive. Fast track authority, which Congress used to grant to presidents to allow them to bring home complex trade agreements that Congress would then either support or not with a simple up or down vote, is a thing of the

past. In the current era, concluding even modest trade agreements requires a fully committed president willing to expend scarce political capital by promoting free trade in the face of a more skeptical public. It also requires a unified executive branch and bipartisan support in an increasingly polarized Congress.

The result of these changes is not likely to be a dramatic reversion to US protectionism or isolationism. The United States is unlikely to turn its back on the world economy, but at the same time it is no longer positioned to move the world economy forward. The risk is more aimless drift than decisive collapse.

It is striking that, notwithstanding the erosion of US leadership, US policymakers continue to take advantage of the special privileges that still accrue to the United States in the world economy. The United States still runs massive deficits with an expectation that its complicit partners (first Europe, then Japan, and increasingly, China) will continue to finance them. The United States takes full advantage of the fact that its dollar, even if eroding in value, is still the world's dominant exchange and reserve currency. America used to impose solutions to financial crises that were initiated in other countries; the current and extraordinarily severe financial crisis was "born in the USA." In short, the United States has moved from being a leader who took special privileges as tacit compensation for shouldering the burden of providing collective goods to the world economy, to being perceived as a country powerful enough to still take advantage of the system yet without necessarily being willing or able to lead it.

Still Making the World Safe for Oil?

The success of a liberal world economy depends on increasingly open markets for goods and services and a stable monetary order that encourages trade and investment. It also relies on predictable access to raw materials, in particular energy. Modern industrial economies, even those that have become more aptly described as service economies, require access to large amounts of energy. In the not too distant future, the United States may become far more energy-independent due to oil and natural gas discoveries in North America and the development of technologies (such as hydraulic fracturing, or "fracking") needed to access them. In the near term, however, the United States is still highly dependent on imported sources. This is all the more so for America's closest trading partners in Europe and Asia. China, the emerging giant of the world economy, is of course heavily dependent on imported energy sources as well.

Assuring the free flow of energy resources, in particular oil, and in particular from that part of the world where so much of the globe's oil is found, the Middle East/Persian Gulf region, has been a critical component of postwar US leadership.²⁴ The United States has relied on a variety of strategies designed to make the world economy safe for oil. US military

power has served its economic leadership; the global reach of the US Navy, for example, has been critical in assuring the free flow of energy in normal times and even in circumstances of regional conflict (e.g., during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s). US power to intervene against “uncooperative” foreign governments has also been significant. With the overthrow of Mossadegh, the elected leader of Iran, in 1953, the United States made clear that it would not tolerate the type of local nationalism with the potential to threaten private Western oil interests or access to energy supplies more generally.²⁵

As OPEC became an important and potentially radical player in oil markets during the 1970s, US policymakers came to rely increasingly on special deals with friendly authoritarian governments to assure the steady flow of oil at predictable (albeit higher) prices. The Nixon administration blessed the Shah of Iran as a “regional policeman”; it provided the Shah access to sophisticated US military systems in exchange for Iran’s unambiguous anticommunist stance and its cooperation in assuring that OPEC oil flowed predictably to the West. The Shah’s support was short-lived since he was overthrown in 1979 and replaced by a regime far more hostile to US interests. At that point US favor shifted toward Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and even more importantly, the Saudi royal family. Saudi Arabia has long been the critical US regional partner given its status as the largest oil producer—indeed the “swing producer” in times of scarcity—in OPEC, and given its role as a consistent, though not altogether faithful, ally of the United States.²⁶

The measures described above have been embedded in a broader, postwar US strategy for the Middle East/Persian Gulf region. America’s geopolitical goals have been straightforward: to protect its democratic though increasingly unpopular ally, Israel; to assure the free and predictable flow of oil at reasonable prices from the region; and to secure the support of friendly governments, not necessarily democratic ones, throughout the region. US policymakers have sought consistently to maintain a regional balance of power such that no individual state, or group of states, become powerful and hostile enough to threaten either Israel, or the free flow of oil, or both.

For much of the postwar era, the US strategy for achieving these regional goals worked reasonably well. But two things have now changed. First, the US strategy itself, since the early 1990s, has shifted from that of effective *offshore* balancer to that of a more controversial and less effective *onshore* balancer. Second, the region itself, in part due to US initiatives, is now entering a state of unstable and unpredictable transformation. The combined result is that the United States can no longer act with any degree of confidence as the guarantor either of political stability or of the free flow of oil resources from this critical region.

The United States achieved many successes with its offshore balancing strategy. In the Suez crisis of 1956 the United States established itself, through military restraint but with economic pressure at the expense of its

most loyal ally, Great Britain, as both an anticolonial power and the great power determined to shape regional outcomes. In the 1967 and 1973 wars, it provided sufficient offshore military support to facilitate Israeli victories while demonstrating to Israel's adversaries that the road to recovering their land and prestige ran through Washington instead of Moscow. The Carter administration used that political capital to broker an Israeli-Egyptian peace that effectively divided the anti-Israeli coalition. After the collapse of the US position in Iran and during the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, the United States essentially swung its support to Iraq on the balancing principle that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend."²⁷ The Reagan administration reflagged and escorted tankers during that conflict to assure that the war between two major oil producers did not undermine energy-dependent Western economies. By the end of the 1980s, Iraq unexpectedly emerged strong enough to upset the regional balance of power by occupying its smaller oil-producing neighbor, Kuwait, and threatening OPEC's largest producer, Saudi Arabia. The United States responded by organizing an international coalition to liberate Kuwait, protect Saudi Arabia, and undermine the military power and prestige of its previous favorite, Iraq.

The significant change in US regional strategy began in the early 1990s, with the decision to maintain significant military forces on site in order to enforce the settlement of the 1990–1991 war against Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. Alongside economic sanctions, the United States relied on an ongoing air campaign to enforce "no fly zones" and the maintenance of ground forces to ensure that Saddam would not rearm and threaten his neighbors again. The United States established a larger and larger military footprint in the region, and found itself, perhaps not coincidentally, as the regular target of terrorist attacks throughout the 1990s (e.g., the attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, attacks against US military installations in Saudi Arabia in 1996, the destruction of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and the attack on the USS Cole in the Persian Gulf in 2000). The most dramatic attack against the United States, on September 11, 2001, was prompted according to Osama bin Laden by America's continued military presence in the region as much as by anything else.

The United States responded, in effect, with an onshore military strategy of "double or nothing." The Bush administration invaded Afghanistan to destroy Al Qaeda and its host, the Taliban, and shortly thereafter invaded Iraq to settle the score once and for all with Saddam Hussein. Neither invasion led to the anticipated quick victory; in both cases the United States became tied down as an occupying force in a costly, complicated, and inconclusive military adventure. The more prudent offshore balance had become a far more ambitious onshore balancer. The Bush administration doubled down again, proclaiming its intention not only to root out terrorists but to transform the region once and for all, this time in favor of democracy. But democracy, of course, is a mixed blessing. It has the potential to undermine America's longstanding allies in the region (e.g., Egypt

and Saudi Arabia) and, depending on the outcome of local elections, to legitimize and empower America's enemies (e.g., Hamas and Hezbollah). By the time President Obama replaced Bush, the United States appeared unsure whether it wanted to promote democracy and accept the uncertain consequences, or compromise its principles in favor of the stability of continuing to partner with friendly but undemocratic regimes. By the end of Obama's initial term, it found that it really no longer had the choice.

After 20 years of onshore balancing, the United States finds itself in a difficult predicament. It cannot easily extricate itself from what are now very costly geopolitical commitments. The Obama administration (like the Nixon administration facing a similar problem in a different region in an earlier era) committed to bring US troops home from Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet even as it succeeds in bringing the troops home, the United States continually risks getting pulled in even further, by post-conflict turmoil in Iraq and Afghanistan, by the need to contain Iran, by the possibility of an Iran-Israel conflict, or, in the wake of locating and killing Osama bin Laden, by domestic upheaval in its unfaithful and unstable ally Pakistan. These risks were painfully evident by 2014, when the United States found itself building coalitions and reengaging militarily in both Iraq and Syria to stem the expansion of ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria). ISIS took advantage of instability in both countries to occupy territory, declare sovereignty, and brutalize any opposition to its rule and values. A US air campaign to destroy ISIS-held oil refineries in Iraq served as a painful if ironic reminder of America's growing inability to assure the stable flow of the region's energy supply.

In short, despite being the strongest military player in the region, the United States has little control over the region. Whether prompted by US interventions or not, the region itself is in a state of turmoil. In Egypt, the authoritarian regime friendly to the United States for decades has been toppled and the country faces an uncertain future. What the United States considers to be radical Islamist groups have meaningful political positions in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. Shiite Iran has grown relatively stronger, no longer hemmed in by Sunni regimes in Afghanistan (the Taliban) or in Iraq. Israel perceives a threat from Iran and cannot be confident that the United States will be effective in addressing it. The medium- and longer-term consequences of the Arab Spring unleashed initially by protests in Tunisia late in 2010 are beyond the capacity of any government to predict or manage.

Saudi Arabia, arguably the key player in the oil game, faces the risk of domestic upheaval as its people watch others in the region experiment with the incipient promise of democracy. The Saudis, too, perceive a threat from Iran, and recently appear to have lost confidence in the ability of the United States to address that threat. As Nawaf Obaid wrote in 2011, "as Riyadh fights a cold war with Tehran, Washington has shown itself to be an unwilling and unreliable partner against this threat. The emerging political reality is a Saudi-led Arab world facing off against the aggression

of Iran and its non-state proxies.”²⁸ For decades, the US-Saudi relationship has been based on a tacit bargain. The Americans get oil and a stable partner in an unstable region. The Saudis get protection from external aggression and US support for their undemocratic domestic political order. After September 11, Americans questioned whether the deal was still viable. Today, Saudis question it as well.

The point is not that the Saudis, or others in the region, will stop selling their oil. It is that the United States can no longer be counted on to promote, much less guarantee, regional security. America’s regional strategy is in crisis as politics in this critical region have become unpredictable and uncontrollable. As in the trade area, the United States is no longer in a position to exercise leadership in a manner that inspires confidence among its would-be followers.

US-China Relations: A More Difficult Road Ahead

If the argument advanced above questioning continued US leadership is correct, then the United States and China may be headed for an even more difficult relationship in the decade ahead. Although the gap in relative military capability still significantly favors the United States, the rapid growth of Chinese military power along with China’s apparent interest in increasing its influence in East Asia have created anxiety in the US defense establishment and renewed interest in strategies of containment. China, in turn, is resentful of America’s mishandling of its domestic and the world economy while simultaneously preaching the virtues of its economic model and political values. The special US-China economic partnership in which China exports and lends and America consumes and borrows is no longer a stable foundation for moving the relationship forward.²⁹ Bilateral disputes—over China’s export restrictions on rare earth metals, China’s subsidies in solar panel production, America’s unsustainable and destabilizing fiscal position, or China’s still undervalued currency and protection of “indigenous innovation”—are likely to become more commonplace.

Each country faces significant domestic adjustment challenges. With mounting deficits at home and a dollar glut abroad, the United States confronts slower growth and reduced consumption in the years ahead. A country long accustomed to special economic privileges will find those privileges less tolerated abroad. China, for its part, can no longer rely so heavily on export-led growth as the world economy and the economy of its most important market slows down. The transition to a more domestic-led growth model is uncertain. For China’s leaders, whose legitimacy relies on their ability to provide high levels of growth and continued economic prosperity to its massive population, the stakes are high and the margin for error is small.

With American leadership waning, the challenges facing the US-China relationship are about to get harder. It is one thing to make domestic adjustments in a stable and growing world economy. It is quite another to make

them in a more uncertain and unpredictable global context. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that the two countries with difficult domestic adjustment challenges are also the two from which the system as a whole is expecting international economic leadership.

How likely is US-China joint leadership of the world economy? Prominent thinkers in the United States and elsewhere (e.g., Zbigniew Brzezinski) have proclaimed or encouraged the emergence of a “G2”—that is, a partnership of China and the United States working together to steer the world economy and produce the collective goods of international economic and political stability. Given their respective domestic predicaments, an effective G2 is unlikely in the near term. What is more likely is the type of global economic leadership transition (hopefully without any great depression and the concomitant security tensions) that the world experienced during the interwar years. At that time Britain was unable to lead and America was unwilling. Today, a more inward-looking China is neither willing nor able to lead. Given its own domestic political and economic landscape, the United States might still be able to lead, but it has lost the will.

China’s strategy of peaceful rise is premised on an accommodating international environment and a stable and growing world economy. China’s leaders, we can presume, would be happy for the United States to continue to lead—to push forward an open trading system and to assure regional stability and the free flow of natural resources. But what if the United States is no longer up to the task? Then China, like other great powers in other eras, will need to devise other strategies to secure its economic and geopolitical interests. To cite one example, if trade follows the flag, then China’s leaders might view the development of a blue water navy as a prudent insurance strategy to maintain China’s access to vital raw materials. The unintended yet predictable consequence might be a US-China naval competition, which in turn would likely reinforce the Chinese view that alternative strategies to reliance on US leadership are needed.

We are entering an uncertain transition in world politics and in the world economy. The United States can no longer assure the global political and economic stability that have been so important to its own interests, to the international system as a whole, and to China as a rising power within that system. As the two most influential players in the global game, China and the United States will need to navigate carefully. The positive news in an otherwise pessimistic assessment is that since the stakes are so high for each side, their incentives to cooperate in maximizing mutual economic benefits and minimizing security dilemmas are also very high.

Notes

1. Robert Pollard, *Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–50* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); Stewart Patrick and Shep Forman, *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001).

2. Jagdish Bhagwati, *Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements Undermine Free Trade* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Jeffrey Frankel, *Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic System* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1997).
3. Michael Mastanduno, "System Maker and Privilege Taker: U.S. Power and the International Political Economy," *World Politics*, Vol. 61, No.1 (January 2009): 121–154.
4. Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," *World Politics*, Vol. 28 (1976): 317–347; David A. Lake, "Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?" *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (1993), 459–489.
5. Paul Doremus and William Keller, Louis Pauly, and Simon Reich, *The Myth of the Global Corporation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
6. Michael Mastanduno, "Economics and Security in Statecraft and Scholarship," *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (1998): 825–854; Stephen C. Neff, *Friends But No Allies: Economic Liberalism and the Law of Nations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).
7. Lake, "Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy"; Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929–1939* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).
8. Narizny, Kevin, *The Political Economy of Grand Strategy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).
9. Helen Milner, *Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
10. Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: U.S. Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2001); Edward Luck, *Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organization 1919–1999* (A Century Foundation Book, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1999).
11. Edward Mead Earle, "Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, and Friedrich List: The Economic Foundations of Military Strategy," in Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), 117–154.
12. David A. Lake, *Power, Protection, and Free Trade* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
13. Jeffrey Frieden, "Sectoral Conflict and U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1914–1940," *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Winter 1988) 59–90; Fred Block, *The Origins of International Economic Disorder* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
14. Douglas Irwin, *Trade Policy Disaster: Lessons from the 1930s* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011).
15. G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Harold James, *International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
16. I. M. Destler, *American Trade Politics*, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2005).
17. Francis Gavin, "Ideas, Power, and the Politics of U.S. Monetary Policy during the 1960s," in Jonathan Kirshner, ed., *Monetary Orders: Ambiguous Economics, Ubiquitous Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 63–82.
18. Jagdish Bhagwati and Hugh Patrick, eds., *Aggressive Unilateralism: America's 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990).
19. Susan Schwab, "After Doha," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90 (May–June 2011), 104–114.

20. "Doha Delivers," *The Economist*, December 9, 2013.
21. Binyamin Applebaum and Jennifer Steinhauer, "Congress Ends 5-Year Standoff in Rare Accord," *New York Times*, October 12, 2011.
22. Bernard Gordon, "Trading Up in Asia: Why the United States Needs the Trans-Pacific Partnership," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 91, No. 4 (July/August 2012): 17–22.
23. Charles Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz, "Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal Internationalism in the United States," *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Fall 2007): 7–44.
24. Ethan Kapstein, *The Insecure Alliance: Energy Crises and Western Politics Since 1944* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
25. Stephen Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle Eastern Terror* (New York: Wiley, 2008).
26. David Spiro, *The Hidden Hand of American Hegemony: Petrodollar Recycling and International Markets* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).
27. Bruce Jentleson, *With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982–1990* (New York: Norton, 1994).
28. Nawaf Obaid, "Special Relationship between Saudi Arabia and U.S. Is Over," *Washington Post*, May 23, 2011.
29. Michael Mastanduno, "Order and Change in World Politics: The Financial Crisis and the Breakdown of the U.S.-China Grand Bargain," in G. John Ikenberry, ed., *Power, Order, and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 162–191.

China as a Listian Trading State: Interest, Power, and Economic Ideology

Weixing Hu

Introduction

Before Deng Xiaoping's open-door policy and economic reforms in 1978, China was an insignificant player in world economy. Its foreign trade volume in 1977 was less than US\$15 billion, the 30th largest trading state with a share of 0.6 percent in world trade. Due to economic autarky, this world trade share was even considerably less than in 1927–1929, when China accounted for more than 2 percent of world trade.¹ Yet, in just over 35 years China's role in world economy has completely changed. It is now the largest exporter and the second largest importer in world trade. As a fastest growing major economy, China's GDP is the second largest in the world, surpassing that of Japan in 2010 and on the way to overtake the United States in the next 15 to 20 years.

China's spectacular economic achievements over the last 35 years raise interesting questions about its development model and preferences over international trade. Does China "free ride" on the world trading system? Is the Chinese economic success built on currency manipulation, "sweatshops," and unfair trade practice? Does China practice a mercantilist policy by using political power to gain economic advantage? What are the Chinese preferences and policies to international trade and resources?

Interest, power, and ideas are three main factors explaining China's past achievements and future preferences in world trade and resources. China is a strong supporter for free trade and global multilateral trading regimes. As the Chinese economy integrates into the world economic system, China has enormous interest in the maintenance of an open and free trade system. China's accession to the WTO in 2001 was a big step in committing itself to the international free trade regime. Its economic openness measured by trade outcomes is far greater than anything achieved by the United States

in the postwar period and the United Kingdom at the height of the empire. While the United Kingdom's exports ratio of GDP was 12.2 percent in 1870 and that of the United States 6.7 percent in 1975, China's exports ratio of GDP was 31.6 percent in 2008.² China's heavy trade dependence creates a strong stake for it to see the world trading system remaining open and free. Its economic interdependence with the outside world serves a powerful political economy force that prevents China from returning to its past autarky and protectionism. The more China is rooted in the international rules-based trading system, the greater the cost for it to see the rise of trade protectionism. China is still a low-income country, and has a bigger stake than the United States and other developed countries in maintaining trade openness as it rises up for prosperity and prestige.

As China becomes a stakeholder in liberal international institutions, it seeks to remake, rather than break, the existing international economic order. All big powers have temptation to translate their power position into privilege and manipulate the world regimes into their favor. China is no exception that it will seek to leverage its power to transform the existing trade system. The World Bank estimates that within the next 20 years China is likely to become an economically dominant power. Its market-based GDP is projected to equal that of the United States by 2030, and its share of world trade will increase from 9.8 percent in 2010 to nearly 15 percent in 2030, larger than the share of the United States and Japan combined.³ The Chinese currency RMB stands a good chance to become a main reserve currency as well. The shift in world trade results from the shifts in world economic gravity. Although it is not in China's interest to roll back the global free trade system created by Western countries after World War II, Beijing will look for transforming it into a system that is fair and pertinent to the interests of developing countries (itself included). As China consolidates its power position in world economy, it still insists and demands its rights and privileges being a developing country. As a big emerging economy, China wants to have more influence in the world trade and financial institutions. It wants to maintain its model of development and industrial policy, continue to try to capture exclusive access to resources abroad, and pursue privileged access to markets by discriminatory FTA arrangement with selected trade partners.

Trade policy preference is determined by economic ideology and the purpose of economy as well as interests and power. China is a country with a strong statist tradition. Throughout modern history, its world trade policy and the purpose of economy have been largely shaped by state-centric interests, international power position and orientation, and economic ideology. The role of the state in economic development has directly influenced the country's external economic relations. After the People's Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949, the country experienced three decades of Maoist economic autarky. In the following 30 years, Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms and opening up to the world have fundamentally changed

China's social, political, and economic cores. Deng's structural economic reforms have led to marketization and the "retreat of the state" when the state-owned and controlled output dramatically declined in the economy. A market-based and export-oriented Chinese economy has timely integrated itself into the global economic system, where China could greatly benefit from free trade, globalization, world production transfer, and massive inflow of foreign direct investment on one hand, while, on the other hand, it could exercise some measures protecting the domestic economy from unwanted world competition. Yet 30 years later, this economic developmental model is now increasingly running into problem. Starting from the Hu Jintao administration in 2003 and especially after the 2008 global financial crisis, the pressure from global economic rebalancing and social justice at home have redirected the leadership's focus to social policy objectives and more state control of the national economy. The revitalizing role of the state and a more active industrial and technology policy affects China's future trade policy and its preferences for the international economic order.

The future Chinese challenge to world trade and resources is not just resulting from its rising power and changing interests, but also ideational. China's preference for free trade is not embedded in the liberal political and economic ideology. Quite in opposition, the Chinese believe in a state-sponsored strategy in world economic competition. The Chinese state takes high economic growth and raising standard of living for its citizens as its primary concern and source of political legitimacy. China is a good student of the rules of the game and comparative advantage principle in the capitalist market. The global economic competition in the twenty-first century is not between capitalism and socialism, rather, it is between different practices of capitalism. China has fully embraced the capitalist rules of the game but has practiced a different version of capitalism in world economic competition. What explains China's approach to world trade and resources is its unique way of blending free trade and state-sponsored competition strategy, which takes in the best of capitalism while preserving its domestic system intact. The Chinese state is used to applying political power to influence how the economic game is played out. Its thinking about the world economy has been deeply rooted in its culture and history. The Chinese development model is unique as it is both a developing country and a rising superpower. China is rising up by transcending the traditional development path of other big powers. Its development model is close to what Ian Bremmer calls "state capitalism."⁴ It would be too simple to label China as a free trader or a mercantilist state. In many ways, the source of Chinese policy can be traced back to the ideas of Friedrich List, whose industrial policy thinking in the nineteenth century has had strong influence on China to rise up in the liberal international system while not sacrificing its autonomy and development space as a latecomer in a system dominated by Western powers.

Changing power and interests are important variables shaping the Chinese preferences in future world economic order. Yet this chapter argues that economic ideology and historical legacies interact with changing power and interests, and these factors combined are important forces shaping China's preferences and policy toward world trade and resources. This chapter identifies and analyzes the role of enduring factors such as images of world order, international orientation, and nationalism in shaping the Chinese thinking on world economy and trade. Following this introduction, the second section of the chapter discusses China's role and policy in world trade today and whether it is a free trade or mercantilist state. The third section analyzes the domestic source of China's international trade policy. The fourth section examines the essence of the Chinese development model. The fifth section explores the underlying historical and cultural roots of the Chinese development model. Before concluding, the sixth section provides a discussion of the implications of the Chinese trade policy for China-US relations and future world order.

China and World Trade: Is It a Free Trade or Mercantilist State?

Over the last 35 years, the world has witnessed China's impressive economic transformation and development propelled by strong export-led growth in an increasingly diversified range of economic sectors. Anchored in its WTO accession in 2001, China has deeply integrated into global and regional economy. Before China's WTO accession, China was the seventh largest exporter and eighth largest importer in world trade in year 2000, with US\$ 249.2 billion export (3.9% world share) and US\$ 225.1 billion import (3.4% world share).⁵ Ten years later, China overtook Germany to become the world's largest exporter and the second largest importer behind the United States. In 2010 China export volume was US\$1.577 trillion (10.36% world share) and US\$1.395 trillion in import (9.06% world share),⁶ while the United States had US\$1.278 trillion export (8.39% world share) and US\$1.969 trillion import (12.78% world share) in the same year.⁷

As globalization increasingly opens up national economic border, countries like China enjoy more comparative advantage over other economies in global exchanges. China's exports have growth rates well above the expansion of world trade and other leading economies. As the world economy becomes highly organized into a well-connected production network, massive foreign direct investment has poured into China and made it the largest manufacturing center (or the "world factory") in the world. Consumers around the world benefit from the lower prices of products "Made in China." With over 1.3 billion population and US\$3.1 trillion foreign reserves in hand, China is both a labor-abundant and a capital-rich country. The Chinese government is promoting outbound investment to secure access to energy, raw materials, and foreign markets. Transforming from

an emerging economy to a global economic powerhouse, China has now significant economic and commercial clout in influencing world economic reorganization. In discussing China's role in reorganizing world economy, Barry Eichengreen and Hui Tong argue that "China's importance as an assembly platform for exports of manufactures, a destination for foreign investment, and a consumer of imported technology, raw materials and industrial goods is not a one-time shock; rather, it is an ongoing process continually reshaping the balance of global supply and demand."⁸

China's spectacular growth over the last 35 years benefited greatly from world free trade and investment, and China has become important for the world liberal trade regime as well. As Pascal Lamy, director-general of the World Trade Organization, observes, "China's involvement in the WTO helps us all in keeping this organization on the move towards more open and fairer trade... the WTO's relevance for China keeps growing and helps this country to address its reform challenges."⁹ China today has a high stake in maintaining an open world multilateral trading system.

In assessing China's trade policy, is it fair to say that China has benefited from world trade because it has practiced a mercantilist policy? I would argue that it is too simplistic to label China as a mercantilist or a free trade state. The China story is too broad and complicated to tell whether it is practicing free trade or protectionist policy. For the Chinese themselves, a simple label could be misleading.¹⁰ Chinese intellectuals argue that almost all developed countries are "capitalist market economies" but the nature of these market economies is not identical. There are the American, German, and Japanese versions of capitalism, one different from another, and diversity is natural.¹¹ Considering the complex nature of the Chinese reform experience, it would be too simple to generalize the China story with any exiting model or theory. That is why Shaun Breslin calls the Chinese experience as "Listian Capitalist Developmental Statism with Chinese characteristics."¹²

The Chinese experience was not a product of any existing model of development, rather, it has created a new pathway toward economic development and integration into world economy. Its success has been based on pragmatism and gradual reforms. In trade policy, it has tried to strike a delicate balance between international liberalization and national industrial policy, through which it could benefit from world trade and investment while protect selected economic sectors from unwanted global competition.

China's international trade practice is a mixed bag by the WTO standards. Before China acceding to the WTO, it was already doing a better job than most developing countries in growth rates, employment, poverty reduction, and welfare improvement for its population. It has high domestic saving and investment rates. International trade and foreign direct investment played a very important role in developing China's labor-intensive manufactured exports. But with high regulatory barriers, internal trade restrictions, and structural imbalances in the economic system, it was difficult for the Chinese leadership to push for more sweeping reforms at home in the 1990s. The biggest advantage of the WTO accession was that it

helped to push forward more sweeping structural reforms in China and make its trade and investment regulations closer to the WTO standards.

The WTO accession has given China a long-term stake in the rule-based multilateral trade regime. When China signed its accession agreement in 2001, many countries were concerned that China might not faithfully implement its free trade commitments or just use the WTO as a foreign-policy football. The prediction was wrong. China's unilateral reforms and implementation of WTO commitments have been positive. It has continued the gradual liberalization of its international trade and investment regime, although it did so gradually to maintain economic and social stability. According to a WTO review report assessing China's performance in 2010, Beijing has followed through its WTO commitment of gradually liberalizing its trade and investment regime and continuously reducing trade barriers.¹³ The trend in China's tariffs reduction has continued. Its average applied MFN tariff was 9.5 percent in 2009, slightly lower than in 2007 (9.7%). Bound rates are close to the applied rates, giving the tariff a high degree of predictability. The Chinese government has been continuing with its customs transit reform by introducing a direct release system into entry-exit inspection procedures to facilitate trade. In addition, China has undertaken major reforms of its tax system, and implemented a comprehensive competition law to foster competition. It also played a constructive role in resisting protectionist pressures, boosting global demand during the recent economic downturn, and stepping up involvement in South-South trade and its duty-free scheme for imports from least-developed countries.¹⁴

Nevertheless, China's trade practice within the WTO is not without controversy, which is not surprising given such a huge and complicated process for it to come to terms with the WTO rules and regulations. The complaints against China are mainly about: (1) import and export barriers; (2) slowness in opening services industries; (3) weak intellectual property rights (IPR) protection; (4) government "guidance" in allocating resources to specific sectors; and (5) its indigenous innovation policy.

It is true that China's trade barriers have been falling but the degree of nontariff border measures such as customs procedures, technical regulations and standards, import licensing and certification remains high. On the export side, the Chinese government still uses various export restrictions, including prohibitions, licensing, quotas, taxes, and less-than-full value-added tax (VAT) rebates, to manage certain exports on grounds of natural resource and energy conservation. Recently, the United States, the EU, and Japan initiated a dispute in the WTO against China concerning its restrictions on export of various forms of rare earths, tungsten, and molybdenum. However, seen from the Chinese perspective, there is nothing wrong to have more stringent environmental protection law, conserve natural resources, and levy an environmental tax on the extraction of natural resources, which are part of its long-term economic development plan and not uncommon in developed countries.

China is yet to accede to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, and its pace in liberalizing services industries, such as banking, insurance, telecommunications, and postal services has been slower than expected. It has relaxed restrictions on foreign investment in services since 2001, and the central government has delegated to local governments licensing authority for the establishment of foreign-invested enterprises in financial services, tourism, logistical support, and so on. But the global financial crisis starting in 2008 considerably increased the risks of lifting of foreign investment restrictions in financial services, and there are still significant restrictions, such as foreign participation limits, on foreign investment in some financial service sectors.

IPR protection is an old problem in China. Many countries criticize IPR violations in China and the Chinese government's weak enforcement of its IPR laws and regulations, particularly with respect to foreign movies and software. In the last ten years China has continued to improve its legislative framework and intensify the enforcement of IPR protection. It has identified the promotion of innovation as a national development strategy, and has made progress in educating the general public about the importance of IPR. The Chinese government has paid special attention to enforcing IPR protection at the border. Following a dispute at the WTO on the enforcement of IPRs, China notified that it has revised its copyright law based on recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Panel in 2009.¹⁵ Yet, China is such a big country, and it will take time for its populace to become more aware of the importance of IPR protection in everyday life.

The Chinese government's "guidance" in allocating resources and its indigenous innovation policy (自主创新) is another controversial issue among WTO members. After the old central planning mechanism was phased out by economic reforms, the state industrial bureaucracy began to use policy guidelines and development strategies to guide individual industrial sectors to participate in the global division of labor and compete in the international markets.¹⁶ For example, the Chinese Ministry of Information Industry established a Chinese National Standard for Wireless LANs in 2003—WLAN Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI). Although it was designed to be compatible with the security protocol developed and used by the US standards, the US government voiced strong concerns to China as it put a mandatory requirement on all foreign companies wanting to access the Chinese market to provide WAPI-compliant products independently or partner with Chinese firms to which the standard was disclosed. These industrial policies help to "guide" the development of selected sectors in the economy. Although China's current sectoral development strategies are more market-oriented than traditional economic plans, they consistently favor "national" industry and selected sectors, and thus some large state-owned enterprises (SOE) benefit disproportionately from the government protection and favorable treatment. In so doing, the government intends to promote indigenous innovation and indigenous brands (自主品牌) of the Chinese industry and this raises concerns about its effect

in restricting access for foreign companies, investors, technology and intellectual property, and their products.

China's WTO accession is of great significance for its multilateral and regional trade policy. As a big emerging economy, China cannot afford to stay outside the global trade regime. Inside the WTO, it can shape future international trading rules, take advantage of the WTO's dispute settlement system, resist arbitrary and unilaterally imposed restrictions on Chinese exports, and achieve international recognition of its growing economic power and the market economy status. Since the WTO accession, China has been active at all levels of the world trading system—multilaterally in the WTO, regionally in East Asia, and bilaterally with a growing number of trading partners for free trade agreements. In signing a series of FTA agreements, China has moved far along the path of creating a large political and economic network of economic and trade partners.

Although there is still a gap between China's current policies and its WTO commitments, its record of WTO implementation is generally good and acceptable for most WTO member countries. The WTO accession package accepted by China in 2001 was very demanding. Many of the entry requirements were tough and well beyond what other developing countries had accepted in the past. For instance, China agreed to forgo some developing country exemptions in the Agriculture Agreement. Other countries can maintain restrictions on Chinese imports for 15 years after 2001, much longer than "transitional safeguard measures" usually allow.¹⁷ China's decision to accede to the WTO under such conditions was for its own good. It was a political decision to bind Chinese reforms with the WTO regulations and to see the integration of the Chinese economy into world economy as a way to grow, to develop, and to raise the standard of living for all Chinese citizens in future. China's post-WTO accession trading performance has been a miracle. Its success was the result of trade opening as well as domestic economic reforms, which have been and will continue to be the major shaping force of China's international trade policy.

The Logic of Domestic Reforms and International Trade Policy

China is a textbook example of how the WTO accession works in tandem with domestic economic reforms and how a transitional economy has transformed itself into a capitalist market economy. Examining how international economic institutions such as GATT/WTO and IMF have influenced the preferences of the Chinese state and actors in society, and the way domestic institutions mediate these preferences to produce policy outcomes provides a good perspective to study China's trade opening. To follow Peter Gourevitch's seminal work of "the Second Image Reversed," international relations scholars have long debated about how independent variables at the international system level, such as the distribution of power,

the distribution of economic activities and wealth, and international institutions, influence domestic regime type as well as the coalition patterns found within states.¹⁸ International institutions, defined as a persistent and connected sets of rules, norms, and common practices, form the international normative structure that constrain activity and shape expectations among states.¹⁹ Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg's book examine how Western policies might induce China to become a constructive player in international institutions and regimes. While Thomas Moore argues how international constraints such as the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) prevented China from increasing the quantity of its textile exports and forced it to increase the value added exports, Margaret Pearson's study shows how foreign firms made China to liberalize its foreign exchanges regime.²⁰

The work done by Harold Jacobson and Michel Oksenberg was among the first that examines how China's domestic politics has influenced its participation in international economic organizations (IMF, World Bank, and GATT).²¹ China's economic reforms (改革开放) starting from 1978 were historic for its economic development and international reorientation. They were the major driving forces shaping China's international trade preferences as well. For the reformist leaders, there were at least three basic issues that needed addressing: (1) economic performance and institutional reforms; (2) the socioeconomic system ("socialism with Chinese characteristics" or "capitalism with Chinese characteristics"); and (3) an open-door policy—how China should integrate into world economy. On opening to the outside world (开放), the Chinese reformists were facing these questions: How should China manage its economic ties with the rest of the world? How should the Chinese government regulate the flow of goods, investment, and people to and from foreign countries? How should China participate in international institutions of economic regulation? How should the government deal with the multiple facets of globalization in opening up to the world and economic reforms? The debate was intense and Deng Xiaoping's pragmatism has prevailed.²²

Deng Xiaoping's economic reform received widespread support among the populace and elites, and has achieved tremendous success in restructuring China's economic and social structure, improving economic performance, and raising people's living standards. The reform started in the rural area with decollectivization and a family-based responsible production system. Then it moved to the opening up of the country for foreign investment and permission for private entrepreneurs to start up businesses. Under the socialist planning economy system, most industries were state-owned enterprises, and the reform in the 1990s began to privatize, contract out of most SOEs, and public-list them in the stock market. The economic reforms took a step-by-step approach in lifting price controls, protectionist policies, and regulations, while the state retains its control in some vital economic sectors or let state monopoly companies in control in sectors such as banking, telecommunication, transportation, and petroleum. Meanwhile, the Chinese private enterprises grew very fast, accounting for as much as

70 percent of China GDP by 2009, a figure even larger in many Western countries. From 1978 to 2010, China has enjoyed an average 9 percent GDP growth every year, and high growth rates lifted living standards and contributed to social stability.

How to integrate China's socialist economy with the world trading system was a big challenge for the Chinese reformers. But on the other hand, integration into the world trade regime was also a useful tool for the Chinese reformers to push forward domestic reforms. China was a typical transitional economy after 1978. For the world trading system, China's reform project was phenomenal, and how to accommodate a socialist country as reformed as China's into the system was a new challenge as well.²³ After World War II, the establishment of the postwar global free trade regime reflected collective learning by governments from the experiences of the interwar period and the American hegemonic role in building multilateral trade institutions. To promote rule-based free trade in the world, the GATT was established to regulate trade among market economies based on one fundamental principle: all contracting parties regulate trade through tariffs rather than direct controls such as quotas, licenses, and other administrative tools. A market economy's internal and external prices are linked and it makes negotiated tariff reduction meaningful to the market mechanism. For a nonmarket economy like China, the initial price is set administratively and completely different from the price prevailing in the world market. Thus before it acceded to WTO, it must have domestic market reform and bring its price system in line with the world market. In order to encourage the less competitive national industry to compete in the international market, the Chinese government first encouraged FDI and joint ventures to produce exports for external markets and liberalized the *internationalized* export regime, while protected the *domestic-oriented* trading regime. This dualistic policy provided breathing space for structural changes and enterprise reforms.²⁴

In opening up to the world economy, Deng Xiaoping's reforms allowed and attracted massive foreign direct investment in China by experimenting special economic zones (SEZs) and other liberalization measures. This experiment was later expanded to cover the entire Chinese coastal area. China has become the largest recipient of foreign direct investment since the late 1990s. In the extent of its economic integration into world economy, most people are amazed by China's high degree of economic openness in such a large and populous country. Over a span of 30 years, China's foreign trade ratio of GDP increased from under 10 percent of GDP to 64 percent of GDP in 2009. Meanwhile, the Chinese government reduced tariffs and other nontariff barriers for foreign goods and services into the Chinese market. The overall statutory tariff rate fell from 56 percent in the early 1980s to 9 percent in 2010, depending on sectors and products.

At the national level, the choice of policies to manage interactions with the world economy is not simple. Trade liberalization and reforms require the development of institutions, rather than merely the reform and

streamlining of border barriers. There are many of the “behind the border” reforms that require institutional capacity and supporting policies to help alleviate adverse impacts on the society. China’s economic reforms have managed the pace and extent of liberalization, internal and external, economic and political. The Chinese state has been successful in liberalizing the economic system, diversifying the ownership of production means, attracting FDI and foreign businesses, and meanwhile maintaining social stability. In the Chinese case, economic liberalization did not come hand in hand with political reforms. Some scholars even argue that reform success and openness even resulted in a strengthened Chinese state, a weakened civil society, and a delay in political liberalization.²⁵ After three decades of economic reforms in China, many observers would expect that political changes are inevitable as the consequence of economic reform and development. Yet, China’s current practice of combining a vibrant economy with authoritarian political institutions runs contrary to the liberalist prediction. Some label the phenomenon as “authoritarian resilience.”²⁶

Trade has played an important role in the postwar world economy. It has grown much more rapidly than output. The countries growing faster than others all have rapid increases in their participation in world trade. Some Chinese scholars even argue that the rise of big powers all relies on international trade.²⁷ Like most developing countries, China practiced a policy of protectionism and import substitution strategy from the 1950s to the 1970s. This policy made it unsuccessful in economic development in comparison with the export-led high growth enjoyed by Japan from the 1960s to 1980s and other East Asian “Little Dragons” in the 1970s–1980s. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union brought sweeping changes in world politics. By the end of the 1980s, virtually all central-planning socialist economies either collapsed or made dramatic reforms. Deng’s post-1978 opening up came at a good time to catch the world production transfers in the 1980s. Like other emerging economies, China began to turn to an open economic system and find itself a place in the worldwide division of labor.

China’s reforms of trade policy brought dramatic changes in the nature of the country’s involvement in world economy. Like most developing countries, China first found itself in primarily exporting commodities in world trade, and the situation exposed itself to the high volatility of commodity prices and gave rise to concerns about dependency on imported manufactured goods. In the early years of reforms, China began to export low-priced, labor-intensive products in the world market, and it helped to accumulate capital and move up on the technology ladder. But most of Chinese labor-intensive exports in the 1980s were very vulnerable to increasing protectionist measures in developed countries. For instance, the MFA prevented China from increasing the quantity of textile exports for which China had enormous advantage over other competitors. So the reduction of tariff and nontariff barriers in multilateral trade liberalization in the Uruguay Round and the phase out of the MFA were beneficial for China.

That was why China's vested interest in global free trade regime increased. So the Chinese foreign trade and export-driven growth depended not only on the maintenance of its MFN status in major trading partners such as the United States, but also relied on the open and liberal trading conditions protected by the international trading regime.

Chinese foreign trade and its pattern have evolved over the years when it was participating more in international economy. From the late 1980s, China dramatically increased its share of manufactured goods in exports due to production transfers and foreign direct investments in China. By the late 1990s, around 80 percent of Chinese exports were manufactured goods. Nevertheless, most Chinese manufactured goods faced higher tariff protection in developed markets than the raw materials and primary products that dominate the exports of many other developing countries. Many poor developing countries enjoyed special trade preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) status in the United States and the Lome Convention in the EU, in which China was not included. In addition to high tariffs, the Chinese exports of manufactured goods also were subject to relatively severe nontariff barriers in developed markets.

The evolving pattern in the commodity composition of Chinese trade suggests that it was consistent with the principle of comparative advantage.²⁸ China's comparative advantages lie in producing and exporting large quantities of labor-intensive products such as toys, garments, footwear, and so on, while developed countries shift to technologically more sophisticated industries. When China acceded to WTO after 13 years of tough negotiation, it agreed to considerably harsher conditions than other major developing countries. Today China is considered the most open large developing economy in the world, compared with India, Brazil, Indonesia, and Argentina. With a large number of foreign businesses and companies operating in China, there is an increase in competition, product quality and standards, technology and knowledge dispersion, and forging close economic linkages between China and the world marketplace. China has become an economic powerhouse for regional and global economic growth. It purchases heavily from Asian neighbors and becomes the engine for regional economy. On the other hand, China's economic success has led to new problems. It is now the world's biggest producer of concrete, steel, ships, textiles, as well as the world's biggest auto market. As it increasingly becomes the "world manufacturing center" (世界工厂), China runs a big trade surplus with its two largest trading partners—the United States and EU. This has become a constant source of dispute and friction between China and the other two economic power centers in the world.

In retrospect, the pace at which China joined world trade regimes was consistent to the pace of domestic economic reforms. The reformist leaders chose to use international pressure to influence domestic economic restructuring. The first major FTA China had committed to was the APEC trade liberalization declaration in 1994. In the same year the GATT Uruguay Round negotiation was completed and an entirely new institution, the

WTO, was established. But China's negotiation on the resumption of its GATT membership did not bear any fruit in 1994, and Beijing was not quite ready for the terms of resumption. Proposed by the Clinton administration, APEC trade liberalization declaration was signed in Bogor, Indonesia, in 1994. China was one of the signatory countries. The APEC agreement set a goal of achieving completely free trade in the Asia-Pacific by 2010 for the industrial countries and 2020 for the developing countries. China wanted to use the APEC agreement as a stepping stone for its future accession to the WTO.

The process for China to accede to the WTO was tortuous and protracted. It was long because the bar was kept high for China and it required the country to keep reforming its economic system before any agreement would be signed. Just pledging to increase imports and market access alone was not enough. The accession required full-fledged acceptance of the global trade regime, determination to continue to increase trade openness and foreign investment, and allowing international competition within the domestic economy. Another major sticky issue was China's insistence that it must accede as a developing country. China has continued to identify itself with the developing world, even though it has become a superpower similar to the United States in many aspects. During the Maoist era, China gave the developing world the highest policy priority, and the third world policy was at the center of its so-called united front strategy against the United States and Soviet Union. Despite its rise, China finds its developing world identity useful because it provides leeway to manage its relations with both the developing and the developed worlds. Under the current world trade regime, the developing country status allows China to continue to keep some protection measures for its infant industries and unwanted external competition.

In sum, the open-door policy and economic reforms have transformed the Chinese economic system over the last 35 years. On one hand, it still protects a broad range of economic sectors from international competition, and, on the other hand, the Chinese market has already become more open to other countries. Its market is more open than that of Japan and other developed countries or at least as open as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan as measured by foreign companies' access to the country. This openness is important for China's integration into global trade. However, China's high trade and economic growth has received increasing criticism that Beijing is pursuing a mercantilist policy and engaging in various types of export promotion and market access restricting. Yet, if we closely examine data on Chinese foreign trade balance, it is not difficult to find that China ran a large cumulative trade deficit since its economic reforms. This makes China quite distinct from Japan's type of trading state, a country that has run an overall trade surplus for a long time. China's trade balance has moved cyclically, tracking trends in domestic economy with a lag of a few quarters and being sensitive to exchange rates.²⁹ Trade follows investment. China's current account surplus as against the United States and the EU and its

current account deficit as against East Asian trade partners are the result of global economic restructuring over the last two decades. Being a world manufacture center and an indispensable link in the global production network, China's current account surplus is largely due to its role as the final assembling place and exporting platform to the world market.

The Chinese Model of Development: What Kind of State? What Kind of Capitalism?

The Chinese experience of open-door policy and economic reforms over the last 35 years, together with its experience of integrating into the capitalist world economy, has been very impressive. It has prompted a great deal of interest in studying the Chinese way to engage in world economy and the international system. The Chinese elites also take great interest in debating about China's unique pathway to rise up to a global great power. Does China's spectacular growth story stand out as an exception to the general pattern of modernization in most of the Western countries? Does the China experience represent a peculiar, innovative, and viable alternative for other countries' development? There are too many lessons to be drawn and too many theories to be made on the Chinese experience. Some people are quick to define it as the "China Model."

The China Model discourse is different from the more narrowly defined Beijing Consensus, which was developed in contrast to the Washington Consensus. The so-called Beijing Consensus, first coined in 2004 by Joshua Cooper Ramo, is a popular interpretation of the China story in a format contrasting the Washington Consensus.³⁰ Although it is called Beijing Consensus, there is really no consensus on what it is. Even the Chinese elites don't want to call China's experience as a consensus model applicable to other developing countries. It still has plenty of problems and even social crises at home, let alone the political reform issue. So whether the Chinese experience could be a viable alternative to the general model of modernization is problematic. Even though some people have argued that the Chinese experience could be an alternative that moves away from the market-democratic model and toward a new type of capitalism, which can flourish without the values and norms of Western liberalism,³¹ it is still too early to tell whether it can eventually be an alternative development path for other countries.

The academic literature on the China Model has grown quickly in the last few years. There are basically two major issues in the debate about what has contributed to the Chinese success story in economic development.³² The first issue is about China's economic model, which has largely copied successful elements of the capitalist market economy, including encouraging free trade, attractive foreign investment environment, labor flexibility, low tax burden, public infrastructure, and so on. The second issue concerns China's political model and the state-society relation. The

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) retains a firm grip on the state political apparatus and power over the society, controlling free flow of information and maintaining social stability. It is the ruling party's will to strike a balance between economic growth and political stability, and the authoritarian state model explains China's steady economic growth and modernization drive. While the notion of the China Model has its origins in the Western academic circles, some Chinese scholars added a third issue to the debate more recently. Different from the Chinese conservative "new lefts," who try to use the model to defend the CCP's political ideology and system, Zhang Weiwei argues that China's unique "national character" and the accommodation to China's unique "national circumstances" (国情) makes the China Model exceptional. This exceptional development model makes China a "civilization-type" of rising big powers in world affairs. The Chinese state prioritizes lives of people, pursues gradual reforms, and maintains a Confucian type of strong government.³³ Pan Wei, a Peking University professor, argues that the China Model is a Western concept. If there is a model based on the Chinese experiences, it should include three sub-models—the unique economic model seen in the Chinese national economy, the unique Chinese political model of people-based politics, and the unique Chinese social model of the state system (社稷体制).³⁴ While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the meaning of the China Model, I would focus on two key dimensions of the Chinese development model—the role of the state, and the Listian type of thinking in the state-led competitive strategy in international trade.

The role of states in economic development has been a central issue in political economy. Douglas North's institutional theory emphasizes the importance of domestic political institutions as determinants of economic growth. He uses the English and Spanish Empires as examples to illustrate how strong domestic institutions ultimately led to more secure rights to property, efficient economic exchanges, and long-term economic prosperity.³⁵ Peter Katzenstein argues that domestic structure matters in political economy as the state strength in relation to society influences the making of foreign economic policy. Strong states lead their economies, while weak states allow economic interests to operate on their own.³⁶ There should be no doubt that the Chinese economic success is attributed to the role of a strong state and state-led economic growth strategy under Deng Xiaoping's reforms programs. The Chinese elites have had a consensus on the importance of sustainable economic growth for China's social and political system. China's economic success has "relegitimized" the state as the pivotal actor in socioeconomic development. The gravity of economic activities in China is controlled by the state. A strong state, at both the central and provincial level, can use financial institutions, soft form of development planning, and, most importantly, the CCP organizational and cadre system, to promote national economic development. Like other state-led developmental experiences in East Asia in the late twentieth century, the Chinese state is more autonomous, interventionist, and has the capacity to carry out extensive interventionist functions. Unlike

the Japanese developmental experience, China is not as a strong regulatory state as Japan. The Japanese bureaucracy is independent and insulates itself from business influence. China has more government ownership of the industry and the economy and a strong policy implementation authority through the CCP political power.

It is true that the Chinese government has become more decentralized and its decision-making is more open to the influence of various interest groups after rounds of economic reforms, as Yao Yang argues in his chapter of this book. But the Chinese state still has enormous power in intervening and directing the country's economic orientation. This distinguishes China from other major emerging economies like India and Brazil, and it is seen as a "source of pride" in Beijing.³⁷ The Chinese government does well in long-term planning coordination. Every five years, the central government compiles a Five-Year Development Plan, and each year it adapts and fine-tunes short- and medium-term objectives.³⁸ In contrast, most Western states do not have long-term planning, and national economic development is often limited by short political cycles. The present Chinese planning mandate and mechanism are different from those in the old socialist days. After the economic reforms and structural changes, the current central planning mechanism only provides long-term projection and guidance, indicates targets for the economy, and leaves the market to allocate resources and set the price.

In international trade, while the outside-in perspective stresses the role of the international structure and the country's position within the structure imposes constraints and creates opportunities for countries' international trade strategies,³⁹ Stephen Krasner's hegemonic stability theory argues that the structure of international trade is determined by the interests of powerful states acting to maximize national goals.⁴⁰ The Chinese state responds to the influence of the international structure but does not quite bend to the international constraining force on its foreign trade policy. It has blended mercantilist elements and free trade mechanisms into its trade policy. There are parallels between the present Chinese experience and historical experience in Europe, the United States, and other East Asian developmental states. As James Fallows argues in *Looking at the Sun*, "it is wrong to call Japan's trade policies were uniquely mercantilist and we should not ignore the historical reality that mercantilism was a stage both the U.S. and British economies had passed through."⁴¹ The United Kingdom and United States switched to free trade when they wanted to lock in competitive advantage and nurture an international free trade regime. At the present stage of development, China is on a development path toward world free trade and open economy, similar to the stage of American and German industrialization and nation-building 100 plus years ago. But what distinguishes China from other countries is that its developmental statism has a bigger role to play in promoting economic growth and international trade.

The Chinese state plays an important role by its "visible hand" in protecting national vital economic sectors and promoting key national projects,

and, externally, promoting the “Going Out” (走出去) of Chinese firms and SOEs. In this sense, the state has “managed” the process of China’s engagement in globalization. In recent years, there has emerged a more assertive role by the Chinese state in promoting and managing economic development. The so-called Guojin Mintui (国进民退, the state enterprises advance and the private sector retreats) refers to the state-owned enterprises that are expanding at the expense of the private sector. If this trend continues, it would reverse the liberal economic reforms toward greater economic liberalization, which has been the hallmark of Deng Xiaoping’s open-door policy and economic reforms. In recent years, some big SOEs are consolidating their monopoly and market share in key economic sectors. The Chinese government’s stimulus plan implemented after the global financial crisis has channeled massive investment into infrastructure and projects linked to large state-owned or state-linked companies, leaving many small private business in struggle for funding.

Yet the Chinese state’s visible hand is increasingly criticized. It causes China’s long-term development to go off its balance. China’s heavy reliance on manufacturing has resulted in overinvestment and hence excess capacity in certain industries, which became more obvious when external demand declined. The global financial crisis has made imperative for the Chinese government to undertake more long-term structural reforms to strengthen its social safety net, reduce precautionary saving by households, diversify its economic structure, and to improve its underdeveloped capital market. Overinvestment and underconsumption are partly the consequence of the government’s visible hand in allocating resources to specific manufacturing activities. And as for the Chinese state itself, its bureaucratic capitalist operation is being eroded by corruption and challenged by rising calls for political reforms. Shaun Breslin suggests a good way to understand the logic of the Chinese state. He argues that it is helpful to think in terms of different types of “spaces.” The political space remains occupied by the CCP. But as the authoritarian power gets more fragmented, there is more private space with market reforms. As the CCP begins to allow more social space to the civic society and interest groups, its political space is further squeezed.⁴²

Turning to the Listian influence on China’s development model, we can easily identify some core elements influenced by Friedrich List’s thinking in China’s policy on international trade and resources. The first core element is the purpose of economy. China has become a good student of List’s thinking on international trade. The Listian economic thinking underscores the difference between simply having wealth and having the capacity to produce wealth. For List, it is important that the state develops and controls the capacity to produce and it is essential for national survival and prosperity. In *The National System of Political Economy* (1841), List argues that economies need to be seen in their political context if their relative successes and failures are to be understood. For List, economic activities have to serve political purpose. It is only when a polity gains

the status of a geographically substantial nation-state that it can become and remain a successful manufacturing and commercial entity.⁴³ To List, the development of productive capacity also includes human intellectual power, technology know-how, and industrial expertise. The Chinese government today fully understands the Listian logic about the manufactory power and political purpose of economic power. To the Chinese elites, the Listian development model provides a realistic and feasible catch-up policy alternative in international trade.⁴⁴

Another core element in China's international trade policy is manufactory power. List's main contribution to economic thinking is economic nationalism and his theory of productive power. Since Listian thinking emphasizes on material prosperity as a means to the nation's social well-being, the short-term maximization of personal consumption should not be the aim of states. The state policy should aim at deploying extensive resources to manufacturing industries, first internally and then externally, and maximize the utilities for the nation as a whole. The Chinese economic policy follows this essential element in the Listian thinking, and has translated it into a well-coordinated national competitive strategy.

China's international trade policy and competitive strategy runs into stark contrast with the Anglo-American style of capitalism. James Fallows has done a nice job highlighting six basic dichotomies between the Listian model and the Anglo-American liberalism. These six fundamental differences are: (1) automatic growth versus deliberate development; (2) consumers versus producers; (3) process versus result; (4) individuals versus the nation; (5) business as peace versus business as war; and (6) morality versus power.⁴⁵

If the Anglo-American capitalism relies on the market-driven "automatic" growth, the Chinese developmental experience tells that simply the adoption of market economy and free trade cannot guarantee the economic growth of a country, especially a latecomer in the economic game. International economic competition entails market failure. Private businesses simply do not move from farming to small crafts to major industries just because millions of small merchants are making decisions for themselves. The Anglo-American model assumes that individuals take care of themselves and the communities and nations take care of themselves. The Listian view sees it quite differently. Between each individual and entire humanity stands the nation (and the society). As Fallows points out correctly, good economic policies need to take into account national or public economic interest, and responsible governments should influence their decisions in a way that serves national interest.⁴⁶

The Chinese style of Listian trading state is different from the traditional East Asian developmental model. China's is a transitional economy toward a market-oriented economic system and international trade regime. Its politics of policymaking is much more complicated than the East Asian developmental states, and it often compounded by the constant tension between socialist and statist ideology and the transition to a market economy.⁴⁷

China still has a national political economy in which the state uses the power of markets primarily for political gain. As a former socialist state, it has learned that the central planning style of command economies will eventually fail, and the market must be allowed space for adjusting economic activities and wealth generation. The state has come to learn how to empower the people to use markets in generating revenue while not challenging the government's authority to dominate political life. The Chinese elites also understand that the state will eventually relinquish its control on key sectors and large state-owned companies, such as national telecommunication and petroleum companies. But the existing political system prevents the people in power to do so. Large SOEs are principal economic actors as well as state instruments in the economy. Because of their monopoly positions, they generate huge profits for themselves and for the state and they can also help to stabilize the economy through providing long-term supply of energy, minerals, and basic services as well as keeping a large number of workers in their jobs. So they serve the state's political goals as well as economic interests. These companies are what Ian Bremmer calls "principal actors" of the "state capitalism."⁴⁸

The concept of state capitalism has some truth about the strength and weakness of the China development model. In Bremmer's view, state capitalism is a mixture of both socialism and laissez-faire capitalism. By a state capitalist policy, governments attempt to "manage" the performance of markets for long-term political survival and, in some cases, personal gains. To Bremmer, with rapidly rising emerging economies in the world, economic decisions in Beijing, Moscow, New Delhi, and Brasilia concerning strategic investments, mergers and acquisitions, state ownership, and regulation would resonate across Western markets and "the free market tide has now receded. In its place has come state capitalism."⁴⁹ Bremmer may have exaggerated his case. But the global financial crisis revealed a hard truth that there are now viable competing forms of capitalism. Friction, competition, even conflict are inevitable among the competing versions of capitalism.

China's Listian trade policy may become a challenge to the existing international economic institutions. Economic nationalism is built on the premise that domestic systems are structured hierarchically, while the international system is premised on anarchy. Thus the state has legitimate reasons to protect the domestic economy from foreign competition and use political power to enhance the competitiveness of domestic producers in the global marketplace against foreign rivals. To extend the same logic to international resource problems, the use of political and even military power could be justified in acquiring, controlling, and transporting natural resources overseas. In history, dominant powers have used power to force foreign markets open, to gain access to natural resources, and to defend expanding national interests abroad. Thus it is not uncommon for the Chinese to view the resource issue from that perspective. And, many Chinese companies are rushing into Africa, the Middle East, and Latin

America for oil and other natural resources. Not just political and military power to gain resources, China has learned and developed a large arsenal of policy instruments in response to world economic crisis and scramble for resources, ranging from economic aids, trade opportunities, exchange rates, financial market tools, loan and credit, and so on.

Ideas and Historical Legacies: Image of World Order, Pragmatism, and Nationalism

As discussed above, the Chinese development model is a new challenge to the international capitalist economy constructed on the ideas of political and economic liberalism. The Chinese economic ideology is deeply rooted in its culture, tradition, and historical legacies, not in political and economic liberalism. In studying the ideational source of China's preferences to world trade and resources, three enduring factors—image of world order, pragmatism, and nationalism—are especially relevant and they have significant implications for future world order.

Over the broad span of its history, China's relations with the outside world have ranged from open engagement to isolation and autarky. Two thousand years ago, the famous Silk Road opened the trade between China and the outside world through interlinking trade routes across the Eurasian landmass. Trade on the historical Silk Road was an important factor in the development of ancient civilizations in China, India, Persia, Egypt, and the Mediterranean. In the Tang dynasty, China's capital city Chang An was the largest and most prosperous in the world. Traders from all over the world gathered there. Yet, ancient China's foreign trade and commerce was not very substantial. Goods traded included salt, silk, dried fish, cattle, iron, and tea, with silk being the most profitable trading item. The lack of good transportation and safety of trade obstructed stable trading relations. WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy observes that "China was strong when it opened to the world. When the Middle Kingdom closed its door, it fell behind."⁵⁰ Lamy is right about China's development and its external economic relations. At least twice in the last 500 years, China closed its door to the outside world, and each time it fell behind when it returned to isolation.

Historians have long debated about why the Chinese emperor decided to close foreign trade in the late Ming Dynasty. After a long period of cosmopolitan policy during the Tang Dynasty and Song Dynasty, why did the Ming emperor decide to close its door to foreign trade in the late fifteenth century? Materially, the Chinese merchants became more ready and eager to trade and pursue wealth overseas from the fourteenth and fifteenth century. Why did the emperor order the closing of borders in all coastal areas? One explanation for the isolationism was that the rest of the world was poor and backward and they had little to offer to China. Another explanation is that while poverty led European monarchs in the period 1500–1800

to promote foreign trade, China's wealth allowed the Chinese emperor to restrict it because he considered it threatened national security.⁵¹ In the fifteenth century, China turned its back on the world economy. It even abandoned naval defenses. Its highly educated elites were uninterested in Western technology and military potential. So for more than 500 years, from the fifteenth to the twentieth century, China's economy slipped further behind the rest of the world. As late as 1820, the gross domestic product of China was still 30 percent higher than the total GDP of Western Europe and its settlements. But as the country became more and more boxed in economic self-sufficiency, cultural and economic inwardness, and an anticommercial culture, its world GDP share kept dropping.

The closed-door policy had lot to do with the traditional anticommercial culture. This culture was deeply rooted in the Chinese thinking and translated into official policy by different dynasties. For a long time, the Chinese rulers and the society believed in the economic ideology of "Promoting Agriculture, Restraining Commerce" (重农抑商).⁵² The Chinese emperor and elites considered "agriculture as the primary industry of the state" (立国之本) and "commerce is corrupting" (重利轻义), and that philosophical thinking also helps to explain the policy of "closing the country to international interactions" (闭关自守) since the late fifteenth century. The debate over self-reliance, open-door policy, and possible corruption by foreign influences in opening up to the outside world has reoccurred many times in history and is still an issue in the modern times.⁵³

If the emperor in the late Ming Dynasty decided to close doors mainly for security reasons and decided that there was no need for foreign trade and the PRC during the Mao era returned to autarky due to political ideology, why did other Chinese rulers in history choose to open doors? Over the last 200 years, China twice opened up to the outside world. One was forced open by the Western imperialist "gunboat" policy in the middle of the nineteenth century. The other was during Deng's reforms period, when China chose to open its door to engage in the international system. Under Chairman Mao's revolutionary leadership, China rejected the dominant norms and institutions in the international system, because they were considered as hostile forces to the Chinese state and not in line of Mao's revolutionary ideology. However, during Deng Xiaoping's period of opening up and economic reforms, China deliberately chose to reengage and embrace those prevalent norms and rules in the international system. Although engaging in global economy and international institutions might lead to the consequences Beijing could not control, changing national interests has made it imperative for the Chinese leaders to reengage in the global economy and international system.

The Chinese leaders understand well that the existing international regime is not something of China's making. Participating in global economic exchanges is not the same as controlling the way the participation would take place. Each time China returns to the international system, it has to pay heavy "tuitions" of reforms. So a big lesson the Chinese elites have

drawn from the past is pragmatism and “selective engagement.” China does not need to be completely bound by the international institutions created without China’s participation, but it does need to stay engaged in the international system.⁵⁴ As Breslin argues, “[The] original logic for participating in the global economy created new logics, interests, and power relationships that influenced the way that China’s re-engagement has evolved . . . the Chinese leadership pursued a very simple and logical strategy—trade and investment was encouraged where it was deemed beneficial, and resisted where it was perceived to threaten domestic Chinese producers.”⁵⁵

The second ideational factor concerns the Chinese image of the world. Chinese preferences to the international system are heavily influenced by its image of the world and the Sinocentric worldview of world order. In premodern times, China viewed and understood the outside world through its image, belief, symbols, and self-image, not through the objective reality of the world. The geographical separation from the rest of the world fostered a Sinocentric perspective of the world. The Chinese believed that the Central Kingdom (中国) was the Celestial Dynasty and the Chinese emperor was the “son of the heaven.” Under the conception of *tianxia* (“All under heaven”—天下), China was considered as being at the center of the world and all other states were tributaries under the suzerain rule of China. The Chinese Empire had an innate superiority in its relations with other states. Its relations with other states were tributary, not state-to-state relations between equals. For centuries, the Chinese Empire enjoyed unchallenged prominence and superiority in its relations with other countries. The Chinese nation (the Han people) viewed non-Chinese people as uncivilized barbarians (外夷). Although China was occasionally overrun and even ruled by the “barbarians,” as during the Yuan Dynasty and the Qing Dynasty, the non-Chinese had to retain Chinese institutions to rule and were eventually assimilated into the Chinese nation and society. By this image of the outside world, to the Chinese, the world order was hierarchical as it was just a corollary to the Chinese society or the idealized image of the Chinese society. The world was such a messy place that the tribute system had a difficult time reducing it to legible order.⁵⁶

Maintaining harmonious relations with foreign people was a critical concern for any Chinese dynasty. China was much superior to the West in technology, living standards, and economic prosperity before the fifteenth century. It did not have much need from foreign trade. Foreign trade with China was carried out in the guise of tribute, that is, foreigners were obliged to follow the Chinese ritual imposed on envoys. In the Chinese imperial court foreign envoys could not expect to be treated as cultural or political equals.⁵⁷ There was no equivalent of a foreign ministry in ancient China. All foreign affairs, including activities such as tributary missions, foreign countries’ requests for trade and commerce with China, and the Chinese military expeditions crushing neighboring barbarians, were handled and kept outside China’s borders. All foreign states (European countries included) that sought trade with China were received as tributary

missions and had to conform to the Chinese formalities and rituals at the imperial court. Marco Polo testified to the rituals at the Chinese imperial court during his visits in the late thirteenth century. When Emperor Zhu Di of the Ming Dynasty launched seven ocean-going voyages between 1405 and 1433 to the Indian Ocean and East Africa, his admiral Zheng He's "treasure ships" were the largest in the world. When Zhen He sailed to Southeast Asia, India, Arabia, and to the east coast of Africa in the largest fleet, the Ming Dynasty spread its civilization and technology, together with silk and porcelains.⁵⁸

Prior to the nineteenth century, China was still the largest economy in the world although its economic growth began to stagnate since the late Ming Dynasty.⁵⁹ Before Western powers came to East Asia and the Central Kingdom was forced to open up by the gunboat, there was a growing demand for tea, Chinese silk, and porcelain in the European and American markets after the first wave of the industrial revolution. But preindustrial China wanted little that the West could offer. To remedy the unfavorable balance of trade with China, the Europeans developed a third-party trade, exchanging their merchandise in India and Southeast Asia for raw materials and processed goods from China. The third-party merchandise were raw cotton and opium from India, and it was the opium traffic that later led to the Opium War between China and Britain.

The two Opium Wars (1839–1842 and 1856–1860) brought an end to the Chinese tribute system and forced China to accept the Western treaty system. As a result, the Chinese image of world order was turned upside down. The world was no longer the same as they had long imagined for the last 2,000 years. The Opium War was the first major armed conflict that China had with the West. The Chinese Empire was totally unprepared and lost. Its loss led to a series of unequal treaties with the West. The British victory and the Treaty of Nanking formally introduced the Westphalian concepts of "sovereignty" and "equality" into China's international relations with the outside world. But the scope and characteristics of these "equal" treaties basically created a substantively "unequal" relationship between China and the West, which the Chinese remember as "national humiliation." These treaties established extraterritoriality, opened coastal trading entrepôts, and conceded tariff and customs autonomy to the West on the Chinese soil.⁶⁰

The "century of humiliation" gave birth to the modern Chinese nationalism, another enduring shaping force in China's engagement and the way to engage with the outside world. Frustrated by the Western intrusion into China's territorial integrity and assault on the deep-seated Chinese sense of cultural superiority, the elites came to a consensus that the Chinese nation was in the danger of being colonized by Western powers. The Chinese intellectuals debated on how to rejuvenate the nation. The rising nationalism went into different directions. One direction focused on catching up on technology and industrialization with the West. The Chinese intellectuals began to study and translate "Western learning" into Chinese. The

movement trying to graft Western technology into Chinese institutions and introducing industrialization to China, known as the Self-Strengthening Movement (洋务运动), saw many young people going overseas for education. The movement was championed by Qing officials like Li Hongzhang, Zeng Guofan, and Zuo Zongtang, who later became responsible for establishing basic industries, communications, and transportation, and modernizing the military in China. But the Self-Strengthening Movement was short-lived as it did not recognize the significance of reforming political institutions and the Chinese society, which led to larger crises later and the 1911 Republican revolution.

Another strand of rising nationalism focused on the abolition of the unequal treaties and establishing relations with Western powers on an equal footing. This goal was very appealing to the Chinese society and helped to mobilize a national salvation movement in the early years of the twentieth century. The nation was in search for a grand answer and a correct course of national survival and prosperity. Chinese intellectuals, left and right, agreed that the nation needed to wake up since their backwardness invited foreign bullying (落后就要挨打). For Chinese communists, the founding of the People's Republic of China and the socialist road was the answer and even the "end of history." After 1949 the newly founded PRC "leaned to one side" with the socialist block and took the socialist path to develop the country. Mao pursued a very radical line of Marxism and Leninism, based on his interpretations of world revolution and the determination to advance communism throughout the world. In foreign policy, the CCP focused on opposing the American imperialism in the 1950s, the collusion between US imperialism and Soviet revisionism in the 1960s, the Soviet social-imperialism in the 1970s, and superpower hegemony in the 1980s. Domestically, Mao attacked the Soviet self-styled "socialist" state as "revisionist" and "social imperialist." Yet, the Chinese version of socialism, central planning, and command economy during the Mao era was not any better. The extremist form of nationalism, radical "leftist" ideology and later the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) brought China into social disorder and economic bankruptcy. In the late 1970s, China arrived at cross-roads of either change or collapse, isolation or opening up. It was not until the death of Chairman Mao and the reemergence of Deng Xiaoping that a new page was turned in Chinese history.

Implications for China-US Relations and World Order

International order is understood as some purposive pattern of behavior and shared values and goals among nation-states in the same international system. The English school emphasizes that international order is "a pattern that leads to a particular result, an arrangement of social life such that it promotes certain goals or values."⁶¹ Hedley Bull examined "order" in world politics within a normative framework developed within the anarchical society of states. For Bull, the international society is anarchical and

there is no common power to enforce law and to underwrite cooperation, but the consciousness of the state in common rules and values can make cooperation possible within a framework of rules and norms. But for realist thinkers, international order does not emerge from nowhere, and states are agents of order-making and order-changing. International order exists as a matter of degree and depends on acceptance of rules by international actors. In that sense, Muthiah Alagappa argues that international order is “a formal or informal arrangement that sustains rule-governed interaction among sovereign states in their pursuit of individual and collective goals.”⁶²

International economic interactions and world politics have nurtured different forms of world economic order, anchored in international institutions, organizations, and treaties between states. International economic institutions are created in the relationship between markets and politically constructed norms and rules. Compared to international political order, world economic order is relatively more mature and established due to common or shared interest among state and nonstate actors. The kind of ordered and cooperative economic relationship among states is based on shared purposes, values, and interests that can be discerned in norms and institutions they seek to regulate their interactions. As China increasingly becomes part of the global economic institutions, it has high stakes in playing by the rules and norms of the established international economic institutions, not vice versa.

Then what is China's approach to world economic order and institutions? To answer this question, it is useful to distinguish what kinds of order and the Chinese perceptions of the order. Andrew Hurrell has classified three type of order in world affairs: (1) a pluralist international order based on the Westphalian system; (2) a liberal solidarist order grown out from shared common norms and values and enshrined in international liberalist institutions; and (3) a complex global governance around and beyond the state with states, private market actors and civil society groups all having a role to play.⁶³

Generally speaking, China has three images of world economic order: the statist image; the hegemonic image; and the global governance image of world economic order. By the statist image, Beijing is more comfortable in dealing with other major powers in intergovernmental forums such as the G20, IMF, World Bank, and WTO. As a rising big power, Beijing is more confident and straightforward in discussing international institutional reforms and power sharing in the existing international economic institutions. Beijing's attitude toward the existing international economic institutions is “remaking, but not breaking.”⁶⁴ China has also taken initiatives to form new regional institutions like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to extend its influence to regional economic governance.

As for the hegemonic economic order, China is becoming more critical of the American hegemonic power in global economic institutions. China has openly criticized the US dollar's central role in world economy and

Washington's irresponsible monetary policy. Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of China's Central Bank, argues that an international reserve currency should be anchored on a stable benchmark linked to a clear set of rules to ensure orderly supply and timely adjustment to global changing economic conditions. For that purpose, the world should have a new international reserve currency with stable value, rule-based issuance, and manageable supply.⁶⁵ Beijing has initiated new international groupings such as BRICS and China-African Summit to challenge international institutions dominated by the West. Beijing is learning to deal with the emerging global governance structure. It is confident to let national companies to compete in the marketplace, but it still has enormous problems to bring the international and domestic NGOs on its side.

There are two types of changes in international order—changes within an order and changes in the type of order. Although China is not completely happy with the existing international economic order, it does not seek a new type of order, rather it wants changes within an order. China is increasingly becoming a “stakeholder” in international economic institutions, although changing definition of Chinese national interests would require more domestic political changes. Reforms to date have led China to accept the international system created by the United States after World War II. To some extent, China's economic growth was achieved on the “free-ride” of the existing international institutions. As its power rises, China is demonstrating more willingness to contribute to international institutions and international public goods. Some Chinese scholars argue that it would be in China's best interest to encourage the openness and diversity, not the exclusiveness and monopoly, in the existing international institutions.⁶⁶

Yet China can join and contribute to international institutions, and it can also “hollow out” the existing international institutions. The current global financial crisis has led to disillusionment with the neoliberal economic order and the structure of the existing international institutions. The disenchantment with “trickle down” economics has led to widespread “occupying the Wall Street” protests in Western capitals. If the existing international economic institutions (IMF and WTO) cannot accommodate more reform appeals and the demand by developing countries in the trade and development agenda, the current crisis in global governance would get further intensified and deepened. China is on the side of reforms and can be a key player for future global governance reforms.

There are both opportunities and challenges for Sino-US relations ahead. For the three types of economic order, the two countries have both convergent and divergent interests in reforming international economic institutions. The global financial crisis has accelerated changes in the global geoeconomic and geopolitical landscapes. In some ways it has helped to form a tripartite economic power structure of the United States, EU and East Asia. The East Asian region now makes up more than one-third of the world economy, and China is becoming the regional powerhouse and potential regional economic leader. The G2 is not a viable concept

for geopolitics, but should be a useful tool for solving geoeconomics and global governance problems. Beijing and Washington should increase their mutual strategic trust and build a partnership based on common interests and shared visions of future global governance. They should respect and accommodate each other's core national interests and join hands to solve regional and global common problems.

If the two countries turn to power rivalry, it would seriously undermine global and regional order. China-US cooperation is vital for global economic governance and future reforms of international institutions. The existing economic international institutions have fostered unprecedented peace and economic prosperity in the postwar era. The postwar international trade regime was built on the bitter memories of interwar economic disasters. As the memory of the interwar experience faded and more developing countries become increasingly integrated into the global economy, the multilateral consensus on international trade has weakened. Washington has played a pivotal role in promoting and leading the postwar multilateral trade system, and now its attitude toward free trade becomes ambivalent. The shift in US attitudes was significant as its policy was affected by both the perception of America's relative decline and the doubt about whether the multilateral trade regime can be a source of influence in world politics. If China increasingly embraces global free trade regimes and the United States moves in an opposite direction, it would undercut the legitimacy of the existing international institutions. The United States and China are the two most influential countries in the world. The nature of this relationship will have a profound impact on world political and economic relations and the functioning of global economic institutions. It is in the best interests of the two countries and the world to cooperate in international economic institutions and global governance.

Conclusion

Over the last 35 years China's economic growth and reforms are spectacular. As China increasingly integrates into the world economic system, it has strong incentives to play by the rules and norms of the existing international institutions. It has high stakes in maintaining the smooth operation of world multilateral trade regimes. China is a strong supporter of free trade. It is not in China's interest to roll back the global free trade system created by Western countries after World War II. As a rising big power, Beijing is more confident and straightforward in discussing reforms and power sharing in the existing international economic institutions. China does not want to "break," just to "remake" the international economic institutions. Its revisionist policy may run into disputes with other stakeholders in the system.

The Chinese challenge to world trade and resource problems should not be viewed just from power and interests perspectives. It also poses an

ideational challenge to the capitalist world economy. The source of the ideational challenge comes from the Chinese model of development and its state-led international competitive strategy. Chinese preferences in world trade are not embedded in the liberal political and economic ideology, rather, they are deeply rooted in its culture, historical legacies, economic ideology, and nationalism. China is a good student of the rules of the game and comparative advantage principle in the capitalist market. The global economic competition in the twenty-first century is not between capitalism and socialism, rather, it is between different practices of capitalism. The Chinese approach to world trade and resources represents a unique way of blending free trade and state-led competition strategy, which takes in the best of capitalism while preserving its domestic system and economic development.

China and the United States are two most influential countries in world politics and economics. Their relationship has a profound impact on world order and global governance. As the two largest economies in the world, China and the United States have shared and overlapped interests in reforming global economic and trading institutions. The recent global financial crisis has changed global geoeconomic landscapes and created both opportunities and challenges for them to reshape future world economic order. They should increase mutual strategic trust and build a partnership based on common interests to help solve global economic and governance problems.

Notes

1. Nicholas R. Lardy, *China in the World Economy* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994), 1–2.
2. Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian, “China and the World Trading System,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5897 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, December 2011), 12.
3. Mattoo and Subramanian, “Table 2: Share of Countries in World Trade, 2010 and 2030,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5897 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, December 2011), 11.
4. Ian Bremmer, “State Capitalism Comes of Age: The End of the Free Market?” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 88, No. 3 (May/June 2009).
5. WTO News, Press Release 243, September 17, 2001, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr243_e.htm (accessed June 3, 2014).
6. WTO World Trade Statistics: China, <http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Country=CN&>.
7. WTO World Trade Statistics: The United States, <http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=US>.
8. Barry Eichengreen and Hui Tong, “How China is Reorganizing the World Economy,” *Asian Economic Policy Review*, No. 1 (2006): 74.
9. Pascal Lamy, “A New Chapter in China’s Reform and Opening,” speech at the forum commemorating the 10th anniversary of China’s accession to the WTO, December 11, 2011, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl211_e.htm.

10. See, for example, Li Shikai (李石凯), "A Critique to the Fallacy that China is Pursuing Mercantilism" ("中国追求重商主义" 谬论批判), *Contemporary Finance and Economics* (当代财经), No. 5 (2007): 86–92; Jia Genliang and Huang Yanghua (贾根良 黄阳华), "A Review of the New Debate on Developing Countries' Trade Policy—Protectionism or Free Trade," (评发展中国家贸易保护还是自由贸易的新争论), *Comparative Social and Economic Systems* (经济社会体制比较), No. 5 (2008): 47–53.
11. Shen Li and Bai Qunying (申力, 白群英), "An Analysis of China's Economic Model" (解读中国经济模式), *Guangming Ribao* (光明日报), May 16, 2006.
12. Shaun Breslin, "State-Led Development in Historical Perspective: From Friedrich List to a Chinese Mode of Governance?" paper presented at the 2009 Beijing Forum, November 2009, Peking University, Beijing.
13. Trade Policy Reviews (TPR) are an exercise, mandated in the WTO agreements, in which member countries' trade and related policies are examined and evaluated at regular intervals. For each review, two documents are prepared: a policy statement by the government of the member under review, and a detailed report written independently by the WTO secretariat. These two documents are then discussed by the WTO's full membership in the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB). The *Trade Policy Review: China* (2010) covered all aspects of China's trade policies and practices. It was based on reports by the WTO secretariat and the Chinese government as well as an extensive and detailed exchange of views between China and other WTO members involving more than 1,500 written questions. For a summary of the report, see http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tp_r_e/tp330_e.htm.
14. WTO Secretariat, "Trade Policy Review: China," WT/TPR/S/230, April 26, 2010, www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tp_r_e/s230-00_e.doc.
15. WTO Dispute Settlement, Dispute DS362: "China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights," requested by the United States on April 10, 2007, dispute settlement board (DSB) ruling on January 26, 2009, and implementation notice on March 19, 2010.
16. See, for example, "Medium and Long-term Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China" at <http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/2007tongzhi/W020070904607346044110.pdf>, "National Plan for Science and Technology Development during the Twelfth Five-Year Plan" at http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2011-07/13/content_1905915.htm, and "Medium and Long-term Plan for Nuclear Energy" at <http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fzgh/ghwb/115zxgh/P020071120528482692949.pdf>.
17. Nicholas R. Lardy, *Integrating China into the Global Economy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), chapter 3, 63–105.
18. Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," *International Organization*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (1978): 881–912.
19. Stephen Krasner, *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1–3, and Robert Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 3.
20. Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, eds., *China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects* (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998); Thomas Moore, *China in the World Economy: Chinese Industry and International Sources of Reform in the Post-Mao Era* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Margaret Pearson, *Joint Ventures in the People's Republic of China: the Control of Foreign Capital under Socialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
21. Harold Jacobson and Michel Oksenberg, *China's Participation in the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT: Toward a Global Economic Order* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990).

22. The discussion in this section draws from Loren Brandt and Thomas G. Rawski, eds., *China's Great Transformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Also see Li Jiguang, Zhang Hanlin, and Sang Baichuan (李计广、张汉林、桑百川), "A Review and Prospect for China's Foreign Trade Development Strategy over the Last Thirty Years of Reforms and Open Door Policy," (改革开放三十年中国对外贸易发展战略回顾与展望), *World Economy* (世界经济研究), No. 6 (2008): 8–13; and Qu Ruxiao (曲如晓), *A Survey of China's Foreign Trade* (中国对外贸易概论), 2nd ed. (Beijing: Jijie Gongye Chubanshe, 2009).
23. For more discussion, see David Zweig and Chen Zhimin, eds., *China's Reforms and International Political Economy* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), and David Zweig, *Internationalizing China: Domestic Interests and Global Linkages* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).
24. Barry Naughton, "China's Trade Regime at the End of the 1990s," in Ted Carpenter and James Dorn, eds., *China's Future: Constructive Partner or Emergent Threat?* (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2000), 235–260.
25. Mary Elizabeth Gallagher, "Reform and Openness: Why China's Economic Reforms Have Delayed Democracy," *World Politics*, Vol. 54, No. 3 (April 2002): 338–372.
26. See, for example, Andrew Nathan, "Authoritarian Resilience," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (January 2003): 6–17; Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Zheng Yongnian, eds., *Bringing the Party Back In: How China Is Governed* (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004); Cheng Li, "The New Bipartisanship within the Chinese Communist Party," *Orbis*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 2005): 387–400; and David Shambaugh, *China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation* (Berkeley and Washington, DC: University of California Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008).
27. Hua Min (华民), "The Rise of Big Powers Depends on Trade" (大国崛起靠贸易), *Shanghai Journal of Securities* (上海证券报), April 21, 2012.
28. Lardy, *China in the World Economy*, 108.
29. *Ibid.*, 35.
30. Joshua Cooper Ramo, "The Beijing Consensus," London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2004, <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/244.pdf>.
31. Stefan Halper, *The Beijing Consensus: How China's Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century?* (New York: Basic Books, 2010).
32. For a good discussion on the background of the China Model debate, see Suisheng Zhao, "The China Model: Can It Replace the Western Model of Modernization?" *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 19, No. 65 (June 2010): 419–436. Also see Gan Yang (甘阳), "The China Road or the China Model? (中国道路还是中国模式?) *The Study of Culture* (文化纵横), No. 5 (October 2011): 84–89.
33. Zhang Weiwei, "The Analysis of a Miracle: The China Model and its Significance," *Qishi*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (July 2011), http://english.qstheory.cn/selections/201109/t20110924_112603.htm.
34. Pan Wei and Ma Ya (潘维、玛雅), eds., *The China Model: Reading 60 Years of the People's Republic of China* (人民共和国六十年与中国模式) (Beijing: San Lian, 2009).
35. Douglas C. North, *Institutions and Economic Growth: An Historical Introduction* (London: Elsevier, 1989), and *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge and London: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
36. Peter Katzenstein, ed., *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies in Advanced Industrial States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).
37. Barry Naughton, "China's Economic Policy Today: The New State Activism," *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (2011): 328.
38. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is in charge of formulating and implementing three types of medium- and long-term development

- plans: the national overall plan (国家总体规划), plans of major functional areas (主要功能区规划), and sectoral planning (专项规划), while individual industrial ministries are responsible for issuing sectoral development strategies and guidelines.
39. David Lake, *Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887–1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).
 40. Stephen Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (1976), 317–347.
 41. James Fallows, *Looking at the Sun: The Rise of the New East Asian Economic and Political System* (New York: Pantheon, 1994).
 42. Breslin, “State-Led Development in Historical Perspective,” 71–72.
 43. Christopher Winch, “Listian Political Economy: Social Capitalism Conceptualised?” *New Political Economy*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1998), 302.
 44. Ben Selwyn, “An Historical Materialist Appraisal of Friedrich List and His Modern-Day Followers,” *New Political Economy*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2009), 157–180.
 45. James Fallows, “How the World Works,” *Atlantic Monthly* (December 1993), <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1993/12/how-the-world-works/5854/>.
 46. Ibid.
 47. Iyanatul Islam and Anis Chowdhury, *The Political Economy of East Asia: Post-Crisis Debates* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 31.
 48. Ian Bremmer, “State Capitalism Comes of Age: The End of the Free Market?” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 3 (May/June 2009). There are various forms of state capitalism. It could mean a society wherein the productive forces are controlled and directed by the state in a capitalist manner, or corporatized government agencies control shares of publicly listed companies. State capitalism could also refer to an economic system where the means of production are privately owned and the state exerts considerable control over the allocation of credit and investment or state monopoly and intervention in the markets to protect and advance the interests of Big Business.
 49. Ibid.
 50. Pascal Lamy, “China in the Multilateral Trading System: Its role and implication,” WTO DG’s address on China’s 5th Year of WTO Membership, September 6, 2006, Shanghai, China, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl33_e.htm.
 51. D. E. Mungello, *The Great Encounter of China and the West, 1500–1800* (Lanham, Boulder, and New York: Roman Littlefield, 2009), 6–7.
 52. Liu Shun (刘顺), “Statism and Policy of ‘Promoting Agriculture and Restraining Commerce,’” (国家主义与重农抑商政策) *Journal of Huainan Teacher’s College* (淮南师范学院学报), No. 6 (2004): 12–14.
 53. See Dwitht H. Perkins, “China’s Prereform Economy in World Perspective,” in Brantly Womack, ed., *China’s Rise in Historical Perspective* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), 109–127.
 54. For more discussion on China’s selective engagement behavior, see, for example, Pitman B. Potter, “China and the International Legal System: Challenges of Participation,” *The China Quarterly*, No. 191 (2007): 699–715; David Shambaugh, “Coping with a Conflicted China,” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2011): 7–27; Pitman B. Potter, “Selective Adaptation and Institutional Capacity: Perspectives on Human Rights in China,” *International Journal*, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Spring 2006): 389–407; Justin S. Hempson-Jones. “The Evolution of China’s Engagement with International Governmental Organizations: Toward a Liberal Foreign Policy?” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 45, No. 5 (September/October 2005): 702–721.
 55. Shaun Breslin, *China and the Global Political Economy* (Hampshire, UK and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 82.

56. John K. Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 1968.
57. Joseph W. Esherick, "China and the World: From Tribute to Treaties to Popular Nationalism," in Womack, ed., *China's Rise in Historical Perspective*, 22–24.
58. Edward L. Dreyer, *Zheng He: China and the Oceans in the Early Ming Dynasty, 1405–1433* (Old Tappan, NJ: Pearson Longman), 2006.
59. Angus Maddison, *The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective*, vol. 1 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2007), 44–45.
60. Esherick, "China and the World," 26.
61. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study in World Politics* (London: MacMillan, 2003), 3.
62. Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).
63. Andrew Hurrell, *On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
64. Gregory Chin, "China's Rising Institutional Influence," in Alan S. Alexandroff and Andrew F. Cooper, eds., *Rising States, Rising Institutions* (Washington, DC: the Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 83–104, and Gerard Strange, "China's Post-Listian Rise: Beyond Radical Globalization Theory and the Political Economy of Neoliberal Hegemony," *New Political Economy*, Vol. 16, No. 5 (2011): 538–559.
65. Zhou Xiaochuan, "Reform the International Monetary System," March 29, 2009, <http://www.bis.org/review/r090402c.pdf>.
66. Su Changhe (苏长和), "China and International Institutions: Seeking Inclusive Cooperative Relations" (中国与国际体系: 寻求包容性的合作关系), *Foreign Affairs Review* (外交评论), No. 1 (2011): 9–18.

Part V

Global Environment

A Green Giant? Inconsistency and American Environmental Diplomacy

Joshua W. Busby

Introduction

The United States is home to the world's most vibrant and well-resourced environmental advocacy sector, but the country has been an inconsistent leader in global environmental diplomacy. Beginning in the 1970s, the US developed a reputation for global environmental leadership as it sought to internationalize its ambitious domestic environmental goals. For issues such as ozone depletion and whaling, the United States coordinated and cajoled others to take on commitments to support environmental aims. For other problems, foremost among them climate change, the United States has influenced global negotiations but has generally been regarded as a laggard from an environmental perspective. Some analysts interpret this as part of a larger secular trend away from global environmental leadership by the United States that began in the early 1990s. This chapter seeks to answer two main questions: (1) What explains the variation in US leadership on environmental issues? (2) Is the US increasingly moving away from leadership in global environmental diplomacy?

The chapter is divided into five sections. The first seeks to anchor the environment in the context of the larger narrative of the country's ideas, traditions, and historical legacies and introduces the notion of environmental leadership. The second explains the source of the country's inconsistent leadership, primarily as a function of the country's pluralism and domestic institutions that intermittently give material and ideational interests opposed to environmental protection influence over policy. The third examines the evidence of a secular decline in US global environmental leadership and focuses on the structure of the country's political system, particularly the tradition governing the accession of the United States to international treaties. The fourth suggests how divisions over climate change have cast a pall

over US environmental policy broadly (and, by extension, its international reputation), crowding out space for other environmental goals and increasingly politicizing the broader environmental agenda. The final section evaluates how these attributes of US international environmental policy relate to China, both with respect to Sino-American relations and also how the countries are similar and/or different from each other.

America's Environmental Traditions and Global Leadership

As Ming Wan's chapter discusses, China has thousands of years of history, practice, and thought related to the environment. The United States as a polity has a much shorter history by comparison, and its traditions with respect to the environment reflect the challenges of a young, economically ambitious country with a rich and diverse natural heritage. In the colonial era of the seventeenth century, the continent's wildness was dangerous to new arrivals, forcing them to adjust to seasonal climate extremes, produce food, and fend off wild animals, as well as deal with native populations whose lives were dependent on the same resources for survival.

After the early history of settlement, conquest, and consolidation, westward expansion of the country in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries increasingly brought in to the union more diverse and wild lands. Native populations and wildlife were violently tamed as demands for minerals, timber, and agricultural and grazing lands grew larger. In the mid-1800s, the tumult of change inspired countervailing landscape romanticism by the likes of writers Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau as well as painters affiliated with the Hudson River School such as Thomas Cole and Albert Bierstadt.¹ Such artistic and philosophical appreciation of the environment took more concrete form as a movement for preservation and protection of America's natural treasures like Yellowstone National Park, the country's first national park created in 1872. Naturalist John Muir deepened this movement in California with efforts to protect the Yosemite Valley, out of which came the nation's oldest environmental group, the Sierra Club in 1892. Muir was a prolific writer and enlisted the support of President Theodore Roosevelt, a Republican and an avid outdoorsman who became an advocate for the national parks. The idea of national parks, of areas largely set aside from consumptive use for tourism and wildlife, has had important ramifications for how other countries think about natural areas.²

With much of the western United States in the hands of the federal government, tensions between preservation and use of America's public lands has been a constant in US history. Gifford Pinchot, who helped establish the US Forest Service in 1905, embodied the stewardship and sustainable use side of this debate. Other classifications such as wilderness areas and wildlife refuges have had a different status with respect to resource use and extraction. This tradition of instrumental and managed use of natural resources has influenced how other countries think about the environment. In a sense,

both campaigns for national parks and sustainable use were part of the Progressive Era reaction to rising industrialization of the late nineteenth century that succeeded in creating a number of rich barons but also accentuated class divides, environmental degradation, and public health worries.

With rising urbanization, the natural lands focus of American environmentalism took on more urban and human health-centered form, particularly in the aftermath of World War II. Writers like Rachel Carson in her landmark book 1962 *Silent Spring* helped usher in the modern environmental movement. Though this book focused on the effects of the pesticide DDT on wildlife, Western environmentalists, led by US environmental groups, increasingly addressed problems of human health from dirty air and water. Many groups, like the Natural Resources Defense Council, came into being in the early 1970s. While most addressed national and local challenges, the international footprint of human action became more important as scientific understanding of transnational air pollution problems like acid rain, ozone depletion, and global warming deepened. US civil society inspired environmental movements around the world. The US government, with the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970 during the Republican Nixon administration, also became an important exemplar. With the 1972 conference on the environment in Stockholm, an era of global environmental diplomacy and leadership truly began.

In this chapter, I assess America's inconsistent global leadership on the environment. By leadership, I mean that the US government offered by its own example (policy leadership) and through proposals in the international arena (diplomatic leadership) measures that influenced the actions of others in a way that improved environmental outcomes. The long lag time between the period of leadership and broader outcomes makes it difficult to distinguish positive leadership for environmental change from influence, which may reinforce antienvironmental outcomes. As a consequence, the motivation of policymakers at the time is important. Where policies that were put forward plausibly were intended to improve environmental outcomes, then these policies contemporaneously can be described as leadership. By contrast, if the policies were put forward to obstruct and delay improvements in environmental outcomes, then they are more accurately described as influence.³ By focusing on the US government, this notion of environmental leadership deliberately sidesteps the contributions of the American environmental advocacy and scientific sectors that provide important inspiration and expertise. However, the US government is the embodiment of the country, and where there has been inconsistency in its leadership, this has undermined the ability of civil society or the scientific community to advance global environmental goals.

Intermittent US Environmental Leadership

Scholars have explained US international environmental leadership largely by referencing its domestic traditions of pluralistic interest groups and

competitive party politics. Scholars have explained leadership episodes as an outgrowth of settled policy at home as the country sought to internationalize domestic regulation. Where the United States has failed to lead (such as on climate change), the absence of settled domestic policy and the importance of internal societal cleavages are identified as the major determinants.

US domestic political traditions and institutions, with the country's separation of powers, create multiple access points for both proponents and opponents of environmental goals to influence the policy process. This engenders a status quo bias, which favors environmental protection where green goals have already been internalized in policy but blocks or delays environmental protection where such rules are lacking. The legislative branch is granted specific powers with respect to treaties and appropriations that can constrain an environmentally minded executive or prod a recalcitrant US president to be more supportive of environmental goals.

At the same time, an important ideational tradition with respect to treaty ratification distinguishes American policymaking even from its closest allies. The US policymaking community perceives itself to be different from other countries when it comes to the seriousness with which it takes ratification of international treaties, and indeed, the country's ratification procedure for treaties requires an almost uniquely high bar of support. Relatedly, observers of the United States note that the country has an unusually robust minority ideology held by influential people who largely reject international treaty commitments on philosophical grounds. Coupled with environmentalists' preferences for legally binding agreements over other approaches, the United States has increasingly been unable (as in the Law of the Sea Treaty) or unwilling (as in the Kyoto Protocol) to ratify international environmental treaties and has often sought alternative venues and processes for addressing global environmental problems.

The remainder of this section unpacks these elements of US domestic political traditions and ideas and their influence on the country's leadership on environmental policy. The third section addresses the structural constraints imposed by traditions of US treaty ratification and the implications for the secular decline in US environmental leadership.

Where there is a strong division domestically on an environmental issue, the United States is less likely to be a consistent voice for action internationally, with societal cleavages between business interests and green groups reflected in divisions between the executive and legislative branches. Where US domestic environmental policy is already law and reasonably settled, the business and environmental communities often make common cause to internationalize US policy. Such situations may emerge when the business community has costs imposed upon it, but international actors lack such costs or constraints. In a 1995 piece, DeSombre identified 13 different episodes, particularly in the fishing sector from the early 1960s onward, where the United States sought to impose sanctions on countries that failed to abide by certain US conservation laws or international conservation agreements.⁴

One can expect a replay of such dynamics for more contemporary environmental problems. For example, if any domestic climate change legislation ever passes in the United States, that legislation will almost inevitably include attempts to subject foreign producers to comparable costs in the US market by imposing some form of border tax adjustment.⁵ One can code this as basket level one use of American power or a reflection of basket level two interests. However, the use of American power to advance global environmental interests (or the interests of a subset of American companies) has limits. Moreover, unlike a monolithic national interest in survival vis-à-vis an external threat, in the environmental space, interests tend to be plural and contested, a *mélange* of material interests and ideational influences.

Business-green group coalitions may also emerge where foreign actors impose negative environmental or economic externalities on US interests. For example, as former US State Department negotiator Richard Smith recounts in his memoir, in the 1980s the practice of driftnet squid fishing on the high seas by a number of Asian countries had a devastating effect on other fish species, marine mammals, and seabirds inadvertently snagged as “by-catch.” The Alaskan salmon fishery industry was concerned that among those were salmon, caught before they could return home to spawn. Though the US Congress had already passed legislation threatening trade sanctions for countries that did not restrict driftnet fishing, internationally the practice largely remained unregulated. Smith describes how negotiations by the US government to better document the destructive by-catch of Japanese driftnet practices ultimately led Japan and other Asian countries to phase out the process. Implicitly, Alaskan fishery interests and conservationists’ goals were both served by US leadership.⁶ In some cases, these efforts to internationalize an issue may undermine environmental goals. For example, in December 2010, prompted by labor groups and to a lesser extent the US renewables industry, the Obama administration filed a complaint with the WTO that China’s subsidies to its wind power sector were illegal under international trade rules.⁷

A third scenario for US leadership is also possible. Where the US domestic industry affected by international environmental commitments is small, their influence may be limited, and environmental groups may find it easier to secure support from the US government. Here, we can think of the external leadership position of the United States as a reflection of the strong domestic ideational attachment to conservation of a vocal minority in the absence of countervailing material interests. For example, in the late 1970s and 1980s, the United States was an exceptionally robust proponent of antiwhaling concerns, seeking to use its economic power, and the threat of trade sanctions and other leverage (basket level one in the parlance of this book), to induce both whaling states and other parties to whaling conventions to take a hard line against whaling.⁸ Similarly, in March 2010, the United States was a strong proponent of (largely failed) efforts to restrict fishing of bluefin tuna and a number of shark species in the Convention on the Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) triennial conference of the

parties, species that are overwhelmingly consumed by Asian countries.⁹ While the US Congress passed legislation in December 2010 to ban the practice of shark finning (where sharks are caught, their fins cut off, and the rest of the shark is discarded), the US National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration declined in May 2011 to list the bluefin tuna as an endangered species, perhaps because the US tuna fishing industry, albeit small, has powerful supporters in Congress.¹⁰

In sum, the United States may play a leadership role on global environmental causes (1) when green groups and business actors make common cause to internationalize US regulatory standards (the externalization of domestic ideational and material interests); (2) when foreign actors generate negative externalities for US firms (a reflection of material concerns about competitiveness); and/or (3) where US business interests that might benefit from lower environmental standards are weak (the projection of domestic ideational attachments).

From Inconsistent to Declining Environmental Leadership

As several observers have noted, the United States, despite a strong record of global environmental leadership dating back to the early 1970s, ceased to be the global environmental leader beginning in the early 1990s. Scholars frequently date the change to the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio where President George H. W. Bush resisted attempts to address climate change and biodiversity loss by weakening the climate change treaty to be purely hortatory and by resisting elements of the biodiversity convention.¹¹

Subsequently, the United States failed to ratify a number of international environmental agreements, most famously the Kyoto Protocol as well as the Law of the Sea Treaty (1982), the Biological Diversity (1992), the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (2000, neither signed nor ratified), the Basel Convention on hazardous waste disposal and transport (1989), the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (signed by George W. Bush in 2001 but not ratified), among other agreements.¹²

Kelemen and Vogel suggest that the United States and Europe have changed places in global environmental leadership since the early 1990s with Europe increasingly seizing the mantle of leadership. What explains the change? They suggest leadership is a function of “regulatory politics.” When environmentalists are stronger, they will be more successful pressuring their governments to make international environmental commitments. An alternative pathway for leadership also emerges when environmentalists are politically powerful: their governments will more likely enact strong domestic environmental standards, in turn incentivizing domestic industries to seek to impose similar standards on foreign competitors.

In their view, beginning in the late 1960s, the US environmental movement buoyed both political parties to accept sweeping environmental goals,

leading the Nixon administration to create the Environmental Protection Agency and champion the 1972 foundational international environmental conference in Stockholm. They suggest that the decline since the early 1990s in US support for international environmental agreements is largely a function of changes in the balance of domestic power between environmental groups, who lost power, and opponents of regulation, largely business groups, who gained political influence. They credit this shift to regulatory fatigue and increasing complacency by the American public as they became more content about the level of environmental protection.¹³

One possible contributing factor to the change in the political balance of power is increasing party polarization over the environment. As Sussman documents, environmental concerns increasingly have become the preserve of the Democratic Party. Sussman finds a large and increasing gap in support between the green voting position between Democrats and Republicans, as reflected by the nonpartisan League of Conservation Voters scorecards. For example, during the Carter era, the gap between Democrats and Republicans in the US House was 27 points. During the Reagan era, the gap in both chambers increased to 32 points and then 35 under George H. W. Bush. By the Clinton era, the gap extended to 52 points and in the first year of the George W. Bush administration stood at 65 points.¹⁴ By 2010, the gap between Democrats and Republicans remained wide. Among the leadership of the top five environmental committees, the partisan gap was 60 points in the Senate (with Democrats receiving an average score of 60 and Republicans 0) and 76 points in the House (with Democratic committee leaders receiving an average score of 88).¹⁵

Similar dynamics are evident for specific environmental issues, such as climate change. In 2006, a Pew Center poll found that a majority of Democrats (81%), Republicans (58%), and Independents (71%) agreed there was solid evidence of global warming. However, only 24 percent of Republicans were willing to say that this was due to human activity, compared to 54 percent of Democrats and 47 percent of independents.¹⁶ By March 2008, the partisan gap on whether climate change was already occurring had grown to more than 30 percentage points, up from an indistinguishable difference in 1998.¹⁷ An October 2010 Pew poll found 79 percent of Democrats agreeing with the question, "Is there solid evidence the earth is warming?" while only 38 percent of Republicans agreed. Of the Democrats, 53 percent ascribed it to human activity while only 16 percent of Republicans did.¹⁸ US elites are even more divided than the mass public. In February 2007, in a poll of some 113 members of Congress, only 13 percent of Republicans (down from 23% in April 2006) said it had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that man-made causes were responsible for warming compared to 95 percent of Democrats.¹⁹ Disbelief in the science of climate change has become such an ideologically significant article of faith among Republicans that leading candidates for the presidential nomination like the 2012 Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney had to disavow prior support for measures to address climate change and

to express doubts about the cause of the problem. In short, the argument suggests that domestic ideational currents with respect to the environment, particularly the drift by Republicans away from support for environmental goals, have made it difficult for the United States to exercise leadership.

Where the parties both compete for environmentally minded voters, this can be good for environmental protection. During the George H. W. Bush administration, pressure from environmentalists led President Bush to support the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990 and to pursue a bilateral agreement with Canada to address air quality concerns. However, with Democrats now virtually owning environmental issues, Republicans infrequently compete for the votes of environmentally minded voters. Moreover, unlike much of continental Europe, where parliamentary systems give voters with intense preferences the possibility of representation through the Green Party, US parties are catch-all parties that have to appeal to voters across a broad cross-section of issues.²⁰ Environmental issues are rarely among the most salient for the American people, which means they receive short shrift from both parties. With Republicans having relinquished competition for environmental voters, the green voters have no place to go. Democrats can count on their support with lip service and mild action to support environmental goals. However, sole reliance on Democrats for support for green policies is ultimately bad for US global leadership on the environment. Democrats are rarely politically powerful enough or united to push through ambitious environmental goals.

While partisan divisions often shape the domestic landscape of environmental policy, regional differences between different US states, often based on idiosyncrasies of local economies, also affect US domestic environmental politics and in turn the country's international posture. Again, these are in a sense, basket level two interests, but they are often the parochial interests of particular regions and industries rather than the interests of the country as a whole. Democratic lawmakers from resource-rich or manufacturing-based states often support local economic interests rather than the broader green sensibilities of their party. For example, members of Congress from states with large coal, oil, manufacturing, or agricultural sectors—such as West Virginia, Montana (coal); Louisiana (oil); Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Indiana (automobiles/heavy industry); and, Iowa (agriculture)—are frequently swing votes on domestic environmental policy. Such states oscillate in support between the two parties during presidential and legislative elections. Democratic legislators from these states are regular holdouts on domestic environmental goals because the costs for their states are thought to be higher. They often seek special dispensation in US legislation and, in turn, the US international negotiating position to protect their interests. By contrast, New England states and California and the Pacific Northwest, with little heavy industry and knowledge-based industries, are more reliable supporters of environmental goals. A number of these states have had moderate Republicans sought after as the source of votes and support for environmental goals. Their numbers are dwindling

in Congress as the parties have become more homogenous and regionally concentrated.²¹

As a consequence of these dynamics, Democratic presidents with strong environmental goals often face difficulties convincing Democratic lawmakers from swing states to support environmental goals.²² President Clinton faced opposition from Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia on the issue of climate change. By the same token, President Obama, after having already faced difficulties passing cap-and-trade legislation that would have imposed economy-wide caps on carbon emissions, pursued environmental goals through EPA regulatory authority. He has, however, like the previous Democratic occupant of the White House, faced difficulties with lawmakers from his own party, like Senators Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia and Mary Landrieu of Louisiana.²³

With power between the two parties frequently divided (with one party controlling the executive branch and the other controlling the legislative branch), Republicans often possess veto power to block environmental agendas. As the next section details, this veto power is especially important with respect to international treaties but also has implications for financing of international commitments. Moreover, as suggested earlier, to the extent that US domestic environmental regulation is often a foundation for global regulation, paralysis at home on environmental problems may mean little US leadership abroad.

The US political system is often credited with exacerbating such domestic divisions. The fragmentation and division of power between the branches are often cited—specifically the role of the Senate in providing advice and consent for international treaties and the legislative branch in providing appropriations. These powers of the legislature can constrain a president when it comes to treaty commitments like the Convention on Biodiversity, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Law of the Sea. They can also undermine the executive branch where it has made pledges of financial commitments for environmental goals, such as the US commitment to provide climate finance in the 2009 Copenhagen Accord. At Copenhagen, the leaders of rich countries promised to mobilize up to US\$100 billion per year in public and private sources by 2020. However, America's ability to provide its share of this pie was contingent upon passing domestic climate legislation with its incentives for the private sector and credits to support adaptation and forestry initiatives. The Obama administration sought to meet its commitments of fast-start climate finance for the period 2010–2012, but the country's long-run commitments are increasingly suspect.

US traditions of past global environmental practice lead a number of analysts like Bodansky to conclude, "successful foreign policy must grow out of domestic political consensus. Certainly this is true in the United States with respect to environmental issues, where virtually every successful international regime has had its roots in U.S. domestic law."²⁴ As former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Nigel Purvis argued, "the Senate

rarely approves international agreements, particularly environmental treaties, unless they are based on prior domestic action.”²⁵

While the US president can on occasion enter into executive agreements, two-thirds of the Senate has to vote in favor to provide so-called advice and consent for contentious international agreements on issues like climate change.²⁶ This requirement is an especially high bar and is almost unique among advanced democracies. In most parliamentary systems, for example, the head of state is also head of the majority party in the legislature and can count on his or her party’s support in treaty ratification, lest a negative vote cause a vote of no confidence in the government and trigger a new election.

This attribute makes the United States not only a reluctant partner in ratifying international environmental treaties but also across a range of issues, from the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to the Ottawa Treaty banning landmines to the Rome Statute that created the International Criminal Court. As DeSombre notes, “it is neither an entirely new phenomenon, nor one restricted to environmental issues, and it is certainly not one that can be attributed to the administration of George W. Bush.”²⁷ Moravcsik explains the paradox that the United States is home to one of the most vigorous human rights NGO communities yet has difficulty ratifying international human rights treaties:

The most immediate veto group involved with human rights treaties, a one-third minority of recalcitrant senators, is created by the unique U.S. constitutional requirement of a two-thirds “supermajority” vote to advise and consent to an international treaty. This is a threshold higher than that in nearly all industrial democracies, which generally ratify international treaties by legislative majority.²⁸

One manifestation of the difference between treaty-making by the United States and other countries is a difference in the legal practice of how countries view treaty ratification more broadly. The United States has a reputation for faithfully complying with treaties that it does ratify. Glennon and Stewart reviewed five environmental agreements (four treaties and one executive agreement) including the London Ocean Dumping Convention, CITES, the World Heritage Convention, the Montreal Protocol on ozone, and the International Tropical Timber Agreement. They concluded that the United States had met the “primary obligations of each of the agreements.”²⁹

A disputed, but oft-repeated claim (particularly by US negotiators) is that differences in legal regimes between the United States, Europe, and (to a lesser extent) Japan have contributed to conflicts over climate change. William O’Keefe, former head of the Global Climate Coalition, an industry group opposed to action on climate change, made the general point:

I believe that one reason for this was the fact that European culture embraces commitments to lofty goals that are pursued pragmatically . . . Most European

governments work closely with industry in pursuing policies. If good faith efforts at implementation fall short, industry is generally told to keep trying. In the United States, policies are implemented by rigid regulations. Failure to achieve these regulatory requirements leads to fines, enforcement actions and citizen suits.³⁰

Tom Jacob, a former senior advisor for Global Affairs for Dupont, echoed this view and contrasted the US model of law from European systems. He characterized the US model as one where “The letter of the law counts more than the spirit of the law.” Jacob goes on to write that: “This ‘rule of law’ character of governance is vigorously disciplined by a legal system in which virtually any significant deviation from the letter of the law by agencies such as EPA is certain to be litigated by one side or another (regulated industry, public interest advocates, etc.).”³¹ Kagan terms this tradition “adversarial legalism,” and suggests that the fragmentation of authority in the United States leads to “American legal exceptionalism.”³² This threat of lawsuits, according to Stewart and Reiner, “tends to lead U.S. treaty negotiators to resist environmental regulatory treaties that they fear would be more rigorously applied in the United States than elsewhere.”³³

Jacob contrasts this with a European model where “The spirit of the law counts more than the letter of the law.” He suggests that “governments in Europe are routinely granted relatively more flexibility in implementing their laws and policies—in essence, greater flexibility to govern,” which “liberates policy at the front-end to more of an aspirational character.”³⁴ In Europe, governments can sign on to international agreements as goals to be sought without risks of being sued for noncompliance. Harold Jacobson summarized the idea as follows:

Simply put, the United States will not ratify treaties unless it feels that it can comply with them. In the United States private parties can sue the government, seeking an injunction to force it to comply with a treaty that has been ratified and consequently has become law of the land... Many other countries, including some members of the EU, sign and ratify treaties that contain commitments that their governments know they will have difficulty fulfilling: these commitments are regarded as targets that they will seek to achieve rather than obligations that they will have to fulfill.³⁵

Nigel Purvis, who served as deputy assistant secretary of state under both President Clinton and George W. Bush, supported these accounts. Unless the executive branch has the legal authority in domestic legislation to allow the country to comply under all reasonably foreseeable circumstances, Purvis suggested the State Department does not recommend to the president to ratify a treaty even if the Senate has given its advice and consent.³⁶

Bodansky sees this argument as self-serving for the United States and noted that the US compliance record with international commitments is more mixed (citing the failure of the United States to pay its dues to United Nations for several years and its violations of the duty of consular

notification under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations).³⁷ He noted that because the United States often has to depend on nonstate actors to implement treaty requirements, it is difficult to ensure compliance, more so where treaties require Congress to appropriate money year in year out.³⁸

Susan Biniarz in the Office of Legal Advisor in the State Department provided additional nuance.³⁹ She described this process as a legal practice rather than a constitutional requirement. While there are probably exceptions, the United States does not generally ratify a treaty unless it can comply. The threat of lawsuits for failure to comply with a treaty she thought was overstated; the executive branch and Senate generally make clear through the ratification process that they do not intend for a treaty to provide for private causes or action or otherwise be judicially enforceable in the domestic arena. In other words, private organizations could not file suit in US courts for the government's failure to comply with the treaty.⁴⁰ Rather than being sued, the United States would suffer foreign policy criticism or be shamed by the environmental community in the national media for failure to comply.⁴¹ On a related note, Glennon and Stewart stress that US terms of accession usually determine whether or not an international agreement is viewed as "self-executing," which is enforceable by the courts in the absence of further legislative action. Many international agreements are generally not regarded by the United States as self-executing, meaning that they require additional legislative action to be domestically enforceable.⁴² This helps explain why treaty commitments often follow rather than precede domestic action since successful compliance in many instances requires more thoroughgoing domestic acceptance of obligations.

Senate advice and consent authority imposes a higher bar for treaty ratification in the United States than the process most other advanced industrialized countries face. However, Senate advice and consent is not a constitutional requirement for all legally binding international commitments.⁴³ Within US law, alternatives to treaties that are equally legally binding exist. Leaving aside executive agreements solely negotiated by the president (which may be politically contentious and rather rare), Hathaway notes that most free trade agreements are handled through a different process—so-called congressional-executive agreements, merely subject to a majority vote of both chambers of Congress. She sees the treaty ratification procedure as an anachronism, with no clear rules or rationale for why some agreements are handled under the Treaty Clause rather than through congressional approval. Though the Law of the Sea Treaty was subject to Senate advice and consent under the Treaty Clause, most fisheries agreements are handled as congressional-executive agreements.⁴⁴ To obviate the challenges of treaty ratification, Purvis encourages greater use of executive agreements with Congress and suggests that Congress should, as is typical with free trade agreements, grant the president, by statute, negotiating authority to pursue a new climate agreement.⁴⁵ That said, as more recent experience with free trade agreements with Panama, Colombia, and South

Korea suggest, congressional approval of these agreements has also been problematic.⁴⁶

Even though executive agreements or up-or-down congressional votes are other ways the United States can enter into legally binding international agreements, tradition dictates that contentious pieces of global environmental agreements like the Kyoto Protocol and the Law of the Sea Treaty be subject to Senate advice and consent subject to the two-thirds support requirement. Given the domestic political obstacles to passage of legally binding agreements, some observers see the United States as increasingly embracing alternative strategies such as nonbinding agreements like the Copenhagen Accord and the annual communiqués from the G8 and more informal, smaller negotiating forums such as the now-defunct Asia Pacific Partnership, the Major Economies Forum, and the Clean Energy Ministerial.⁴⁷ Others see the United States as more supportive of voluntary public-private partnerships.⁴⁸ Raustiala makes the case that nonbinding pledges may permit states to make deeper, more ambitious agreements that, even if not fulfilled, would achieve more than a shallow legal commitment.⁴⁹

However, as Victor and Coben argue, there has been a “herd mentality” in the design of international environmental agreements of legally binding emissions caps as the only viable way to address pollution problems.⁵⁰ For politicians seeking the support of environmental groups as a green stamp of approval, there may be few rewards for departing from such orthodoxy. Why do environmental advocates privilege legally binding agreements? Prominent environmental scholars James Gustave Speth and Peter Haas make the paradigmatic case: “Only when an agreement is binding will the parties be sufficiently engaged to work out an agreement that they truly accept and intend to implement. If you are really serious, or you want the world to think you are, you write a law.”⁵¹

The Copenhagen Accord (and the subsequent Cancun Accord that largely reaffirmed the Copenhagen commitments but with more international buy-in) are departures, and it is premature to assess whether or not they will be as or more effective than legally binding efforts. With respect to US-China relations, the clean energy agreements signed by President Obama and President Hu during Obama’s November 2009 visit to Beijing were also nonbinding agreements. Though modest, these agreements set the stage for Sino-American cooperation on a number of topics including carbon sequestration, fuel efficiency, energy efficiency, among other areas.⁵² At an operational level, this more prosaic cooperation between the United States and countries like China—carried out by USAID and EPA, by contractors like ICF International, by government-supported laboratories like Lawrence Berkeley National Labs, by academic institutions like MIT, Harvard, and Ohio State, and by industry partners like American Electric Power and Honeywell—has been ongoing for decades and has received renewed impetus under the Obama administration through the Clean Energy Research Centers. While not high-level environmental diplomacy,

technical cooperation and action of this nature are ultimately as, if not more, significant than meetings and summits.⁵³

The challenge is that the resources available for such cooperation are limited. The Obama administration's ambitious longer-run plans to provide climate finance for mitigation (i.e., emissions reductions, forest conservation) and adaptation largely died when cap-and-trade legislation failed to move forward in the Senate in 2010. Nonetheless, the Obama administration still sought to meet its commitments for short-run climate finance that it pledged at the 2009 Copenhagen climate negotiations. In an exhaustive overview of all expenditures for the period 2010–2012, the Overseas Development Institute and research partners found that that United States committed nearly \$7 billion for climate-related purposes, including mitigation of emissions and adaptation to climate change.⁵⁴

In its June 2013 review of support for purely multilateral environmental initiatives (excluding bilateral programs), the Congressional Research Service identified nearly US\$500 million in 2012 appropriations spread across different agencies and programs.⁵⁵ US support for the Global Environment Facility (GEF) is of particular interest, as it demonstrates the arc of inconsistency in the country's environmental leadership.⁵⁶ Since its founding, the GEF has undergone five replenishments of donor funds. The United States committed US\$430 million in 1994, a similar sum again in 1998 and 2002, US\$320 million in 2006, and US\$575 million in 2010. These commitments amounted to 13.9 percent of the total contributions over the organization's history, though a declining share of each replenishment cycle until a slight uptick in the fifth cycle—21.3 percent of total contributions for GEF-1, 16.1 percent for GEF-2, 14.7 percent for GEF-3, 10.2 percent for GEF-4, and 13.2 percent for GEF-5. The Obama administration initially intended to commit US\$680 million to the fifth replenishment but scaled back when other donors did not commit as much as expected. While its pledges are usually meant to be divided into equal installments over the four-year schedule of the replenishment cycle, congressional appropriations frequently have been variable, forcing the United States to be in arrears. Despite increasing commitments under the Obama administration, the United States as of September 2012 was more than US\$107 million in arrears on pledged commitments (see figure 9.1).⁵⁷

These trends in inconsistent and often declining US support for international environmental goals raise a number of questions. The United States did sign and ratify a spate of international treaties in the 1970s and 1980s (including the convention on wetlands, the Stockholm Declaration, the London Convention on Dumping at Sea, the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, among others). What has changed? Has the nature of multilateral treaty commitments changed? Has America changed?

While a systematic analysis of the nature of international commitments is beyond the scope of this chapter, some analysts suggest that, unlike the




Figure 9.1 US contributions to the GEF 1994–2013.

Source: Richard K. Lattanzio, *International Environmental Financing: The Global Environment Facility (GEF)* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013); Nominal dollars, in millions, 2013, does not include sequestration reductions.

post-World War II instruments, more contemporary multilateral agreements may have fewer opt-outs and safeguards that protect the privileges of the powerful.⁵⁸ US opposition to the landmines ban, for example, is frequently seen as driven by an unwillingness by mine ban supporters to provide the United States an exception for mines along the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea. With respect to multilateral environmental initiatives, it is unclear if newer initiatives provide fewer protections of US interests. For example, despite European opposition, the United States successfully negotiated a number of flexibility mechanisms as part of the Kyoto Protocol to make compliance cheaper. Nonetheless, the treaty was a political nonstarter at home. Even before the negotiations took place, the Senate passed a non-binding resolution by a vote of 95–0 that suggested it would not support any treaty that did “serious harm” to the US economy and that failed to include some form of commitments for developing countries. Rather than an unwillingness by foreign delegates to cater to US negotiating demands, the Kyoto Protocol’s political failure in the United States is more attributable to flaws in the Clinton administration’s negotiating strategy—including acceptance of a high emissions reductions target (minus 7% below 1990 levels) and an earlier failure to press for phased-in developing country commitments.⁵⁹

Some scholars explain declining US support for multilateral environmental efforts by emphasizing the country’s largely interest-based objections to a number of treaties. The United States initially opposed the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Treaty because of specific concerns about sharing deep seabed resources, which seemed to be a product of the then fashionable

debates about the New International Economic Order. Similar objections were raised against the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, which sought to share profits from discoveries developed from developing countries' genetic resources. Jacobson suggests that these treaties, as well as the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (which promised technology transfer to and avoided commitments for developing countries), spurred American opposition.⁶⁰ DeSombre argues that resistance to redistribution, which one could code either as an ideational objection or potentially an interest-based one, is not a consistent, principled source of opposition, since the Montreal Protocol, which the US vigorously supported, also offered technology transfer and assistance funds for developing countries.⁶¹

A parsimonious explanation from Sprinz and Vaahutoranta would emphasize a basket level two interest-based argument, the confluence of high costs and low vulnerability.⁶² This perspective would suggest that the United States is increasingly a laggard because newer environmental agreements pose higher costs for the United States for problems that do not affect it as much as other countries. For problems like desertification, which have little immediate implications for the United States, Sprinz and Vaahutoranta would expect the United States to support if not lead international agreements. It is notable that the 1994 Convention on Desertification is one of the few international environmental treaties that the United States has ratified in recent decades. While attractive, this argument has other flaws; as Kelemen and Vogel note, a country's sense of vulnerability is politically constructed. In their view, there is simply too much uncertainty about the effects of climate change to explain US intransigence and European leadership on the basis of vulnerability alone.⁶³

Costs also provide a problematic basis for assessing US opposition to newer environmental instruments. In comparative terms, while Europe did face lower costs of implementing its Kyoto commitments, in part because of providential reductions of greenhouse gases by Germany and the United Kingdom, it is unclear whether the United States faced any higher implementation costs than Japan or Canada, yet the latter two ratified the Kyoto Protocol (though it is notable that neither of them have actually done much to constrain emissions).⁶⁴ For other issues, Kelemen and Vogel dispute the significance of costs, emphasizing the Montreal Protocol was more costly for the United States than it was for other countries. Here, the net cost-benefit ratio may be more relevant than total costs. As Sandler has noted, the United States faced clearer net benefits of avoided skin cancer by taking action on ozone, compared to climate change where the cost-benefit ratio for the United States was less clear.⁶⁵ Nonetheless, an interest-based logic of costs fails to explain US opposition to other initiatives like the Law of the Sea Treaty where US interests appear to be overwhelmingly served by ratification.

Other analysts locate increasing opposition to multilateral environmental agreements by the United States as part of a broader pattern of rising unilateralism. Some analysts like Robert Kagan saw this as emerging out

of the US power position, a basket level one explanation for US preferences. With the United States at the end of the Cold War hegemonic, it was able to pursue unilateralist strategies because it could do so, while weaker entities like Europe had to pursue multilateral strategies because they had to.⁶⁶ An extensive interrogation of this question is beyond the scope of this chapter, though scholars like Ikenberry have challenged the wisdom of self-consciously pursuing such a strategy.⁶⁷ Others, like Falkner, have noted that the US power position when it initially championed Bretton Woods organizations and other multilateral instruments was as great or greater than it was in the early post-Cold War years. In Falkner's view, power is not destiny.⁶⁸ As numerous analysts have noted, transnational environmental problems like climate change do not, in any case, lend themselves to successful unilateral action.

Some scholars see America's opposition compared to Europe's emergent environmental leadership as a function of more deeply embedded support in Europe for the "precautionary principle," a divergence in ideational currents. While the principle has received more explicit backing with respect to genetically modified foods, it is unclear if the principle is deeply embedded culturally. Previous scholars used to explain American leadership on environmental protection compared to Europe as a function of different approaches to risk that prompted Americans to be more responsive to new risks and more aggressive in addressing old ones.⁶⁹ As Falkner argues, European support for the precautionary principle is relatively new and may reflect particular fears of GMOs and attempts to internationalize European regulatory standards rather than a broader outgrowth of Europe's supranational identity.⁷⁰ As Brunnée suggests, American and European distance on this question may be less than appears.⁷¹ Vogel emphasizes that Europe's regulatory turn started later than the United States, and it had yet to experience the societal and political backlash that the United States experienced in the 1980s.

Another ideational or values-based argument suggests the Americans broadly have views antithetical to accepting multilateral commitments that undermine defense of American sovereignty. A variation suggests that Americans possess fewer post-materialist attitudes than other polities. Given that the United States has in recent history been a leader of multilateral environmental initiatives, one would have to explain what has changed to generate a broader center of gravity if not cultural consensus to reject multilateral agreements of all kinds, including environmental ones. Scholars of American public opinion vigorously dispute the notion that Americans oppose multilateralism.⁷² More convincing are arguments that emphasize the lack of political salience of foreign policy, including international environmental policy. Americans have generally not been deeply engaged in foreign policy, typically do not prioritize environmental issues, and know little about climate change in any case.⁷³

A related objection to these variety of basket level three values-based and sovereignty arguments comes from Moravcsik on America's human rights

exceptionalism. He examines several arguments that suggest the United States has a distinctive “rights culture” and finds they are all flawed:

we have learned that simple arguments based on a homogeneous American “political culture,” that is, the cultural or ideological preference of American elites or citizens for specific procedural forms, tend to display fatal weaknesses. Such accounts explain change and cross-national differences poorly. Perhaps their most serious failing—and it is a classic failing of such theories—lies in the lack of an account for the extreme domestic cleavages over human rights.⁷⁴

Moravcsik does conclude however, that the tail of extreme pro-sovereignty views is fatter than in other polities.⁷⁵ Indeed, as Walter Russell Mead argues, the Jacksonian wing in US foreign policy, often identified as opposing international commitments and preserving America’s freedom of maneuver, is seen as increasingly politically ascendant.⁷⁶ It may be that the periodic dislocative effects of rising interdependence provokes a nativist backlash among segments of the American populace who have intense preferences. Where international initiatives couple with concentrated costs for particular sectors, as is the case with many environmental initiatives, the most passionate actors tend to be those with strong ideological axes to grind or particular interests. While the general public may benefit from global climate protection and other environmental goals, such benefits are likely to be diffused over the broader population.⁷⁷ The politics of intense passions and concentrated costs in a political structure that favors inertia helps explain why the United States has become a less consistent champion of global environmental goals. Given the episodic swings in attention to environmental issues, the political salience of environmental issues are, in the absence of breakthroughs in achieving environmental goals, bound to surge again as they did in the early 1970s and the early 1990s.⁷⁸

Climate Change—A Darkening Cloud

Among global environmental issues, attention by the international community in the past decade has centered on the issue of global climate change. Very little attention by the media and/or government has been dedicated to other urgent environmental problems. For example, the emergent problem of overfishing in the oceans has received scant attention. Issues that once received independent emphasis such as forest conservation are now part and parcel of the climate change debate, as new initiatives seek low-cost greenhouse gas emissions reductions through Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD). Other issues like clean energy and renewables policies are also now bound up with climate change (and in the United States have increasingly been subject to the same partisan polarization).

Evidence of the almost exclusive attention to climate change is the amount of coverage in digitized English language books from Google Ngrams. One can see that climate change between 2000 and 2008 supplanted ozone as the leading environmental reference, with other issues like rainforests, overfishing, and renewables receiving little mention (see figure 9.2).⁷⁹ Similar results are visible when one searches congressional hearings for keywords (see figure 9.3).⁸⁰

Statistics of media coverage tell a similar story. A keyword search of *New York Times* stories by year provides further support for the view




Figure 9.2 Keyword search in English-language digitized books.

Source: Google Ngrams.




Figure 9.3 Keyword search congressional hearings 2001–2010.

Source: Federal Digital System.




Figure 9.4 Keyword search *New York Times* 2001–2010.

Source: *New York Times*.

that climate change has overwhelmingly dominated environmental news coverage (see figure 9.4).

Not to diminish the problem's importance, but climate change has sucked most if not all of the oxygen from the policy space to consider other global environmental issues of import. With environmental issues almost exclusively revolving around climate change and identified as Democratic Party issues, the prospects for renewed American leadership on global environmental problems remain grim as long as (1) Republicans remain unconcerned about climate change and (2) few other issues get any attention by policymakers, academics, or the media.

The United States and China

Given the size of the US economy, the environmental footprint of its citizenry, and its robust environmental regulatory tradition at home and influence abroad, the world needs the United States to reassert itself as an environmental leader. The prospect of continued reluctant and inconsistent leadership on the part of the United States is inopportune to say the least.

China is less likely to take ambitious steps to address its global environment impact without parallel action by the United States. China has significant incentives to unilaterally address its air and water quality problems (to guard against negative effects on public health) and to become more energy efficient (if only to be more energy secure). However, while climate change is increasingly of concern to China, particularly as drought and

water scarcity loom large, the imperative of sustained economic growth remains a powerful objective. While China's climate change policies now have their own internal logic, the international pressure for China to be more aggressive in reducing the carbon intensity of its economy will be reduced if the United States fails to address its emissions.⁸¹ As China's people become richer, their consumption of fish, meat, paper, wood products, and energy will rise still further. China's search for and acquisition of natural resources will generate even larger negative externalities on habitats, wildlife, resources, and human populations across the world. In this context, a powerful environmental benefactor will need to speak up for nature. While the United States, with its own consumptive history and behavior, is not the most legitimate interlocutor, it is difficult to imagine either Europe or Japan, given their recent challenges, from performing such a role. China may have discipline to rein in some of its worst antienvironmental tendencies, but the country's growth trajectory is so rapid that left to itself it is hard to believe China possessing sufficient wherewithal to look out for the interests of others.

Observers of China have noted that its environmental regulatory structure is weak and understaffed. Here, China has much to learn from the more robust regulatory institutions of the United States. Observers, including Ming Wan in this volume, have noted that local leaders in China are often able to resist environmental directives from the center. In this respect, China's regional heterogeneity and diffusion of power begin to resemble the fragmentation of the US system. However, one has to be careful about extending this metaphor too far. The Chinese state is still able to impose incredible restrictions on individual mobility and economic activity when the stakes are high, as was the case during the 2008 Olympics and, more recently, when the country sought to meet its energy efficiency goals of its 11th five year plan by shutting down dirty industries. China's state can mobilize a vast system of subsidies and industrial policies to support a homegrown clean energy industry in ways that make Americans jealous.

As the last section suggested and as Ming Wan's chapter in this volume attests, US-China relations on the global environment are frequently seen through the prism of global climate change. Certainly, there are other issues. In its search for resources from around the world, China's global environmental impact is likely going to become a more contentious issue in coming decades for issues as diverse as shark fins to regional air pollution to forests to arable land grabs in Africa. That said, climate change has already eclipsed all these issues and will likely remain the critical fault line in US-China global environmental relations, particularly as these issues intersect with energy issues and competitiveness concerns.

As Ming Wan's chapter detailed, China and the United States experienced considerable diplomatic friction in the early years of the Obama administration. Each side had unrealistic expectations of the other. In the lead up to Copenhagen, the United States expected more willingness by China during the 2009 negotiations to embrace a transparency regime

around climate change actions. The China delegation, for its part, thought it had secured a favorable US and global reception to its plans by announcing unprecedented emissions intensity targets in the lead up to the negotiations. The Copenhagen meeting, however, resulted in negative reputational consequences for China as it was blamed for having been uncooperative. In part, this was a product of skillful diplomatic deflection by US negotiators. As Ming Wan's chapter in this volume details, China has in subsequent climate change negotiations sought to ensure no subsequent meeting results in the perception that China played the role of diplomatic spoiler. This road was made a little easier by the Obama administration's weakened hand at home as its climate and energy agenda stalled and its ability to offer China much in the way of positive inducement to embrace broader environmental goals became attenuated.

After Copenhagen, US-China relations became more contentious on a host of issues, many of which are discussed in this volume, from American concerns about the value of China's currency and other measures that undercut US competitiveness, tensions over industrial espionage and censorship in China of American companies like Google, worries about rising assertiveness by China in the South China Sea, as well as American anxiety about China's monopoly on the export of rare earth minerals. For its part, China's principal concern was the contagion effects of the Great Recession in America and the rest of the West. In this context, environmental issues played a bit part, but an important one. The heady optimism of the incoming Obama administration on the environment and other issues gave way in 2010 to a more nuanced and assertive hedging strategy on the part of the United States that ultimately culminated in a new American military base in Australia. Even as the US military and diplomatic posture in Asia on security and economic matters has become more forceful, its global environmental position has become more defensive, a reflection of heightened domestic contestation over its climate and energy policies. America's pluralism and separation of powers again worked to stymie the leadership aspirations of the Obama administration.

In terms of Sino-American relations on the global environment, the challenge will remain managing the tensions between rivalry and cooperation to realize joint gains where possible and to avoid lapsing into unhealthy patterns of security and economic contestation that China's rising power otherwise might provoke. Elsewhere, I have explored the kinds of policies that might foster greater trust and cooperation between the United States and China with respect to cooperation on climate change.⁸² However, most of the policies reflect technocratic cooperation on the margins. Unless the United States is prepared to do something more aggressive such as border tax adjustments to price the carbon content of Chinese exports, China's global environmental posture largely has its own logic, both a reaction to rising domestic pollution, concerns about energy security, the desire by the leadership to transition away from heavy manufacturing, as well as the rising sentiment in the developing world that China is becoming a

climate scofflaw. The 2011 Durban climate negotiations opened the door to a new agreement that would generate obligations both for the United States and China (though the results were quickly disputed after the fact). Even if an agreement emerges in 2015 at the climate negotiations in Paris, the US-China relationship is likely to be more productive on the environment if US policymakers can decide to do something at home.⁸³

Conclusion

What then are the implications of US traditions of global environmental policy for world order? The United States expects that commitments made will be kept. Treaty commitments, given the challenges of making them, in particular are perceived as a very important undertaking. The country's leadership also has a pragmatic and presentist bias. Whereas other countries are concerned about historic responsibility, US concerns about fairness have much more to do with burden-sharing and distribution of responsibilities to resolve the problem in the moment. Countries like China currently responsible for a problem like climate change will have to do their fair share. The confluence of both of these dynamics—a high regard for treaty commitments and concerns about equitable distribution of responsibilities—means that if the United States makes a commitment to a treaty then other parties responsible for a problem will have to have commensurate obligations. If others are not willing, then the United States will not be bound either.

America's leadership may be conveniently amnesiac about the past. The United States also is not sentimental about multilateral agreements. Its leaders are perhaps more willing than others to abandon multilateral processes and agreements when they are seen as unworkable. For example, the language in previous climate agreements enshrining common but differentiated responsibilities has given China no legal commitments to address the problem and has long been regarded by American policymakers as unhelpful.

Given the challenges of securing domestic consensus in the United States, the country's leadership is cautious about overpromising, though individual leaders are like politicians of other countries: anxious to use the global stage to advance both their personal ambitions as well as the prestige of the country. Perhaps more than other countries, however, US leaders are more attuned to how the global stage will play politically at home.

Though some observers express optimism that global challenges can be resolved without the involvement or leadership of the United States, the country's power and its environmental footprint generally make it a necessary, albeit sometimes unreliable, partner from the perspective of global public goods provision. Despite what will likely remain a difficult relationship with the international community on climate change, some environmental issues lend themselves to sustained US leadership, particularly (1) where US domestic legislation is already in place (which typically requires

material and ideational convergence), (2) where US economic interests are hurt by overseas environmental damage, or (3) where no sizable US economic interests oppose environmental goals. Given the onerous tradition of US treaty ratification that almost inevitably engenders significant opposition to even mundane treaties like the UN Law of the Sea Treaty, the United States and its international partners would be better served by seeking nontreaty-based instruments for future global environmental agreements. With respect to China, its competitive position and increasing transnational environmental footprint on air quality, forests, and food will likely engender efforts by Americans to internationalize standards and expectations of environmental quality, creating another source of friction in the Sino-American relationship but potentially a productive one to the extent that pro-environmental forces in China can seize the initiative and forestall punitive action by the United States. Ideally, that relationship would increasingly be characterized by technical cooperation, joint research projects and ventures, and educational exchanges on a frequency, duration, and depth that can withstand the inevitable strain imposed by economic and security tensions.

Notes

1. Max Oelschlaeger, "The Roots of Preservation: Emerson, Thoreau, and the Hudson River School," *Nature Transformed*, TeacherServe©. National Humanities Center, 2012, <http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/tserve/nattrans/ntwilderness/essays/preserva.htm> (accessed March 28, 2015).
2. Ken Burns, "The National Parks: America's Best Idea," PBS, 2009, <http://www.pbs.org/nationalparks/history/> (accessed March 28, 2015).
3. For example, the Clinton administration heavily shaped the direction of the Kyoto Protocol, including the flexibility mechanisms like emissions trading. At the time, they were put forward with the intention of improving environmental outcomes so could be described as leadership. Vice President Al Gore's last minute intervention in the Kyoto talks helped secure a breakthrough in 1997. However, given that this legal mechanism remains unratified in the United States and has itself become a barrier to more constructive action, US actions at Kyoto are perhaps retrospectively described as influence. The George W. Bush administration withdrew the Clinton administration's signature from the Kyoto Protocol and never put forward a constructive plan to address the problem, helping scupper international progress throughout its eight-year tenure. The Bush administration's actions were influential but did not constitute leadership, both lacking motivation at the time to improve environmental outcomes and subsequently contributing to deteriorating environmental outcomes.
4. Elizabeth DeSombre, "Baptists and Bootleggers for the Environment: The Origins of United States Unilateral Sanctions," *The Journal of Environment and Development*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1995): 53–75.
5. Joshua Busby, "After Copenhagen: Climate Governance and the Road Ahead," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/publication/22726/after_copenhagen.html (accessed March 28, 2015); Robert Keohane and David G. Victor, "The Regime Complex for Climate Change," *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2011): 7–23.

6. Richard J. Smith, *Negotiating Environment and Science : An Insider's View of International Agreements, from Driftnets to the Space Station* (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 2009).
7. Lucia Green-Weiskel and Tina Gerhardt, "Obama Admin Takes Aim at China's Renewable-Energy Subsidies," *Grist*, 2010, <http://www.grist.org/article/2010-12-28-obama-admin-takes-aim-at-chinas-renewable-energy-subsidies> (accessed March 28, 2015).
8. Tora Skodvin and Steinar Andresen, "Non-State Influence in the International Whaling Commission, 1970–1990," *Global Environmental Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (2003): 61–87.
9. David Jolly, "U.N. Group Rejects Shark Protections," *New York Times*, March 23, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/science/earth/24shark.html?adxnnl=1&ref=sharks&adxnnlx=130.6987616-uj7jbjFkKuRwFk8nj/y6gHA>; David Jolly and John M. Broder, "U.N. Rejects Export Ban on Atlantic Bluefin Tuna," *New York Times*, March 18, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/19/science/earth/19species.html> (accessed March 28, 2015).
10. Felicity Barringer, "U.S. Declines to Protect the Overfished Bluefin Tuna," *New York Times*, May 27, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/28/science/earth/28tuna.html> (accessed March 28, 2015). Fishermen from the northeastern United States enlisted the support of their congressional delegation such as Republican Senator Olympia Snowe of Maine and Democratic Representative Barney Frank of Massachusetts to oppose the endangered species listing of bluefin tuna.
11. Elizabeth R. DeSombre, "The United States and Global Environmental Politics: Domestic Sources of U.S. Unilateralism," in Regina S. Axelrod, Stacy D. VanDeveer, and David Leonard Downie, eds., *The Global Environment : Institutions, Law, and Policy*, 3rd vol. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2011), 192–212.
12. Jutta Brunnée, "The United States and International Environmental Law: Living with an Elephant," *European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (2004): 617–649; DeSombre, "The United States and Global Environmental Politics: Domestic Sources of U.S. Unilateralism"; Robert Falkner, "American Hegemony and the Global Environment," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 7 (2005): 585–599; Maria Ivanova and Daniel C. Esty, "Reclaiming U.S. Leadership in Global Environmental Governance," *SAIS Review*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2008): 57–75; Michael E. Kraft, "U.S. Global Environmental Policy in the Post-Bush Era," in Steven W. Hook and James M. Scott, eds., *U.S. Foreign Policy Today American Renewal?* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2011): 217–235; Glen Sussman, "The USA and Global Environmental Policy: Domestic Constraints on Effective Leadership," in Ronald B. Mitchell, ed., *International Environmental Politics* (London: SAGE Publications, 2008), 200–221.
13. R. Daniel Kelemen and David Vogel, "Trading Places: The Role of the United States and the European Union in International Environmental Politics," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (2009): 427–456.
14. Sussman, "The USA and Global Environmental Policy: Domestic Constraints on Effective Leadership," 210.
15. League of Conservation Voters, "National Environmental Scorecard '10," 2010, http://scorecard.lcv.org/sites/scorecard.lcv.org/files/LCV_Scorecard_2010.pdf (accessed March 28, 2015).
16. The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, "Little Consensus on Global Warming," 2006, <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=280> (accessed March 28, 2015).
17. Riley E. Dunlap, "Partisan Gap on Global Warming Grows," 2008, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/107593/Partisan-Gap-Global-Warming-Grows.aspx> (accessed March 28, 2015).

18. Pew Research Center, "Little Change in Opinions about Global Warming," 2010, <http://people-press.org/report/669/> (accessed March 28, 2015).
19. National Journal, "Congressional Insiders Poll," 2007, http://syndication.nationaljournal.com/images/203Insiderspoll_NJlogo.pdf (accessed March 28, 2015).
20. Josh Busby and Alexander Ochs, "Mars, Venus down to Earth: Understanding the Transatlantic Climate Divide," in David Michel, ed., *Beyond Kyoto: Meeting the Long-Term Challenge of Global Climate Change* (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University [SAIS], 2004), 35–76.
21. Joshua Busby and Jonathan Monten, "Without Heirs? Assessing the Decline of Establishment Internationalism in U.S. Foreign Policy," *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2008): 451–472.
22. Joshua Busby, "The Hardest Problem in the World: Leadership in the Climate Regime," in Stefan Brem and Kendall Stiles, eds., *The Dispensable Hegemon: Explaining Contemporary International Leadership and Cooperation* (London: Routledge, 2008), 73–104.
23. Juliet Eilperin, "Rockefeller Pushes to Rein in EPA," *Washington Post*, March 4, 2010, http://views.washingtonpost.com/climate-change/post-carbon/2010/03/rockefeller_pushes_to_rein_in_epa.html.
24. Daniel Bodansky, "Bonn Voyage: Kyoto's Uncertain Revival," *The National Interest*, No. 65 (Fall 2001): 45–55. This is supported by the findings of Stephen Bocking, "Review of Negotiating Environment and Science: An Insider's View of International Agreements, from Driftnets to the Space Station," *Global Environmental Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2010): 154–155; DeSombre, "The United States and Global Environmental Politics: Domestic Sources of U.S. Unilateralism"; Michael J. Glennon and Alison L. Stewart, "The United States: Taking Environmental Treaties Seriously," in Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K. Jacobson, eds., *Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 173–213; Smith, *Negotiating Environment and Science*.
25. Nigel Purvis, "Europe and Japan Misread Kerry on Kyoto," *International Herald Tribune*, April 5, 2004.
26. Kathryn Harrison and Lisa Sundstrom, "The Comparative Politics of Climate Change," *Global Environmental Politics*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (2007): 1–17.
27. DeSombre, "The United States and Global Environmental Politics: Domestic Sources of U.S. Unilateralism," 193.
28. Andrew Moravcsik, "The Paradox of US Human Rights Policy," in Michael Ignatieff, ed., *American Exceptionalism and Human Rights* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 187.
29. Glennon and Stewart, "The United States: Taking Environmental Treaties Seriously." For a similar, largely positive review of US compliance with five environmental agreements (including the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Desertification Convention, CITES, the Montreal Protocol, and the North American Agreement), see GAO, "U.S. Actions to Fulfill Commitments Under Five Key Agreements," 2002, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02960t.pdf> (accessed March 28, 2015).
30. William O'Keefe, "Climate Change Skepticism: A Virtue or Vice? Remarks before the Johns Hopkins Transatlantic Dialogue on Climate Change," 2003, <http://marshall.org/climate-change/climate-change-skepticism-a-virtue-or-vice/> (accessed March 28, 2015).
31. Tom Jacob, "The Precautionary Principle and Alternative Regulatory Models: A Thought Starter. Unpublished Manuscript," Undated.
32. Robert A. Kagan, *Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).

33. Richard B. Stewart and Jonathan B. Wiener, *Reconstructing Climate Policy* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2003).
34. Jacob, "The Precautionary Principle and Alternative Regulatory Models."
35. Harold K. Jacobson, "Climate Change: Unilateralism, Realism, and Two-Level Games," in Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman, eds., *Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 2002): 415–434.
36. Nigel Purvis, Personal Communication, The Brookings Institution, 2003. This is echoed in Phillip R. Tremble, *International Law: United States Foreign Relations Law* (New York: Foundation Press, 2002), 131.
37. Daniel Bodansky, "Transatlantic Environmental Relations: The Growing Rift between US and European Climate Change Policies," in Mark Pollack and John Peterson, eds., *Europe, America and Bush: Transatlantic Relations after 2000* (London: Routledge, 2003), 59–68.
38. Dan Bodansky, Personal Communication, University of Georgia, 2004.
39. The job of the Office of Legal Advisor is to analyze, with input from other agencies, whether or not any changes in existing domestic law need to be made before a treaty is ratified.
40. For a discussion of non-self-executing treaties, see Tremble, *International Law: United States Foreign Relations Law*, 162–165.
41. Susan Biniaz, Personal Communication, Office of the Legal Advisor, US State Department, 2004.
42. Glennon and Stewart, "The United States: Taking Environmental Treaties Seriously."
43. Other attributes also help further delay and shape US ratification of international treaties. In the Senate, lead prerogative over international issues rests with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Law of the Sea Treaty shows how the Senate majority leader can delay final vote on a widely popular treaty, even when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) has already supported a treaty in committee. The Law of the Sea Treaty was initially negotiated in the 1980s but was rejected by the Reagan administration due to obscure institutional requirements for revenue sharing from the as-yet undeveloped industry of seabed mining. The more objectionable aspects of the treaty were jettisoned, and it has been in force since 1994. Helms had prevented the treaty from moving forward during his tenure as chair of SFRC. In 2004, SFRC chair Richard Lugar, a moderate Republican, attempted to bring the Law of the Sea Treaty up for a vote in the full Senate. His committee voted to support the treaty and send it to the full Senate in February 2004. The US military, business, and environmental communities all came out strongly in support of the treaty. Nonetheless, Bill Frist, Senate majority leader, delayed schedule of discussion and final vote before the full Senate as a handful of treaty-shy Senators upped the political stakes of ratification in an election year. Despite overwhelming support from core societal interests, the Law of the Sea Treaty remains unratified as of September 2014.
44. Oona Hathaway, "Treaties End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States," *The Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 117 (2008): 1240.
45. Nigel Purvis, "Paving the Way for U.S. Climate Leadership The Case for Executive Agreements and Climate Protection Authority," *Resources for the Future*, 2008, <http://www.rff.org/documents/rff-dp-08-09.pdf> (accessed March 28, 2015).
46. Both the US-Panama and US-South Korea free trade agreements were originally negotiated in 2007. One with Colombia was negotiated in 2006. All three were finally ratified in October 2011.
47. For a review of these initiatives, see Busby, "After Copenhagen: Climate Governance and the Road Ahead"; Katherine E. Michonski and Michael A. Levi, "Harnessing International Institutions to Address Climate Change," *Council on Foreign*

- Relations*, 2010, <http://www.cfr.org/climate-change/harnessing-international-institutions-address-climate-change/p21609> (accessed March 28, 2015).
48. Brunnée, "The United States and International Environmental Law"
 49. Kal Raustiala, "Form and Substance in International Agreements," *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 99, No. 3 (2005): 610–612.
 50. David G. Victor and Lesley A. Coben, "A Herd Mentality in the Design of International Environmental Agreements?," *Global Environmental Politics*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2005): 24–57.
 51. James Gustave Speth and Peter Haas, *Global Environmental Governance* (New York: Island Press, 2006), 56.
 52. For a discussion, see Josh Busby, "China and Climate Change: A Strategy for U.S. Engagement," 2010, www.rff.org/rff/documents/rff-rpt-busby-chinaclimatchangefinal.pdf; Joshua Busby, "The Need for Power: Implications of Chinese Energy Security and Climate Change Policies for Sino-American Relations," in Abraham Denmark et al., eds., *China's Arrival: A Strategic Framework for a Global Relationship* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2009), 19–42.
 53. See <http://www.us-china-cerc.org> (accessed March 28, 2015).
 54. Taryn Fransen et al., *Mobilising International Climate Finance: Lessons from the Fast-Start Finance Period* (London: Overseas Development Institute, November 2013), <http://www.wri.org/publication/mobilising-international-climate-finance> (accessed March 28, 2015). While some of this represented repackaging of existing funds, these commitments also represented new money for climate-related purposes. According to the World Resources Institute, US appropriations of climate-related finance increased from US\$305 million in 2009 to US\$1.3 billion in 2010. Athena Ballesteros et al., "Summary of Developed Country 'Fast-Start' Climate Finance Pledges," *World Resources Institute*, 2010, <http://www.wri.org/publication/summary-of-developed-country-fast-start-climate-finance-pledges> (accessed March 28, 2015).
 55. In 2012, the Department of State supported three programs: Least Developed Country Fund (US\$25 million), the Special Climate Change Fund (US\$10 million), and the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership (US\$8 million in 2011). The Department of Treasury supported six other funds including: the Tropical Forests Conservation Act (US\$12 million), the Global Environment Facility (US\$119.8 million), the Clean Technology Fund (US\$229.6 million), the Strategic Climate Fund: Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (US\$18.7 million), the Strategic Climate Fund: Forest Investment Fund (\$37.5 million), and a Strategic Climate Fund: Scaling up-Renewable Energy (US\$18.7 million). Richard K. Lattanzio, *International Environmental Financing: The Global Environment Facility (GEF)* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013). The Obama administration has often asked more than what was appropriated for these programs. In 2011, for example, a US\$400 million request for the Clean Technology Fund was funded at US\$185 million, and support for the GEF was US\$90 million instead of US\$175 million. Richard K. Lattanzio, *International Environmental Financing: The Global Environment Facility (GEF)* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011).
 56. The GEF is an independent financial organization that was created in 1991. It is one of the main sources of international environmental finance, meant to finance the incremental cost of cleaner technology compared to less costly, dirtier technology. As of 2013, it had allocated more than US\$11.5 billion and mobilized an additional US\$57 billion in cofinance since its founding. Initially a pilot program in the World Bank, it became independent in 1994, though it retains a close association with the Bank. It is the primary fund administrator for a number of international

- environmental agreements. Lattanzio, *International Environmental Financing*, 2013.
57. Lattanzio, *International Environmental Financing*, 2011.
 58. G. John Ikenberry, "Is American Multilateralism in Decline?" *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 1, no. 3 (2003): 533–550.
 59. For a more extended discussions, see Josh Busby, "Climate Change Blues: Why the U.S. and Europe Just Can't Get Along," *Current History*, Vol. 102, No. 662 March (2003): 113–118; Joshua Busby, *Moral Movements and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Joshua Busby, "New Troubles for the West: Debt Relief, Climate Change, and Comparative Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era" (Georgetown University, Government Department, 2004).
 60. Jacobson, "Climate Change"
 61. DeSombre, "The United States and Global Environmental Politics."
 62. Detlef Sprinz and Tapani Vahtoranta, "The Interest-Based Explanation of Environmental Policy," *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (1994): 77–105.
 63. Kelemen and Vogel, "Trading Places," 8.
 64. See Busby, "Climate Change Blues."; Busby, *Moral Movements and Foreign Policy*; Busby, "The Hardest Problem in the World."; Busby, "New Troubles for the West."
 65. Todd Sandler, *Global Collective Action* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
 66. Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003); Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," *Policy Review*, Vol. 113 (2002): 3–28, <http://www.hoover.org/research/power-and-weakness> (accessed March 28, 2015).
 67. G. John Ikenberry, "American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror," *Survival*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (2001): 19–34; G. John Ikenberry, "Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order," *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2009): 71–87.
 68. Falkner, "American Hegemony and the Global Environment."
 69. Sheila Jasanoff, "American Exceptionalism and the Political Acknowledgment of Risk," *Daedalus*, Vol. 119, No. 4 (1990): 61–81.
 70. Robert Falkner, "The European Union as a 'Green Normative Power'? EU Leadership in International Biotechnology Regulation," 2006, https://ces.fas.harvard.edu/files/working_papers/CES_WP140.pdf (accessed March 28, 2015).
 71. Brunnée, "The United States and International Environmental Law"
 72. Steven Kull, "Public Attitudes toward Multilateralism," in Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman, eds., *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 99–120; Benjamin I. Page and Marshall M. Bouton, *The Foreign Policy Disconnect: What Americans Want from Our Leaders but Don't Get*, American Politics and Political Economy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).
 73. Josh Busby and Jon Monten, "Republican Elites and Foreign Policy Attitudes," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 127, No. 1 (2012): 105–142; Bethany Albertson and Joshua Busby, "Hearts or minds? Identifying persuasive messages on climate change," *Research & Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2015): 1–9.
 74. Moravcsik, "The Paradox of US Human Rights Policy," 165–166.
 75. Ibid.
 76. Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World*, 1st vol. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf : Distributed by Random House, 2001); Walter Russell Mead, "The Jacksonian Tradition," *The National Interest*, No. 58 (1999): 5–29.
 77. James Q. Wilson, *American Government: Institutions and Policies* (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1980).

78. Anthony Downs, "Up and Down with Ecology: The 'Issue Attention' Cycle," *The Public Interest*, Vol. 28 (Summer 1972): 38–50.
79. See <http://ngrams.googlelabs.com> (accessed March 28, 2015).
80. See <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/> (accessed March 28, 2015).
81. For an exploration of these themes, see Busby, "China and Climate Change."
82. Ibid.
83. This agreement is supposed to be concluded by 2015 with obligations beginning after 2020. Purvis is pessimistic about the possibilities of US domestic action and progress via international negotiations in the medium-term. Nigel Purvis, *Climate of Despair? The Future of U.S. Climate Policy and Global Negotiations*, German Marshall Fund, 2012, http://blog.gmfus.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/purvis_climateofdespair_mar12_web.pdf (accessed March 28, 2015).

China and International Cooperation on the Environment: Historical and Intellectual Roots of Chinese Thinking about the Environment

Ming Wan

The environment is normally viewed as a growing but still low-priority area for a general study of Chinese foreign policy or Sino-US relations, but it is actually central to the Chinese conception of world order from a longer historical lens because it goes to the core of Chinese natural philosophy as the intellectual foundation for its understanding of world order. Thus, China's orientation toward environmental problems that has deep, enduring, and conflicting historical roots opens a window into its basic attitude toward world order.

Traditional Chinese philosophers viewed the human world and the natural world as inseparable, linking environmental events to the legitimacy of the emperor and holding the government responsible for management of the environment. The traditional Chinese conception of world order had a cosmic-religious foundation. However, while current Chinese environmental diplomacy draws from these historical legacies, it can largely be framed using universally understood concepts such as power, national interests, sovereignty, economic development, and common good. The intellectual basis for much of what the Chinese government is doing on the environmental front is mainly the concepts, theories, and mindsets formed in the nineteenth century under Western pressure and intellectual influence. Therefore, whether one agrees with the Chinese positions or not, one can understand what the Chinese are trying to do. Put simply, China's preferences and policies in the environment area of world order can be explained by "basket one" and "basket two" variables of bargaining power in a complex multilateral game and national interest in rapid economic growth linked to its political legitimacy, informed by "basket three variables" of traditions and ideas, namely the nineteenth-century ideas about nature and science without obvious references to its earlier intellectual traditions.¹

One may argue that having the nineteenth-century mindset is backward now and particularly damaging for the environment because the world has moved forward and the global environment has deteriorated at an alarming pace. However, while Europe has advanced, as defined by environmentalists, the United States and some other major and emerging powers have not, particularly over climate change. That is why US concern about China over environment centers on national competitiveness for green technologies and relative gains.

The fact that China's deep cultural roots prior to the nineteenth century have not reflected much in current Chinese policies in the environment area raises a larger question as to whether such views can be brought back to life and to form the basis of a Chinese vision of world order such as *tianxia* or all under heaven.² My analysis of the environment case shows that this would be extremely difficult. The Chinese classical view of what we now call the environment or nature was once part of a coherent and deeply socialized belief system. One cannot practice *tianxia* unless everyone believes it. But the contemporary Chinese policy elites have no core beliefs or faith, which means that there is no real normative basis for an alternative world order.

If one infers China's overall foreign policy orientation from its view of the environment, one would not see a fundamental shift. The Chinese delegation's tough stance at the 15th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP15) in Copenhagen in December 2009, often cited in the West as one of several Chinese actions that created doubts whether China would continue its peaceful development strategy, merely shows that China made a power move within the existing world order.³ In short, the Chinese could be viewed as defending their national interests in economic development and sovereignty more assertively than before, but not necessarily challenging the normative basis of the current world order. "Selfish" state behavior is damaging to the functioning of a world order, but great power politics, where states jockey for position to benefit themselves, has always been part of all world orders.

This chapter includes four sections. The first section examines China's historical legacies related to the environment. The next two sections analyze China's contemporary strategic thinking toward global environmental issues and its interaction with the United States. The last section concludes the chapter. As will be shown in the chapter, much of the Chinese historical legacies prior to the mid-nineteenth century discussed in the first section is actually not felt in China's current environmental thinking and diplomacy analyzed in the following two sections. Indeed, one may largely skip China's ancient traditions when discussing Chinese environmental diplomacy. However, this chapter is part of a larger intellectual project comparing Chinese and American preferences for world order. In this context, the fact that China's ancient natural philosophy no longer applies helps us assess how different the Chinese and Americans are at present against how different they could have been.

My discussion of China's current thinking toward the environment and its foreign policy leans heavily to climate change. China faces mounting environmental problems at home and engages the international community on other global environmental issues. But climate change has been the most salient global environmental issue in recent years, the most difficult environmental diplomatic issue between China and the United States, and most challenging domestically in both countries. Thus, the chapter focuses on a hard case for international cooperation, which is also arguably most revealing about Chinese and American preferences for world order.

Historical Legacies

The historical legacy for China's view of the environment comes from four periods: classical Chinese traditions, neo-Confucianism, Sino-Western interaction in the nineteenth century, and the Maoist legacy in the first three decades of the People's Republic of China.⁴ Some of these issues have been well studied. I will provide a cursory discussion of these findings and then focus on how they relate to Chinese traditions toward world order, which is not as well understood.

China followed a distinct intellectual tradition though the early nineteenth century. One may point out correctly that China always had cultural exchange with the outside world, with borrowing of Buddhism from India and interaction with the Islamic civilization as prominent examples. But Chinese civilization and European civilization were basically alien to each other. Imagine if we ask Lǚ Buwei, a Qin Kingdom prime minister (about 290 BC–235 BC), what the relationship between the environment and world order is. He would be puzzled. Nothing in that question would be familiar to him. The Chinese did not have the terms environment or world order. They might find functional equivalents, but those terms were understood differently. And Lǚ did not think in terms of cause and effect in his natural philosophy. One may suggest that it is inappropriate to contrast a Chinese thinker from ancient times to Europeans in the nineteenth century. But Lǚ Buwei was important in shaping early Chinese conceptions of the physical environment as part of Chinese intellectual traditions that continued to the early nineteenth century. He commissioned the *Lǚshi chunqiu*, an encyclopedia of Chinese intellectual scholarship completed in 239 BC. This was one of the earliest texts on *tianren ganying*, which may be roughly translated as “feeling-response between heaven and humans” in a unique Chinese cosmology or natural philosophy that might be called “cosmic resonance.” The term *ganying* means that phenomena or events that take place simultaneously at different spatial locations may have effect on each other without obvious linear causal connections. *Ganying* is fundamentally based on the traditional Chinese view that *qi* or air is the essence of universe as all objects are different forms of *qi*, which operates between opposing and yet complementary *yin* and *yang*.⁵ Chinese garden rocks are

valued because they believed that *qi* is physically revealed in the shapes and holes of these rocks.

The cosmic resonance theory traced to earlier Chinese philosophers, particularly Laozi (Lao Tsu) of Taoism, Kongzi (Confucius) of Confucianism, and Zhou Yan of the Yinyang School. *Zhongyong* or *The Doctrine of the Mean*, part of the Five Classics for early Confucianists and one of the Four Books for neo-Confucianism, maintained ontological inseparability of heaven and humans.⁶ After the *Lüshi chunqiu*, the cosmic resonance theory gained greater intellectual influence and came to dominate in the early Han dynasty, with the publication of the *Huainanzi*, another encyclopedic collection of works commissioned by Prince Liu An presented to Emperor Wudi in 139 BC. Dong Zhongshu (179–104 BC), an influential Confucian scholar who established Confucianism as the ruling doctrine for the Han Dynasty, was credited for elevating cosmic resonance to its highest intellectual prominence in Chinese history. Cosmic resonance was challenged intellectually by Wang Chong (27–97 BC) and gradually lost prominence, particularly after neo-Confucianism came to dominate Chinese intellectual thinking in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. But cosmic resonance continues to influence Chinese life to this day in practices such as *fengshui* (Chinese geomancy).

Two features stand out when it comes to contemporary implications of Chinese traditional thinking regarding the environment as a basket three variable. One is the strong conviction that the government should be held accountable for what is happening in nature. The Chinese notion of the mandate of heaven links natural happenings to the legitimacy of the emperor or dynasty. Factually, the change in climate, which affected whether there would be a good harvest, indeed helped explain the rise and fall of Chinese dynasties, whether people at that time understood the relationship or not. In fact, some have noticed a pattern of climate cooling coinciding with the country's dynastic cycle.⁷

Second, unlike later Europeans who separated the natural from the human worlds, the Chinese believed in harmonious existence between the two. It was an organic view. Dong Zhongshu (179–104 BC), in particular, put what we would call the environment as a central component of his vision of *datong shehui* or all equal society. Cosmic resonance was not the only Chinese tradition related to the environment. Taoism paid particular attention to the physical world, believing that human way of living should conform to the intangible force of nature. And contemporaries can find plenty of wise quotes about balance between nature and humans throughout Chinese intellectual history.⁸ Such views are now embraced by many environmentalists as ancient wisdom that provides a badly needed corrective to the modern mindset to conquer and control the nature. More broadly, contemporary environmentalists who reject a much stricter Western dichotomy between nature and culture sometimes turn to non-Western beliefs for inspiration, including Taoism, Buddhism, and Hinduism in Asia. Asian philosophies were indeed more contextual and relativist when it came to nature and culture than European traditions.

However, despite all this seemingly environmentally friendlier thinking, Asia was not faring better in environmental protection before the nineteenth century.⁹

Precisely because there was no clear separation between the natural world and the human world, the Chinese did not view nature as needing protection. That is why Chinese did not think whether it was appropriate to cut beautiful rocks from nature and take them into private possession. More important, Chinese philosophical tradition was heavily human-centered and human affairs took practical precedence over everything else. Put simply, the Chinese emphasized environmental management rather than environmental protection as we understand it now. And China's past environmental record has not been great despite artistic images, particularly in Chinese traditional landscape paintings. Its environment deteriorated over the millennia due to the cumulative effect of intensive agricultural life styles and demographic pressure on limited land resources.¹⁰

What did all this have to do with world order? The Chinese did not have a term world order. The Chinese term *tianxia* or all under heaven was the closest equivalent to the English term world order but it is different from world order. *Tianxia* goes beyond the human world. *Tian* refers to heaven. So it is a cosmic order. But it is humanist in that Confucianism firmly plants humans in the center. Also, China's conception of world order was narrower than the contemporary world order. China's world order was the Chinese world order.

Cosmic resonance relates to Chinese conception of world order in at least three ways. First, we should view Chinese notions of cosmic resonance and *tianxia* as parts of an organic, living system of beliefs. The Chinese world order has a cosmological foundation. As Benjamin Schwartz argued, "after all the qualifications and corrections have been made, the notion of a Chinese perception of world order will still prove generally valid in the sense in which all general propositions about entities such as Chinese society or Chinese culture are valid."¹¹ He noted that similar to other ancient civilizations the Chinese had a conception of universal kingship, which was well established normatively despite the existence of an interstate system before China was unified under Qin. What set ancient China apart was linking universal kingship and *tianxia* to high culture as defined by Confucianism. The Chinese conception of world order had a firmer religio-cosmological foundation than other cultures because the emperor had a well-established, pivotal position in the Chinese cosmic-social order.¹²

Second, the proponents of cosmic resonance philosophy were directly linked to the Chinese empire builders. Both *Lüshi chunqiu* and *Huainanzi* were compiled to help the rulers at the time. Lǚ Buwei and Liu An played crucial roles in Chinese political history as well. Lǚ was rumored to be the biological father of the first Chinese emperor for whom the famed terracotta soldiers and horses were buried. The first emperor not only built a unified Chinese empire but also created the firmly shared view that China should be unified. A unified China is the foundation of the Chinese world order.

Liu An presented his commissioned *Huainanzi* to Han Emperor Wudi who ruled in 147–87 BC. Wudi was a martial emperor who engaged in constant warfare and expanded the Chinese territories in all directions, including Greater Central Asia and starting the Silk Road. Dong Zhongshu elevated Confucianism to the dominant doctrine at the expense of all other competing ideologies during the reign of Wudi, which is normally interpreted as providing the normative foundation and legitimacy for the Chinese imperial system, explaining the success of the Han Dynasty in contrast to the brief history of the earlier Qin dynasty. The First Emperor allegedly buried hundreds of Confucian scholars alive, a brutal act that horrified future generations of Confucian scholars.

Third, China's highly developed intellectual traditions corresponded to its central position in East Asian international relations. Highly complex intellectual traditions were not a sufficient condition for a country's prominence but it was important for both domestic and external reasons. Intellectual traditions were the cultural glue for a nation's coherence. Having written language, and therefore history, also gives one significant advantage over those who did not. And it was vigorous and sophisticated intellectual debates at the formative years of the Chinese empire rather than the intrinsic values of any particular school of thinking that provided the basis for a successful Chinese system.¹³ This is part of the reason that China dominated East Asia for such a long time and that China almost alone supplied the cultural notions underlying the traditional East Asian international relations. This is also the reason that the Chinese could make nomadic conquerors accept their notion of world order in most cases. As Schwartz noted, China was not challenged by a similar universal state nearby.¹⁴ Thus, when the Westerners came with an alternative but powerful civilization, they put tremendous pressure on China and East Asia, as will be discussed later in the chapter.

Neo-Confucianism developed in the eleventh and twelfth century as the intellectual project of Cheng Yi (1033–1107) and Zhu Xi (1130–1200), two influential philosophers in the Song Dynasty (960–1279). Its key intellectual innovation was to add *li* or principle/pattern to the concept of *qi*. *Li* structures *qi* in a particular shape and directs it in a particular direction. Neo-Confucianism would become the doctrine in the following dynasties. The focus of neo-Confucianism was on construction of a moral order, a more humanistic vision of the world that saw diminished importance of cosmic resonance. However, New Confucianism, influenced by but not identical to neo-Confucianism, which started in the twentieth century, often interprets neo-Confucianism as ecologically aware. Tu Wei-ming, a leading New Confucianist, has repeatedly argued that neo-Confucianism and classical Confucianism before it all contain spiritual resources about the consanguinity between humans and the environment.¹⁵

Neo-Confucianism came about in a historical context of significant Chinese military weakness against nomads. Following a “correct” reading of history, the Chinese tend to view the Song Dynasty (960–1279) as

a shameful period in Chinese history. But from a different perspective, the Song Dynasty was a vibrant period, with true indigenous innovations in commercial, financial, technological, cultural, and military technologies. There was also extensive foreign trade. The Song emperors arguably could have made a bigger splash in world history. But they were held back by the political institutions that could not keep up with the progress made on so many fronts.

Having said all that, neo-Confucianism and other cultural progress in this period gave China tremendous soft power. Chinese cultural influence spread and reinforced previous cultural diffusion in Korea, Japan, and Vietnam. Peace between states in Northeast Asia held for an amazingly long period, unlike constant warfare in the European interstate system around that period. There were three centuries of peace between 1598 and 1894 in Northeast Asia. And northeast Asian countries did not seek to build overseas empires. Rather, China behaved like China, and Japan and some others tried to be “mini-Chinas” with their own tribute systems.¹⁶ East Asian peace could be traced to the founding of the Ming Dynasty in 1368, with only two wars between China, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, until the end of the nineteenth century, which could be explained by the immense space provided for the members who participated in the formally hierarchical structure of East Asian international relations.¹⁷ One reason for East Asian stability was firmly established neo-Confucianist norms shared in Northeast Asia, which also explains why China had frequent wars with nomads who did not share these values.¹⁸

The modern Chinese conception of nature was heavily influenced by Western thinking. Defeated by Great Britain in the Opium War of 1839–1842, the Chinese thinkers began searching for new ideas to revive the country, thus starting a modern era. China was more advanced than Europe in many areas for centuries. But why did China fall behind Europe in the modern period then? It is widely accepted in China that Chinese fell behind Europe in experiment-based scientific way of looking at the world,¹⁹ which was also relevant for our understanding of the environment.²⁰ Modern Chinese intellectuals and leaders almost all seized upon science and technology as the essence of modernity.

In that historical context, Chinese thinkers discovered “nature,” the natural world separated conceptually from the human world. So they had to acquire new concepts and theories from the West. Contemporary Chinese use *ziren* as the Chinese equivalent for nature, understood as opposite to culture. But the term *ziren* was widely accepted in China only in the 1920s. Yan Fu (Yen Fu) (1854–1921), an early influential Chinese thinker who introduced Charles Darwin’s evolution theory into China continued to use heaven as the equivalent of nature.²¹ Following what he viewed as an evolutionary logic, Yan thought the wise rules the ignorant and saw Darwin’s theory (heavily influenced by Herbert Spencer’s interpretation) as one of action based on values. He was among the earlier Chinese thinkers who wanted to learn from the West. The Western theories presumably proved

superior to the Chinese ones. As a legacy of that period, much of traditional Chinese thinking including cosmic resonance were deemed “superstitious.” It was quite common to read Chinese commentaries on early Chinese intellectual works with casual remarks that these works contained superstitious elements such as cosmic resonance.

Yan Fu also helped popularize the notion of rich nation, strong army. No human being wants to be weak. But some feel more strongly if they believe that they had fallen from a higher place. The rich nation, strong army arguments were prevalent in all the Confucian East Asian states. To become a rich nation, one has to acquire a modern economy. No East Asian elites dispute that. They all aim at fast economic growth, with serious environmental consequences.

The Chinese world order collapsed not just because of Western military power but also because of perceived weakness in Chinese knowledge base. Chinese medicine is based on natural philosophy such as cosmic resonance. The Japanese essentially followed the same medical tradition. But they began engaging in so-called Dutch learning through controlled contacts with the Dutch staying in an enclave in Nagasaki from 1641 on. After some Dutch medical science books were translated into Japanese after the 1720s, some bold Japanese conducted dissections, which demonstrated the accuracy of Western medical science compared to traditional Chinese medicine.²² Dutch learning would have a greater impact in the nineteenth century. Most Japanese intellectuals, who believed in refinement of thought under Confucianist influence, embraced Western *bunmei* or civilization once they were convinced about Western superiority over East Asia in science and technology.²³ Thus, the Chinese world order collapsed partly because others no longer accepted its normative basis.

Chairman Mao Zedong dominated in the first three decades of the People's Republic of China. When it comes to the environment, Mao was known mainly for his war against nature.²⁴ Mao famously said “battling with nature brings so much joy.” Mao's negative environmental legacy is well documented.

China's Strategic Orientation and the Environment

Environmental protection was part of a broad theme of China joining the international community starting in the early 1970s.²⁵ China participated in the international environmental regime in the early 1970s after it became a member of the United Nations. It began to build domestic environmental institutions shortly afterward, particularly with Deng Xiaoping's economic reform and opening.²⁶ At the same time, Beijing argued that its priority was economic development, that its sovereignty should not be encroached upon, and that the developed countries that had polluted the world and created global warming and ozone depletion bear the moral and financial responsibility to assist the developing countries in dealing with these problems.²⁷ China was not the only country holding these views. India, for example,

shared similar views. Viewing itself as within the majority of the nations in the world, the Chinese government often rallied the developing countries to its cause.

China's basic strategic orientation since the late 1970s has been to treat economic development as its principal national objective. At the same time, with reform and opening, there emerged a group of officials and researchers more inclined toward environmental protection. In the reform era starting in the late 1970s, people became aware of many problems China faced, including the environment. The Chinese environment had deteriorated to a disastrous level.²⁸ The environment became an issue in the 1970s already. An increasing number of environmentally conscious officials and researchers sought and used international cooperation as a tool to force greater change at home. A socialization process was at work, as revealed in the sequence of international events leading to domestic developments. Western influence was exercised partly through the scientific language to frame the issue that also gave the environmental discourse prestige and legitimacy. The scientific language as the basis of environmental protection discourse was acceptable to the Chinese leadership, most of whom were science and engineering graduates of elite Chinese universities.

As part of China moving in the right direction, it joined international environmental treaties and institutions and created domestic law, regulations, and institutions.²⁹ At the same time, environmental protection is at the core of Chinese concern for rapid economic growth. Pollution such as bad air or dead rivers has a direct impact on people's lives, thus easy to justify government activism. By contrast, greenhouse gases that are often defined as air pollutants detrimental to public health contribute to global warming, which pose a common challenge to the humanity.³⁰ The climate change negotiations would potentially affect China the most because a verifiable reduction target would put a break on its rapid economic growth, which has depended heavily on manufacturing. Thus, in the debates within China, while more environmentally sound views have gained ground, partly thanks to transnational coalition building, the traditional views that emphasized economic development and sovereignty typically prevailed.³¹

The Chinese government conducted a successful environmental diplomacy in the scheme of things. It participated in international negotiations while managing to minimize its own obligations and to benefit financially from the international mechanism to achieve global warming emission reduction. Beijing did so by making a strong argument for "common but differentiated responsibilities," meaning that the developed countries have historical responsibilities for cumulative emissions of CO₂ and that the developed countries therefore have obligations for deeper cuts and for financial and technical assistance to the developing countries.

Put simply, China played a nineteenth-century-style foreign policy in the environment arena. The dominant legacy came from the intense Sino-Western interaction in the nineteenth century. China is playing the environment game using the Western languages within the same conceptual

framework formed in the nineteenth century. If one listens to Chinese environment diplomats in international forums and the Chinese government at home, one will never hear cosmic resonance. True, there is much talk about harmony between nature and people, but without any firm conviction and belief underneath it, which raises a question of whether it is possible to imagine a different world order without a non-Western cosmology and natural philosophy. The Chinese do not have it as of now, as revealed in the environment case.

People now debate whether China has fundamentally changed its strategic orientation. I argue in this chapter that there is no breach in Chinese strategic orientation as far as the environment is concerned. The Chinese delegates simply acted more assertively and invited a backlash. In response to the rise and fall of environmental issues in the global diplomatic agenda, the Chinese government is trying to maximize its national interests. Fundamentally, it cannot slow down economic growth too much, which is believed to relate to its legitimacy and social stability. Even if the central government wants to slow down, the local governments will not because they are focused on advancing their careers, reflecting powerful institutionally entrenched interests.

China's environmental diplomacy is determined by the interaction between foreign policy saliency of environmental issues and the distribution of political interests in China's domestic politics. Environmentalists are growing in China and pushing for policy change, particularly over air and water pollution. There are also more people possessing more nuanced understanding of sovereignty and the need for global cooperation for common interests. But a much larger cynical crowd thinks that China could demonstrate international responsibilities and cooperation in an area that is not that politically sensitive and relate directly to people's life, which is largely consistent with government policy. After all, economic development has the largest and most powerful constituency in China.

The more important the environmental issue becomes diplomatically, the more energized and involved the "anti-environment" crowd becomes. Environmental diplomacy has become almost high politics in the contemporary world. As a result, the traditional foreign policy crowd has also turned their attention to environmental diplomacy, viewing it as a new front of great power politics. Predictably, they see American conspiracy in this area as in all areas.³² But the thrust of Chinese environmental diplomacy is to seek some compromise, balancing Chinese domestic need for growth and international pressure.

What is underlying all this Chinese environmental diplomacy that will help us understand Chinese attitudes toward world order then? We need to find out what Chinese analysis reveals about the impact of traditions, power, and ideas on Chinese environmental diplomacy. Since China is not a leader initiating global environmental movements, the quantity and quality of its discourse fluctuates depending on whether there is a major international event or an environmental diplomatic issue. There has been much

written in China about global environmental protection, roughly proportional to the saliency of a particular issue on the global diplomatic agenda. Not surprisingly, global climate change has attracted most attention. Thus, I will focus on the Chinese discourse around the time of the COP16 talks in Cancun in 2010, the COP17 talks in Durban in 2011, the COP18 talks in Doha in 2012, and the COP19 talks in Warsaw in 2013. The Chinese media interviews of Chinese officials and quick think pieces are arguably truer to the inner thoughts of the Chinese involved, unlike far more polished and deliberate longer articles or books.

COP16 was held in Cancun, Mexico, from November 29 to December 10, 2010. Partly because of the failure of the Copenhagen meeting, the Cancun talks generated much media coverage and expert analysis in China. There was some variation in the Chinese discourse, with some more subtly supportive of stopping global warming while others focusing on the drama of soft-power politics. There was expectation prior to the conference that COP16 would not achieve much due to the unwillingness of the developed countries to shoulder their historical responsibilities for global warming and that the international community was in no mood to repeat the Copenhagen fight.³³

Once the Cancun meeting began, with Japan taking a hard-line position from the start by vowing not to support extension of the Kyoto Accord, the Chinese felt that their position had improved, thanks also to what they viewed as Beijing's more flexible position and better public relations efforts.³⁴ The Chinese delegation expressed basic satisfaction that the final compromise document accommodated different views. Xie Zhenhua, the head of the Chinese delegation, told the Chinese Central Television that the Cancun meeting was more constructive than the Copenhagen meeting.³⁵ In summary, the Chinese discourse predominantly focused on the diplomatic side of the meeting, with a sprinkle of "correct" views of the global environmental problems. There was a complete absence of discussion of Chinese traditional thinking about nature and humans.

The Chinese analysts viewed Cancun as having failed to secure the extension of the binding commitment to reduce greenhouse gases made by the developed countries under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. So when Chinese media offered its new-year anticipation of major events for the year 2011, a senior Chinese environmental scientist saw COP17 to be held in Durban, South Africa, during November 28–December 10, 2011 as "the last chance" for saving the Kyoto Protocol.³⁶ The Durban meeting proved to be as difficult as anticipated but a compromise was reached after the meeting was extended for a day. The Durban Platform pledged to create a new accord by 2015 that would be legally binding on all countries, including developing nations not covered in the Kyoto Accord. It also addressed some of the concerns by the developing countries such as transfer of fund and technologies. The Chinese delegation promptly offered its assessment, seeing some important results achieved—maintaining the two-track negotiation, making arrangements for extending the Kyoto Protocol, and launching the

green climate fund—while further efforts were needed—fully realizing the Bali roadmap and for the developed countries to show greater resolve in transferring funds and technologies to the developing countries.³⁷ American analysts, on the other hand, viewed Beijing as moving away from its previous insistence on common but differentiated responsibilities.³⁸

Chinese academic analysis of the global environment, as in much of Chinese writing, focuses on other countries rather than China's own policy.³⁹ When it comes to the positions and moves of other players involved in the game, the Chinese analysts are largely “realists” defined as presenting those views as they are. The environment is less sensitive than human rights after all. The Chinese analysts generally see a complex picture of different camps, between the developed and developing countries, between the European Union and the United States, and between developing countries.

Before Cancun, the Chinese writing largely viewed Copenhagen as overly ambitious and recognized that the expectation had been reduced for the Cancun meeting in 2010. Then as now, the Chinese analysts generally view the developed countries as backtracking from previous commitments and seeking to shirk responsibilities given their current fiscal difficulties, domestic resistance, and fear of competition from emerging powers like China, India, and Brazil.⁴⁰ There was lowered international expectation of the Cancun meeting given the sharp differences among the participants based on their varied national interests. Even Japan was opposed to the extension of the Kyoto Protocol beyond its termination at 2012 even though the accord is associated with its ancient capital city. Japan wanted China and other countries omitted in the 1997 protocol to chip in as well. Prior to the Cancun meeting, there was voice even in the West that it was time to think about adaptation to climate change rather than an apparently unobtainable dream of reducing emissions to keep global warming in check.⁴¹ Moreover, there was criticism of the United States. President Obama's failure to pass domestic legislation regulating greenhouse gases further dampened the expectation. Then the third day into the meeting, Japan became a target for strong criticism.⁴² Furthermore, even among the countries supposedly most interested in global environmental protection, there are signs that narrow national interests are gaining ground. As a case in point, some environmentalists accused Canada of engaging in lobbying campaigns to kill US and EU clean fuel bills to protect its oil exports.⁴³ Canada actually withdrew from the Kyoto Accord on December 13, 2011. For the Durban meeting, the Chinese officials and analysts again saw a complex multilateral game in which China shared much common interest with the emerging powers and the developing countries.⁴⁴

The environment constitutes a new front in Chinese foreign policy, and national interests continue to prevail despite rising environmentalist sentiments in developed countries and some developing countries. The environment is a diplomatic rather than a world-order issue for China. Some Chinese thinkers think in terms of world order, but the environment has not factored heavily along that line.

Diplomacy involves necessary compromises. The Chinese government has been adjusting its environmental diplomacy to project a more responsible image. As a correction to its tough position at Copenhagen, the Chinese delegation showed greater flexibility in Cancun by accepting greater legalization in measuring, monitoring, and verification. Again in Durban, the Chinese delegation contributed to the eventual compromise by accepting legally binding commitment. In fact, they appeared more flexible than the Americans at the meeting. The Chinese delegation indicated during the negotiation that China would not exclude the possibility of joining a legally binding international agreement although how and when would depend on the actual negotiations, starting probably after 2020.⁴⁵ The United States drew most criticism at the conference. China was also acknowledged for its domestic efforts to slow carbon emission growth by reducing intensity of energy use.⁴⁶

The Chinese government has taken its own initiative to reduce the rate of growth of greenhouse emissions. The National People's Congress meeting in March 2011 issued the government report that put reduction of emission in Beijing's next five-year plan, the first time to do so.⁴⁷ Specifically, the Chinese government pledged to contribute to global climate change abatement with 17 percent reduction in CO₂ emission per unit of GDP and 16 percent in energy used per unit in the next five years.⁴⁸ To present China as a responsible country right before the Durban meeting, it issued its second white paper on climate change on December 22, 2011, detailing the objectives announced in the NPC report. It makes sense for the Chinese government to seek a balance between environmental protection and fast economic growth by focusing on energy-efficient technologies that also constitute a growth engine.⁴⁹ In the domestic context, one can easily see how key industrial players will promote sectoral interests but frame them as advancing China and the world's environmental agenda.⁵⁰

The Chinese government has promised even more since COP17, partly due to increased public awareness of environmental challenges for the country and the world. The Chinese media continues to view China's participation in the climate change conferences as constructive⁵¹ even though there is much urging from the West for China to match its international negotiation efforts with its impressive domestic efforts. On November 18, 2013, the Chinese government issued its first national strategy on climate change. A few days later, the Beijing government launched a test exchange for carbon emission credit trading.

We now see a general trend of senior Chinese officials mentioning Chinese traditions in explaining Chinese foreign policy. As an example, Chinese ambassador to Great Britain Liu Xiaoming mentioned both Chinese traditions and Copenhagen in his speech at a seminar organized by Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, his alma mater. He suggested that people should think out of the box of the existing Western international relations theories and understand China correctly. China is practicing a peaceful diplomacy partly because of its peaceful traditions. He also touted China's

contribution to the 2010 Cancun meeting on climate change.⁵² Liu did not link Chinese traditions and Chinese attitude toward climate change in his speech but conceivably could have done so. Nevertheless, representative of a majority of Chinese officials, his remarks expressed a strong desire for the West to understand China on their terms but not in a sense that China wants to revive its traditional world order.

There has been much discussion of the Chinese traditional view of *tianxia* for the past few years.⁵³ Moderates in China think that given the problems the world is facing and the problems with the Western model, the Chinese conception of *tianxia*, which they believe emphasizes harmony and cooperation, could make a positive difference.⁵⁴ More radical thinkers assert that the China model may replace the American model. Some bother to check historical roots while others do not. However, few in this discourse talk about the philosophical issue of the environment.

Take Zhao Tingyang's theory of *tianxia* for example. Zhao's book is arguably the most influential book on *tianxia* in China at present.⁵⁵ This is a thoughtful book and one of few true theoretical works produced in China in recent decades. However, even though he is a philosopher, Zhao treats *tianxia* as mainly a political subject without any discussion of its religio-cosmic foundation. And he wrongly assumes that Western International Relations (IR) theory has no deep philosophy behind it.⁵⁶ In fact, Western IR theory has evolved and has been embedded within the Western philosophical and value system. Thus, while Zhao is bold in treating Chinese features as universal rather than unique, he mainly challenges the Western assumptions about the international system. He is imagining an alternative and more peaceful world order, but Western scholars can readily understand his position as fundamentally that of a utopian with some Chinese characteristics. As Zhao himself recognizes, he is not seeking to revive the past and merely trying to understand the world from a Chinese perspective. Some of the other Chinese writing on *tianxia* often engage in sloganeering, arguing essentially that the contemporary Western international system is flawed while the ancient Chinese had better ideas about how the world should be organized. However, if contemporary scientifically oriented Chinese elites do not believe in cosmic resonance, what would be the deep foundation of *tianxia*? It is not inconceivable that one may imagine *tianxia* without cosmic resonance, but that needs to be thought through. On a more practical note, how does one reconcile *tianxia* with "socialism with Chinese characteristics"?

The Environmental Front of Sino-US Relations

My discussion so far of Sino-Western intellectual exchange since the nineteenth century and China's environmental diplomacy is very much about Sino-US relations. The United States was part of Western cultural exchange with China. In fact, with its heavy involvement in establishing modern colleges and medical schools in China and educating Chinese in American

schools, the United States arguably had stronger intellectual influence on Chinese elites than any other Western power. Moreover, China joined the US-dominated world order in the 1970s. But Sino-US relations are not the same as Sino-Western interaction and the US-led world order is not the same as the global environmental regime.

The Sino-US exchange over the environment is a reflection of the changing nature of the bilateral relationship. The environment was not an important issue between the two countries in the 1970s because the two nations focused on a strategic game against the Soviet Union while treading carefully in a new relationship. The United States was supportive of China's environmental protection in the 1980s because it was supportive of Chinese reform, with the environment as part of that package. Unlike other advanced countries, such as Japan, the United States was forbidden by law to provide official development assistance to China, but there were various American projects to support Chinese efforts for environmental protection. In the 1990s, more tension arose because of different priorities and interests between the two countries.

To a large extent, China was joining the US-led international order, often framed as "connecting tracks" to the international system. Both material interests and change of mind helped to explain why Beijing was willing to do so. China was not in a position to change the international system prevalent for the past three decades, but as the country continues to grow, the day might come when it would behave differently. For many observers, that day is now. That may or may not be the case for China's overall foreign policy, but it is acting more like a nineteenth-century state over climate change. With its rapid growth and large population, China is surely challenging Mother Earth, but it is not really challenging the US-led climate change world order because no such order exists. Sino-US tension over climate change is largely that between two laggards and not resulting from an unsatisfied great power challenging the existing world leader.

The environment case shows that the US-led international order has been incomplete.⁵⁷ The global environmental movement is a societal movement that has pushed the US government along, not the other way around. Europe has provided greater leadership in intergovernmental exchange over climate change although the overall US leadership has arguably allowed Europe to play a greater role in a particular functional area. As Joshua Busby's chapter in this book shows, the United States provided environmental leadership early on in issues such as ozone depletion and whaling but is viewed as a laggard in other issues such as climate change. Similarly, China does not do that badly in the environment area if we look beyond climate change, which has attracted most attention in recent years. But looking beyond governments, American activists have been a crucial intellectual and financial force for global environmental protection.⁵⁸ As a case in point, America's biologist Rachel Carson who published *Silent Spring* in 1962 was an intellectual founder of the environmental movement. By contrast, China does not yet have environmental nongovernmental organizations with global impact.

Entering the new millennium, with a rising China, the United States needs China's support or nonopposition in an increasingly large number of issue areas but has decreasing ability to coerce or persuade China to do its bidding. So adjustments are necessary or there will be greater frictions. China is willing to make strategic deals with the United States following an old-style diplomacy but the American policy community still wants to dominate the world, which makes deal-making difficult. More important, a growing list of powerful American interest groups critical of China over issues such as human rights, trade, currency, and military expansion put tremendous constraint on the government's China policy in a democracy. The environment is not the worst area in the overall Sino-US relationship.

The two countries may cooperate on climate change as something that is not as sensitive as some other issue such as human rights. One potential area of cooperation is science. The Chinese leaders are largely trained as scientists or engineers. It also makes sense to focus on scientific and engineering solutions for the protection of environment as the least costly political solution. Also, the Chinese government sees green technologies as a new engine for growth. The Obama administration is moving in the same direction. Since it is politically difficult to tighten environmental regulations, the United States wants to protect the environment while generating new jobs. But green technologies can also be a source of tension, with the solar energy panel as a case in point. Indeed, President Obama declared to the nation in his state of the union address on January 24, 2012, that "I will not cede the wind or solar or battery industry to China or Germany." On March 20, 2012, Commerce Department announced its decision to impose small countervailing duties (2.9–4.73 % for various Chinese firms) on Chinese solar cell imports. American importers and exporters of solar equipment welcomed the modest measures, while unsatisfied manufacturers hoped for harsher separate antidumping duties expected to be levied in mid-May 2012.⁵⁹

Copenhagen is generally viewed as the start of the recent tensions between the United States and China.⁶⁰ President Obama paid a high-profile visit to China, but one month later, the perceived debacle occurred in the Danish capital. The United States and China did not fight that much in Cancun, and they narrowed their differences somewhat with Beijing agreeing to a vague framework for verification of reduction in greenhouse emission.⁶¹ Beijing adopted a more cooperative tone before the meeting. China's chief negotiator Xie Zhenhua acknowledged for the first time that China was now the largest greenhouse gases emitter in the world.⁶² But this had little impact one way or another on President Obama's high-profile visit to Asia in November 2011, which emphasized the "American pivot to Asia." Vice President Xi Jinping's much anticipated visit to the United States in February 2012 helped improve the atmosphere for management of the relationship and constituted a mutual investment in the bilateral relationship for the next decade but it could not change the basic nature of the bilateral relationship.⁶³ But with a new Chinese leadership

under Xi, the US-China relationship has become more tense over a range of issues, particularly China's territorial disputes with Japan and a few Southeast Asian countries. But the two countries are improving more in the environmental protection area, including issuing of a joint statement on climate change in February 2014.

There has been and will be tension between China and the United States in the environment area, but this is largely a type of great power politics rather than a reflection of civilizational clash. Fundamentally, a majority of Chinese and half of the Americans are not that different when it comes to global environmental issues. The Republican congressional leadership has long been skeptical of climate change science and considers emission targets to be energy taxes. True environmentalists want a different kind of world order, which the United States or at least its conservative side does not yet accept. In a bold move, the Environmental Protection Agency announced a proposal on June 2, 2014, to reduce carbon dioxide emission from the existing power plants. But stiff resistance from the Republicans and coal-state democrats and court fights are expected. While not questioning the science of climate change like the American doubters,⁶⁴ China is on the same side as the American conservatives and they use each other as foils at the expense of the global commons. Since China and the United States are the two largest greenhouse emitters, other players such as the European Union and Japan typically argue that they cannot accept a new binding agreement unless China and the United States are on board. The *de facto* cooperation between China and the United States in this area is a reminder that G2 cooperation may not always be in the best interest of the international community, as defined by environmentalists. In increasingly complex global environment politics, China and the United States hold similar positions at times. For example, China, the United States, India, and some other non-European countries have been opposed to the EU airline carbon tax aiming at reduction of greenhouse emissions.

Conclusion

Historical roots of China's orientation toward the environment came from four historical periods, namely those of classical Chinese philosophy, neo-Confucianism, Western modernity, and Mao's war against nature. But the dominant Chinese thinking about global environmental challenges came from the interaction with the West in the nineteenth century. China's overall strategic orientation has been that of rich nation, strong army since that period. Since the late 1970s, China's priority has been economic growth, which relates to what it believes to be political legitimacy, social stability, and ultimately strong army. That has not fundamentally changed since early 2009, as revealed by looking at the environment case. There have certainly been national interest calculations, but Chinese discourse shows that the Chinese are using Western concepts and theories learned in the nineteenth century rather than drawing deep into its own traditions. The

Chinese traditional thinking about environment was an integral part of its unique natural philosophy, which also informed its view of the Chinese world order. As of now, the Chinese policy elites have not demonstrated any conviction in traditional Chinese philosophical beliefs, which means that they are not imagining or recreating a fundamentally different world order but are mainly interested in elevating its position within the existing world order. Put simply, the environment case shows that China's distant past is unlikely to be its near future.

Notes

1. For a discussion of the three baskets of variables, see the introduction chapter in this book.
2. For discussion of *tianxia*, see Fei-Ling Wang's chapter in this book.
3. China was blamed for the failure to create a credible international climate change regime by taking a strong position against US pressure to commit to reduction in emissions with international monitoring. It was reported that Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao walked out of a conference at one point and sent a lower official to negotiate with President Obama instead. "China Blamed as Anger Mounts over Climate Deal," *The Observer*, December 20, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/20/china-blamed-copenhagen-climate-failure> (accessed March 29, 2012). There was also a report about the Chinese negotiator using angry words in front of the American president. The Chinese government denied the charge that the Chinese delegation was arrogant at the conference. Premier Wen Jiabao himself tried to clarify the Chinese take on the incident. China News Agency, March 14, 2010, <http://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/news/2010/03-14/2168077.shtml> (accessed March 14, 2010).
4. The periodization of the first three periods borrows from Robert P. Weller and Peter K. Bol, "From Heaven-and-Earth to Nature: Chinese Concepts of the Environment and their Influence on Policy Implementation," in Michael B. McElroy, Chris P. Nielsen, and Peter Lydon, eds., *Energizing China: Reconciling Environmental Protection and Economic Growth* (Cambridge: Harvard University Committee on Environment, 1998), 473–499.
5. For a study that emphasizes *Lüshichunqiu* and *Huainanzi*, see Weller and Bol, "From Heaven-and-Earth to Nature," 474–482.
6. Tu Wei-ming, *Centrality and Commonality: An Essay on Confucian Religiousness* (Albany: State University of New York, 1989), 81–86.
7. Mark Elvin, "The Environmental Legacy of Imperial China," in Richard Edmonds, ed., *Managing the Chinese Environment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 9–10.
8. Richard Louis Edmonds, *Patterns of China's Lost Harmony: A Survey of the Country's Environmental Degradation and Protection* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 22–25; Mark Elvin, *The Retreat of the Elephants: An Environmental History of China* (New York: Yale University Press, 2004), 321–368.
9. Ole Bruun and Arne Kalland, eds., *Asian Perceptions of Nature: A Critical Approach* (London: Curzon, 1995).
10. Elvin, *The Retreat of the Elephants*.
11. Benjamin I. Schwartz, "The Chinese Perception of World Order, Past and Present," in John K. Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 277.
12. *Ibid.*, 277–83.

13. For analysis of such an ancient Chinese debate, see Ming Wan, "Discourses on Salt and Iron: A First Century B. C. Chinese Debate over the Political Economy of Empire," *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (June 2012): 143–163.
14. Schwartz, "Chinese Perception of World Order," 281–282.
15. See, for example, Tu Weiming, "The Ecological Turn in New Confucian Humanism: Implications for China and the World," *Daedalus*, Vol. 130, No. 4 (Fall 2001): 243–264; Tu Weiming, "The Confucian World," delivered at Colorado College, February 5, 1999, <http://www.coloradocollege.edu/academics/anniversary/Transcripts/TuTXT.htm> (accessed February 28, 2011).
16. Giovanni Arrighi, *Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century* (London: Verso, 2007), 314–321.
17. David C. Kang, *East Asia before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Sugihara Kaoru, "Tōajia kinsei no sekai chitsujo" [The World Order in Modern East Asia], in Mitani Hiroshi, Namiki Yoriyoshi, and Tsukiashi Tatsuhiko, eds., *Otona no tame no kingendai-shi juku seiki hen* [Modern and Contemporary History for Grownups: The 19th Century] (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2009), 8–19.
18. For a broad discussion of Confucian influence in Northeast Asia, see Tu Weiming, ed., *Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education and Economic Cultures in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996).
19. For a representative narrative, see Justin Yifu Lin, *Demystifying the Chinese Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 49–54.
20. Mark Elvin, "The Environmental Impasse in Late Imperial China," in Brantly Womack, ed., *China's Rise in Historical Perspective* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), 152–153.
21. Robert P. Weller, *Discovering Nature: Globalization and Environmental Culture in China and Taiwan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 43–44. Weller cited Benjamin Schwartz's classic on Yan Fu, Benjamin Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), 45–46.
22. But traditional practice does not disappear easily. As a case in point, traditional Chinese medicine remains popular in Japan and elsewhere in East Asia, as a compliment to Western medicine.
23. Watanabe Hiroshi, "'They Are Almost the Same as the Ancient Three Dynasties': The West as Seen through Confucian Eyes in Nineteenth-Century Japan," in Tu Wei-ming, ed., *Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education and Economic Cultures in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 128–129.
24. Judith Shapiro, *Mao's War against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
25. Lester Ross, "China and Environmental Protection," in Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, eds., *China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 296–325.
26. Wang Hanchen and Liu Bingjiang, "Policymaking for Environmental Protection in China," in Michael B. McElroy, Chris P. Nielsen, and Peter Lydon, eds., *Energizing China: Reconciling Environmental Protection and Economic Growth* (Cambridge: Harvard University Committee on Environment, 1998), 371–403.
27. Elizabeth C. Economy, "China's Environmental Diplomacy," in Samuel S. Kim, ed., *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Facing the New Millennium*, 4th ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 264–283.

28. Vaclav Smil, *The Bad Earth: Environmental Degradation in China* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1984) and *China's Environmental Crisis: An Inquiry into the Limits of National Development* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993); Richard Louis Edmonds, *Patterns of China's Lost Harmony: A Survey of the Country's Environmental Degradation and Protection* (New York: Routledge, 1994); Elizabeth C. Economy, *The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's Future* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).
29. Lester Ross, "China and Environmental Protection," in Economy and Oksenberg, eds., *China Joins the World*, 296–325.
30. Moreover, environmental protection is different from traditional security matter. It is a question of negative externality rather than intention to harm others. Lester Ross, "China and Environmental Protection," in Economy and Oksenberg, eds., *China Joins the World*, 297.
31. Elizabeth Economy, "Chinese Policy-Making and Global Climate Change: Two-Front Diplomacy and the International Community," in Miranda A. Schreurs and Elizabeth Economy, eds., *The Internationalization of Environmental Protection* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 19–41.
32. Yan Xuetong, for instance, sees global environmental diplomacy as great power competition for soft power. Yan Xuetong, "Kankun huiyi zhongguo yingduizhice" [China's Response to the Cancun Meeting], *Xinhua yuebao* [New China Monthly], November 18, 2010, <http://green.sina.com.cn/news/roll/2010-11-28/102521546870.shtml> (accessed November 20, 2010).
33. *Xinhua*, November 28, 2010, <http://green.sina.com.cn/news/roll/2010-11-28/113721547024.shtml> (accessed November 30, 2010); *Sina.com*, November 26, 2010, <http://green.sina.com.cn/news/roll/2010-11-26/140021538787.shtml> (accessed November 30, 2010); *Liaowang*, November 28, 2010, <http://green.sina.com.cn/news/roll/2010-11-28/101721546857.shtml> (accessed November 30, 2011).
34. *Guangzhou Daily*, December 2, 2010, <http://www.chinanews.com.cn/gj/2010/12-02/2694091.shtml> (accessed December 2, 2010).
35. CCTV, December 12, 2010, <http://news.sina.com.cn/green/news/roll/2010-12-12/133321626287.shtml> (accessed December 12, 2010).
36. *Xinjingbao* [New Capital Paper], January 2, 2011, <http://news.sina.com.cn/green/2011-01-02/013221747102.shtml> (accessed January 2, 2011).
37. *China News Agency*, December 11, 2011, <http://www.chinanews.com/gj/2011/12-11/3523112.shtml> (accessed December 11, 2011).
38. I thank Joshua Busby for this observation.
39. Recent representative works include Zhao Hongtu, "Qihou bianhua huaiyilun fenxi yu qishi" [Analysis of Doubts of Climate Change], *Xiandai guoji guanxi* [Contemporary International Relations], No. 4 (2010): 56–63; Bo Yan, "Quanqiu qihou bianhua wenti shang de zhongmeiou sanbian guanxi" [China-US-EU Triangle over Global Climate Change], *Xiandai guoji guanxi*, No. 4 (2010): 15–20, 63; Zheng Yan and Liang Fan, "Qihou gongping yuanze yu guoji qihou zhidu goujian" [Principles of Climate Justice and Construction of International Climate Regime], *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi* [World Economics and Politics], No. 6 (2011): 69–90; Zhang Shengjun, "Quanqiu qihou zhengzhi de biange yu zhongguo mianlin de sanjiao nanti" [Change in Global Climate Politics and China's Triangle Dilemma], *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi*, No. 10 (2010): 97–116; Zhang Lei and Zhuang Guiyang, "Guoji qihou tanpan kunju yu dongya hezuo" [Predicament of International Climate Negotiation and East Asian Cooperation], *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi*, No. 7 (2010): 51–64; Dong Yan, "Quanqiu qihou bianhua boyi zhong de tanbianjie tiaojie cuoshi yanjiu" [Carbon-Related Border Adjustment Measures In Climate Change Negotiations], *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi*, No. 7 (2010): 65–82;

- Zhang Haibin, "Yingdui qihou bianhua zhongri hezuo yu zhongmei hezuo bijiao yanjiu" [Addressing Climate Change: A Comparative Study of Sino-Japan and Sino-US Cooperation], *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi*, No. 1 (2009): 38–48; Liu Qing, "Lun liyi jituan dui meiguo qihou zhengce zhiding de yingxiang" [The Influence of Interest Groups on American Climate Policy Making], *Guoji wenti yanjiu* [Journal of International Studies], No. 3 (2010): 58–64; Yang Yi, "Qianxi shatearabo zai guoji qihou bianhua tanpanzhong de lichang yu celue" [Brief Analysis of Saudi Arabia's Position and Tactics in the International Climate Change Negotiations], *Xiya feizhou* [West Asia and Africa], No. 9 (2011): 92–102.
40. Wei Zonglei, "Quanguo qihou bianhua tanpan qianjing zhanwang" [The Prospect of the Global Climate Change Negotiations], in Cui Liru and Fu Mengzi, eds. *Shijie dabianju* [The World in Transition] (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2010), 284–299.
 41. "Facing the Consequences," *The Economist*, November 27, 2010, 85–88.
 42. The Japanese delegation strongly opposed the extension of the Kyoto Protocol, which was named after its ancient capital, arguing that it was unfair for Japan when the United States and China as the two largest emitters did not commit to any specific reduction targets. "Stance on Kyoto Pact Draws Fire," *The Japan Times*, December 3, 2010, 2.
 43. "Canada Accused of Trying to Kill EU., U.S. Clean Fuel Policies," *The Japan Times*, November 24, 2010, 8.
 44. The Chinese media offered much coverage, interviewing Chinese negotiators and scholars or offering their own analyses. For examples, see *China News Agency*, November 28, 2011, <http://www.chinanews.com/cj/2011/11-28/3492474.shtml> (accessed November 28, 2011), <http://www.chinanews.com/cj/2011/11-28/3492600.shtml>, <http://www.chinanews.com/ny/2011/11-29/3492754.shtml>, <http://www.chinanews.com/gj/2011/11-28/3492153.shtml>.
 45. *Asahi shimbun*, December 5, 2011, 4.
 46. "Fruits of Climate Talks Rest with Asia Nations: China's Pilot Trading System Wins Praise at Durban Meet," *The Japan Times*, December 13, 2011, 1. This story came originally from the *Washington Post*.
 47. *Asahi shimbun evening*, March 5, 2011, 1. The news story also made a connection between the Chinese government's goal and the rising expectation of the international community.
 48. One obvious question is just how much China's net emissions are without which we cannot really assess how well Beijing has achieved its objective. As an indication of both the government's considerable sincerity and the dedication of Chinese environmental scientists, the Chinese Academy of Science fought to get a five-year, US\$125 million project started to create a CO₂ emissions inventory. Li Jiao and Richard Stone, "Climate Change: China Looks to Balance its Carbon Books," *Science*, Vol. 334 (November 18, 2011): 886–887.
 49. For a representative analysis by China's climate change scientists, see He Jiankun, et al., "Quanguo ditan jingji chaoliu yu zhongguo de xiangying duice" [Global Trends of Low Carbon Economy and China's Responses], *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi* [World Economics and Politics], No. 4 (2010): 18–35.
 50. As an example, Liu Wei, vice chairman of the China Nuclear Power Engineering Co., in an interview with Japan's *Asahi shimbun*, said that China needs to build 60 nuclear reactors in the next 10 years partly to reduce CO₂ emission. He also indicated an interest in exporting nuclear reactors based on lower costs and more construction experience than the developed countries that had not built that much in recent years. *Asahi shimbun*, March 10, 2011, 6.
 51. *China News Agency*, December 9, 2012, <http://finance.chinanews.com/ny/2012/12-09/4393381.shtml> (accessed December 8, 2012); *China News Agency*, November

- 5, 2013, <http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2013/11-05/5463676.shtml> (accessed November 5, 2013); *China News Agency*, November 24, 2013, <http://www.china-news.com/gj/2013/11-24/5539151.shtml> (accessed November 23, 2013).
52. "Speech by Ambassador Liu Xiaoming at the 8th Annual London Symposium of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy," Hellenic Center, London, December 4, 2010, <http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/EmbassyNews/t774369.htm> (accessed March 3, 2011).
53. For a critique of the contemporary Chinese discourse on *tianxia*, see Gilbert Rozman, "Invocations of Chinese Traditions in International Relations," *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (June 2012): 111–124.
54. Ren Xiao, "Traditional Chinese Theory and Practice of Foreign Relations: A Reassessment," in Zheng Yongnian, ed., *China and International Relations: The Chinese View and the Contribution of Wang Gungwu* (London: Routledge, 2010), 102–116.
55. Zhao Tingyang, *Tianxia Tixi: Shijie Zhidu zhexue daolun* [*The Tianxia System: A Philosophy for the World Institution*] (Nanjing: Jiangsu jiaoyu chubanshe, 2005).
56. *Ibid.*, 17.
57. For analysis of American leadership, see the chapters by Jeffrey Legro and Michael Mastanduno in this book.
58. I thank Anne-Marie Slaughter for this observation at the workshop in Princeton on April 13–14, 2012.
59. Steven Mufson, "Commission Imposes Low Duties on Chinese Solar Panels," *The Washington Post*, March 21, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/panel-imposes-low-duties-on-chinese-solar-panels/2012/03/20/gIAOVkuPS_story.html (accessed March 29, 2012).
60. There was much American media coverage of a lower level Chinese official being rude to President Obama. As mentioned before, the Chinese government has actually denied the charge.
61. For a good news account of US-China improvements including climate change, see John Pomfret, "U.S., China End Year on Positive Note as They Prepare for Presidential Summit," *The Washington Post*, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/23/AR2010122305833.html> (accessed December 30, 2010).
62. "China for the First Time Admits It's No. 1 Emitter," *The Japan Times*, November 14, 2010, 1.
63. In his written statement to the *Washington Post* prior to his visit, Xi mentioned the climate change conferences in Copenhagen, Cancun, and Durban as one of the areas where China and the United States have coordinated and cooperated. "Views from China's Vice President," *The Washington Post*, February 13, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/views-from-chinas-vice-president/2012/02/08/gIQATMyj9Q_story.html (accessed February 14, 2012).
64. Opinion polls in the United States often show a widening divide between self-identified Republicans and Democrats, with less than half of the Republicans believing in the effect of human activities on climate and around 70 percent of Democrats believe so. For a news summary, see "The U.S. 'Allergy' to Global Warming: What is Going On," *The Japan Times*, September 26, 2011, 5.

Part VI

Alliances and Arms Control

The American Way of Seeking Security: Ideology and Pragmatism

John Owen

Introduction

Does America have a historical tradition concerning international order, particularly in the areas of alliances, arms control, and nuclear weapons? Can we locate a long-term way of American thinking about national security that will help us project the country's future security preferences and policies toward China?

Some would argue for a tradition dating from the 1940s, the decade in which World War II ended and the Cold War began. Realists generally say that it was then that the United States tossed aside its longstanding isolationism and became a global power. Prior to the 1940s, America remained aloof from foreign alliances. Relying on geography and the British Navy for its security, it enjoyed the luxury of condemning great powers for their *realpolitik* behavior. From the 1940s the country had to take responsibility for its own security and that of a number of other states, and began to act like a great power.¹ And of course, atomic weapons did not exist until 1945, so no nuclear tradition before that date is possible. Institutionalists would agree that the 1940s were a crucial turning point, but would emphasize America's turn from unilateralism to multilateralism—its construction of international institutions to reassure other states and preserve its international position.²

There is much to this general line of argument that sees the 1940s as a wide ditch in US security policy. Especially when we want to know why America became and remains a global power, we must take a hard look at the decade of World War II and early Cold War.³ But if a historical tradition truly matters, it should have effects regardless of the structure of the international system. To find a robust tradition, we should look for continuities in America's approach to security policy without regard to

America's position in the global distribution of material power. We should see if the country has taken a consistent set of attitudes and preferences, acted in similar ways, and obtained similar outcomes when it was a third- or second-rank power in a multipolar world, as well as a superpower in a bipolar and then a unipolar world. After all, America's position as the unipole will not last forever, and indeed the country is already experiencing relative decline, at least regarding its wealth, vis-à-vis China. When trying to excavate a historical tradition, we should consult America's entire foreign-policy history.

In recent years many historians and political scientists have come to do just that, arguing for strong continuities in American foreign policy.⁴ Scholars assert that America was not in fact isolationist prior to 1941, except in the sense that it refused to ally with foreign states; it had extensive economic and societal ties with Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Asia. And notwithstanding its multilateralism since 1945,⁵ the United States has retained a unilateralist streak even in the modern era, most obviously during the G. W. Bush administration (2001–2009) but evident, argue some, throughout the postwar period.⁶

The truth is, of course, that US foreign policy exhibits many changes and many continuities. In this chapter I argue for a significant underlying continuity in American preferences and policies concerning an international security order, a continuity that has weathered changes in the country's relative military power. Since the nation's founding, US policy-makers have practiced what Tony Smith has called *national-security liberalism*.⁷ America's national interest derives heavily from its identity as a liberal-democratic, free-market country; take away its political economy of liberal-democratic capitalism, and you no longer have America. A certain foreign-policy logic has followed from this notion of interest and identity. In contrast to China's "harmony of differences" tradition which, as depicted by Yu Bin in this volume, values global ideological and cultural diversity, US elites have viewed the world through an ideologically tinted lens.⁸ They have sought to push foreign societies and international order in a more liberal, democratic, and capitalist direction. They have treated capitalist liberal democracies better and nondemocracies worse. They have promoted democracy, human rights, and free markets. These policies have given foreign states incentives to respond in kind, at least once they interact with America over time: fellow liberal democracies tend to treat America better and to favor its version of international order, while nondemocracies have been more aloof from the United States and have been suspicious of the international order it has underwritten. These policies and outcomes have been more pronounced in times and places when America's model has faced serious transnational competition (as in the early Cold War). Even so, the United States has rarely been a purely ideological or crusading country. Rather, it has proved pragmatic through most of its history and capable of real but more precarious cooperation with nondemocracies who share significant interests.

My task here is descriptive rather than evaluative; I am neither endorsing nor condemning this American tradition of national-security liberalism, either in principle or in practice. My point, rather, is that recognizing and understanding America's preference for a global security order is important for Americans and Chinese alike as they try to anticipate and plan for future Sino-American relations and the future of international order.

The American National Interest

The place to begin a consideration of US security policy is with the country's interests. Realism, the leading school of thought in security affairs, shapes how scholars and policymakers think about national interests. America, like other states, is primarily concerned with its physical security. Its top priority is the retention of its territory, people, and productive capacity. But in the modern world a simple material conception of security does not get us very far. Most obviously, productive capacity is a function not merely of natural resources, industrial plant, population, education, and so on, but also of the system or domestic institutions that have produced and sustained these things. Furthermore, the power of a country's governors depends in part on the preservation of the institutions under which they govern. The national interest, at least in the minds of the government charged with protecting it, includes the preservation of a state's domestic regime.⁹

States in the modern world are highly aware of one another's domestic institutions precisely because these institutions can affect how states interact. Elsewhere I argue that demonstration effects in international relations mean that the fates of governments with similar domestic regimes are linked to some extent. In Europe, prior to 1918, monarchists believed the "national" interest of their states to consist in large part in preserving their thrones and dynasties. Because the credibility of monarchy in one country depended upon the success of monarchy in other countries, monarchies had a stake in one another's flourishing. This stake was especially high when there was a republican (anti-monarchical) threat extending across the monarchies, as was the case in Europe between the 1780s and 1860s. More generally, when ideologies compete transnationally—across countries in a region—then this tendency toward favoring one's own regime type and being suspicious of others' types is more pronounced.¹⁰

Together, these tendencies to want to preserve one's domestic regime and to perceive interests in common with states who share that regime produce two other important tendencies. First is the tendency—sometimes weak, sometimes strong—for states to seek closer relations with states whose domestic institutions resemble their own; and a corresponding tendency for states to be more aloof or even confrontational with states whose domestic institutions are very different from their own.¹¹ Monarchies, especially when threatened by a transnational republican threat, will tend to seek cooperation with one another and view republics with suspicion.

(The same dynamics may give republics analogous tendencies at the same time.) Security threats are ultimately about war—which, in Clausewitz's definition, is "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will."¹² The more the will of a foreign state resembles one's own, the less reason the foreign state has to attack or threaten one. The resulting double standard in foreign policy—favoring one's own regime type, institutionalizing cooperation with it, investing more in long-term relations with it—may be overridden by various other factors, but certain events such as revolutions or wars can bring it to the fore.¹³

The second tendency—sometimes weak, sometimes strong—is to promote one's own institutions and practices both within other countries and at the level of international institutions. States seek to shape their international environment in their favor, and that includes their social environment. Monarchies generally prefer to have neighbors that are monarchies so as to avoid the demonstration effects of republicanism. They also tend to build international institutions that are hierarchical and elitist. Again, the history of the Concert of Europe (1815–1849), in which the monarchical great powers of Europe institutionalized collusion to keep smaller powers subordinate and to suppress liberalism, is instructive.¹⁴

The United States has always practiced this kind of foreign policy in the service of its own domestic regime of free-market liberal democracy. Samuel Huntington was correct to use religious language concerning this identity: there is an American Creed.¹⁵ America would not be America without its institutions, and so Americans value liberal-democratic capitalism unusually highly and regard their version as unique and superior to all alternatives. It is these institutions, they believe, that have made their country into the world's wealthiest and most powerful. It follows (so Americans tend to think) that other nations have flourished over the long term insofar as they have adopted these institutions as well. There are obviously domestic actors—exporters, investors, and lenders—with direct interests in global economic liberalism, and they exert influence on US foreign policy.¹⁶ But they succeed only because elites and the public basically agree that America flourishes to the degree that the global economy is open.

The upshot is that, for most Americans, their country is secure to the extent that its liberal-democratic capitalism is secure. This conviction has a number of ramifications for US foreign policy. US governments have historically sought economic openness first in the Caribbean and Latin America, then in East Asia, and then all over the world. They have opposed formal imperialism by other powers for fear of being excluded from blocs or regions. Most have promoted democracy and human rights rhetorically and with financial support, and many have done so with lethal force. All else being equal, America is better off, elites have reasoned—the more countries are capitalist liberal democracies the more that global order encourages this regime type. Under a logic that has eluded many scholars and statesmen, an open global order is one that serves American hegemony.¹⁷ This is one reason why the permanent decline of Great Britain, once the world's guarantor

of openness, finally prodded America to construct international institutions to extend and preserve a liberal international order. This has meant a fear of great powers that seek to spread a different political economy, particularly in areas of strategic interest to the United States.¹⁸

This tendency has been most pronounced during periods when an alternative regime type was spreading in regions of strategic or economic interest to the United States. During such periods, elites across countries tend to polarize according to regime preference; their preferences become more ideological than usual. For their part, American elites have been especially favorable toward foreign liberal democracies, and suspicious of foreign monarchies, fascist states, communist states, and so on. Consider, for example, the Monroe Doctrine of December 1823. Often taken to be a simple (if brash) *realpolitik* assertion against the European great powers, the Monroe Doctrine illustrates the degree to which the US government feared *monarchical* power specifically. President Monroe issued his declaration a few weeks after 100,000 French troops had invaded Spain to restore absolute monarchy there; Monroe's administration feared that the European powers would do the same in the infant Latin American republics that had recently declared independence from Spain. "The *political system* of the allied powers is *essentially different* in this respect from that of America," declared Monroe. "We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to *extend their system* to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety [*italics added*]." ¹⁹

Indeed, the United States has exhibited foreign policy favoritism since its founding in 1776. Anecdotal evidence is abundant that American elites see foreign states through a discriminatory lens.²⁰ Experimental evidence confirms this as well.²¹ It has not fought wars against states it regards as democracies (or, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, republics), and it has tended to show suspicion of states it regards as nondemocratic. America tends to ally with democracies more; its alliances with democracies are more robust; it tends to have more success with them in arms control and counter-proliferation; and it tends to object less to their having nuclear weapons and delivery systems. By contrast, with states that are not liberal democracies or capitalist, Washington has more difficulty building trust; it therefore hedges more in its dealings with them.

National-security liberalism has other ramifications. Americans tend not to appreciate that some of their country's policies can aggravate the security dilemma for other states, especially nondemocracies.²² For example, Americans have tended to view the eastward expansion of NATO as an enlargement of the international zone of democracy and peace rather than as an extension of US power toward the Russian border. They see military actions such as the NATO interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 as vindications of human rights rather than American muscle-flexing or attempts to expand the US sphere of influence.²³ They

tend to interpret skepticism about their good intentions as disingenuous and further evidence that nondemocracies are paranoid or obsessed with power.

Finally, the United States has never been shy about proclaiming its special mission to promote political and economic liberty throughout the world. These periodic proclamations make the country an easy target for charges of hypocrisy. During the Cold War, Washington supported authoritarians all over the Third World so long as they were anticommunist, and even some communists (such as Tito and later Mao) who were sufficiently anti-Soviet. Today the United States is good friends with the decidedly undemocratic Saudi Arabia, and was intimate with the authoritarian Mubarak regime in Egypt as well. American inconsistency infuriates (or perhaps delights) the country's critics, but notwithstanding, the United States does promote liberal-democratic capitalism under some conditions and has been instrumental in its remarkable spread since the 1940s.²⁴ It sometimes does so haltingly and indirectly, as in the cases of Taiwan and South Korea, both of which were authoritarian until the late 1980s. But it does try to create conditions under which other states will become capitalist liberal democracies.

Of course, what some see as American hypocrisy others may see as pragmatism. US security cooperation with various types of nondemocracies and noncapitalist states has been abundant throughout American history. As we shall see later in this chapter, however, such cooperation is more difficult to achieve and institutionalize. In general, the United States displays more favoritism the more threatened it feels by transnational ideological competitors. The United States cooperated most closely with its democratic allies, and was most prone to promote liberal democracy not when the Soviet Union reached nuclear parity with the United States (around 1970), but earlier, when communism was spreading in Eastern Europe and East Asia (in the late 1940s and 1950s).

I have been discussing US foreign policy *preferences*—that is, the ends the United States seeks and the means it chooses to reach those ends. Of course, international outcomes are the product of interactions with other states and nonstate actors, each of which has preferences of its own; and these interactions are mediated through power disparities, institutions, and norms. Outcomes may differ sharply from preferences, even the preferences of a country as powerful as the United States. But as I show later in this chapter, alliance and arms control outcomes do display patterns that are remarkably consistent with America's national-security liberalism. This is for two reasons. First, many other states have analogous preferences; liberal democracies tend to trust the United States more, while nondemocracies tend to trust it less. Second, international outcomes feed back into preferences, reinforcing them. America treats fellow capitalist democracies better, and they tend to reciprocate; it treats nondemocratic or noncapitalist states worse, and they tend to reciprocate.²⁵ The causality is entangled, and preferences are to some extent endogenous to international interaction.²⁶

But American preferences, at least, have a strong foundation in the country's historical ideology and identity. Even when it has good relations with a nondemocracy, as with the Soviet Union in the early 1970s or Saudi Arabia today, its strong preference for capitalist democracies does not change.

This rough consistency between US preferences and beliefs, on the one hand, and international outcomes, on the other, has led American elites across time and regardless of political parties to believe that protecting national autonomy and promoting liberalism are complementary rather than contradictory. US leaders believe the country is more secure in a world that reflects and complements its domestic order. Furthermore, tying the national interest to preserving America's political economy appears to have met, broadly speaking, with success. Notwithstanding its many mistakes, the United States has preserved its domestic institutions and is now well into its third decade as the globe's only superpower. The international system seems to have rewarded the United States for its discriminatory foreign policy, or at least has not punished it sufficiently to cause it to change as yet. Hence national-security liberalism has been reinforced and perpetuated.

Although most liberal democracies practice this kind of favoritism, the United States may practice it more consistently than most. This is because American identity and interests consist so heavily of liberal-democratic capitalism. "Eternal France" was France long before it became a republic, and remained France during its various monarchical interludes. England was England when it was lurching toward absolute monarchy under the Stuarts or a republic under Cromwell. Japan and Germany are both young democracies, and each has a much more ethnic basis for national identity. No doubt citizens of all of these countries today ardently wish to preserve their liberal-democratic, free-market regimes. But America's very identity depends upon its doing so.

In the next section I show how national-security liberalism characterizes US policy over the decades in the three policy areas of alliances, arms control, and nuclear weapons. Elsewhere I present direct evidence that American elites perceive foreign states' intentions and trustworthiness based in part upon their regime type.²⁷ In this chapter I do not present such direct evidence, but rather, in the interests of presenting the broad sweep of US practices over many decades, discuss tendencies in American foreign policy behavior and international outcomes.

Alliances

Ironically, the United States for most of its history was like China as regards foreign military commitments. Between 1793 and 1917—and, arguably, up to December 8, 1941—America's tradition concerning alliances was to have none. The original alliance with France in 1778 was forged out of sheer common interest; the infant republic fighting for its life against a constitutional monarchy allied with an absolute monarchy. President George Washington abrogated the French alliance in 1793 by declaring US

neutrality in France's war against Britain and the other major European powers. Three years later, in his farewell address, Washington set the neutrality norm: "The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible . . . [Europe] must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns."²⁸ Over the next 111 years, American governments contemplated alliances—as the nation's third president, Thomas Jefferson even thought about allying with Britain during the Napoleonic wars—but George Washington's norm predominated.

When the United States finally began to violate the neutrality tradition in April 1917, it was ostensibly to make the world "safe for democracy," as President Woodrow Wilson declared in his war message to Congress. Wilson's justification for joining Britain and France against Germany was based not only, or even chiefly, on American physical security but on the preservation and spread of its institutions, including to "the German peoples themselves."²⁹ Although US entry into World War I was surely about more than promoting democracy, Wilson was not being wholly disingenuous, as is seen in the nation's double standard concerning the belligerents. From 1914 through 1916, when Britain was seizing US cargoes, reading US mail, and so on, Americans made excuses for their fellow democracy; the British, Germans, and Americans all knew that America would not do very much to retaliate, and would certainly not go to war against Britain. By contrast, when Germany waged submarine warfare in the Atlantic, Americans roundly condemned them.³⁰ Furthermore, it evidently helped Wilson and many Americans see their way to join the war when Russia went through her February 1917 revolution (which was followed by a liberal-democratic provisional government until the October Bolshevik coup).³¹ Democratic favoritism, then, is evident when the United States finally ended its long neutrality.

America recoiled from political connections with Europe after the war, but following Japan's attack in December 1941 again allied with Britain against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Of course, Washington also allied with Stalin's Soviet Union, demonstrating amply that the United States is fully capable of close security cooperation with nondemocracies. Roosevelt had judged well before Pearl Harbor that the imperial aggressiveness of Germany and Japan—threatening, as they were, to impose closed, brutally authoritarian systems on vast portions of the globe—made them greater threats to US interests than relatively isolationist communist Russia. It is important to note, however, that within the Anglo-Soviet-American triangle, the most robust leg was the Anglo-American. Churchill and Roosevelt had a secret hotline, whereas neither leader had one with Stalin. Britain (and Canada) was involved with the United States in developing atomic weapons; the Soviet Union was not only excluded but was kept ignorant of the project. The two Western powers had their disagreements and tensions, but trusted one another far more than either trusted

the USSR, and this mistrust was mutual. Churchill feared that Roosevelt wanted to dissolve the British Empire, but Stalin feared that Churchill and Roosevelt wanted to destroy the Soviet Union. Well before it was evident that the world would be bipolar following the war, the Grand Alliance was decidedly asymmetrical.³²

After World War II, the United States became a global power, and tried to construct an international security order against the spread of communism and Soviet power. Table 11.1 displays formal US alliances since 1945, along with the regime type of each. These are states to whose defense America committed by treaty.

Note two tendencies. First, although America certainly allies with non-democracies, its alliances with fellow liberal democracies last longer. The most successful alliance is NATO. Its only nondemocratic members have been Greece, which became a democracy in 1975, and Turkey, which has oscillated between democracy and authoritarianism but has been in a democratic phase for more than a decade. NATO has outlived the Soviet threat that generated it. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, NATO has added 12 new members. In 1995 the alliance established a set of rules for admission, one of which was “a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy.”³³ All of its new members since 1989 are former communist states or substate republics (of the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia), and all are capitalist liberal democracies. The North Atlantic alliance went through a deep crisis in 2002–2003 over the US-led war in Iraq. But the alliance survived, and NATO is so successful that its members have been at pains to perpetuate it in the absence of a common security threat; it is now less a traditional alliance and more a club that promotes democracy and human rights.³⁴

Table 11.1 Formal US alliances since 1945

<i>Years</i>	<i>Country/Countries</i>	<i>Regime type</i>
1947–today (but dormant)	Rio Pact (Latin America)	Mixed; more democracies beginning in 1980s
1949–today	NATO (Canada, Western, Southern, then Eastern Europe)	Mostly democracies; since 1990s all democracies
1951–today	ANZUS (Australia and New Zealand)	Democracies
1952–today	Japan	Democracy
1954–today	South Korea	Authoritarian until 1988, democracy thereafter
1954–1980	Taiwan	Authoritarian (after 1987, democracy)
1954–1977	SEATO (Southeast Asia)	Mixed
1958–1973	CENTO (Central Asia)	Mixed

Sources: *Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2010* (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 2010).

Likewise, the alliances with Japan and with Australia and New Zealand have been robust and, despite inevitable tensions, never in doubt. Meanwhile, America's Cold War alliances in Southeast Asia and Central Asia died out well before the Cold War ended.

Second, US allies tend to democratize over time. Greece and Turkey did so within NATO, South Korea as a bilateral US ally in 1988. The US-Taiwan alliance legally ended in 1980, but security cooperation between the two countries has continued, and it is striking that Taiwan finally held multiparty elections in 1987, joining the club of liberal democracies. Today most US allies in the Rio Treaty are liberal democracies. Clearly, there is no simple causal relationship at work here. As discussed later, a military alliance with the United States does not magically make a country democratic. An entire wave of democratization took place in the 1970s and 1980s, which included many countries that were not US allies.³⁵ Further, as is well known, Washington helped oust democratic (but insufficiently anticommunist) governments in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), and Chile (1973) during the Cold War. It has proved difficult for America to support authoritarianism in the long term, however. There is evidence that lobbyists and Congress press administrations to press security partners to implement human rights and other reforms as a condition for continuing close relations.³⁶ In any case, the correlation between joining a US-led alliance and becoming a liberal democracy is striking, to the point that nondemocratic governments might be reluctant to enter a formal alliance with America.

Informal Alliances

US security cooperation is not limited to its formal treaty allies. America cooperates closely in security affairs with a number of countries that it is not legally obligated to defend. These include Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Argentina, Bahrain, Thailand, Kuwait, Morocco, and Pakistan. Each of these, along with America's formal alliance partners, is a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA). MNNAs are security partners—some formal allies, some not—covered by US law that allows them special privileges concerning technology sharing and other advantages. Table 11.2 lists the MNNAs, along with the year each gained that status via presidential designation.

MNNAs “are eligible for priority delivery of defense material and the purchase, for instance, of depleted uranium antitank rounds. They can stockpile US military hardware, participate in defense research and development programs and benefit from a US government loan guarantee program, which backs up loans issued by private banks to finance arms exports.”³⁷

America has close security relationships as well with Singapore,³⁸ Malaysia,³⁹ Indonesia,⁴⁰ Kuwait,⁴¹ Qatar,⁴² Saudi Arabia,⁴³ and many other states. It has moved since the 1990s from a cold peace with India to a warm cooperative relationship. An ironic measure of the closeness of Indo-US

Table 11.2 Major Non-NATO allies (MNNAs)—formal in boldface

<i>Country</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Year</i>
Israel	1989	Argentina	1998
Australia	1989	Bahrain	2002
Japan	1989	Philippines	2003
South Korea	1989	Thailand	2003
Egypt	1989	Kuwait	2004
New Zealand	1989	Morocco	2004
Jordan	1996	Pakistan	2004

Sources: <https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/22/120.32>; Bruno Tertrais, "The Changing Nature of Military Alliances," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Spring 2004): 135–150.

Table 11.3 Current US allies

<i>Formal allies</i>	<i>Democracy?</i>	<i>Informal allies</i>	<i>Democracy?</i>
NATO (27)	yes (all 27)	Israel	yes
Japan	yes	Jordan	no
South Korea	yes	Egypt	no → ?
Australia	yes	Argentina	yes
Philippines	yes	Bahrain	no
		Thailand	partial
		Kuwait	no
		Morocco	no
		Pakistan	partial

Note: Democratic status is based upon ratings by Freedom House, www.freedomhouse.org

relations was seen in 2004, when Bush's announcement that Pakistan was a MNNA shocked and offended Indian public opinion. Many Indians felt betrayed, to the point that US Secretary of State Colin Powell said that Bush was willing to consider offering MNNA status to India as well.⁴⁴ (Indian government publicly demurred.)

Note from table 11.3 that America's formal allies—those that it is committed by treaty to defend—tend to be liberal democracies; its informal allies—those that it is not legally committed to defend—contain many more nondemocracies.

The conclusion is clear: although America has engaged in various forms of security cooperation with states of various regime types—liberal democracies, monarchies, authoritarian republics—its most institutionalized and deepest cooperative relations are with fellow liberal democracies.

Arms Control

In important ways, the United States is a normal country concerning arms control. In the twentieth century it engaged in several arms races, and it has been no more willing to disarm unilaterally than most states have been throughout history. But America has sought, and sometimes achieved, arms control with rivals in hopes of freeing up resources for other purposes, and perhaps further relaxing international tensions as well. There is some evidence of liberal-democratic favoritism in America's arms control history. The evidence is hazier, however, than that concerning alliances. If my argument about America's liberal-democratic favoritism is correct, then the haziness is inevitable. A state only engages in arms control with states that are not its allies. Allied states typically coordinate arms levels, because an alliance is among other things a division of labor among states facing a common threat. But allies are not security rivals who need to reduce armaments levels against one another. Thus using arms control data to test for America's liberal-democratic favoritism would entail selection bias: pairs or groups of states "select in" to arms control only if they are already rivals, and my argument predicts that liberal democracies will tend not to be rivals. The bias is against my argument however; arms control data should underreport US democratic favoritism.

Thus it is striking that in fact America tends to have more successful arms control with liberal democracies. America participated in the multilateral Hague Convention of 1899, an ambitious initiative of Tsar Nicholas II of Russia. Having just won the war with Spain and confident (unlike Russia) in its ability to compete in armaments development and production, the United States was one of the states that hampered the 1899 agreement from making meaningful armaments reductions (the first Hague Convention agreed only to banning certain classes of weapon such as dum-dum bullets). Washington also participated in the multilateral Hague Convention of 1907, which was a near complete failure.⁴⁵ More successful was the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, in which the United States, Great Britain, and Japan agreed to limit naval tonnage (to a 5:5:3 ratio). At the time, all three states were liberal capitalist democracies (Japan was early in its Taishō Democracy period of two-party parliamentary government). America did not always negotiate successful arms control with fellow democracies; at the 1927 Geneva Naval Conference it failed to agree with Britain over the quality and quantity of naval cruisers. But three years later the Anglo-American deadlock was broken; in the London Naval Treaty of 1930 the two nations and Japan agreed to another limit in tonnage (the Britain: United States: Japan ratio was 10:10:7).⁴⁶ Over the next few years, arms control attempts that involved the United States were foiled by German and Japanese refusal. The World Disarmament Conference (1932–1934), initiated in part by the United States, failed as Nazi Germany refused to submit to any inferiority.⁴⁷ The Second London Naval Conference of 1936 failed as Japan, by then a military-dominated authoritarian state, withdrew.⁴⁸ In sum, the United

States had the most arms-control success with its fellow liberal democracies Britain and (in the 1920s) Japan.

The United States emerged from World War II with an atomic monopoly and an incipient rivalry with the Soviet Union, whose armies occupied Central and Southeastern Europe, northern Iran, and northern Korea. Over the course of the Cold War, America varied between seeking arms control with its Soviet rival and trying to defeat it in an arms race. The 1960s and especially 1970s saw some impressive achievements in arms *limitation*, but the United States only sought arms *reduction* in the late 1980s, as the Soviet Union began to become more capitalist and liberal-democratic. Figure 11.1 depicts variation in the total numbers of warheads in the world, and illustrates how, in spite of Soviet-American arms control through the 1970s, reductions in US and Soviet/Russian stockpiles were only made once the USSR began to undertake reforms.

Under the Baruch Plan of 1946, the Truman administration offered to turn America's atomic bombs over to a UN-administered authority if all countries would agree not to develop such weapons and to submit to intrusive inspections. The Soviet Union refused on the grounds that the UN was dominated by the United States and hence not trustworthy.⁴⁹ The Soviets' atomic explosion of 1949 was a terrible blow to Americans' sense of security. The country responded with a hydrogen bomb test in 1952 and by building more bombs, bombers, and missiles over the next few years. Mindful of the relative cheapness of atomic weapons, the Eisenhower administration decided to rely on nuclear deterrence against the USSR and was uninterested in arms control.




Figure 11.1 Nuclear stockpiles of United States and USSR, 1976–1993.

Source: Natural Resources Defense Council, Archive of Nuclear Data, <http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datainx.asp>, accessed on January 16, 2015.

Following the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the Kennedy administration signed the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, confining atomic tests to underground. In 1968 it signed and ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), pledging to cooperate with other states and the UN to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and to work toward disarmament. The Nixon administration accelerated arms control efforts. In 1972 it ratified two treaties with the Soviet Union: the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which limited each superpower to two facilities to shoot down incoming missiles; and the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), which froze the number of ballistic missile launchers on either side. The more ambitious SALT II was never ratified, but the Carter and Reagan administrations both abided by its terms. In 1974 both superpowers signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (not ratified by the US Senate until 1995).

The Soviet deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Central Europe beginning in 1976 triggered another arms race, accelerated in the early 1980s by a Reagan administration determined to bankrupt the Soviet Union. But the accession of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 was followed by significant political and economic liberalization in the USSR. In 1986 Reagan, America's most anticommunist president ever, came close to agreeing with Gorbachev (without asking the NATO allies) to eliminate all intermediate-range missiles from Western Europe. The following year the two superpower leaders did agree to do so under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF)—the first Cold War agreement to eliminate an entire class of weapons. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) of 1991 heavily reduced both sides' warheads and delivery systems. START II was signed in 1993 but the Russian Duma refused ratification owing to concerns that the United States was violating the ABM Treaty.⁵⁰ Notwithstanding this problem, it is clear that, here as elsewhere, US governments tend to seek and achieve deeper arms control with countries whose domestic regimes are more liberal, democratic, and free-market. Especially striking is the progress the Reagan administration made with Gorbachev's reforming Soviet Union.

Nuclear Weapons

The preceding section on alliances contains much material about America's tendencies concerning nuclear weapons. Nuclear policy is more than arms control treaties; it also covers proliferation. In this area, as in others, Washington exhibits over time a degree of favoritism toward America's fellow capitalist democracies. Perhaps the difference in its attitudes toward nuclear tests by Great Britain (1952) and France (1960), on the one hand, and China (1964), on the other, is to be expected. These events all took place during the Cold War and Britain and France were allies (as well as liberal democracies), while China was an adversary (as well as being communist). More difficult to explain away has been Washington's differing

attitudes toward the nuclear weapons of India (1998), on the one hand, and Pakistan (1998) and North Korea (2006), on the other. Following India's first "peaceful" nuclear test in 1974, the Nixon administration prohibited nuclear cooperation with that country. India was a socialist democracy at the time, aligned with the Soviet Union. In 1998 India, now a much more capitalist democracy, tested another weapon and the Clinton administration imposed sanctions. But the G. W. Bush administration in 2005 agreed to a new bargain under which it would help India develop civilian nuclear technology in exchange for a number of conditions, including a moratorium on testing.⁵¹

The story is quite different with Pakistan. A longtime US security partner but a country that has lurched throughout its history from electoral democracy to military authoritarianism and back, Pakistan answered India's 1998 test with a test of its own, and was likewise met with US sanctions. But neither the Bush nor the Obama administration has offered Pakistan a bargain comparable to what Bush offered India. The Pakistanis keenly feel this double standard, which favors their longtime rival. Neither has the United States even hinted at the possibility of an India-style offer to North Korea, which has a Stalinist regime. Washington also has adamantly opposed the nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran. These countries, too, are offended (if not surprised) by America's double standard.⁵²

A second nuclear policy area is missile defense. Every administration since Reagan's has pursued missile defense, some with more money and determination than others. The original Strategic Defense Initiative of the 1980s was intended to render the United States invulnerable to a Soviet nuclear attack. More recently, US allies have been building and deploying interceptors. In the 1990s, NATO began pursuing missile defense to protect military assets, and in 2002 to protect all NATO territory.⁵³ Japan has a functioning system,⁵⁴ and South Korea has announced deployment of one by 2015.⁵⁵ India—not a formal US ally but certainly friendly—recently announced a system ready to deploy that was capable of defending two cities.⁵⁶ The United States is untroubled by any of these initiatives, and indeed is cooperating with those of its allies. Each of them is explicitly intended to deter or defend against potential attacks from nondemocratic states such as Iran (NATO), North Korea (Japan and South Korea), and Pakistan (India).

As in the other issue-areas discussed earlier, the US national-security liberalism not only produces but is reinforced by the actual behavior of other states. This is especially so in the case of proliferation. US elites note that nondemocratic states are prone to share nuclear and missile technology with hostile entities. North Korea evidently has sold missiles to Iran and Libya.⁵⁷ The Pakistani case is even direr. From the 1970s through 1990s, Dr. A. Q. Khan shared nuclear technology with various parties hostile to the United States, including Iran and Libya.⁵⁸ America's problem with Pakistan is not simply that it is not a liberal democracy, but that it appears to be an incoherent or divided state, in which some elements in the military are working

at cross-purposes with others. A more centralized but still nondemocratic Pakistan, with an army under the complete control of friendly or at least neutral leaders, would be less worrisome to US leaders. Of course, we cannot know whether the United States would offer a coherent, centralized Pakistan a nuclear deal similar to what it offered India. In any case, in the following sections I return to considering Pakistan and nuclear proliferation more generally as an area for Sino-US cooperation.

Implications for Sino-American Relations

We have seen that, across the issue-areas of alliances, arms control, and nuclear weapons, America has traditionally favored fellow capitalist liberal democracies over states with other regime types. It has sought and achieved cooperation more often and more deeply with such states. Its preferences for an international security order involve building incentives for states to become free-market liberal democracies. Clearly the United States sometimes seeks or achieves security cooperation with other types of states. Its alliance and arms control patterns demonstrate flexibility and a recognition of common interests. Yet, it does appear that America's historical tradition of national-security liberalism is as prominent as it was at the country's founding in the late eighteenth century. What does this broad tradition imply about the future of Sino-American relations?

People with widely differing normative commitments and national loyalties can agree that China and the United States have different domestic regimes or institutions. They are not as divergent as they were during the era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), when China had a command economy and an influential transnational ideological following. The reforms of Deng Xiaoping and his successors that began in 1978 have moved China decisively into the capitalist club. In 2005 roughly 70 percent of China's economy was in private hands.⁵⁹ The country has become an industrial powerhouse, the world's leading exporter, and a WTO member. In October 2014 the IMF reported that the Chinese economy had surpassed the American as the world's largest (measured in purchasing power parity).⁶⁰ Yet, China is ruled, as before, by a Communist Party with an effective monopoly on meaningful political power—although one that also has been adroitly reforming itself in recent years.⁶¹ In addition, Chinese norms of human rights differ from those of the United States and other Western countries. Where America emphasizes the individual's civil rights to free speech, assembly, and so on, China stresses social rights and societal harmony.⁶² These differences in how individual rights are conceived of and practiced, and the differences in the rules for political competition and succession are significant.

America's historical tradition of favoring liberal democracies suggests that this Sino-American regime mismatch complicates bilateral relations and visions for an international or regional security order. By no means is security cooperation impossible between the two giants, nor are their

versions of international order bound to clash. China and the United States have a number of important common interests, as discussed further, and have proved capable of acting on those interests. But America's historical tradition of national-security liberalism will tend to inhibit deep and sustained cooperation in two ways. First, it will lead America to be relatively suspicious of China when contemplating cooperation, and to hedge more when bargaining; these tendencies will in turn give China incentives to do the same; thus bargaining outcomes will tend to be less efficient. Second, Washington's tendency to promote democracy and human rights, especially in Asia, will continue to make China's government uncomfortable. It could feed suspicions that the United States is seeking to encircle it and to weaken the Chinese Communist Party's hold on power.

The logic of the argument also implies, however, that America's ideological double standard is not as severe as it could be, precisely because there is not (at this time) a strong transnational movement pushing a "Chinese model" of political economy. The Cold War (1946–1991) was at its most intense in times and regions where transnational ideological competition was most acute. Communist parties existed across many countries on all continents, and various types of socialist parties sometimes made common cause with these communists; this was especially the case in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Communists tended to be friendlier to the Soviet Union, and hence acted as carriers of Soviet influence. In the 1960s Maoism became a transnational ideology, an alternative to Soviet communism that threatened both Soviet and US influence in the Third World. Once China abandoned Maoism in the late 1970s, this transnational ideological support decreased, China ceased to be an ideological rival in the Third World, and Chinese relations with the United States improved further.⁶³

That said, China's spectacular economic success and post-1989 political stability have raised again, within and without China, the potential for a Chinese model of political economy—one quite different from the Maoist one. Cheng Yung-Nien insists that the model is not simply export-driven capitalism; it begins with China's political institutions, which he recommends to other developing countries.⁶⁴ Western writers argue about the existence and appeal of a Chinese model of "authoritarian capitalism."⁶⁵ Russian officials, seeking to maintain capitalist-based growth without multiparty democracy, have openly expressed admiration for China's system. In April 2007 Sergei Lavrov, then Russia's foreign minister, announced that "for the first time in the last decade and a half a real competitive environment has formed in the market for ideas" concerning "value [systems] and development models."⁶⁶ Still, at the time of this writing it is clear that transnational support for a Chinese model of political economy is not nearly as robust as was support for Maoism in past decades. Nor does the Chinese government seem to set a high priority on propagating its model.

Ironically, the more aggressive ideology has been liberal-democratic capitalism, propelled by the United States. American democracy promotion was especially assertive under the G. W. Bush administration. Bush

used force to overturn authoritarian regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, and a famous statement about an “axis of evil” that included China’s neighbor and ally North Korea seemed to imply that the president was willing to take a similar action on China’s border. The Obama administration has generally pursued a more *realpolitik* strategy, but it continues to press China and other states concerning human rights. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, known as more realist than idealist, was clearly attuned to ideological competition, telling a journalist in 2011 that the “Chinese model is doomed.”⁶⁷ US ally Japan has recently begun to criticize the Chinese regime more than it has normally done. Although China and the United States are not in a cold war, ideological tensions continue to simmer, and there is little reason to think they will completely disappear any time soon.

Ramifications for Alliances

For China, it is significant that it is neighbor to seven of America’s MNNAs: Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan. The US Navy’s Seventh Fleet is headquartered in Japan and a US naval base is on Guam. Tens of thousands of US military personnel are stationed in Japan and South Korea. Furthermore, the United States has long cooperated on security with Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, provoked the United States into invading and occupying Afghanistan and building security relations in Central Asia, on China’s western flank. Perhaps the most important development since the 1990s has been deepening US cooperation with India. And of course the United States maintains its unusual relationship with Taiwan—no official diplomatic relations and no formal alliance, but robust security cooperation with a country that China counts as one of its provinces.⁶⁸

The Obama administration has openly sought to widen and deepen America’s security partnerships in East and Southeast Asia and, while stating a desire to cooperate with China, has singled it out for criticism. In November 2011 Obama announced the deployment of 2,500 US Marines to Australia. The Pentagon’s January 2012 strategic statement declares that the United States “*will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region*” (italics in original). The report mentions enhanced cooperation with “emerging allies” and singles out China’s need for “greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in the region.”⁶⁹ In America’s eyes, this Pacific pivot is for the sake of safeguarding and expanding the zone of peace, democracy, and prosperity.⁷⁰ In China’s eyes, it has the potential for American “muscle-flexing.” “If the United States indiscreetly applies militarism in the region,” stated the *Xinhua* news agency, “it will be like a bull in a china shop, and endanger peace instead of enhancing regional stability.”⁷¹

Western security experts often observe that America’s military presence in East Asia may annoy China, but in the short to medium term China has

an interest in the continuation of that presence precisely because it inhibits regional powers from trying to balance against China. Japan has no need for nuclear weapons or a heavy conventional rearmament as long as the American military is there. US troops in South Korea may infuriate the North Korean rulers, but those same troops help deter a second Korean War.⁷² As St. Augustine asked God to make him chaste and continent, but not yet,⁷³ it is plausible that China might want America out of Asia, but not yet. Still, China is bound to be ambivalent about even America's short-term security presence in Asia owing to the US tradition of favoring and promoting liberal democracy. Table 11.3 shows that most of America's Asian security partners (except Pakistan and Singapore) are stable multi-party democracies, which makes Beijing's "social environment" disquieting. Neither the United States nor its Asian allies are remotely capable of bringing about "regime change" in China. But the regime mismatch complicates international cooperation to a degree.

What might cause the United States to reduce its security relationships and commitments in Asia? Should the economy again fall into a deep recession as it did in 2008–2009, the American electorate could cross a threshold and demand that the country scale back its foreign commitments. Setting aside a true cost accounting of these commitments—which would have to recognize the benefits of hegemony in the region—Americans do tend to believe that their country bears a disproportionate set of burdens in its dealings with allies. However, a policy change of this magnitude typically requires a shock to the system such as an economic depression. Even then, an alternative grand strategy with sufficient support among US elites would need to be available.⁷⁴ Of course, some of America's Asian allies could lose interest. Indians could decide that their new American friends are too cozy with Pakistan, or some of the East Asian allies could decide that aligning with America compromises their autonomy more than they would like. But such changes also seem unlikely in the near future. The likely result is a continuation of this system that elicits such ambivalence in China.

Concerning an American departure from Asia, when, if ever, will China's "not yet" become "now?" This question is outside the scope of this chapter, but structural realism suggests that as China's power grows, so will its discontent with America's military presence in Asia.⁷⁵ So, say some, will America's fear of a putative Chinese threat⁷⁶ (and the interests of China's neighbors in aligning with the United States or some other outside power). The good news is that Washington has strong incentives not to allow its Asian alliances to degrade relations with China. As many scholars and political leaders routinely declare, China's capitalist economy and heavy interdependence with the US economy give both countries strong reasons to keep their relations friendly. China is not a liberal democracy, but it is a major source of manufactures to US consumers, a target for US investment, and, perhaps most important, America's biggest foreign creditor. Neither is China trying to exclude the United States from trade with and investment in Asia. US leaders know that, were Sino-American relations to deteriorate,

America would pay a steep price indeed. Thus, notwithstanding the difficulties that US alliances present to bilateral relations, Washington has strong incentives to minimize the damage to its relations with China.

Ramifications for Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control

The broad tradition of national-security liberalism described above suggests that the United States will inevitably be less comfortable with a China that expands its military capability. China's development of the J-20 Stealth fighter,⁷⁷ growing presence in outer space, and increases in coercive power in East Asia can raise US fears of exclusion from the region. With the gap between the two countries' conventional and nuclear capabilities so wide, and China economic growth so rapid and steady, it is doubtful that China has any interest in arms control with the United States, and hence that any would take place for many years to come. On the other hand, regarding nuclear weapons specifically, the United States has no interest in relinquishing its status as the world's only superpower, and China has no interest in perpetuating that status. *Prima facie*, then, the two should be expected to differ on nuclear weapons and the distribution of military power more generally. In particular, US administrations will almost certainly refuse to adopt a no-first-use nuclear policy because such a policy would render America's forward military deployments in East Asia much more vulnerable and hence less politically sustainable. Insofar as US nuclear doctrine continues to vex China, the vexation will remain.⁷⁸ More generally, visions of a security order in Asia will be difficult to mesh completely, and that will be a diplomatic challenge to both countries (and the entire region) for the foreseeable future.

Missile defense also remains a bone of contention. Regarding missile defense by the United States and its formal allies, China's stance has been similar to that of Russia. Beijing has publicly condemned the initiatives and alleged that it is the real "target" of such defense. As China's *Global Times* recently opined: "North Korea and Iran are named by Washington as the targets of the missile defense system, though it is clear the real targets are China and Russia. China should firmly oppose it."⁷⁹ China also has tested its own systems in direct response to what it considers US provocations—specifically, arms sales to Taiwan in 2010.⁸⁰

Matters change, however, when one moves to the specific question of nuclear proliferation. The United States and China do have significant common interests that could outweigh the problems of ideological distance, doctrinal difference, and geopolitical rivalry. The most important cases are North Korea, Pakistan, Iran, and the problem of nuclear terrorism. These cases are related. North Korea—whose extreme ideological distance from the United States makes good relations very difficult indeed—has a nuclear arsenal of unclear size, and inducing Pyongyang to give up its weapons may well be beyond the ability of any external actor. The United States has

clear interests in not only deterring a North Korean attack on South Korea or Japan, but also in preventing Pyongyang from sharing nuclear or missile technology or nuclear fuel with other hostile actors. China, meanwhile, may not mind having in North Korea a neighbor that limits US hegemony over its region. But China does have an interest in deterring any North Korean attack on a neighbor and in averting a collapse of the Pyongyang regime.

Iran's importance to both China and America owes chiefly to its potential to become the predominant power in the oil-rich Middle East, as also to its militantly Islamist regime. On the former, a nuclear-armed Iran might simply feel more secure from American or Israeli attack and become a "normal" regional power. But it might instead do what other nuclear powers (including the United States) have done in the past and attempt to use its arsenal as a leverage in its region. Fear of the latter could trigger proliferation in the Middle East, as Saudi Arabia—Iran's chief rival in the region—would feel compelled to go nuclear in response, and Egypt might as well. Israel might finally declare its nuclear arsenal openly. All of these weapons and fuel in a region shot through with terrorist networks would increase the danger of nonstate actors' detonating a nuclear weapon—about which more is discussed further.

For several decades, both China and the United States have had cooperative relations with Pakistan. During the Cold War, the realist logic behind this configuration was straightforward: both Beijing and Washington saw an opportunity to counterbalance the Indo-Soviet alignment. China's geopolitical interest in cooperation with Pakistan may be the same as before, but the US interest is complicated by its deepening cooperation with Pakistan's *bête noire* India. Where American and Chinese interests most clearly converge is in the threat of nuclear terrorism. The most egregious proliferator known to the public in recent years was A. Q. Khan, father of the Pakistani bomb and enabler of the Libyan and Iranian nuclear programs. Although Khan is out of business, the opacity of Pakistan's army officer corps and evidence that its intelligence branch (the Inter-Services Intelligence or ISI) includes men tied to radical Islamist networks means that the threat of Pakistani proliferation to terrorists remains. The threat is no more abstract to China than to America. Pakistan borders China's Xinjiang Province, a majority-Muslim region with an Islamist presence. The recent opening of the Karakoram Highway connecting Pakistan and Xinjiang has heightened fears in China of an Islamist bomb. Inasmuch as China has provided nuclear technology to Pakistan in the past, it has special knowledge of Pakistan's nuclear program.⁸¹

Indeed, the United States and China have strong interests in cooperating to keep nuclear weapons, technology, and fuel out of the hands of terrorists, be the origin in Pakistan, Iran, or North Korea. And thus far the two have acted on those interests. China has not joined the Proliferation Security Initiative begun by the G. W. Bush administration. But it has cooperated since 2002 on policing ports and cargoes. The United States

provided help in counterterrorism at the 2008 Beijing Olympics.⁸² As long as radical Islamism remains a threat that threads across southwest, central, and southeast Asia—and, notwithstanding the killing of Osama bin Laden, that threat has yet to dissipate—China and the United States will have strong incentives to cooperate on nuclear proliferation.

One final potential area of arms control cooperation is in the area of cyber-war. Cyber-espionage is already common, and for a number of years the United States has been launching cyber-attacks against Iran's nuclear facilities.⁸³ The state apparatuses and economies of China and the United States are both highly dependent upon the Internet, and promise to become more so over time. The two have some interest in cyber-arms control to prevent Internet warfare and to limit the damage should such a virtual war break out. Both have signed on to a United Nations agreement to cooperate in reducing the risks of cyber-attacks.⁸⁴ The barriers to cyber-arms control are perhaps even more daunting than those to nuclear; they include the difficulties of monitoring and verification and the prominence of nonstate actors.⁸⁵ But cyber war is still young, and we should not rule out the possibility of some meaningful arms control involving China and the United States (as well as many other countries) at this early stage.⁸⁶

Conclusion

The foreign policy of any country, including the United States, is a function of a variety of factors, including relative military power and economic interest. But historical tradition and identity also makes a difference by shaping national preferences and actions. America's historical tradition of favoring liberal-democratic capitalism has complicated its relations with China. It has made US elites see fewer common interests with China and more suspicious of Chinese intentions. It has affected US behavior, particularly in propelling the promotion of democracy and human rights, leading China in turn to be more suspicious of American interests and intentions. Because the tradition of national-security liberalism seems to Americans to be vindicated by the overall success of US foreign policy—the country won the Cold War and is now in its third decade as the world's only superpower—it is unlikely that America will abandon it any time soon. Thus US alliance patterns, arms control, and nuclear policies will likely continue to favor democracies and hamper cooperation with China.

Yet, the United States is not simply a democratic crusader, blinded by zeal and unmindful of the consequences of its ideologically shaped behavior. Particularly in times like these, when China poses no transnational ideological threat to the American model, US elites are relatively serene about relations with China. This serenity allows Sino-American interdependence to continue, which in turn gives China incentives to avoid challenging the open international system in Asia that is so vital to US interests. It also means that the ideological distance between the two countries is

not so great as to override common security interests, such as keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of radical terrorists. Those radicals lump China and America together as enemies of their severe version of Islam. In doing so, they make bedfellows of these two wealthy, dynamic, contentious giants.

Notes

1. Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993).
2. G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). On America's ambivalence about multilateralism see Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman, ed., *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001).
3. Jeffrey W. Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).
4. Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence* (New York: Routledge, 2005); Robert Kagan, *Dangerous Nation* (New York: Knopf, 2006).
5. G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); John G. Ruggie, "Third Try at World Order? America and Multilateralism after the Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 109, No. 4 (Autumn 1994): 553–570.
6. John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); Hilde Eliassen Restad, "Old Paradigms in History Die Hard in Political Science: U.S. Foreign Policy and American Exceptionalism," *American Political Thought*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2012): 53–76.
7. Tony Smith, "National Security Liberalism and American Foreign Policy," in Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., *American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 85–103.
8. Yu Bin, this volume.
9. John M. Owen IV, *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change 1510–2010* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), chapter 2.
10. Ibid.
11. Mark N. Haas, *The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789–1989* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).
12. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Anatol Rapaport (New York: Penguin, 1982), book 1, chapter 2, 101.
13. Suzanne Werner, "Absolute and Limited War: The Possibility of Foreign-Imposed Regime Change," *International Interactions*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1996): 67–88; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph Siverson, "Nasty or Nice? Political Systems, Endogenous Norms, and the Treatment of Adversaries," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (February 1997): 175–199; and Owen, "International Promotion of Domestic Institutions." Of course, war victors often replace the leaders of states they defeat; see, for example, Henk E. Goemans, *War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
14. Bruce Cronin, *Community under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

15. Samuel P. Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981).
16. Lawrence R. Jacobs and Benjamin I. Page, "Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?" *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 99 (2005): 107–123.
17. Ikenberry, *After Victory*; Daniel W. Drezner, *All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
18. For more on the links between economics and security policy, see Michael Mastanduno, "Economics and Security in Statecraft and Scholarship," *International Organization*, Vol. 52 (1998): 825–854.
19. The text was drafted by John Quincy Adams, Monroe's secretary of state. The full text is available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/monroe.asp (accessed on May 9, 2011).
20. John M. Owen IV, *Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).
21. Tomz, Michael, and Jessica Weeks, "Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 107, No. 3 (2013): 849–865.
22. On the security dilemma, see John Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 2 (1950): 157–180; Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 30 (1978): 167–214.
23. For a theoretical grounding by a Clinton official who is also a professor of international relations, see Anthony Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement," School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, September 21, 1993, <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/lakedoc.html> (accessed May 10, 2011).
24. Samuel P. Huntington, "American Ideals *versus* American Institutions," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 97, No. 1 (1982): 1–37. On US decisions to abandon friendly dictators, see John M. Owen IV and Michael Poznansky, "When Does America Drop Dictators?" *European Journal of International Relations* (2014), Vol. 20, No. 4 (2014): 1072–1099.
25. John M. Owen IV, "Transnational Liberalism and U.S. Primacy," *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Winter 2001/2002): 121.
26. Alexander Wendt puts the point more generally: "Culture is a self-fulfilling prophecy." Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 184–189.
27. Owen, *Liberal Peace*, chapters 3–5.
28. Text at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp (accessed May 9, 2011).
29. Text at http://www.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Wilson's_War_Message_to_Congress (accessed May 9, 2011).
30. H. G. Allen, *Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783–1952)* (London: Odhams Press, 1952), 681–687.
31. In Wilson's patronizing language, Russia had thrown off its unnatural autocracy and now "the great, generous Russian people have been added in all their naïve majesty and might to the forces that are fighting for freedom in the world, for justice, and for peace. Here is a fit partner for a league of honour." Ibid.
32. Evan R. Resnick argues that the asymmetry declined as allied victory became assured. Resnick, "Hang Together or Hang Separately? Evaluating Theories of Wartime Alliance Cohesion," *Security Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (2013): 672–706.
33. NATO, "1995 Study on Enlargement," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm? (accessed May 11, 2011).
34. Rachel A. Epstein, "NATO Enlargement and the Spread of Democracy: Evidence and Expectations," *Security Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2005): 63–105.

35. See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
36. C. William Walldorf, *Just Politics: Human Rights and the Foreign Policies of Great Powers* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); Mark Peceny, *Democracy at the Point of Bayonets* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999).
37. Agence France-Presse, "Bush Makes Pakistan 'Major Non-NATO Ally,'" June 16, 2004, <http://www.spacewar.com/2004/040616170233.1phe27u8.html> (accessed May 11, 2011).
38. <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2012/02/20120201161612su0.98644.html#axzz1qXZihzzd> (accessed March 29, 2012).
39. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2777.htm> (accessed on March 29, 2012).
40. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2748.htm> (accessed on March 29, 2012).
41. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35876.htm> (accessed on March 29, 2012).
42. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5437.htm> (accessed on March 29, 2012).
43. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3584.htm> (accessed on March 29, 2012).
44. Sridhar Krishnaswami, "U.S. Willing to Consider India a Non-NATO Ally," *The Hindu*, March 24, 2004, <http://www.hinduonnet.com/2004/03/24/stories/2004032408240100.htm> (accessed May 11, 2011).
45. Detlev F. Vagts, "The Hague Conventions and Arms Control," *American Journal of International Law* Vol. 94, No. 1 (January 2000): 31–41.
46. Gregory C. Kennedy, "The 1930 London Naval Conference and Anglo-American Maritime Strength, 1927–1930," in B. J. C. McKercher, ed., *Arms Limitation and Disarmament: Restraints on War, 1899–1939* (Westport: Praeger, 1992), 154.
47. B. J. C. McKercher, "Of Horns and Teeth: The Preparatory Commission and the World Disarmament Conference, 1926–1934," in McKercher, ed., *Arms Limitation*, 173–202.
48. Meredith W. Berg, "Protecting National Interests by Treaty: The Second London Naval Conference 1934–1936," in McKercher, ed., *Arms Limitation*, 202–228.
49. Shane J. Maddock argues that the Truman administration, and Baruch himself, knew that the Soviets would object to these conditions, and indeed never intended to hand the country's atomic arsenal over to any international body. Maddock, *Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the Present* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010).
50. For a synopsis of US nuclear treaties, see <http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/inter-national.html#salt1> (accessed May 18, 2011).
51. For a synopsis of the deal, see Council on Foreign Relations, "The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal," updated on November 5, 2010, <http://www.cfr.org/india/us-india-nuclear-deal/p9663> (accessed May 18, 2011).
52. It is also possible, *pace* Yu Bin's chapter in this volume, that America's refusal to adopt a "no first use" nuclear doctrine owes in part to the American suspicion that nondemocratic nuclear-armed states such as China are threatening to some degree.
53. NATO, "Ballistic Missile Defense," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-30257CBB-FA142812/natolive/topics_49635.htm? (accessed June 4, 2012).
54. Masako Toki, "Missile Defense in Japan," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January 16, 2009, <http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/missile-defense-japan> (accessed June 5, 2012).
55. "S. Korea to Get Its Own Missile Defense System," *Chosunilbo*, April 18, 2011, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/04/18/2011041801003.html (accessed June 5, 2012).
56. "India's Missile Defence Shield Ready: Defence Research and Development Organisation," *Press Trust of India*, May 6, 2012, <http://www.ndtv.com/article>

- /india/india-s-missile-defence-shield-ready-defence-research-and-development-organisation-206946 (accessed June 6, 2012).
57. Steven A. Hildreth, "Iran's Ballistic Missile Programs: An Overview," *CRS Report for Congress*, July 21, 2008 (RS22758).
 58. Gordon Corera, *Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A. Q. Khan Network* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
 59. "China Is a Private-Sector Economy," *Bloomberg Business Week*, August 22, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_34/b3948478.htm (accessed May 28, 2011).
 60. International Monetary Fund, October 2014, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/download.aspx> (accessed March 31, 2015).
 61. David Shambaugh, *China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).
 62. See the website of the China Society for Human Rights Studies, <http://www.chinahumanrights.org/>.
 63. One could argue that Sino-American economic interdependence is so high that the United States is treating China quite well. Security cooperation, however—the concern of this chapter—remains far lower than economic. I thank Jeffrey Legro for raising this question.
 64. Cheng Yung-Nien, "The Chinese Model of Development: An International Perspective," *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2010): 44–59.
 65. Robert Kagan, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams* (New York: Random House, 2008); Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "The Myth of the Authoritarian Model," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 1 (January/February 2008): 68–84; Charles A. Kupchan, "The Normative Foundations of Hegemony and the Coming Challenge to Pax Americana," *Security Studies* Vol. 23, No. 2 (June 2014): 219–257.
 66. Owen, *Clash of Ideas*, 259.
 67. Jeffrey Goldberg, "Danger: Falling Tyrants," *Atlantic*, Vol. 307, No. 5 (June 2011), p. 46–54.
 68. Indeed, if the argument in this chapter is correct, then should China adopt multiparty democracy, America would lose one powerful reason for continuing its strong support of Taiwan; instead, Washington might finally encourage Taiwan to unite politically with mainland China.
 69. *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st-Century Defense* (Washington: Department of Defense, 2012), 2.
 70. Representative is former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, "As China Rises, a New U.S. Strategy," *Wall Street Journal*, December 14, 2011, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203413304577088881349304486.html> (accessed March 30, 2012).
 71. "China Warns U.S. on Asia Military Strategy," *BBC News*, January 6, 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-16438584> (accessed March 30, 2012).
 72. Michael Mastanduno, "Incomplete Hegemony: The United States and Security Order in Asia," in Muthia Alagappa, ed., *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 141–170.
 73. St. Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. Henry Chadwick (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), book 8, chapter 7.
 74. Legro, *Rethinking the World*.
 75. On the discontents of rising powers, see Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
 76. On the fears of great powers experiencing relative decline, see Dale C. Copeland, *The Origins of Major Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).

77. Robert Johnson, "China Claims Air Supremacy with Its New J-20 Stealth Fighter," *Business Insider*, May 10, 2011, <http://www.businessinsider.com/china-j20-stealth-fighter-2011-5> (accessed May 30, 2011).
78. See Bin Yu's chapter in this volume.
79. "US Missile Shield Fosters Asian Arms Race," *Global Times*, March 29, 2012, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/702623/US-missile-shield-fosters-Asian-arms-race.aspx> (accessed June 5, 2012).
80. Andrew Jacobs and Jonathan Ansfield, "With Defense Test, China Shows Displeasure of U.S.," *New York Times*, January 12, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/13/world/asia/13china.html> (accessed June 6, 2012).
81. Ziad Haider, "Sino-Pakistan Relations and Xinjiang's Uighurs," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 45, No. 4 (2005): 522–545.
82. Shirley A. Kan, "U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy," *CRS Report for Congress* (Washington: Congressional Research Service), July 2010.
83. David E. Sanger, "Obama Order Sped up Wave of Cyberattacks against Iran," *New York Times*, 1 June 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html?_r=1 (accessed June 7, 2012). More generally, see Richard A. Clarke, *Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do about It* (New York: Harper Collins, 2010).
84. "US Joins UN Cyber Arms Control Collaboration," *theintellhub.com*, <http://theintellhub.com/2010/07/22/us-joins-un-cyber-arms-control-collaboration/> (accessed June 6, 2012).
85. Christopher A. Ford, "The Trouble with Cyber Arms Control," *New Atlantis*, Fall 2010, <http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-trouble-with-cyber-arms-control> (accessed on June 6, 2012).
86. Herbert S. Lin, "Arms Control in Cyberspace: Challenges and Opportunities," *World Politics Review*, March 6, 2012, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11683/arms-control-in-cyberspace-challenges-and-opportunities?page=3> (accessed June 6, 2012).

This page intentionally left blank

In Search of Security and Self-Identity: Promise and Paradox of China's Nuclear Weapons

Bin Yu

Introduction: Between Trees and Forests

The study of China's nuclear weapons program represents a paradox at best. On one hand, it is perhaps one of the most thoroughly combed issues, both by Western scholars¹ and, more recently, by Chinese researchers;² on the other hand, it is also an area of uncertainties, unknowns, and guesswork. This is the case despite the increasing effort, particularly from US scholars, and despite a growing trend in China, to demystify its weapons programs. As a result, the issue of transparency, or lack thereof, regarding the strength, scope, speed, and strategy of the Chinese nuclear forces—including the Second Artillery, its air and naval siblings, and China's nuclear and aerospace industries—continues to be a source of concern for many.³

The quest for more information regarding China's nuclear weaponry and related issues is understandable, particularly during China's historical and steady rise in both economic and military areas. Obsession with details, nuances, or "individual trees,"⁴ however, may run the risk of missing the "forest," that is, China's long-standing declared and operational "no first use" (NFU) policy, as well as its significantly smaller nuclear force in comparison to those of the United States and Russia. The current posture and strategy of the Chinese nuclear forces, therefore, need to be understood by taking into consideration both the "forest" and the "trees."

Survival and security were the main motivating factors behind China's race to build the bomb. Indeed, as Parts I and II examine, the security environment for the Chinese Communists and the PRC has been continuously overshadowed by the superpowers' nuclear arsenals, be it in peace or war; before and after China acquired its own bombs; and whether

China is a weak or strong nation. Despite these asymmetries, China's overall nuclear posture, particularly its minimalist deployment and NFU policy, remains rather consistent, mainly at three levels: philosophical/strategic (NFU), operational/tactical (small size of its nuclear forces and the so-called transparency issue), and foreign policy (stance on arms control). These unique policies of China cannot be fully understood without looking at the "basket three" variables (historical, cultural, and ideational factors) that have directly and/or indirectly shaped China's nuclear posture, which is addressed in Part III.

The Nuclear Shadow in East Asia Revisited: Implications for China

The Regional Setting

East Asia was impacted, perhaps more than anywhere else, by the sudden advent of the nuclear era in August 1945. It is the only place where atomic bombs have ever been used in warfare. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, the region is on the verge of becoming the first, if not the only, region in the world where all major players have become nuclear capable. Along with this nuclear factor, there were at least three geopolitical paradigm changes in the region at the dawn of nuclear weapons' age.

The first was the final arrest of nearly 100 years of Japanese military ascendancy. During much of the first half of the twentieth century, Japan was fighting three continental powers of China, Russia, and America, first separately and then simultaneously. In August 1945, the US atomic bombs served as "final touches" in Japan's reluctant conversion from a militarist state to a "pacifist" one.

The second new paradigm was the start of Pax Americana. With the pacification of Japan, America became a global power with the economic might, military capabilities, technological edge (nuclear weapons), and political will to turn the vast Pacific into its own backyard lake. At the systemic level, the Cold War—which was a highly ideological, militarized (in the format of a nuclearized arms race), and zero-sum game—turned to be a "long peace"⁵ in Europe.

The notion of a long peace, however, is misleading at best in East Asia, where Americans twice fought at the periphery of the Asian continent (Korea and Vietnam) to contain the third paradigm change: the spread of communism across the Eurasian continent. The Cold War, therefore, meant real wars for China. Between the 1950s and 1970s, China fought across the 38th parallel in Korea, along the Taiwan Strait, down to Indochina, up in the Himalayas, and along the 4,000 miles of the Sino-Russian border. Although these conflicts were not entirely the making of China, the periphery of China became an active fault line separating East and West, maritime and continental powers, democracies and communism, the yellow world and white world, and the liberal and centralized economies.

Mao's Nuke Predicament

The nuclear factor was, first and foremost, a revolution in military technology, but with different impacts on the Soviet Union and Chinese Communist forces. Stalin was well aware of America's Manhattan program (1942–1946), and accelerated Russia's own nuclear program even before Hiroshima.⁶ Mao and his colleagues, however, were dreading the prospects of a civil war with US-supported Nationalist forces, which were already well armed with US-supplied weaponry, and had at least a three-to-one numerical superiority over the Communist forces.⁷ The mushroom clouds over Hiroshima and Nagasaki simply cast a long shadow over the Chinese Communists. Nuclear weapons, World War III, and the possibility of America's direct intervention in China should the Nationalists fail were some of the common concerns for many of the Communist rank and file. To overcome the growing pessimism inside the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Mao insisted that nuclear weapons do not determine the outcome of war (原子弹不能解决战争) and "Nuclear weapons are empty without the struggle by the people." Apparently, Mao's words failed to quell the fears and the chairman chose the one-year anniversary of atomic bombing to make his famous "atomic-bomb-as-paper-tiger" speech with American reporter Anna Louise Strong. Still, some were not persuaded.⁸

At the height of the Cold War, the Sino-Soviet ideological polemic had escalated to military conflicts along the 7,000-kilometer border in March and August 1969. On October 18, 1969, two days before the scheduled Sino-Soviet border negotiation, Chinese nuclear forces were put on "combat alert" (临战状态), the first and only time that China's nuclear forces have been in such a high state of alert. Chinese archives indicated that Chinese leaders suspected that the Soviets might have repeated their invasion of Czechoslovakia a year earlier, that is, Soviet paratroopers would follow the Soviet negotiating team to take over Beijing as a precursor to Soviets' all-out war with China. The two-day "window" was needed for China's nuclear missiles' refueling and preparation. The Soviet nuclear threat in the late 1960s was the culmination of China's insecurity during the Cold War. Prior to this, there were several times in the 1950s when the United States either threatened and/or prepared to use nuclear weapons against China. Indeed, China was perhaps the only country that was threatened by both sides of the iron curtain with nuclear weapons at the height of the Cold War.⁹ In the twenty-first century, the United States was said to be able to destroy China's entire nuclear forces should Washington choose to do so.¹⁰

Beijing's "Splendid Isolation"

Beyond the nuclear issue, PRC's insecurity was aggravated by its confrontation with both superpowers in the 1960s. Perhaps more than any other time in its history was the strategic space of the PRC so restricted as it was in the 1960s–1970s by the West-dominated international system, be it by Western capitalist democracies or Western communist countries. For both, Mao's

brand of communism was perhaps more dangerous than their respective ideological foes. A case in point was that during the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, both Washington and Moscow were rushing arms to India. Upon taking office in early 1969, US President Richard Nixon, who was famous for his 1972 historical opening with China, was said to have actively sought to adopt a position of “neutrality, or even cooperation, in the event of a Soviet attack on China” on the condition of Soviet assistance in obtaining a “dignified exit” from Vietnam. Meanwhile, Henry Kissinger, who was Nixon’s national security advisor, reportedly ordered a classified study of a nuclear attack exclusively on China, which was a major departure from previous planning by American strategists that China and Russia would be simultaneously attacked. Only Soviet hesitation to respond to Nixon’s repeated probing for joint action against China eventually led to the “China option” for Nixon’s Vietnam exit. In hindsight, China’s strategic predicament of simultaneously confronting two nuclear superpowers in the late 1960s could have been much worse and US-China diplomatic breakthrough might have been a mere historical accident, thanks to the indecision and suspicion of the Kremlin.¹¹

Only Nixon and Kissinger would know exactly what was going on in the early days of their White House years. China’s strategic situation was unambiguously worsening in 1969 following the January border clashes with Soviet troops. In June, Brezhnev spoke about the need for a “collective security system” in Asia. Moscow never specified the nature and content of such a system. It was, nonetheless, widely believed to target China.¹² For Beijing, Brezhnev was clearly reciprocating with candidate Nixon’s October 1967 *Foreign Affairs* article calling for a “shift” in Asia to oppose “the common danger from Communist China.”¹³ Between these two speeches, Soviet tanks rolled into Prague in October 1968. After this, China had to reorient its entire national economy and put it on wartime footing for many years (1964–1980).¹⁴ Mao’s fear was real as he remarked in the late 1960s, “Think about this... We have the Soviet Union to the north and the west, India to the south, and Japan to the east. If all our enemies were to unite, attacking us from the north, south, east, and west, what do you think we should do?”¹⁵

Fast forward to the twenty-first century, a much stronger China is said to be still haunted by contemporary encirclement by the United States and its allies and friends. While Garver and Wang described China’s current encirclement largely in diplomatic terms,¹⁶ China is now faced with “the largest and densest encirclement of nuclear weapons (22,530 pieces) around China’s periphery,” according to General Peng Guangqian (彭光谦), a senior analyst at the Chinese Military Academy. Meanwhile, East Asia is on the verge of a nuclear arms race because of the Korean nuclear issue, according to *Southern Weekend*, an influential periodical in Guangzhou. The weekly went as far as to claim that “Although nuclear weapons used to grant China with the status of a major power, they are increasingly becoming a grave threat to China’s national interests.” The newspaper refers to China’s NFU

nuclear strategy, which, though sounding noble, is dangerously “outdated” in a world riddled with nuclear weapons, increasingly sophisticated missile defense (MD) systems of various kinds, and lowered nuclear thresholds among major nuclear powers.¹⁷

The historical rise of China in the past 30 years has, therefore, been accompanied by a steadily increasing counterforce, regardless of the diplomatic posture of China. In a sense, there is little China could do about such an unpleasantness in the enduring geopolitics of the Eurasian continent where mutual balancing and counterbalancing are almost automatic.¹⁸

China's Bomb in A World of Asymmetries

The above discussion illustrated an enduring strategic fact of life that the PRC has always operated in a world of disparity and is overshadowed by powerful foes. This has been the case whether China is strong or weak, and with or without nuclear weapons. One may hypothesize the “what ifs” had China not pursued its own bombs. The real question is how and why Mao demonstrated a remarkable duality regarding nuclear bomb: dismissing it as a “paper tiger” while pursuing it with such speed and determination that no other nuclear powers had ever done.

Between “Paper” and Real “Tigers”

The paper tiger analogy was misleading at best. As a romantic revolutionary and sober-minded pragmatist, Mao had been a master of coping, and even playing, with “contradictions.” In this sense, Mao’s paper-tiger argument was by no means unrealistic. It was a timely and necessary psychological cushion for the CCP’s morale on the eve of a showdown with the Nationalist forces, and the much weaker Communist force needed not to be intimidated by the American bomb. Anything short of that might have led the CCP down the path of defeat even before the outbreak of the Civil War with the Nationalists. It was also a historical fact of life that the Chinese Communist forces always engaged more powerful foes and were able to overcome overwhelming odds. In operational terms, Mao remained a realist and believed that whatever the enemy had, the Chinese Communists must also work to acquire.¹⁹ The question was when and how to do so.

As soon as the mainland was pacified, Mao’s mind focused on turning the paper tiger into a real one for China. China’s January 1955 decision to go nuclear is well documented.²⁰ The CCP’s effort to acquire its own nuclear scientists and resources, however, was made ten years before. Kang Sheng (康生), who was a member of the CCP Politburo and intelligence minister until April 1945, was reportedly recruiting overseas Chinese nuclear scientists from abroad in 1946. Shortly after Beijing was peacefully surrendered to the PLA in January 1949, the CCP allocated US\$50,000, which was one-sixth of CCP’s total foreign reserves at the time, to purchase from Europe nuclear-weapon-related books and lab instruments.²¹ During Mao’s two-month

stay in Moscow (December 16, 1949 to February 17, 1950) shortly after the PRC founding in October 1949, Stalin let Mao watch a documentary on the Soviet tests of nuclear weapons. Deeply impressed by the Soviet success, Mao indicated that China, too, should acquire its own nuclear weapons, even if “just a little bit (我们也可以搞一点嘛). Three months later (May 1950), the Modern Physics Institute was created within the Chinese Academy of Science (中国科学院近代物理研究所), which eventually became the launching pad for China’s nuclear weapon projects.²² Over the next five years, it took the Korean War (1950–1953), the Indochina conflict (following the 1954 Geneva Conference), and the Taiwan Strait crisis (1954) for the CCP to finally decide to go nuclear.²³

The Soviets played a dual role in China’s nuclear and missile programs. It provided China with extensive and crucial technologies, weapons samples (short of atomic weapons), blueprints, and weapon scientists and engineers. Soviet assistance, however, was limited to somewhat outdated weapon systems, though they were vital for PRC’s nuclear and missile projects in its earlier phases. Khrushchev’s sudden withdrawal of Soviet experts from China in 1960 caused massive disruption of China’s R&D for nuclear weapons.²⁴ This occurred at a time when China underwent what was perhaps the most serious economic failure in its history and the Chinese scientists seriously debated if they should continue the unfinished and expensive projects. The 1962 Sino-Indian border war, though a tactical victory for the PLA, actually worsened China’s overall security situation as Moscow took a neutral stand in the conflict. In light of these developments, Mao and others overcame resistance to continuing China’s nuclear program and made a major effort to centralize and accelerate the Chinese nuclear weapons development program. In December 1962, Premier Zhou Enlai was appointed to be the leader of a 15-person special commission, consisting of seven vice premiers and seven ministers who were responsible for devoting all available national recourses to the construction of China’s nuclear weapons. In less than two years, China detonated its first nuclear device (October 1964).²⁵

Between China’s first test of atomic bomb in October 1964 and 1983, when the PLA’s Second Artillery Forces conducted its first nuclear counterstrike drill,²⁶ China completed its entire range of nuclear weapon systems including air (May 1965), land (ICBM test in May 1980), and sea (SLBM test in October 1982) based nuclear forces. In the latter half of the 1970s, the Second Artillery Force set itself the objective of building a “lean and effective” strategic missile force.²⁷ In 1984, the Second Artillery established, for the first time, a round-the-clock alert duty (战备值班). The mid-1980s was also a time when China’s nuclear strategy moved away from “antinuclear deterrence” (反核威慑战略)—which combined large-scale civil defense, relocation of key sectors of the national economy into the interior of China, and conventional and nuclear preparations—toward “limited deterrence” (最低核威慑战略) that is performed largely by China’s small but credible nuclear arsenal. The transformation of China’s nuclear strategy, however, is perhaps not as thorough as is claimed. A key linkage of the two strategies was the completion of a 16-year construction effort to create an

underground missile basing network in 1995, code-named the Great Wall Project (长城工程). The system, which is believed to be located in the Taihang Mountains between Hebei and Shanxi Provinces, would guarantee the survival of China's land-based strategic nuclear forces after any preemptive strikes by a foreign nuclear attack and enable the Second Artillery to launch retaliatory strikes.²⁸

Since then, China's strategic forces have also started to move from a purely strategic nuclear weapon arsenal toward a mix of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons;²⁹ away from liquid-fueled missiles toward the use of solid fuel; away from fixed-site launchers toward the use of mobile launchers; away from single-use launchers toward the use of reloadable launchers; away from a purely nuclear missile force toward a mixed nuclear and conventional force; and toward building a reliable short-range ballistic missile force capable of being used in local wars.³⁰ In the twenty-first century, the Second Artillery, like other PLA branches, is dedicated to "informationization," meaning going hi-tech in its command, control, and communication infrastructure. As a result, the 2008 Defense White Paper describes the Second Artillery as "a lean and effective strategic force with both nuclear and conventional missiles, capable of both land-based strategic nuclear counterattacks and precision strikes with conventional missiles" and with "both solid-fueled and liquid-fueled missiles, different launching ranges and different types of warheads."³¹

China's Trio Nuclear Posture

Unlike the constant upgrading of its small nuclear arsenal, China's nuclear posture and doctrine have remained relatively constant, that is, its minimalist force configuration and deployment; its longstanding no first use declaration despite its evolution from antinuclear deterrence to limited deterrence; and its evolving arms control and disarmament policies of both principle and pragmatism. In the twenty-first century, a comprehensive understanding of China's nuclear posture is both imperative and possible as more and more Chinese military strategists, academics, and nuclear scientists are engaging the discussion of China's nuclear posture and policy. A consensus seems to have emerged among Chinese military strategists, academics, and nuclear scientists in the following three broad areas of development/deployment, NFU, and arms control/disarmament policies. They represent three intimately related, but also separate, levels/domains of China's nuclear policy at political/strategic, military/technological, and foreign policy levels for PRC's national security and global stability.

China's No First Use (NFU)

Perhaps more than anything else, China has identified itself with its no-first-use principle. China declared its NFU on the day of its first nuclear detonation in 1964. "At no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons," and it would never use nuclear weapons against a nonnuclear state. This is perhaps the most enduring principle of China's

nuclear policy.³² Many decades later, the same principle continues. The 2008 Defense White Paper states, “The Second Artillery Force sticks to China’s policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, implements a self-defensive nuclear strategy...and takes it as its fundamental mission the protection of China from any nuclear attack. In peacetime the nuclear missile weapons of the Second Artillery Force are not aimed at any country.”³³ The 2013 Defense White Paper reiterates China’s NFU principle that the mission of the Second Artillery Forces “is to execute nuclear retaliation and conventional precision strikes [遂行核反击和常规导弹精确打击任务].”³⁴ No other internationally recognized nuclear power, with the exception of India,³⁵ have ever adopted the NFU posture.³⁶ Ironically, the former Soviet Union declared in 1982 that it would not first use nuclear weapons; as a democracy, however, Russia abandoned its NFU in 1993.

Chinese analysts argue that China’s NFU posture has several implications: it deters those with nuclear weapons but aims not to threaten nonnuclear states (有威慑无威胁);³⁷ it demonstrates the defensive nature of China’s nuclear weapons; it enables China to take the higher moral ground in international politics; it is conducive in moving the world toward a system without nuclear weapons by not threatening countries without nuclear weapons; and it is pragmatic for a small and much less sophisticated strategic force in a world of superpowers with oversized nuclear arsenals (see Table 12.1).

China’s NFU is not mere rhetoric. At the operational level, China’s nuclear weapons are not in a “hair trigger” state as those of the other four original nuclear powers, which deploy a significant portion of their warheads on delivery systems that are ready to fire at a moment’s notice (1,000 for the United States and Russia respectively). Under normal circumstances, China is said to separately store its warheads and delivery systems because preemptive strikes are not in the toolbox of China’s nuclear strategy.³⁸

Developmental and Deployment Policy: Lean and Effective Force

China never specifies exactly the size and type of its nuclear arsenal. Various Western estimates indicate a range of 80 to 300 warheads ready for deployment and in storage.³⁹

Table 12.1 Nuclear warheads—the five nuclear-weapon states under the NPT

<i>Country</i>	<i>Active</i>	<i>Total</i>
United States	1950	8000
Russia	1900	10000
UK	160	225
France	290	300
China	180	240

Source: Federation of American Scientists: Status of World Nuclear Forces, April 13, 2011, <http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html> (accessed May 10, 2012).

The 2008 Defense White Paper uses “lean and effective” to describe China’s small strategic force. It needs to be noted that the decision for maintaining a small nuclear force was made in the late 1950s and early 1960s when China was plagued by severe economic crisis. In the twenty-first century when China is in its steady and historical rise with a much larger and robust economy, the size of the country’s strategic forces still remains very limited,⁴⁰ which defies Kissinger’s recent prediction that it would be unusual if the world’s second-largest economy did not translate its economic power into increased military capability.⁴¹ This is done, however, because China exercises “utmost self-restraint” (极大的克制).⁴²

The smaller the force, the more robust, flexible, and survivable it needs to become. By the late 1980s, China managed to achieve these goals with its second generation of launch vehicles when the solid fuel DF-21 and SLBM Julang-1 were finally developed (定型). In the 1990s, however, it became painfully clear that China’s newest generation of nuclear weapon systems became increasingly vulnerable for at least two reasons: precision guided munitions and MD. In the first Gulf War (1990–1991), the accurate and devastating effect of the first generation of smart weapons demonstrated the potential to achieve what nuclear weapons can and cannot do. For silo-based Chinese strategic missiles, conventional smart weapons pose serious threat. Throughout the decades, research and development of MD were in active process in the United States. By the end of the 1990s, its limited effectiveness created a “Goldilocks” dilemma for China. It was too little for the still large, though somewhat decaying, Russian strategic forces that would easily overwhelm the US MD system; it was too much for “rogue” states with just a few primitive devices.⁴³ China’s small nuclear force was perhaps “just right” for the US MD mechanism.

As China’s strategic posture was overshadowed by the advancement of precision guided weapons and MD, two additional developments in and around China also presented new challenges to the PLA’s Second Artillery. In the 1980s, the PLA went through two deep cuts of 1.5 million troops from its overall military forces. This required the technical component of the PLA, such as the Second Artillery, to provide more assurance to China’s overall security. The PLA’s restructuring, modernization, and streamlining effort in the 1980s and beyond, therefore, significantly elevated the nuclear component within the PLA. Second, developments on China’s periphery, particularly the worsening of the cross-Strait relations in the late 1980s (Lee Teng-hui’s pursuit of Taiwan independence from 1988 and Bush’s 1992 decision to sell 150 F-16s to Taiwan), required the PLA to deal with “less-than-nuclear” situations.

This predicament of China at both strategic and technical levels was compounded by a series of crises between China and the United States regarding Taiwan (1995–1996), the bombing of a Chinese embassy (1999), and an airplane collision (2001). China, therefore, had to update its small nuclear forces, making sure that their ability to conceal and to counterattack would remain intact.⁴⁴ Beginning in the late 1980s, China developed and deployed

a series of short-range ballistic missiles such as the DF-15 to offset the military imbalance across the Strait and other contingencies around China's periphery. In 1999, the three-staged, 8,000-kilometer, MIRV-capable (multiple independently guided reentry vehicles), solid fuel DF-31 was successfully tested and it went to service in the early twenty-first century. Its naval version, the JL-2, was also believed to be in service in 2009–2010 after a decade of development.⁴⁵ The longer range (12,000–15,000 km), road-mobile, MIRV-capable DF-41 remains a mystery but is believed to have been ready for deployment in 2009–2010.⁴⁶

Despite these significant gains in updating China's small strategic force, the gap between China and the US nuclear forces continued to widen in the new millennium. By 2006, the United States claimed to have obtained, for the first time in almost 50 years, nuclear primacy, meaning the ability to destroy the long-range nuclear arsenals of Russia or China with a first strike. This is the case for at least five reasons: a series of improvements in the US nuclear system; the precipitous decline of Russia's arsenal; the slow pace of modernization of China's nuclear forces; a steady, albeit slow, development of a US missile defense mechanism, and Washington's unrelenting effort to seek nuclear primacy with a nuclear force "designed to carry out a preemptive disarming strike against Russia and China."⁴⁷ The recent US effort to soft peddle its missile defense in Europe⁴⁸ while building up one in East Asia⁴⁹ will also seriously compromise China's current limited deterrent posture. Decades after testing its first nuclear device in 1964, China—and the rest of the world—finds itself living in the shadow of US nuclear primacy, or threat/blackmail, for many years to come.

It is against this backdrop that the issue of transparency deserves special attention. With the steady development of China's nuclear hardware, the doctrinal elements of the PLA's strategic forces naturally lead to curiosity and questioning by many.⁵⁰ "Lack of transparency" has been always been associated with China's nuclear doctrine.⁵¹ Some go as far as to assert that Chinese leaders and its strategic forces "lack the political maturity to keep a security crisis with either Japan or the United States from escalating."⁵² China's 2008 Defense White Paper (published in January 2009) systematically, albeit briefly (1,500 characters), disclosed, for the first time, the configuration and doctrines of China's Second Artillery forces. The 2010 White Paper (released in March 2011), however, only devoted five sentences to the Second Artillery. The questioning, therefore, continues, which predominantly focuses on tactical parts of the White Papers.⁵³ An US military assessment of China's 2010 Defense White Paper even suggests that the English translation of the Chinese version of the 2010 White Paper is "massaged to make it more palatable and less threatening to foreign audiences, while the original Chinese document is consistently more strident, stark and assertive."⁵⁴

Almost all of these assessments of China's defense papers tend to dismiss the importance of China's declared NFU policies as well as the policy of maintaining a significantly smaller nuclear force compared with those of the United States and Russia. Such a paradox in the study of Chinese

nuclear strategy—most studied yet least known—may have to remain in the indefinite future for at least four reasons. One is the issue of unlimited appetite, particularly from the United States, to know more about the PLA and its strategic forces. This means no matter how much the PLA reveals its “secrets,” the West would not be satisfied.

If anything, certain levels of secrecy are actually normal for all governments. For example, the United States never fully discloses its own top nuclear secrets and has been strictly guarding its own military technology and operational planning. In the 1990s, the notorious “spy case” of Wen Ho Lee made the US District Court Judge James Parker later remark that “top decision makers in the Executive Branch...have embarrassed our entire nation and each of us who is a citizen of it.”⁵⁵ More recently, the US government’s furious reaction to the Wiki Leak disclosure is perhaps both ordinary and extraordinary.⁵⁶

Second, the issue of transparency is one of inherent asymmetry between two militaries of huge disparity in terms of quality and quantity of their weapons systems, as well as the scope and scale of their operations (global versus largely domestic). A strictly equal and one-to-one disclosure is actually unequal and unfair. It is a matter of proportionality in that the opening of a fraction of the huge US military installation equals a large proportion of a relatively small Chinese arsenal. In operational terms, China’s much smaller strategic forces require more “concealment” than its larger counterparts for the purpose of deterrence.⁵⁷ The PLA, therefore, would never make its strategic forces as transparent as the US desires. Yet even the almighty US military performs its own highly ambiguous, “ask-but-not-tell” practice that never clarifies if its warships and military aircraft, which operate on a global scale, carry any nuclear weapons.

Third, transparency is not an isolated issue, but part of a broad relationship and is usually balanced by a certain level of mutual strategic trust. In this case, Taiwan remains a fundamental barrier to a healthy reciprocity between the two militaries. US arms sales to the island are considered a hostile act and in violation of the bilateral agreements.⁵⁸ Under these circumstances, strategic trust, if any, is shallow and fragile between the two sides.⁵⁹ Without the minimum trust, requesting transparency from the weaker side is unrealistic. Moreover, the US forward deployment and “routine” but provocative aerial surveillance along China’s coastal lines and frequent exercises in the area close to China’s territorial waters have been the sources of a series of incidents and accidents between the two militaries. There is no question that transparency and trust constitutes a reciprocating game and the former can certainly enhance the latter. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to have transparency in the absence of trust.

Last but not least, the issue of transparency for the Chinese and US militaries is one of difference, not one being better than the other. Specifically, the Chinese side pursues strategic transparency by declaring, from its nuclear test in 1964, that it adhered to the policy of “no-first-use of nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstances,” and that “under no circumstances

will it use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones.”⁶⁰ The United States has never made such a commitment despite the fact that it possesses both the largest nuclear and conventional arsenals in the world. It took more than two years, plus the enticement of a Nobel Peace Prize, for President Obama to commit the United States to a partial no-first-use posture, that is, not to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states that are in compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) while still targeting the so-called rogue states such as Iran and North Korea. Still, the current commitment of United States to a partial NFU policy is not irreversible as conservatives and neocons are accusing Obama of diluting the United States’ most potent deterrent.⁶¹ In 1999, although US president Bill Clinton signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the US Senate failed to ratify it and President Bush took actions to “un-sign” the treaty as soon as he came into office.⁶²

Arms Control/Disarmament Policy

Although China claims to be the first country in the world to publicly propose in 1963 a nuclear-weapons-free world,⁶³ the last thing Mao and his colleagues wanted to see was the “collusion” between Moscow and Washington to monopolize nuclear weapons, particularly when China was already at the nuclear threshold at the time.⁶⁴ Khrushchev’s acceptance of a US test ban proposal in September 1958 was also an alarm and irritant for Mao, and was believed to be one of the key factors that led to the final split of the alliance.⁶⁵ As a result, China never embraced the idea and practice of arms control for the rest of the Cold War as Beijing nervously watched arms control agreements reached by Moscow and Washington. China’s return to UN in 1971 was the beginning of China’s “long march” to its gradual and eventual acceptance and participation in international arms control and disarmament activities. In the twenty-first century, particularly after 9/11, Beijing has also cooperated with the international community for an effective, peaceful, and fair approach for non-proliferation issues (such as the Korean and Iranian nuclear issues).

China’s current policy toward nuclear arms control consists of three major components of multilateralism, differentiated responsibility and reduction, and maintenance of strategic stability by opposing MD.⁶⁶ For Beijing, the UN’s role in this area needs to be completely fulfilled; so is the functionality of other related international organizations and multilateral mechanisms. Specifically, the existing multilateral arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation systems should be consolidated and strengthened. Within this context, the legitimate and reasonable security concerns of all countries should be respected and accommodated. For these purposes, China remains active in the review process of the NPT, particularly in the Eighth NPT Review Conference in 2010; it supports the early entry into force of the CTBT, and the early commencement of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. In the regional

realm, China supports establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones such as ASEAN, Central Asia, and efforts for of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. As part of the requirement by the Preparatory Commission of the CTBT organization, China has set up 12 international monitoring stations and laboratories including six primary seismological monitoring stations, three radionuclide stations, the Beijing Radionuclide Laboratory, the China National Data Center, and one infrasound station.

Beyond multilateralism, China also insists that the countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals bear special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament. This should be done in a verifiable, irreversible, and legally binding manner. When conditions are "appropriate," other nuclear weapon states including China should also join in multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. But even before the actual reduction of nuclear weapons, all nuclear weapon states should adopt NFU policies and lower their nuclear thresholds, leading to an eventually legalized NFU with an international accord.

Here, China always pushes other nuclear weapon states to follow its own NFU policy. In this context, China considers an intimate connection between NFU and nuclear arms control and disarmament. NFU is, and should be, the first step for all nuclear weapon states to move toward arms control and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. A Chinese scientist argues that if nuclear weapon countries, such as the United States, with strong and sophisticated conventional weapons, still insist on first use, it is difficult, if not impossible, to convince other nonnuclear states not to pursue nuclear weapon programs of their own.

Last but not the least, China maintains that the global MD program is detrimental to international strategic balance and stability, particularly China's minimalist deployment policy. Other nuclear powers may even be inclined to strike first at China if they believe their MD is able to neutralize China's retaliatory capabilities.

Taken together, multilateralism, differentiated reduction, and antimissile defense constitute the diplomatic part of China's integrated nuclear security policy in a world of asymmetrical balance of nuclear forces. These efforts in the political/strategic, military/technical, and diplomatic domains are aimed at achieving two goals: the survival of the Chinese nation at a minimum and global nuclear disarmament at maximum. For these goals, China has pursued a dual-track approach in its arms development/procurement and arms control/disarmament policies. China would always try to achieve breakthrough in R&D of any particular types of major weapon systems (atomic, hydrogen and neutron bombs, ICBMs, SLBMs, solid-fuel, mobile, MIRV technologies, etc.). Once this is achieved, China would not commit itself to an arms race. Actual deployment of these weapon systems has always been very limited given the relatively small size of China's strategic force. Meanwhile, the country's arms control policy would make sure that other countries would also limit their development and deployment, and do not proliferate those weapons systems. An ongoing case for the same dual approach to weapon

development and deployment and arms control is China's policies regarding outer space. Although its 2010 Defense White Paper reiterates its opposition to US weaponization of outer space and MD, China went ahead in January 2007 with its antisatellite test and its MD test in January 2010.

In retrospect, China's trio approach to its nuclear policy—NFU, development/limited deployment, and arms control/disarmament policies—are intimately related. In an asymmetrical world of nuclear overkill capacity, preemption, and nuclear first use, China's nuclear policies and goals are not entirely altruistic. Its NFU, however, is the least provocative and represents the shortest distance to nuclear arms reduction and disarmament.

In Search for Security and for Its Self: History, Identity, and Culture

What are the prospects for China's nuclear posture in the future? At least in terms of symbolism, China's acquisition of nuclear weapons means the country finally "Westernized" itself in a Westernized world of independent nation-states since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. Within such a system of social Darwinism, "The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must."⁶⁷ China's traditional culture and morality, which were central to the stability of the traditional regional international system in East Asia,⁶⁸ means very little in the twenty-first century still dominated by the West.⁶⁹ Beyond the nuclear factor, perhaps the most challenging task for Chinese political elites and strategists is how to interact with the United States. Not only is it a nation with "primacy" positions in both nuclear and conventional arms despite its recent economic difficulties, but also it is bent on promoting its own political, economic, and cultural values in other countries through various means, including military interventions, while offering favoritism toward the states with similar domestic institutions to those of the United States. Will China be ready, willing, and able to maintain its current nuclear posture as its economy continues to grow? How will Washington, whose foreign policy has been shaped by its tradition of "national-security liberalism," be able to accommodate a rising power with entirely different historical, cultural, political, and ideational underpinnings?⁷⁰

While much of the future remains unknown, three sets of China's ideational factors regarding nuclear weapons, security, and diplomacy may offer some insights. One is China's dichotomic belief over the importance and limitations of nuclear weapons in its overall foreign and security calculus: important for offsetting nuclear blackmail from China's more powerful adversaries; limited because nuclear capability alone was not adequate in averting China's security predicament. The extremely dire situation for China's security in the 1960s and 1970s was eventually alleviated through diplomatic breakthroughs in Sino-US relations, not by improving China's nuclear posture. This was very different from the post-Cuban-missile-crisis Soviet foreign and defense policies seeking strategic parity with the United

States before engaging in serious arms control agreements. In the reform decades, it is the changes in China's domestic political and economic policies that have finally paved the way for China's historical rise after more than a century of decay, defeat, and demoralization. Its nuclear capability, therefore, is at best one of several necessary conditions for this outcome. This is perhaps a more important ideational factor that embeds China's nuclear arsenal in the overall political, diplomatic, and strategic calculation, rather than matching the opponent's hardware in a one-to-one game, as was the case of the former Soviet Union and the United States in the 1970s and 1980s.

The paradoxical nature of China's nuclear forces at the politico-strategic level—important for national survival but with limited practical use—is also manifested in the military domain. Since its inception in the 1960s as an independent service of the PLA, the Second Artillery is considered, at least by one credible source, neither the bedrock nor the “core” of China's national defense. It remains important only at the strategic level but has limited utility in conventional terms.⁷¹ Part of the reason is that it is almost unusable in applying to the low-level and limited conflicts around China's peripheries; its massive destructive power renders it as the last resort in the minds of China's strategic thinkers. The Second Artillery does develop its conventional capabilities such as the DF-21 and DF-25 antiship ballistic missiles. In maneuvers, however, they are usually put under the command of other services such as the PLA Navy (PLAN),⁷² rather than under the direct control of the Central Military Commission as is the case for the nuclear-armed strategic missiles.⁷³

Third, the nuclear factor, no matter how important for China's security, has never entered China's diplomatic interactions with other countries.⁷⁴ This is the case for at least two reasons: China's promised NFU and China's own experience as a victim of nuclear blackmail. In this case, China follows its traditional thinking of “Do not do things to others if one does not want others to do the same to him [己所不欲勿施于人].” For the same reason, the best use of nuclear weapons is its nonuse for China. Although Western countries and their political-strategic elites also realize this nonuse utility of nuclear weapons, their respective nuclear strategies remain ambivalent (Britain and France) or first use (United States and Russia).⁷⁵

These ideational factors behind China's nuclear posture, together with its NFU principle and lean force configuration, have transcended the changes in China's domestic/foreign policies, and the transitions in the international structure from bipolarity to unipolarity to nonpolarity.⁷⁶ Much of these ideational elements reflect, to different degrees and directly or indirectly, China's traditional culture. It is necessary, therefore, to explore China's nuclear posture in China's overall foreign/defense policy and in the broader and deeper context of Chinese strategic culture and its traditional sources. In this regard, at least four cultural elements separate China from its Western counterparts: the notion of prudence in warfare; the primacy of diplomacy over power; the concept of harmony of differences versus alliances of similarities; and leadership versus coexistence.

Prudence in War-Fighting (慎战)

China's NFU policy for its small nuclear force was first and foremost a pragmatic and balanced approach conceived and developed in the 1950s–1970s when China was besieged by severe economic difficulties and political upheaval. How and why does it continue to date when an economically more powerful China is able to support a much larger nuclear force, despite sea changes in both China's domestic and foreign environments, and in facing pressure from both inside and outside to abandon it?⁷⁷

One of the key factors is that of traditional thinking of warfare. From even Mao's time, Chinese military commanders and strategists have attributed China's NFU policy to its traditional cultural roots, particularly Sun Tzu's notion of prudence in war-fighting⁷⁸ that "the art of war is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected [兵者，国之大事，死生之地，存亡之道，不可不查也]".⁷⁹ Indeed, the most supreme art of war, according to this Chinese military strategist living 2,500 years ago, is to subdue the enemy without fighting (不战而屈人之兵). Further, "Attacking the enemy's strategy is superior to engaging in diplomatic negotiations; engaging in diplomatic negotiations is superior to waging field operations; and waging field operations is superior to attacking fortifications."⁸⁰ China's NFU nuclear posture, therefore, is not propaganda as is perceived by many in the West,⁸¹ but reflects the traditional thinking of prudence in using force.

While nuclear weapons have both strategic value (战略价值) and technical value (战术价值), and the two reinforce each other, it is clear that China's political and strategic elites—who are deeply rooted in China's traditional military culture and are keenly aware of the limitations of China's nuclear force—attach greater importance to the former. This strategic and philosophical approach to the nuclear issue remains constant through generations of political and military elites despite revolutionary changes at the technical level.

Power versus Diplomacy

Western disbelief regarding China's NFU policy is rooted in the West's thinking about power and its own historical experience that acquisition of a powerful weapon system by any country, or the "rise" of any nation-state, would inevitably mean disruptive wars against existing international order. Historical trajectory of China, however, indicates that a strong, stable, and self-confident China tends not to use force but diplomacy, leading to regional peace and stability.⁸²

Conversely, a weak China would be either the prey of stronger powers or a cornered beast reacting with militant policies toward others, which is the case for both traditional and modern China. "A weak country has no diplomacy to speak of [弱国无外交]," goes a popular saying in China. Indeed in the first 30 years of the PRC (1949–1979), China's peripheries became lines

of skirmishes either with superpowers or with its neighbors, or both at the same time. Its current policy of peaceful development was conceived and is being implemented as China is enjoying the longest period of sustained stability and development since 1840. (See Figure 12.1 for China's decline from mid-19th century and China's revival during the reform decades of 1979-current.) Instead of imposing itself on the rest of the world and waging endless wars when the West was rising, a relatively stable and reasonably strong China is not repeating Western steps. China so far has no military bases outside of its soil, no armed personnel other than those on UN-authorized missions, and not a single piece of nuclear weaponry deployed on other countries' soil. For this, a prominent Chinese political scientist describes China's rise as one of peace, by peace, for peace."⁸³ A stronger China, therefore, is more likely to use diplomacy, rather than its power, in its reciprocity with others.

This historical trajectory of China is almost the opposite of the West. For example, the United States has pursued three different foreign policy paradigms in search of its security in the past 100 years:

- Wilsonian collective security when the United States was one of several major powers in the world;
- Cold War bilateral security when Washington reluctantly accepted the MAD (mutually assured destruction) concept, meaning that its own security depended on the fact that Moscow, too, should feel secure; and
- Unilateralism for absolute security during the post-Cold War when the US primacy in comprehensive power towers over the rest of the world.

In each stage, a stronger America departs from the realm of diplomacy and toward the use of force. In his book, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?*




Figure 12.1 China's Share of World GDP (in PPP terms), 1600–2014*.

Source: List of regions by past GDP (PPP), Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_regions_by_past_GDP_%28PPP%29; list of countries by GDP (PPP), IMF 2014, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28PPP%29, assessed April 13, 2015.

which was published ten years after the end of the bipolar world order and 95 days before 9/11, Kissinger complains that both the attitude of missionary rectitude of the left and the overplay of power of the right lead to a situation in which the world's most powerful state does not have a working foreign policy.⁸⁴ Kissinger's call for a genuine foreign policy was not out of nowhere. A 2002 study by the US Congressional Research Service shows that the average US overt use of military force under the Clinton administration increased more than five times to eight instances per year, as compared to 1.15 per year during the Cold War (1945–1991).⁸⁵ In the post–Cold War decades, US power was simply unchallenged, unbalanced, and unrestrained, which eventually led to Bush's preemption and unilateralism after 9/11. In those apparently numerous debates among Republican presidential candidates in 2012, future foreign policy of the most powerful nation in the world has been consistently reduced to a militarized propensity among presidential hopefuls competing to become the next “commander-in-chief.”

With its military primacy—conventional and nuclear—diplomacy is time-consuming, difficult, and sometimes frustrating for Washington. In the age of globalization and weapons of mass destruction, however, diplomacy is perhaps the only way to handle some of the difficult bilateral, regional, and global issues, particularly those with high stakes, such as the two six-party talks on Korean and Iranian nuclear issues.

Harmony of Differences versus Alliances of Similarities

China's nuclear posture is not only a matter of military strategy, nor is it driven primarily by the traditional prudence in exercising power. A deeper philosophical underpinning for interpersonal and intercultural interactions can be found in the Confucian notion of “harmony of differences” (和而不同). For Confucius and his contemporary disciples, diversity in culture, society, and policy is not only normal but preferred. Furthermore, harmony is needed precisely because of these differences. Within this context, the use of force, including that of nuclear weapons, should be the last resort. Along this line of thinking, contemporary China is embracing multilateralism, not necessarily to oppose the West, but because China is not uncomfortable with a world of diverse ideas and political systems. Such a concept is also obvious in the making and operations of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which interfaces with nearly all major civilizations such as Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Confucianism, all kinds of political systems with democracies and nondemocracies, and big/strong and small/weak states. Within this context, the rise of China, together with the rise of other non-Western states, will by no means be the end of the West, though it does mean the end of the West's domination of the non-West.

Western international relations theories and policies, in contrast, insist on unity *because of* (or *by, of, and for*) sameness; hence, NATO members must be democracies and European Union members must be European, Christian—and perhaps even white.⁸⁶ The quest for similarity is the hallmark

of the West. In the second half of the twentieth century, Western liberalism and Western Marxism feverishly competed for primacy. Each tried to change the rest of the world according to its own ideological pure type; neither wanted to live in an imperfect world full of gray areas; both saw the world in black-and-white terms; together, they dragged the rest of the world into the last phase of the "Western Civil Wars,"⁸⁷ which was the Cold War. Beyond Western liberalism and Marxism, almost all of other Western ideologies, including nationalism, fascism, militarism, statism, anarchism, individualism, and so on, have developed their own extremism by excluding other alternatives. This solipsism of the West was the root cause of the world wars in the twentieth century, which was the bloodiest century of human history. And much of this happened without the impact of nuclear weapons.

In operational terms, the Confucian notion of unity in diversity is perhaps more challenging and necessary for interactions among states of different types than those with similarities. In this sense, what the ubiquitous democracy-peace theory has enshrined is perhaps the minimum of what countries of similar political systems—and perhaps even similar religion (Christian) and race (Caucasian)⁸⁸—should do. Indeed, the West, which has barely found ways to live with minorities of different races and religions within its borders,⁸⁹ has a long way to go in order to live with much of the non-Western part of the world.

From a historical perspective, there is perhaps nothing wrong with democracy as a political system that evolved through Western history and culture. It deserves both respect and serious consideration by others, including China. Indiscriminately imposing democracy anywhere and anytime, however, amounts to a witch doctor prescribing Viagra to every patient, regardless of his or her age, gender or symptoms. Ultimately, it may undermine one's own interests, as in the case of Iraq, which has become the bloodiest democratization ever in the world's history. For China, democracy may not necessarily be the final destination for human and social development, but a mechanism for some higher goals such as social harmony. Such a goal may be reachable through other paths, not just those of the West.

Partly because of the Confucian notion of harmony of differences, China has so far been able to avoid the excessiveness of Western ideologies, including that in defining Western nuclear strategies as first strike, nuclear utilization theory and its operational mode (nuclear utilization target selection, or NUTS), nuclear retaliation if attacked by conventional weapons, launch on warning, and so on. This comes, of course, in the wake of China's protracted learning and experimentation with almost all Western ideologies: 35 years of its experimentation with Western market capitalism, 65 years after its switch to Western Marxism, and 95 years after its dismay with Western liberalism,⁹⁰ China is searching for its own answer, guideline, and approach for many of its problems and those of the world, including the role of nuclear weapons.

Leadership versus Coexistence

The historical rise, or restoration, of China as a non-Western, nondemocratic, non-Christian or nonwhite major power equipped with an independent nuclear force has recently led to two types of the so-called China leadership issue. One viewpoint is that China is challenging and competing with the United States for world leadership, hence America's much publicized "return" to Asia to reclaim its leadership position.⁹¹ Meanwhile, China is also being accused of avoiding its responsibilities as a major power.⁹²

These criticisms, however, misread China's culturally derived behavior, which focuses on living with, but not leading, others, particularly those nations and peoples with different cultural, historical, political, and economic backgrounds. Moreover, a fair, legitimate, and effective "leadership" should emerge, or be earned. Alternatively, it may be imposed or self-claimed,⁹³ but should not be requested. As a result, China has been rather reluctant to promote or impose its own model of development onto others, no matter how successful it is. Instead, China has insisted that its own approach to development is unique to China but not universal, which is in contrast to the US' aggressive promotion of the Washington Consensus around the world. For these reasons, China has not been receptive to West's talking of the so-called Beijing Consensus, G2, or Chimerica.⁹⁴

At the heart of the so-called leadership issue is the different thinking regarding the necessity and style of leadership. Most American political elites seem unable to distinguish between exercising leadership and domination over other nations.⁹⁵ For the Chinese, a sound domestic system naturally draws the attention and admiration from others. Like a traditional statesman who must be an honest, learned, and family-oriented man before setting out to rule the bigger world (正心、修身、齐家、治国、平天下), a nation deserves the respect of others if it is able to put its own house in order. In this case, China carefully studies experiences of many nations in the world, regardless of the nature of their political systems. In the past 30 years, America has been a role model for many Chinese in many areas. In the twenty-first century, America would be more attractive to the Chinese if it could undergo a "regime change" to reverse the current trends toward overspending consumers, overdrugged populations, overarmed societies, overcrowded jails, overlobbied politics, overpaid CEOs, and excessive use of force around the world. A society that consumes 25 percent of the world's energy and has a quarter of the world's prisoners with less than 5 percent of the world's population⁹⁶ is not a model for others.

From China's perspective, the real challenge is how to be part of the world but not above it, be it in political, economic, or military terms. A rising China, therefore, has largely joined the promising, complex, and imperfect world still dominated by the West. Such a historical and strategic choice, however, may not be possible for America, whose foreign policy toolbox contains only two pieces: isolationism and interventionism. When America is weak, it reverts to its own world; when it is strong, it sets out to shape the

world. There is simply no situation in which the United States would live and work with the existing world, which is full of gray areas.

Conclusion: Back to the Future

For the “China issue,” Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821) had an aphorism, if not a solution: “Let China sleep; when she wakes she will shake the world.” A hundred and ninety four years after his death, this famous aphorism (or cliché, for Sinologists/China experts) by the French military genius is both right AND wrong. He was right because China, indeed, had gone into almost a century-and-a-half “sleep”—a benign word for a prolonged devastation from 1839 to 1979 by wars, defeats, occupation, revolution, civil wars, and political upheaval. Napoleon was wrong, however, to predict that China’s awakening would shake the world, meaning to challenge the West-dominated international system. Thirty years after China unfolded its historical reform in 1979, a strong and stable China—instead of switching between Napoleonic “sleeping” and “shaking” modes—has served as a world factory and has been a stakeholder of the existing international system still dominated by the West. China’s current nuclear posture with limited deterrence and NFU, therefore, can be regarded as part of its identity lost, distorted, and regained.

As a soldier, Napoleon would perhaps understand China’s nuclear posture of strategic clarity (NFU) and tactical ambiguity in a brave new world of US nuclear primacy, missile defense and preemptive strikes. Beyond that, the French military genius would definitely remember China as the world’s biggest economy with nearly a third of the world GDP (in purchasing power parity) but never tempted to drive to Moscow like what he did. Instead, the richest country with the only unbroken civilization in world history⁹⁷ was waiting, unknowingly, for the arrival of the European gunboats. The rest is history. It is anybody’s opinion to consider whether traditional China was smart or stupid at the dawn of the modern world in which might makes right. In the twenty-first century, both China and the West have changed so much, yet so little. Whatever the case, in the era of weapons of mass destruction, and particularly as China and the United States are inching toward strategic distrust,⁹⁸ there is little tolerance for nuclear margin of error. In the longer term, China’s nuclear posture, particularly its NFU policy, stands out as perhaps the only meaningful step toward an eventual build-down and complete ban of nuclear weapons.

Notes

1. For books partially or largely focused on Chinese nuclear weapon programs, see James Mulvenon and David M. Finkelstein, eds., *China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army* (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., 2003), particularly chapter 5 on China’s nuclear doctrine and chapter 6 on PLA’s Second Artillery; Evan Feigenbaum,

China's Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition from the Nuclear to the Information Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Mark A. Stokes, *China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1999); John W. Lewis and Litai Xue, *China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994); Benjamin C. Ostrov, *Conquering Resources: The Growth and Decline of the PLA's Science and Technology Commission for National Defense* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1991); Mark A. Ryan, *Chinese Attitudes towards Nuclear weapons: China and the United States during the Korean War* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1989); Rosita Dellios, *Modern Chinese Defense Strategy* (London: Macmillan, 1989); John W. Lewis and Litai Xue, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); Ellis Joffe, *The Chinese Army after Mao* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987); Chong-Ping Lin, *China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988); Anne Gilks and Gerald Segal, *China and the Arms Trade* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985); Paul H. B. Goodwin, ed., *The Chinese Defense Establishment: Continuity and Change* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983); June T. Dreyer, *China's Military Power in the 1980s* (Washington, DC: China Council of the Asia Society, 1982); Harlan W. Jencks, *From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945–1981* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982); Harvey Nelson, *The Chinese Military System* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980); Morton H. Halperin, *China and the Bomb* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967); Alice Langley Hsieh, *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1962).

For major articles, see Kenneth Allen and Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise, "Implementing PLA Second Artillery Doctrinal Reforms," in James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein, eds., *China's Revolution in doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in then Operational Art of the Chinese People's Liberation Army* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2003), 159–160; Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, "The Chinese Strategic Rocket Forces: Transition to a Credible Deterrence," China and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications for the United States, National Intelligence Council, Conference Report, November 5, 1999; Alastair Iain Johnston, "Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence Versus Multilateral Arms Control," *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 146 (June 1996): 548–576; Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking': The Concept of Limited Deterrence," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/1996): 5–42; John Lewis and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall 1992): 5–40; John W. Lewis, Hua Di, and Xue Litai, "Beijing's Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms-Export Enigma," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Spring 1991): 87–109; John Lewis and Litai Xue, "Strategic Weapons and Chinese Power: The Formative Years," *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 112 (December 1987): 541–554; Paul Godwin, "Changing Concepts of Doctrine, Strategy and Operations in the Chinese People's Liberation Army, 1978–1987," *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 112 (December 1987): 572–590; Jonathan D. Pollack, "Chinese View on the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1964–9," *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 50 (April 1972): 244–271; Morton Halperin, "China and the Bomb—Chinese Nuclear Strategy," *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 21 (March 1965): 46–60; Alice Langley Hsieh, "China's Secret Military Papers: Military Doctrine and Strategy," *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 18 (June 1964): 79–99.

2. Shen Zhijia [沈志华], *苏联专家在中国: 1948–1960* [*Soviet Experts in China: 1948–1960*] (Beijing: 新华出版社 [Beijing: Xinhua Press], 2009), particularly 252–315; Rong Yu and Hong Yuan [荣予、洪源], "从反核威慑战略到最低核威慑战略: 中国核战略演

- 进之路 [The Evolution of China's Nuclear Strategy: From Anti-Nuclear Deterrence to Limited Deterrence],” 当代亚太 [Contemporary Asia-Pacific], No. 3 (2009): 120–132; Chu Shulong and Rong Yu, “China: Dynamic Minimum Deterrence,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia* (Stanford University Press, 2008); Xiaobing Li, *A History of the Modern Chinese Army* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2007), chapter 5, “Building the Missiles and Bombs,” pp. 147–176; Zhu Mingquan [朱明权], 威慑与稳定——中美核关系 [Deterrence and Stability—US-China Nuclear Relationship] (Beijing: 时事出版社 [Public Affairs Press], 2006); Li Bin [李彬], “中国核战略辨析 [Identifying China's Nuclear Strategy],” 世界经济与政治 [World Economics and Politics], No. 9 (2006): 16–22; PLA General Armament Department [解放军总装备部], 两弹一星: 共和国丰碑 [China's Atomic/Hydrogen Bombs and Satellite Programs: Republic's Records of Brilliance] (Beijing: 九州出版社 [Jiuzhou Publisher], 2001); Han Qinggu [韩庆贵], 中国核武器试验追踪 [Tracing the Path of China's Nuclear Tests] (Beijing: 长征出版社 [Long March Publisher], 2000); Xie Guang [谢光] ed., 当代中国的国防科技事业 [Defense Science in Contemporary China] (Beijing: 当代中国出版社 [Contemporary China Publisher], 1992); Li Jue [李觉], et al., eds., 当代中国核工业 [Contemporary Chinese Nuclear Industry] (Beijing: 中国社会科学出版社 [Chinese Social Sciences Publisher], 1988); Ministry of Nuclear Industry [核工业部], 秘密历程: 记我国第一颗原子弹的诞生 [Secret History of China's First Atomic Bomb] (Beijing: 原子能出版社 [Atomic Energy Publisher], 1985); Nie Rongzhen [聂荣臻], 聂荣臻回忆录 [Nie Rongzhen's Memoir] (Beijing: 战士出版社 [Zhanshi Publisher], 1983).
3. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2009,” I, 20, 24–25, www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf (accessed May 19, 2011); “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2010,” I, 35, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf (accessed May 19, 2011).
 4. This “obsession” is clearly seen in the West's study of Chinese military and security policies and behavioral patterns. See Robert Ash, David Shambaugh, and Seiichiro Takagi, eds., *China Watching: Perspectives from Europe, Japan and the United States* (London: Routledge, 2007), 231–235.
 5. John L. Gaddis, *The Long Peace* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
 6. At the July 1945 Potsdam Conference, US president Truman hinted to Stalin that the United States possessed a new destructive weapon. Stalin immediately instructed to speed up Soviet atomic program. See Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–2006*, 10th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 27–28.
 7. For comparison of the Communist and Nationalist forces on the eve of the 1946–1949 Civil War, see Tang Yilu [唐义路], ed., 中国人民解放军全国解放战争史 (第一卷) [History of the National Liberation War of the People's Liberation Army, Vol. 1] (Beijing: 军事科学出版社 [Military Science Press], 1993), 323–338; 中国人民解放军全国解放战争史 (第二卷) [History of the National Liberation War of the People's Liberation Army, Vol. 2] (Beijing: 军事科学出版社 [Military Science Press], 1994), 1–4.
 8. In his speech at the Yan An Cadres Conference [延安干部会] on August 13, 1945, which was a week after Hiroshima, Mao strongly criticized those fears of nuclear weapons and American power as “bourgeois influences” and “weapon determinism.” Citing British general Mountbatten's remark that “the worst possible mistake would be to believe that the atom bomb could end the war in the Far East,” Mao insisted that Soviet entry into the war was the key factor for Japan's surrender. See Mao Tse-Tung, “The Situation and Our Policy After the Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan,” *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, Vol. 4 (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1961), 11–27; Mao Tse-Tung, “Talk with the American Correspondent Anna

Louise Strong," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, Vol. 4 (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1961), 97–102; Zhang Jing [张静], "核武器与新中国60年发展历程 [Nuclear Weapons and 60 Years of the New China]," *当代中国史研究 [Studies of Contemporary Chinese History]*, Vol. 16, No. 5 (September 2009): 216–217.

9. See Rong and Hong, "The Evolution of China's Nuclear Strategy," 127–128.

A different description of China's "first ever" alert was offered by Xia Liping (2010). Accordingly, on August 18, Soviet diplomats in Washington hinted at a nuclear surgical strike against China's nuclear facilities as well as China's political and military centers. In response, China's Second Artillery forces were ordered to be on "combat alert." See Xia Liping [夏立平], "论中国和战略的演进与构成 [On the Structure and Evolution of China's Nuclear Strategy]," *当代亚太 [Contemporary Asian Pacific]* (2010): 124–125.

According to Niall Ferguson, in October 1970, Mao ordered China's top leadership to evacuate Beijing and put the PLA on "first-degree combat readiness." Niall Ferguson, "Dr. K's Rx for China," *Newsweek*, May 15, 2011, www.newsweek.com/2011/05/15/dr-k-s-rx-for-china.html (accessed May 20, 2011).

10. "俄称若美国先发制人核打击能毁灭中国全部核武 [Russia Says U.S. Preemptive Nuclear Strike Able to Destroy All China's Nuclear Weapons]." *环球网 [Global Times Net]*, May 4, 2011, http://mil.gmw.cn/2011-05/04/content_1918021.htm (accessed May 22, 2011).
11. For the Nixon-Kissinger effort to reach out to the Soviets in the early months of the Nixon administration in 1969, see, Patrick Tyler, *A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China* (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), 61–70. According to Tyler, Nixon and Kissinger later tried to create the impression by establishing "an internal government record, ex post facto, that they had opposed Soviet aggression in China all along." See p. 66.
12. See Alexander O. Ghebbard, "The Soviet System of Collective Security in Asia," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 13, No. 12 (1973): 1075–1091.
13. Richard M. Nixon, "Asia after Viet Nam," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (October 1967): 111–125.
14. This refers to the massive relocation of China's key industries from coastal areas to the nation's interior, or *san xian* [三线]. From 1964 to 1980, 1,100 medium- and large-scale projects were implemented. In some years, about two-thirds of China's fixed-asset investment was made to those areas. See "三线建设 [Third-front Construction]," *百度百科 [Baidu Encyclopedia]*, <http://baike.baidu.com/view/798186.htm> (accessed May 20, 2011).
15. Mao reportedly made the statement to his personal doctor. Ferguson, "Dr. K's Rx for China."
16. John Garver and Feiling Wang, "China's Anti-encirclement Struggle," *Asian Security*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2010): 238–261.
17. 刘斌 [Liu Bin], "中国核战略：当变则变 [China's Nuclear Strategy: Change It When Necessary]," *南方周末 [Southern Weekend]*, June 21, 2009, Guangzhou, <http://focus.news.163.com/09/0621/09/5CAQ09PM00011SM9.html> (accessed May 22, 2011); "周边虎狼呈扇形之势，中国与其实力优劣对比 [C-ring Encirclement in China's Periphery: Comparing Power between China and Others]," *环球论坛 [Global Forum]*, June 8, 2011, <http://bbs.huanqiu.com/thread-659149-1-1.html> (accessed May 24, 2011).
18. Major powers such as China, India, Germany, and Russia "cannot augment their military capabilities so as to balance the United States without simultaneously becoming an immediate threat to their neighbors." Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, "American Primacy in Perspective," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 4 (July/August 2002): 24.

19. Litai Xue, "Evolution of China's Nuclear Strategy," in John Hopkins and Weixing Hu, eds., *Strategic Views from the Second Tier: The Nuclear Weapons Policies of France, Britain, and China* (London: Transaction Publishers, 1995), 168 and 181, note 2.
20. For English sources, see Lewis and Xue, *China Builds the Bomb*, particularly chapters 2 and 3, 11–72. For recent Chinese sources, see Xia, "On the Structure and Evolution of China's Nuclear Strategy," 113–127; Zhang Jing, "Nuclear Weapons and 60 Years of the New China," 216–224; Shen Zhihua [沈志华], "援助与限制: 苏联与中国的核武器研, 1949–1960 [Assistance and Restrictions: Soviet Union and China's Nuclear Program Development, 1949–1960]," in Luan Jianghe et al. [栾景河 主编], eds., *中俄关系的历史与现实 [Sino-Russian Relations: History and Reality]* (开封: 河南大学出版社 [Kaifeng: Henan University Press, 2004], 488–521; Zheng Jun [郑军], "中国核力量与核战略 [China's Nuclear Capability and Strategy]," *兵器知识 [Weaponry]*, No. 5 (2002), 40–43.
21. Kang Sheng's role in recruiting overseas Chinese nuclear and rocket scientists was first described in Cong-Pin Lin, *China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy*, cited in Shen Zhihua [沈志华], *Soviet Experts in China: 1948–1960*, 252, note 3; "毛泽东对原子弹的认识: 如何从纸老虎变真老虎 [Mao Zedong Perceived Nuclear Weapons: How Did Paper Tigers Become Real Tiger?]," cited from "中国蘑菇云[China's Mushroom Cloud]," *新闻午报 [News at Noon]*, November 18, 2008, www.qstheory.cn/subject/2014-10-16/c_1112839342.htm, assessed April 13, 2015; Lewis and Xue also recorded the purchase of nuclear lab instruments from Europe, but do not provide the sum of money (Lewis and Xue, *China Builds the Bomb*, 38).
22. See 叶子龙回忆录 [Ye Zilong Memoir] (Beijing: 中国文献出版社 [China Archives Publisher], 2000), 186; *新闻午报 [Noon News Daily]*, 2010; Chen Xiaonan [陈晓楠], "国之大器—当代中国两弹一星事业(一) [The National Endeavor: The Success of Contemporary China's Atomic/Hydrogen Bombs and Satellite Programs, part 1]," *凤凰大视野 [Wide Angle of Phoenix TV]*, April 4, 2011, <http://v.3g.ifeng.com/video/fhtese/fhssy/news?aid=13794503&mid=7phbPV&v=2&vt=2> (accessed May 22, 2011).
23. Lewis and Xue, *China Builds the Bomb*, chapter 2, 11–34.
24. Shen Zhihua [沈志华], *Soviet Experts in China: 1948–1960*, 252–315; Shen Zhihua [沈志华], "Assistance and Restrictions," 488–521.
25. Xia Liping [夏立平], "On the Structure and Evolution of China's Nuclear Strategy," 114; Zhang Jing, "Nuclear Weapons and 60 Years of the New China," 217.
26. *中国人民解放军的70年 [70 Years of the PLA]*, 军事科学院军事历史研究部 [Department of Military History Studies, Academy of Military Science] (Beijing: Military Science Publishers, 1997), 637.
27. *China's National Defense in 2008* accessed May 24, 2011, 38 (Chinese version).
28. The literal translation of "最低核威慑战略" should be "minimum deterrence." This paper adopts the translation and usage by Rong Yu and Hong Yuan who argue that "minimum deterrence" is a loose term due to different criterion by different nuclear powers with different strategic cultures. See Rong and Hong, "The Evolution of China's Nuclear Strategy," 123–130; Li Jiawei [李佳威], "毁灭力量的投送: 解放军二炮的远程导弹 [Delivering a Destructive Force: Long Range Missile of the PLA-Second Artillery]," *中国海军 [The Chinese PLA-Navy]*, February 2, 2010, 36–40.
29. China successfully tested a neutron device in 1988, leading to the development of its low-yield, miniaturized weapons for tactical purposes. See "中国尖端核震撼出世, 中子弹低调成功内幕 [Shocking Insight of China's Most Powerful Nuclear Weapon: Inside Story of China's Low-key Success in Developing Neutron Bombs]," *第三媒体 [The Third Media]*, April 14, 2011, cited from *参考军事网 [Reference Military Web]*, <http://ido.3mt.com.cn/Article/201104/show2175667c30p1.html> (accessed May 24, 2011).

30. Zheng [郑军], "China's Nuclear Capability and Strategy," 40–43; Allen and Kivlehan-Wise, "Implementing PLA Second Artillery Doctrinal Reforms," 159–160.
31. *China's National Defense in 2008*, January 2009, Beijing, www.gov.cn/english/official/200901/20/content_1210227.htm (accessed May 24, 2011), 38–40 (Chinese version).
32. "加强国防力量的重大成就, 保卫世界和平的重大贡献—我国第一颗原子弹爆炸成功 [The Successful Detonation of Our Countryseat First Atomic Bomb: A Great Accomplishment for National Defense and A Major Contribution for Safeguarding World Peace]," *人民日报* [*People's Daily*], October 17, 1964.
33. "2008年中国的国防 [China's National Defense in 2008]," 中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室 [Press Office of the State Council, PRC], January 2009, 38–39, http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2011-01/06/content_4249949.htm (assessed April 10, 2015).
34. "2013年国防白皮书: 中国武装力量的多样化运用 (全文) [China's National Defense in 2013: Multitasking of China's Armed Forces (Full text)]," 中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室 [Press Office of the State Council, PRC], April 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-04/16/c_115403491.htm (accessed September 27, 2014).
35. In 1999 when India tested its first nuclear device, it also declared its no-first-use policy.
36. In his 2010 nuclear posture review, President Obama did rule out the use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countries. The question is if such a position is sustainable, given the strong opposition among Republican lawmakers. "The Nuclear 'Implementation Study,'" *New York Times* editorial, March 12, 2012, A18.
37. Xu Guangyu [徐光裕], "中国核战略基本特征: 有威慑无威胁 [The Essence of China's Nuclear Strategy: Deterrence without Threats]," *解放军报* [*PLA Daily*], April 22, 2010, 003.
38. Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2010," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November 1, 2010, <http://bos.sagepub.com/content/66/6/134.full.pdf+html> (accessed January 10, 2012); "The Nuclear 'Implementation Study,'" *New York Times* editorial, March 12, 2012, A18.
39. For various sources of estimates, see Xia Liping [夏立平], "On the Structure and Evolution of China's Nuclear Strategy," 112; Gregory Kulacki, "China's Nuclear Arsenal: Status and Evolution," Union of Concerned Scientists, May 2011, <http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/UCS-Chinese-nuclear-modernization.pdf> (accessed May 31, 2011).
40. Various Western sources attribute the small number of China's nuclear warheads to China's limited stocks of military plutonium, which is estimated to be adequate for a few to several hundred new warheads. See Kulacki, "China's Nuclear Arsenal: Status and Evolution." The question, then, is how and why China has not greatly expanded its plutonium-producing capability, which is not a technological and financial problem for China.
41. Henry Kissinger, "The Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 91, No. 2 (March/April 2012): 44–55.
42. Sun Xiangli [孙向丽], 2006, "中国核战略性质与特点分析 [China's Nuclear Strategy: Nature and Characters]," *世界政治与经济* [*Journal of World Politics and Economics*], No. 9 (2006): 26 and 28; 2010年中国的国防 [*China's National Defense in 2010*], 中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室 [Press Office of the State Council, PRC], Part 10, Arms Control and Disarmament, March 2011, www.gov.cn/jrzq/2011-03/31/content_1835289.htm (accessed May 30, 2011).
43. See Brad Roberts, Robert A. Manning, and Ronald N. Montaperto, "China: the Forgotten Nuclear Power," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 4 (July/August 2000): 53–63.
44. Sun Xiangli [孙向丽], "China's Nuclear Strategy," 26.

45. “巨浪2导弹研制艰辛：两次成功试射后多次失败 [Difficult R&D for Julang-2: Many Failures after First Two Successful Tests],” *中国航天报* [*China Aviation Daily*], reprinted by *环球时报* [*Global Times*], September 26, 2014, <http://mil.huanqiu.com/china/2014-09/5151908.html> (accessed September 27, 2014).
46. “DF-41 (CSS-X-10) (China), Offensive Weapons,” *Jane’s Defense Weekly*, June 1, 2010, <http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Strategic-Weapon-Systems/DF-41-CSS-X10-China.html> (accessed May 27, 2011); “东风41将改变美对中国认识赢得世界对华尊重 [DF-41 Will Change America’s Perceptions of China and Win World Respect for China],” *环球时报* [*Global Times*], December 19, 2013, <http://mil.huanqiu.com/paper/2013-12/4676402.html> (accessed September 28, 2014).
47. Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 2 (March/April 2006): 42–54.
48. David Goodman, “Microphone Catches a Candid Obama,” *New York Times*, March 27, 2012, 17.
49. Jim Wolf, “U.S. Eyes Missile-Defense Shields for Asia, Mideast,” *Reuters*, March 26, 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/26/usa-asia-missile-idUSL2E8EQDZD20120326> (accessed April 1, 2012).
50. See Allen and Kivlehan-Wise, “Implementing PLA Second Artillery Doctrinal Reforms,” 159–160; Gill and Mulvenon, “The Chinese Strategic Rocket Forces”; Johnston, “Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization.”
51. The US military defines transparency as “providing information about military capabilities and policies that allows other countries to assess the compatibility of those capabilities with a country’s stated security goals.” Isaac Kardon, Ross Rustici, and Phillip Saunders, “China’s 2010 Defense White Paper: No Leap Forward in Transparency,” US National Defense University, April 21, 2011, <http://inssblog.wordpress.com/2011/04/21/chinas-2010-defense-white-paper-no-leap-forward-in-transparency/> (accessed May 24, 2011).
52. Wendell Minnick, “China Speeds ICBM Plans,” *Defense News*, July 10, 2006, http://fsi.stanford.edu/news/experts_judge_likely_effects_of_new_icbm_on_chinas_nuclear_policies_20060807/ (accessed May 24, 2011).
53. See, for example, Kardon, Rustici, and Saunders, “China’s 2010 Defense White Paper”; Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip C. Saunders, “Assessing Chinese Military Transparency,” *China Strategic Perspectives*, No. 1, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington DC: June 2010, <http://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-1.pdf> (accessed April 12, 2015); Dean Cheng, “The Limits of Transparency: China Releases 2010 Defense White Paper,” Heritage Foundation Web Site, Web Memo #3215, April 7, 2011, www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/04/the-limits-of-transparency-china-releases-2010-defense-white-paper (accessed May 25, 2011); Michael S. Chase, “China’s 2010 National Defense White Paper: An Assessment,” *China Brief Volume*, No. 11: 7, Jamestown Foundation Web Site, April 22, 2011, [www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=37839&cHash=e176a7e11e636fd09f1805a83dff95dc](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37839&cHash=e176a7e11e636fd09f1805a83dff95dc) (accessed May 25, 2011).
54. Isaac Kardon, “Parsing the Translation of China’s 2010 Defense White Paper,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, US National Defense University, April 21, 2011, www.ndu.edu/inss/docUploaded/Kardon_DWP%20Chinese-English%20analysis_4-20-11%20FINAL.pdf (accessed May 25, 2011). A reading of Kardon’s comparison and interpretations suggests that he overplays, if not politicizes, the differences between the two versions. Translation is an art, not a mechanical word-by-word conversion.
55. “Full Text of Remarks of Judge James A. Parker, US District Court, New Mexico, at Wen Ho Lee’s plea hearing,” November 28, 2008, www.wenholee.org/apology (accessed May 26, 2011).

56. Scott Neuman, "Clinton: Wiki Leaks 'Tear at Fabric' Of Government," The National PublicRadio (NPR), November 29, 2010, <http://www.npr.org/2010/11/29/131668950/white-house-aims-to-limit-wikileaks-damage> (accessed May 26, 2011).
57. Shen Dingli [沈丁力], director of the American Studies Center of Shanghai's Fudan University who is often regarded as an unofficial spokesman on Chinese nuclear weapons and doctrines, remarked, "We have to keep certain secrets in order to have a war-fighting capability... We can't let Taiwan and the U.S. know how we are going to defeat them if the U.S. decides to send forces to intervene in a conflict over Taiwan." Cited from Richard Fisher, *China's Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach* (Westport: Praeger, 2008), 13.
58. According to China's estimate, the United States has sold US\$40 billion worth of arms to Taiwan since the 1979 normalization of diplomatic relations. The two most recent sales (2008 and 2010) amount to US\$12.8 billion. Cited from Xiong Zhengyan [熊争艳], "浮沉三十年: 求破中美军事关系怪圈 [30 Years of Ups and Downs: How to Break the Strange Cycle of Sino-U.S. Military Relations]," *环球杂志 [Global Journal]*, May 26, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/globe/2011-05/26/c_13895075.htm (accessed May 26, 2011).
59. Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, "Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust," Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 2012.
60. *Xinhua*, "China Sticks to No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons: White Paper," March 31, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/31/c_13806909.htm (accessed May 26, 2011).
61. David e. Sanger and Peter Baker, "Obama Limits When U.S. Would Use Nuclear Arms," *The New York Times*, April 5, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/world/06arms.html (accessed May 26, 2011).
62. "The Test Ban Treaty," *New York Times* editorial, May 24, 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/05/25/opinion/25mon1.html (accessed May 26, 2011).
63. The Chinese government proposed in 1963 a comprehensive, thorough, and complete ban of nuclear weapons. See Xia Liping [夏立平], "On the Structure and Evolution of China's Nuclear Strategy," 124.
64. Zhu Mingquan [朱明权], "部分核禁试谈判过程中的 '中国因素'—历史的回忆与思考 [The "China Factor" in the Limited Ban Talks: Historical Recollection and Thoughts]." June 28, 2006, cited from *政治学论文网 [Political Science Papers Web]*, <http://politics.csscipaper.com/china/chinadiplomacy/24041.html> (accessed May 30, 2011).
65. See Shen Zhihua [沈志华], *Soviet Experts in China: 1948–1960*, 276.
66. The following discussion is based on 2010 年中国的国防 [*China's National Defense in 2010*], March 2011 (accessed May 30, 2011); Sun Xiangli [孙向丽], "China's Nuclear Strategy," 27.
67. Thucydides, "The Mellan Dialogue," reprinted in Richard K. Betts, ed., *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 2002), 38.
68. The coming of the West meant not just military defeat, economic loss, humiliation, and extraterritoriality (foreigners were above and beyond China's law in China), but a complete change of the rules of the game. That is, the West ended China's unique cultural mechanism interfacing with its neighbors for thousands of years. Within this traditional setting, there was no equality between the "central kingdom" and others. But the system functioned with a remarkable "aloofness" on the part of China, in that the "center" had little interest or willingness in managing the internal affairs of the "tributary states." Confucianism, therefore, was exceptionally consistent in its domestic and foreign policy of hierarchy, order, and rule by virtue. For the aloofness of China from the internal affairs of its neighbors, see Harry Harding,

- “China’s Co-operative Behavior,” in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 375–400. In contrast, the modern Western interstate system of the 1648 Westphalia Treaty recognized the sovereignty and equality among nation-state, but only in principle. In reality, it was a system based on the power and the social-Darwinism principle of “survival of the fittest,” which justifies the territorial expansion of the West in modern times. The two different types of international systems led to vastly different results. While most of the 500 European states vanished in the next 200 years, most East Asian states were able to preserve their territorial and cultural identities all the way to modern times. See David Kang, *China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 36–41.
69. See Niall Ferguson, *Civilization: The West & the Rest* (New York: Penguin Press, 2011).
 70. See the chapter by John Owen in this volume.
 71. The original wording is “核力量是中国武装力量的重要支柱和重要组成部分之一，但不会作为中国国防力量的基石和核心。” See Xia Liping [夏立平], “On the Structure and Evolution of China’s Nuclear Strategy,” 121.
 72. Liu Yan [刘艳], “中国近期密集大规模军演 火力齐开显示不惧威胁 [China’s Recent Military Exercises: High Frequency and Large Scale: China Cannot be Threatened],” 中国新闻网 [China News Net], September 28, 2014, <http://mil.huanqiu.com/china/2014-09/5153436.html> (accessed September 28, 2014).
 73. “2013 年国防白皮书：中国武装力量的多样化运用（全文） [China’s National Defense in 2013: Multitasking of China’s Armed Forces (Full text)],” 中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室 [Press Office of the State Council, PRC], April 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-04/16/c_115403491.htm (accessed September 27, 2014).
 74. There were two “exceptions” in this regard. In 1996 and 2005, two PLA generals, General Xiong Guangkai [熊光楷] and General Zhu Chenghu [朱成虎], reportedly stated that China could respond in kind to a US nuclear strike in the event of a Taiwan conflict. The Chinese side dismissed the statements as representing only the personal, not official, view regarding China’s NFU nuclear strategy. In both cases, statements by individual PLA officers were directed at deepening US involvement in the Taiwan issue. In 1996, Xiong made the statement at the height of the Taiwan Strait crises after Lee Tenghui’s US visits. In 2005, Zhu’s statement was made in response to the leaked Pentagon’s “Blair Witch Project” for defending Taiwan, which is said to cover scenarios ranging from conventional to nuclear wars with the PRC. For details, see Alexandra Harney, Demetri Sevastopulo, and Edward Alden, “Top Chinese General Warns US over Attack,” *Financial Times*, July 15, 2005, www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/28cfe55a-f4a7-11d9-9dd1-00000e2511c8.html#axzz1xMAVb0FD (accessed June 10, 2012); Richard Halloran, “Taiwan,” *Parameters* (Spring 2003), US Army War College, 22–34, www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/Articles/03spring/halloran.htm (accessed June 10, 2012); Zhen Jinxue [甄尽雨], “从朱成虎的谈话看中国核战略的变化 [Changes in China’s Nuclear Strategy according to Conversation with Zhu Chenghu],” August 4, 2005 www.laocanmou.com/zj/aqyzl/zg/gfdx/zch/sztx/200608/zj_20060821001429.html (accessed May 31, 2011).
 75. Lieber and Press, “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy.”
 76. Richard Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 3 (May/June 2008): 44–56.
 77. See 刘斌 [Liu Bin], “China’s Nuclear Strategy”; “周边虎狼呈扇形之势，中国与其实力优劣对比 [C-Ring Encirclement in China’s Periphery: Comparing Power Between China and Others],” 2011; Zhen Jinxue [甄尽雨], “从朱成虎的谈话看中国核战略的变化 [Conversation with Zhu Chenghu],” 2005, www.laocanmou.com/zj/aqyzl/zg/gfdx/zch/sztx/200608/zj_20060821001429.html (accessed May 31, 2011); Wei Guoan

- [魏国安], “中国该奉行什么核战略 [What Nuclear Strategy Should China Follow]? ” 环球时报 [Global Times], March 6, 2009, world.huanqiu.com/roll/2009-03/395341.html (accessed May 31, 2011); Sun Xiangli [孙向丽], “China’s Nuclear Strategy,” 26.
78. See Xia Min [夏旻], “孙子的慎战思想与中国核战略文化 [Sun Tzu’s Thinking of Boeieing for Prudence in War and China’s Nuclear Strategic Culture],” 滨州学院学报 [Journal of Binzhou College], Vol. 24, No. 5 (October 2007): 121–124; Liu Huaqiu [刘华秋], “孙子兵法与当代核威慑理论 [Sun Tzu’s Art of War and Contemporary Nuclear Deterrence Theories],” in Yu Rubo, et al., [于汝波等], eds., “孙子”新论集粹: 第二届孙子兵法国际研讨会论文选 [New Analyses of Sun Tzu: Collection of Papers of the Second International Symposium of Sun Tzu’s Art of War] (Beijing: Long March Publisher, 1992), 210–216.
 79. Sun Tzu, 孙子兵法 [Sun Tzu, Art of War], trans. Lionel Giles, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_70db1e7f0100ri6t.html (accessed May 26, 2011).
 80. Ibid.
 81. See Mark Schneider, “The Nuclear Doctrine and Forces of the People’s Republic of China,” United States Nuclear Strategy Forum, No. 7, November 2007, 6, www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Current%20Publications/PDF/China%20nuclear%20final%20pub.pdf (accessed May 26, 2011).
 82. Kang, *China Rising*.
 83. Wang Yiwei, “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power,” *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 616, No. 1 (March 2008): 257–273, <http://ann.sagepub.com/content/616/1/257.full.pdf> (accessed May 31, 2011).
 84. Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?: Toward Diplomacy for the 21st Century* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 19–20, and 30.
 85. Steven Hook, *US Foreign Policy: The Paradox of World Power* (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2005), 296.
 86. Turkey has been an associate member of the EU since 1963. Despite decades of talks for a formal membership, Turkey is unlikely to join the EU in the near future given the unfavorable public opinion among EU population largely because of a thinly disguised race factor in the name of “religion.” See “Turkey and the European Union: The Ever Lengthening Road,” *The Economist*, December 7, 2006, http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displaystory.cfm?subjectid=682266&story_id=8381644 (accessed May 31, 2011).
 87. Huntington cited William Lind, Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clashes of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993): 23.
 88. See Samuel P. Huntington, “The West Unique, Not Universal,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 6 (November/December 1996): 28–46.
 89. The 2014 Ferguson riot indicates that race relations in the United States have changed so much (election of a black president) and yet so little. David Carr, “View of #Ferguson Thrust Michael Brown Shooting to National Attention,” *The New York Times*, August 17, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/18/business/media/view-of-ferguson-thrust-michael-brown-shooting-to-national-attention.html?_r=0 (accessed September 28, 2014); Leonard Pitts Jr., “A Tale of Two Countries—Jefferson County’s Assault on U.S. History,” *The Miami Herald*, September 28, 2014, <http://www.sacbee.com/2014/09/28/6738903/leonard-pitts-jr-a-tale-of-two.html> (accessed September 28, 2014).
 90. Before 1919, most Chinese intelligentsia believed that the only way to national salvation was total Westernization, or to learn from “Mr. Science” and “Mr. Democracy.” At Versailles in 1919, however, Chinese delegates soon discovered that their goal of regaining national sovereignty was dashed by a secret treaty between Japan and

European democracies to transfer the German concession of Shandong to Japan, not back to China. Between the two Asian allies, Western democracies chose the stronger at the expense of the weaker. The May 4, 1919, demonstrations across China decisively turned proliberal intellectual sentiment into one of anti-imperialism and nationalism.

91. In January 2012, President Obama unveiled a new strategic plan designed to articulate US defense priorities for the coming decade, that is, a “*rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region*” (italics in original), which is widely described as a US “pivot” toward Asia, or specifically, to use US military might, political influence, and economic power to check the rise of China. Alex M. Parker, “With Leaner Military, a New Focus on China: Obama Announces Shift in Size of Military—and Geographic Focus towards Asia,” *USNews*, January 5, 2012, www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/01/05/with-leaner-military-a-new-focus-on-china (accessed April 1, 2012).
92. *MSNBC News Service*, “Obama to China: Behave like ‘Grown Up’ Economy,” November 14, 2011, www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45283979/ns/politics-white_house/t/obama-china-behave-grown-economy/#.T3fKfNk0iSo (accessed April 1, 2012); Chen Dingding, “China Is No International Security Free Rider,” *The Diplomat*, August 13, 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/china-is-no-international-security-free-rider/> (accessed September 28, 2014).
93. Former US secretary of state Albright is famous for claiming that the United States is “the indispensable” nation/leader of the world. See Melissa Grannetino, Sarah Wiley, and Alex Walling, “Former Secretary of State Pays Visit to the Hill,” *Denisonian.com*, April 19, 2011, <http://media.www.denisonian.com/media/storage/paper1253/news/2011/04/19/News/Former.Secretary.Of.State.Pays.Visit.To.The.Hill-3994494.shtml> (accessed May 31, 2011).
94. Joshua Cooper Ramo, *The Beijing Consensus* (London: The Foreign Policy Center, 2004); Fred Bergsten, “Two’s Company,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 88, No. 5 (September/October 2009); Fred Bergsten, *The United States and the World Economy* (Washington DC: Peterson Institute, 2005); Niall Ferguson, *Civilization: The West & the Rest* (New York: Penguin Press, 2011).
95. Former president Bill Clinton stated in the 2008 Democratic Party Convention that the United States should lead by the power of example, but not example of power. Henry Kissinger also juxtaposes two ways with which America relates to the rest of the world: running an empire or being a leader. Both prefer leading to dominating. Neither, however, would envision a world without American “leadership.” Being equal with others is not an option. See NPR, “Transcript: Bill Clinton’s Prime-Time Speech,” August 27, 2008, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=94045962> (accessed June 10, 2012); Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* chapter one, 17.
96. Adam Liptak, “Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations: Tough Laws and Long Terms Create Gap,” *New York Times*, April 23, 2008, 1. Also see Godfrey Hodgson, *The Myth of American Exceptionalism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), chapter 5, 128–154.
97. According to Kenneth Lieberthal, the extraordinary length of time of the Chinese traditional system had lasted, from the first unified dynasty of Qin (221–206 BC), to the last Qing (1911 AD), “as if, in Western terms, the Roman empire had evolved but nevertheless survived into the twentieth century.” See Kenneth Lieberthal, *Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform*, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), 4.
98. Lieberthal and Wang, “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust,” vi.

Conclusion: The United States, China, and World Order

Wang Jisi and Zhu Feng

Introduction

The research presented in this book seeks to uncover different preferences that guide the United States and China in their views and handling of the world order, through its analysis of the “basket three” variables—ideas, traditions, and historical experience. Viewed against the backdrop of the rise of China and the evolving relationship between the United States and China, this research offers clues into the future interactions between these two countries and, ultimately, in the role that their relations will play in the evolution of the world order. The chapters provide portraits of how China and the United States think about world order, as that thinking emerges out of each country’s distinctive past. Together, the book seeks to construct a sweeping portrait of US-China ideas and foreign policy orientations and their implications for the evolution of the current international order.

The 12 essays included by scholars from the United States and China offer insights into the foreign policy ideas, traditions, and historical legacies of the two countries. These essays cover six important practical areas: sovereignty; global security; the global governance system; economics, finance, and trade; energy and natural resources usage; and the control and reduction of nuclear weapons. On each of these topics, one American scholar and one Chinese scholar¹ have offered an account, presented through the prism of their country’s historical experience, ideas, and preferences. By drawing comparisons on these issues, we hope that we can clearly observe the differences in the competing perceptions and experiences between the United States and China, with regard to the rules and institutions of the world order. Regardless of the lingering divergence between Washington and Beijing, the convergence of their interests in maintaining stability and the forward progress of the liberal world order has begun to gain real momentum since China’s entrance into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, a linchpin of this order. The argument that the US-China relationship is too big to fail is now more convincing than ever before. Yet,

there remain more questions than answers about China's future.² Many Chinese believe that American policy toward China will be an important factor in shaping China's future. The key challenge here is not to find ways to include China in this order, but to find ways for both powers to collaboratively enhance the desirability and feasibility of this order for themselves and the rest of the world.

A Conversation between Our Authors

The 12 chapters in this book are not only balanced between American and Chinese authors, but also balanced in their objective assessments of the role basket three factors play in shaping the outlook and foreign policy of the world's two greatest powers. Taken together, these chapters trace the influence of US and Chinese political traditions and culture through their origins, China's traditional Confucian culture and America's liberal democracy; to the formative periods, China's "century of humiliation" and the American experience during the two world wars; up to the present day in the post-Cold War era of fading American unipolarity. While these chapters seek to elucidate the impact of ideas, traditions, and historical experiences on both countries' approach to the international system, these authors have also examined the role that basket one (power) and basket two (domestic interests) variables play in shaping mainstream and elite views of how their countries should act on the world stage and the foreign policy outcomes of these variables.

From the collective narrative these authors have woven, the reader is left with a succession of theories, evidence, conclusions, predictions, implications, and policy recommendations that quickly turn into more questions than answers about the future of US-China relations. This volume's intention is to guide the reader through the underlying dynamics, interests, and beliefs that will factor into the relationship between these countries and shape the world in the twenty-first century.

The impact of both countries' founding ideologies and views of sovereignty is evident throughout both nations' approach to nearly all aspects discussed in this volume. *Tianxia*, the traditional Chinese concept of the international system as a unitary and hierarchical celestial system encompassing the known world, as explained by Fei-Ling Wang in Chapter 2, was a powerful influence on imperial China's foreign policy but was largely discarded after 1840. Weixing Hu and Ming Wan argue that China has abandoned its ancient philosophy when it comes to economic and environmental policies, respectively, for a Western discourse. While Wan argues that China's adoption of Western ideas enables the United States and China to share common views on environmental action, Hu contends that the two countries have divergent forms of capitalism. Jianwei Wang believes China's concept of *tianxia* is incompatible with the concept of collective security, but finds this irrelevant since China's policy is largely dictated by interests. Most importantly, the belief in Chinese exceptionalism embedded in *tianxia* has continued to shape China's foreign policy into the modern day.

The United States has retained more of its original principles. Whereas China's changes were very much a Western-induced shock, the United States has evolved on issues of economic policy and sovereignty over time. Jeffrey Legro's discussion of American concepts of exceptionalism and sovereignty reappear throughout the US-focused chapters. Stewart Patrick sees the founding ideals of liberalism and exceptionalism in US views of the United Nations while John Owen finds the influence of national-security liberalism throughout the US isolationist and multilateral periods. However, Michael Mastanduno contends that the United States has become more involved in the international economic system after its initial mercantilist and isolationist phase and Daniel Drezner similarly argues that it has gradually accepted international economic norms over time.

According to Legro and Fei-Ling Wang, the founders of both countries were concerned with outside intervention and thus exalted sovereignty as a bedrock principle of their foreign policy. However, while the US version of sovereignty was split between "own sovereignty" and "other sovereignty," China's safeguarding of sovereignty has generally been consistent through all dimensions of its foreign policy. Yet Jianwei Wang finds that Beijing appears to be gradually accepting international norms of collective security overriding sovereignty when it does not threaten Chinese interests. Many of the authors find a danger in their countries overvaluing sovereignty in a return to the failed protectionist and isolationist policies of the interwar years, encouraging both countries to instead become more engaged in strengthening the international system.

The United States and China share many more similarities and common interests than differences, but both fail to emphasize their commonalities in a productive way to strengthen strategic mutual trust. While these two countries share a very different founding mythology, they both embraced an ardently anti-imperialist, isolationist, and mercantilist foreign policy in their early years only to transition to a supporter of collective security and free trade as a vital member of the global community. Both countries use all aspects of their national power—military, economic, and political—to achieve policy objectives, such as military means for political purposes. Both countries draw upon the failure of isolationist periods in their history—the later Ming dynasty and the interwar period—to demonstrate the need for continued engagement in the international order to secure their interests. Mastanduno finds that the United States had its own version of "peaceful rise" and only later moved away from its mercantilist state-interventionist tendencies when its economy became more competitive. America's history and current actions serve not only as a roadmap for China but also a legitimating factor when China works outside or against international institutions, especially ones touted by the United States, suggesting the United States should be cognizant of the legacy of its own history and the example it now sets for China.

The fact that the United States and China now stand alone above the rest of the international community is both a blessing and a curse for other states. Legro notes that both countries' reverence for their own sovereignty above all else may drive them to collude to avoid international obligations

that they see as detrimental to their interests, such as climate change regulations. Wan suggests that the United States and China can exploit the other to oppose climate change negotiations to the detriment of the world community, such as Drezner's finding that they colluded to sidestep the Kyoto Protocol in 2005. Joshua Busby contends that they may repeat this collusion by seeking bilateral agreements on environmental issues separate from multilateral action, but agrees with Wan that this may be one possible avenue for cooperation on a nonsensitive area to build strategic trust.

One prominent question is whether China will follow the example of America's rise in the international system by increasingly asserting its power to become an active rule-setter and no longer be a passive rule-taker. As China's interests grow increasingly complex, will China begin to engage more selectively in multinational fora and scale back its multilateral diplomacy in favor of pursuing its own national interests unburdened with the responsibilities of collective security and international norms? Drezner's discussion of "forum-shopping" and Mastanduno's "privilege-taking" as ways the United States leverages its dominance to influence the international economic system provide a roadmap for similar Chinese action. Many of the Chinese authors see China as reactively embracing many of the international norms and integrating itself into the institutions and frameworks that were thrust upon Beijing against its will, after having no influence over their creation or structure. They conclude that China isn't interested in changing the international order but rather in maximizing and leveraging its growing interests to shape the existing order to further its interests, at least for the time being. Fei-Ling Wang believes that China's elites will seek to "replace the United States...but still preserve the Westphalia system," although China's embrace of the system is "selective and potentially reversible." Jianwei Wang believes that China still seeks a multipolar world and would even accept constraints on its own power in order to further limit US unilateral tendencies, but may develop a double standard for intervention like the United States. Hu states that China has already successfully integrated into the international economic system and is more open than the United States and England were during their development, but Beijing will naturally seek to influence the system for its benefit. Yang Yao does not foresee China engaging in rule-making, since it is focused on maximizing its interests within the current international economic system. Wan sees China's resistance to binding international environmental regulations not as ideological opposition but as harkening back to the West's own development-first economic policies of the nineteenth century, similarly driven by power politics. Legro concludes that the globalization of US interests and military challenges that accompanied its rise eventually led the US government to sacrifice some of its "own sovereignty" beliefs in return for greater security through collective security treaties and economic accords, after several failed attempts to break free of the isolationist mentality, suggesting China may follow the same path toward even greater integration.

Widespread perception amongst Chinese elite of a relative US decline toward a multipolar world suggests China will have the space it needs to expand its diplomatic influence within the current system, but will China be able to capitalize on this moment? Both US and Chinese authors were in general agreement that the United States has stopped leading the international community, usually dated to the mid-1990s, and most saw a role for renewed US leadership. Mastanduno believes that the United States needs to reassert its economic leadership by further integrating China into the global economy and continue to provide common goods for the international community, or else China will be left to secure its economic interests on its own through military means, which will raise the chances of future US-China conflict. Weixing Hu states that the United States must stay engaged in the international economic system but should create space for China to shape future reforms of the system, such as the IMF and World Bank, since the world cannot afford to return to the interwar years of isolationism. Drezner notes that the George W. Bush administration did allow China more influence in the IMF and other international economic institutions, suggesting the United States is comfortable ceding some influence to China to keep it within the system. Yet Drezner pinpoints a possible source of tension as the conflicting historical institutionalism in both countries' economic policy. Busby echoes these calls for renewed US leadership in his discussion of environmental policy, as China's domestic environmental lobby may be emboldened to push China's leaders after the United States passes domestic legislation.

The United Nations will be a critical focus of how the United States and China navigate their complex interests in the coming years. Patrick and Jianwei Wang both find possible tension in the future of the United Nations as it relates to the utility and criteria for intervention and sanctions. Another source of tension will be whether China will continue to work within the United Nations or begin to exercise more of its power by abandoning the collective security framework when its core interests are challenged, like the United States increasingly does. In order to cope with this tension, Patrick recommends the United States pursue "minilateralism," namely a combination of multilateralism, unilateralism, and regional cooperation, as in the case of Libya. He concludes that expanding UN peacekeeping forces is one path for greater US-China cooperation in the United Nations. Patrick recommends the two countries endorse the enlargement of the UN Security Council to maintain its legitimacy in an era of shifting power balances and reassure the world about China's strategic intentions. Jianwei Wang recommends cooperation based on nuclear nonproliferation. The editors suggest that the United States and China should discuss tacit criteria for unilateral action based on dire threats to core interests in order to avoid future conflicts as their interests likely intertwine in the coming years. Outside of the collective security framework, Yu Bin contends that the United States' lack of a no-first-use policy for its nuclear weapons will be a source of tension in the relationship as the United States pushes for increased transparency and eventually arms control with China.

The history of the ideology-fueled Cold War raises worries that the United States and China may be headed toward a showdown of competing models for the international system, yet the authors find little evidence to support these fears. As explained by Owen, while the US belief in exceptionalism and national security liberalism does lead to democracy promotion abroad, especially in the face of ideological competition, the lack of a “China model” ready for export to other countries suggests that the current US-China rivalry lacks an ideological component. Legro and Fei-Ling Wang both find strong currents of exceptionalism in US and Chinese worldviews, but see room for cooperation over ideological competition. Hu predicts potential conflict arising not from a communism versus capitalism dichotomy but rather competition between two different forms of capitalism—a Chinese version of Listian “state-led international competitive strategy” and the liberal economics of the United States. Owen traces the possible ideological tension to the US political philosophy of national-security liberalism, since it drives suspicion of non-democracies, including China, and leads to hedging and democracy promotion abroad. This in turn raises Chinese suspicions of US intentions, which the United States cannot understand since it believes this skepticism must be driven by a desire for power. He finds that the United States favors other liberal democracies, especially in times of ideological competition, so avoiding a repeat of Cold War tensions is critical to avoiding a negative cycle of mutual suspicion. In order to build mutual trust through cooperation, Owen finds that the United States must share common interests to sustain a relationship with a nondemocracy, so he recommends US-China cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation and possibly even a cyber-arms control treaty. Yu Bin contends that the ideological divide is between China’s emphasis on diversity in global affairs against the US emphasis on sameness, but concludes that the lack of a “China model” means Beijing is only interested in ending Western dominance of the international system, not the system itself. Fei-Ling Wang predicts possible tension between the West’s universal values and the resurgent *tianxia* system, unless *tianxia* can be stripped of its Sino-centric elements to make a new concept of “neo-*tianxia*-ism” with global values based on Western principles of democracy and the rule of law.

Both domestic political systems present challenges for better US-China cooperation and are in urgent need of serious reforms. Many of the US authors trace US difficulties with multilateral diplomacy and the lack of global leadership to the US political system, both its institutional structure and increasingly “toxic partisanship.” Mastanduno blames the loss of the “responsible middle” of the US polity for the lack of US leadership on economic issues, and Patrick and Busby cite the unusually high bar for Senate ratification of treaties as an impediment toward multilateral collective security and environmental efforts, respectfully. Busby contends that the US domestic paralysis inhibits any new environmental legislation at home, and this lack of US leadership has caused the international movement to stall. He recommends the United States pass new legislation as a foundation for

future global action to spur China's own domestic environmental lobby, though Wan notes tensions remain over climate change regulation. In a similar light, Fei-Ling Wang notes that the Chinese state's dominance of history education and the education system as a whole feed China's misplaced belief in the *tianxia* system, which is favorable to the ruling elite but not the country since it is "fundamentally incompatible with market economy, equitable human rights and civil rights, and rule of law," as well as the current Westphalia system. Jianwei Wang believes Chinese domestic politics complicates China's support for the United Nations, especially on issues relating to recognition of Taiwan. Drezner believes that China must reform the structure of its domestic financial and trade institutions in order to allow China to shift toward more of a consumption-led growth model with pro-business lobbies, echoing Hu's calls for greater domestic political reform to spur further integration into the international economic system. While unmentioned by the authors, factional politics within China's political elite may worsen over time and eventually jeopardize the Chinese political system.

Improved mutual understanding by dispelling persistent myths will lessen the ideological aspect to the future US-China competitive rivalry. According to Yao, China's remarkable economic success was not driven by state capitalism but rather by following the Washington Consensus by enacting deregulation, market liberalization, and a less involved state hand in the economy. Yao asserts that the more the West approaches China as a monolithic entity, not a normal state with domestic politics and interests groups, the more this will alienate China and problematize cooperation on economic issues. Hu dispels the myth that China is not living up to its responsibilities to the WTO and also dismisses the false dichotomy of China as a mercantilist or free trade power. What was often left unsaid in these chapters, but undoubtedly needed to avoid increasing tensions by repairing strategic mutual trust, is the oft-repeated call for increased US-China dialogue across the board, especially on sensitive issues and military affairs.

Identity, Power, and the "Sinicization" of World Order?

The differences between US and Chinese conceptions of the future world order are obvious. A key objective of this book is to clearly identify and explain such differences. Interestingly, there are two synonymous concepts in English to portray Chinese views of the world: one is "Sinicized" and the other is "Chinese." We can see that the Chinese way of looking at sovereignty, international security, and world order remains highly "Chinese," but "Sinicization" is no longer relevant.³

The Sinicization standpoint stems from China's experience of being a latecomer to the modern international order. Prior to the Opium War of 1840, Chinese people had not joined the Westphalian nation-state system, but rather lived in an East Asian hierarchical order centred around

the tribute system. To a large degree, this Sinicized perspective originates from Chinese tradition and culture.⁴ This is a national perception that has formed over a period of 2,000 years, founded upon Chinese philosophical thought about world order, *tianxia*, and reflects the traditional Chinese societal structure. As Fei-Ling Wang's chapter shows, there is some amount of Chinese nostalgia for this "all-under-heaven" view of the world, a phase redolent of Sino-centrism. Along with the other authors, the editors believe that this all-under-heaven system has all but disappeared since the demise of the Qing Dynasty. This Chinese world order was based neither on a geographic perception, nor on racial elements. It was the relation to and acceptance of the Sino-centric civilization that determined the position of people and countries within the order.⁵ China's history after the Opium War witnessed the breakdown of this order as China looked comparatively "uncivilized" and backward when it encountered the Western world. Given China's huge scale and rich culture, however, Chinese views of the world order today remain very Chinese, not the fully Sinicized notions but still carrying ideational legacies from the past.

While this Chinese view of the world order is not unchangeable, it is very unlikely that China would be able to "rule the world" given China's huge domestic and political dynamics.⁶ Drawing from China's long history, the power and resources of imperial rulers were normally exerted largely on trying to control the great tracts of land they already held, though dynasties did occasionally expand to conquer threatening or beneficial neighbors. China rarely, if ever, directed its territorial ambitions outside of the larger Asian region.⁷

In contemporary China, it is more accurate to call Chinese perceptions of the world order as those of a "*guanxi wang*," or relationship system. Similar to Chinese society's emphasis on *guanxi*, heavily formulated around relationships and transactional exchanges, China's diplomacy can likewise be defined as "transactional diplomacy."⁸ In contrast to the traditional Chinese world order based on Sino-centric cultural values and principles, Chinese diplomacy is now largely driven by interests, along with basket three variables. While China does have espoused principles for its diplomacy, highlighted by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence first established in the 1950s, these are ultimately subservient to China's interests and have yet to form a coherent grand strategy for the Chinese government.⁹

The transition from a Sinicized world view to a Chinese outlook on the world order is a reflection of China's progress toward a modern, diverse, and pluralist system. Today's China is a dedicated student of Western civilization, an enthusiastic participant and an active contributor to the Western-centric international system. Yet this engagement is always directed by China's interests and ideas, creating a Chinese approach to the Western-centric international system. This Chinese approach often drives China's selectiveness and hesitation, and is confounded by popular calls for inheriting China's own civilization. The fundamental reason for the success of China's economic reform over the past 30 years is China's willingness

to comprehensively and profoundly adapt itself to a previously unfamiliar system, one that China suffered humiliation at the hands of, but one that a newly strengthened China must integrate into.

China does not seem to be an earnest “follower” of the West, leading to Western apprehensions over how China will behave as its growing power increasingly allows it to shape the international system, long maintained by Western powers. China’s future behavior in the international system will be partly determined by the outcome of China’s ongoing domestic transformation toward market economy and democratization. For now, Beijing remains more accustomed to an authoritarian system to manage its political evolution. China’s basic perception of the world order still retains some unique characteristics that stem from its desire for an international order that is organized around the building and cultivation of *guanxi*, yet has not returned to a Sinocized *tianxia* conception of the world order.

China’s preference for a *guanxi* system will persist until a more mature democracy and civil society emerges at home. Until then, China’s political elites will continue to regard the international society as fundamentally a state-centric system in which nonstate and transnational actors, such as NGOs, ethnic groups, religious groups, and multinational corporations are subordinated to national governments. As a result, when Beijing conducts its foreign relations today, it focuses, and depends, on traditional diplomatic tools that may change the behavior of other states by way of establishing *guanxi*. The relevance and importance of other factors and actors are weighed by their perceived *guanxi* with the current governments.

In China’s foreign relations vocabulary, distinctions between different “categories of states” that so often crop up in the West, such as “democratic states” and “nondemocratic states,” and “rogue states,” among others, simply do not exist. Instead, China categorizes states based on their national power and importance to China, such as “major powers” and “developing countries.” The basic model that China uses to manage its foreign relations is to primarily take into account the strength of its relationship with the state in question. China does not pay overt attention to the domestic political systems of these countries or their international behavior. China’s assessment rests on whether or not the country is willing to maintain good relations, or *guanxi*, with China and engage in mutually beneficial cooperation.

This doesn’t mean that China has no sense of morality in its foreign relations. Although this issue has been the focus of much controversy, China’s voting record in the United Nations indicates that, generally speaking, China has been increasingly inclined toward international norms that are prevalent in the post-Cold War era. It has played a part in the implementation of common human rights initiatives, as well as in humanitarian intervention. On the Iranian nuclear issue, for example, China has maintained good diplomatic cooperation with the United States and Europe. However, when compared to the United States, China clearly has a very Chinese view of the importance of moral issues in determining its foreign policy practice. This is not only embodied in China’s stance on international human rights

regimes, but it is also revealed in how China handles the phenomenon of “immorality” in international affairs. One good example of this is China’s fervent opposition to Western military intervention in Syria. Beijing also opposed United Nations condemnation of North Korea’s human rights record. In fact, China’s engagement with international institutions has illustrated that the country could be increasingly receptive to international norms as it embraces an indispensable process of “socialization.”¹⁰

Behind China’s perception of a world order as a “*guanxi* system,” there also lies, of course, Chinese diplomatic pragmatism. After the end of the Cold War, China’s socialist ideology and one-party system often made China seem like an outsider in international society. Its domestic political system and value-orientation obviously deviate from the broader trend of global democratization, which means that a rising China often faces international criticism about its human rights situation, media censorship, lack of individual freedom, and a host of other issues. Beijing does understand that the stagnation of China’s democratization not only harms its international reputation and weakens its soft power, but also means that a rising China will always be a target for criticism and reproach in the international system. Democratization is a long way off in China, making it difficult to include the promotion of universal human rights values as an important facet of Chinese foreign policy. Therefore, advocating a world order based on a *guanxi* system reflects China’s domestic rigidity and suits the practical needs of the Chinese government, which currently lacks domestic political legitimacy in its foreign policy values. Thus a *guanxi* system in the Chinese view of the world is quite utilitarian and perennial but not necessarily perpetual. This “narrative historicism” is also an important reason why Chinese leaders put forward the idea of the “democratization of international relations” in the 1990s and promoted their “harmonious world” policy in the early few years of the twenty-first century.¹¹ However, regardless of whether China’s worldview is based on its culture and tradition or its pragmatism in foreign relations, the real issue is the extent to which the *guanxi* system world order, advocated by an increasingly influential China, will clash with the “norm-centric system,” advocated by the United States. Will the future world order be a clash between the two opposing views of order as represented by the United States and China? This book offers a cautiously optimistic response to this question.

There is no doubt that China has its own Chinese perception of world order. This Chinese worldview had not disturbed the international community over the last six decades, if only because China has not until recently had sufficient power to change and challenge the existing world order. Historically, China used its power and cultural superiority to force its perceptions of order onto its non-Chinese neighbors. Yet, in recent decades, China has been adapting to the international community. With growing clout, will China begin to pull back from this process of adaptation and begin to challenge the world order? China, once considered the embodiment of poverty and misery, a victim of colonial globalization, emerged as an economic giant in the early twenty-first century and this “paradigm

shift in global stature [has had a] tectonic” effect.¹² Though China does not want to force its perceptions of the world order onto others, will China’s needs—in terms of its changed power and interests—lead to the realization that the future world order can only be well-suited to China’s desires if Beijing imposes certain changes upon it? This book argues that this grand narrative is too simple.

Optimistic estimates of China’s future rest upon two facts. The first is that, regardless of the issues that still plague China’s international behavior, this book has shown that, at the very least, China is constantly changing for the better in general terms. This change is not only beneficial to China’s own interests or made with the desire to gain respect and influence for China, but, more importantly, makes China increasingly suited to today’s liberal international system. State capitalism has become the main pillar of China’s current economic model. However, this kind of state capitalism model has been met with a great deal of criticism and opposition, even from within China. Just as Yang Yao argues in his contribution to this volume, “the market share that China’s state-owned economy occupies depends upon China’s political situation.” However, its domestic political situation is certainly in a process of ongoing change. Chinese views of the role of the US factor in China’s rise as well as China’s relations with the world as a whole are more pluralistic and debated now than ever before. It remains an authoritarian system, but embraces an increasingly vibrant civil society that propels forward this debate over the Chinese conception of the future world order.

It remains to be seen how long China’s current “state capitalism” will continue. Although this book does not set aside the whole chapters to analyze China’s domestic politics, we can be certain that continual change and transformation in its domestic situation is unavoidable. In spite of the increase in nationalism, as well as the Communist Party’s control over ideology and the conservative tendencies of interest groups, the Chinese government and the Party face existential pressure to instigate fundamental political reform. If they do not, dissatisfaction with the old system will become a real danger for the Party and the country. In a broader sense, China’s modernization strategy will never succeed unless it introduces a real and binding market economy, individual freedom, and a robust system of checks and balances for domestic power. The hot and bitter debates in China now are not about how credible state capitalism is, but how possible it is for the current leadership to reset the country in an ardently reformist direction. The economic reforms necessary to unleash the next round of tremendous growth require even bolder political reforms to further reduce the sway of monopolistic state-owned enterprises in China’s marketplace. Only such bold reforms can fully unleash its enormous potential and entrepreneurial energy to propel it into the advanced world.¹³

Two dynamics in China’s relations with the international community further reinforce its continued support for the current world order. First, in this era of globalization, in which people can increasingly travel freely from country to country and the broadcasting of information is no longer restricted within national borders, the speed of China’s integration into the

liberal world order is increasing, rather than slowing down. The energy and natural resource issue provides a clear example of this. China's large-scale energy and natural resources industry is increasingly moving into the international market to secure safe and reliable natural and energy resource suppliers. During this process, there is not one example to indicate that China intends to employ military measures to obtain or guarantee these supplies. It is true that one of the potential motivations for its territorial disputes with its neighbors in the East China Sea and South China Sea is natural and energy resources. However, in China's current decision-making process, natural and energy resource motivations have not surpassed the unchallengeable principles of sovereignty, and are certainly not China's direct motive for these frequent territorial disputes with its neighboring countries. As long as Chinese energy companies have enough purchasing power, China can obtain sufficient energy resources from international markets without resorting to other means of acquisition.

Second, although the international system is currently undergoing a profound redistribution of power and wealth with the rise of China, the US-led "Western camp" is still very strong and continues to hold a central position of power and wealth within the international system. This is especially obvious in comparisons between the United States and China. Although China has achieved great success in its rapid economic development and military modernization over the past 35 years, this has not completely altered the power disparity between the two countries. The United States is still far ahead of China in terms of maturity of its political system, its economic and financial competitiveness, and even more so in science and technological innovation and in its alliance system. As G. John Ikenberry points out, China can easily participate in today's US-led liberal international order, but it will be very difficult for China to change it. More importantly, in the ongoing process of China's integration into the world community, the role that the United States plays is multifaceted. As shown in this book, on economic, financial, international security and regulation setting in the international system, as well as on other issues, the United States is China's competitor. However, at the same time, they are collaborators, because cooperating on these issues as much as possible is in the interests of both the United States and China. This bond of common interests will also help ensure that stability, cooperation, and prosperity between the two countries are of paramount focus as the existing international order undergoes constructive adjustments.

The United States is China's most important reference in shaping China's participation in the existing liberal international order, and US history and current actions are used to legitimize Chinese moves in the international system. Since World War II, no other country has exerted such profound influence on China as the United States. China has always looked to the United States as a benchmark for its national development. Even before the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, leading Chinese intellectuals studied in US universities and returned with Western ideas for reforms of the imperial system. Soon after the founding of the PRC, Mao focused his economic

reforms on catching up to American levels of production. Deng Xiaoping's Reform and Opening up can be traced back to President Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1972. It was precisely the meeting of US and Chinese pragmatism 40 years ago that initiated the end of Red China's semi-isolation. This also marked the beginning of a gradual process in which China started to view its development and national interest from a normal perspective, as opposed to idealistic internationalism. China's military modernization has also been shaped dramatically by the United States, from the First Gulf War's role in driving the informatization of China's war strategy to its current military systems focusing on US military capabilities.

A huge challenge facing this relationship in the twenty-first century is how the United States should go about assisting China to adapt further to today's international order without further raising Beijing's suspicions of US intentions for regime change, and how the two nations should cooperate to provide common goods for the stability and prosperity of the world, and on this basis, build a better international order. The Chinese government often employs the example of the United States to defend against criticism of the environmental costs of China's economic development or its military modernization. As China's interests grow and possibly conflict with the constraints of the current international system, it could turn to the US example of the Iraq War to legitimate actions serving its own interests and security outside of the international system. The United States needs to understand how its actions leave legacies for Beijing to follow in the future, for better or worse.

The research presented in this book clearly shows that, if China's culture and tradition has produced a "Chinese perspective," it has inevitably also created a "Chinese" foreign relations practice. However, this does not mean that a clash between "Americanization" and "Sinicization" over the future world order is inevitable. The coming transformation in China's domestic politics and the changes in its social and economic structure may not only reduce the scale of Sinicization, but may also produce positive changes in China's international behavior, toward closer adherence to international norms. At the same time, effective management of interactions between the United States and China, while furthering the US ability to strategically balance against China, will also magnify the constructive influence of United States on China. The future international order will not only be able to accommodate both competition and cooperation between the two countries, but also nurture US-China relations toward meeting the common expectations of international society and also aid in achieving stability and prosperity around the world. As long as the nature of US-China relations remains stable, and the two countries are able to manage their disputes by avoiding military conflicts in case of misunderstandings, the United States will be a positive external force throughout China's domestic transformation.¹⁴ The issue now is what kind of US-China relationship is beneficial to the stability of the world order, or rather, can the existing liberal international order allow for the stable development of US-China relations?

Experiences, Preferences and US-China Relations

This book also argues that while China may have ideas and traditions that are at odds with liberal international order, they are not absolute and they are changing. The ideas and ambitions China espouses abroad are deeply shaped and constrained by its domestic political and economic predicament. Over the long term, the way China decides to project its power and influence the international order will be heavily mediated by the future changes in its own domestic system.

The United States is not only an illuminating guide for China as it integrates into the liberal international order, but also may also be a formidable source of strategic pressure that China cannot avoid. America's own strategic interests and domestic politics create frequent swings in US policy toward China, and mainstream US views of China are likewise often variable. This means that when China assesses US policies toward China and goals in its relations with China, there may be a large discrepancy between US intentions and China's interpretation of US action. Consequently, China's process of domestic transformation is not one that will simply promote US-China cooperation, but to a certain extent, it is also a process that will obstruct US-China cooperation and prevent an increase in mutual trust between the two countries. This will be mirrored by the increasingly partisan nature of American politics, as conservative Republicans expropriate the China threat to legitimate higher defense budgets in an era of austerity, and liberal Democrats scapegoat China for outsourcing and push for more jobs at home for their unions. If the United States and China are not able to enact cautious and rational policies, the two countries may find it difficult to move beyond competition and overcome estrangement. Failure to do so will threaten the stability of the liberal international order and its future development.

The response to this issue offered in this book incorporates completely different recent historical experiences of the two countries in its explanation. This precise description of different experiences of the United States and China helps us understand the origins of the competition between the two countries on the issue of international order, and moreover, helps to explain why, at a time of rapid transformation in the US-led liberal international order, China has become more vocal and willing to exert its influence to shape this transformation.

Although American hopes were dashed at the Versailles Peace Conference and the United States consequently entered a period of isolationism, lasting from 1919 to 1941, the United States has been a member of the Western world throughout modern history. After World War II broke out, the United States very quickly became the leader and a hope for the free world. The United States of post-World War II era was, to an even greater extent, a builder and protector of international order. The United States was not only the sole superpower, but it was an established power in the real sense of the word. However, China, on the other hand, was forcibly dragged into the

international system as a result of the expansion of the globalization strategy of Western imperialism. The process in which China found itself “joining” the international system was one in which it suffered invasion and humiliation. Thus, China is a latecomer to the liberal international order created by the United States after World War II. More importantly, China has always retained a sense of historical injustice about the way in which it joined the current international order. In the more than six decades since 1949, the narrative of China is one of two very distinct phases of “revolutionary China” and “developing China.” The China that existed between 1949 and 1979 was a China that exported revolution, a “rebel” in the international system by the very definition of the word. However, the China that has existed from 1979 to the present day, under the guidance of Deng Xiaoping thought, is one that began to abandon communist ideology, ended its isolationism, and is transforming its economy and integrating itself into the world.

Although these two Chinas are completely different from one another, the developing China of today is still a China that only very recently moved beyond the revolutionary period. It is a China that has undergone great changes in its relations with the outside world, but in terms of its system, strategy, policies, attitude, social structure, as well as various other aspects, this brand-new China is not yet fully prepared to cope with this huge change. This is a China that still holds onto a sense of historical injustice in its perception of the outside world and the liberal international order, and a China that has still not fully updated its mainstream ideologies. The consequence is that historical suffering, memory, lack of ruling legitimacy, and domestic vulnerability, combined together, aggravate China’s feeling of insecurity, despite the dramatic ascent in its international position and impressive military modernization.¹⁵ Therefore, the issue of how the United States and other Western countries will treat China during its rise, whether they welcome China’s newfound strength or blunt the rise of China, is one that still causes a greater deal of controversy and confusion in China. The strategic accommodation of US-China relations in 1978 helped Beijing embark on a journey of reform and opening. Is there a similar need for China to speed up its political reform with a new accommodation between Washington and Beijing? Further progress toward cooperation in US-China relations would be a big boost for China’s political reforms—a metaphor for China’s democratization. An increasingly well-informed Chinese public, fed-up with corruption, inequality, and injustice is growing bolder in demanding a better deal from its government. A sophisticated US policy toward China, geared more toward appealing to the Chinese public than government, could play an instrumental role in furthering China’s domestic political transformation if implemented well against a backdrop of peaceful, stable, and cooperative US-China relations.

The rise of China has inevitably led to an increase in the perceived seriousness of the “China problem” in the eyes of international community, including the United States. In an international system that still relies on balance of power as a foundation of stability, the power shift brought

about by the rise of China, is certain to lead to feelings of insecurity in that country. Many Chinese people view the US “rebalancing” strategy for the Asia-Pacific, announced in November 2011, as an enforcement of a US strategy to contain or encircle China. The process of China’s rise, both in theory and in practice, has been one in which US-China relations have been increasingly at odds. On the one hand, the United States needs to strengthen its military alliance system and its front line military deployments to balance against a rising China to hedge its bets. Furthermore, due to the increasing strength of China, many Asia-Pacific countries have increasingly leaned toward the United States for a security guarantee. The credibility and dependability of United States in the Asia-Pacific is, therefore, not only necessary for the United States to galvanize its regional and global leadership, but also desired to support the increasing economic and strategic reliance of United States on the Asia-Pacific region. Consequently, this reliance upon Asia leaves the United States determined to prevent a powerful China from impinging upon US strategic assets and interests. On the other hand, following the continual expansion of China’s demands in the world market for natural and energy resources, its commercial and international influence in the world is constantly increasing.

At the same time, a sense of urgency for the United States to respond to a China that throws its weight around continues to grow. US-China relations have already moved beyond traditional bilateral issues, replaced by larger issues over geopolitical, geoeconomic and geostrategic competition. In the Asia-Pacific region, this change in the US-China relationship is very obvious. Traditionally, issues of human rights and religious freedom, represented by the Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang issues, as well as the protection of intellectual copyright and market access issues, have been sticking points in US-China relations. Prominent issues in US-China relations today have changed to become “rebalancing” issues of the two countries in the global economic and trade system, China’s territorial concerns with its neighboring countries, as well as the US attempts to prevent China from becoming increasingly assertive. From China’s perspective, in addition to the question of whether the United States will support and protect Southeast Asian countries in their territorial disputes with China, another issue is whether or not the United States will introduce policies to oppose China’s military expansion.

The US policy toward China has also become increasingly complicated. At the very least, the United States is afraid that the rise of China will affect its primacy. This fear has led the reflexive chorus of politicians and analysts—calling for balancing or perhaps even containment policies—against China to grow even louder. In the past, the risk of direct military conflict breaking out between China and the United States was only present over the Taiwan issue. Nowadays, however, the North Korean issue, the South China Sea dispute, the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands tension, and US surveillance over coastal China are all issues that have the potential to directly lead to military conflict between China and the United States. What makes these conflict scenarios potentially worse than Taiwan is that the rest involve US allies with their

own agenda, meaning these allies could drag the United States into a war Washington does not want nor fully control. This possible lack of control would challenge crisis management between the two countries and immediately complicate and problematize a peaceful resolution of the issue.

United States, China, and the Future of the World Order

The emergence of geostrategic and geoeconomic competition between China and the United States in the Asia-Pacific seems not to cast doubts on the sustainability of liberal international order, but instead highlight the mismatch of China's domestic politics. With China on the rise, the balance of power system has effectively been restructured and America's "pivot to Asia" aims to fend off growing uncertainties by attempting to reshape China in the years ahead. Beijing has responded primarily by speeding up its military modernization, seemingly triggering an asymmetric arms race in the region. This predicament, along with China's tangle with territorial disputes, has precipitated strategic anxiety about whether "China's military moment is coming."¹⁶ If China attempts to be "respected for strength and strategy," relations between Washington and Beijing might shake the world.

While China's nationalist sentiments have reached unprecedented heights, its people's perceptions of the United States are more divided than ever before. The United States factors into many of China's current territorial disputes, as well as China's competitive relations with its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region. Chinese leaders have continued the fundamental policy of pursuing stable US-China relations and seeking regional cooperation with the United States. However, the Chinese government also needs to show its people that the Party is firmly protecting China's sovereignty and territorial interests in the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands and South China Sea disputes, and, to a certain extent, responding to the nationalist sentiments of the Chinese people. Therefore, Beijing has implemented hard-line policies on territorial disputes to meet these practical political needs. The result is that, even though Chinese leaders want to increase their cooperation with the United States, they need to resolve the issue of US presence in these border security issues. Therefore, in practice, China often makes policy choices of noncooperation with the United States. The South China Sea issue offers a clear example of this. China's noncooperation, its hard-line attitude, and the fact that its strategic intentions are not always clear, along with various other issues, have increased US concerns that China may take military risks. Because of this, the United States has increased its initiatives to deter and balance against China in China's border regions. However, these actions have actually increased the complexity and competition in US-China strategic relations and have given hardliners in China an excuse for anti-Americanism.

This process of "reaction" and "re-reaction" has meant that China often holds contradictory attitudes about the existing world order. On

the one hand, its continued economic growth and international influence require that China use this opportunity to integrate itself into the existing world system, by abiding by the regulations and maintaining its “peaceful rise.” On the other hand, in its regional policies, Beijing cannot neglect policy choices that are well-received by its domestic audience, even if they lead to a reduction of trust between itself and the United States. Similarly, the US government occasionally has to cater to domestic audiences, especially Congress during election season, at the temporary cost of US-China relations. The challenge for leaders of both countries will be to identify this nationalistic pandering and consciously dismiss it as inconsequential noise from the actual dialogue of the relationship. The problem is to what extent Washington and Beijing can restrain their actions and seek ways to communicate and cooperate. By means of cooperation, the two countries can strengthen the stability of existing international order while significantly benefitting through managed competition.

In conclusion, US-China relations are truly the most important—yet most complicated—bilateral relations in the world today. The greatest contribution that the two countries can make to existing liberal international order is nothing more than adopting a cooperative and coordinated approach to provide common goods for the stability and prosperity of the world. However, different historical experiences and domestic political needs of the two countries often lead to uncertainty, misunderstandings, controversial policies, and an adoption of strategic precautions against one another. A multilayered free, open, and inclusive international order will, without a doubt, benefit the stability of US-China relations. A pressing challenge for the time being is whether the United States can pursue policies that are conducive to China’s domestic transformation. This would be beneficial because a speedy political transformation in China would facilitate China-US cooperation and reduce the potential for conflict in the future.

The fate of Chinese domestic reform is quickly approaching a decisive moment. Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, who have ascended to the most powerful two spots on the Politburo Standing Committee of China’s Communist Party, need to show their ability and popularity to move the Chinese system sufficiently in the direction they know it must go. But to what extent will they build their political leadership by emphasizing nationalist and foreign policy antagonisms, which undermine collaboration with the United States? The question could be similarly asked for Washington. To what degree will American ambition of revitalizing its manufacturing base and increasing exports come at the expense of scapegoating China? We do know that the US-China relationship has been overshadowed by their respective domestic agendas. But President Xi Jinping has a much tougher job than President Barack Obama.¹⁷ China is now at a crossroads where the country has once more asked for the emergence of a historic figure like Deng Xiaoping to lead China’s transformation and direct its exodus from authoritarianism toward full participation in the international community. Deng, driven by China’s lingering poverty and daunting isolation, steered his country onto a new

course of integration with the world community and laid the foundation for China's economic take-off.¹⁸ Today, Chinese leaders should seize the baton of Deng and carry forward the commitment to significantly reform China's domestic politics to complete what Deng could not. Thus China will be able to forge a successful transformation of the old authoritarian system toward a new democratic one. Without this historical transformation, China's contribution to the world order may not be assured.

Whether or not the United States is able to accommodate a rising China in political, economic, military, and financial terms, and whether or not China is able to control nationalist sentiments, undercut domestic power opacity, raise military transparency, create a more positive and less controversial international image for itself, and expand the influence of its soft power, are major issues that remain to be seen. These issues will, to a large extent, decide the future direction of relations between the two countries and consequentially the evolution of a liberal international order. "Accommodating" a rising China is a rare occurrence. The last power transition, the rise of Pax Americana to replace Pax Britannica, involved two democracies and very similar cultures yet was not a smooth process. The fundamentally different domestic political systems of the United States and China suggest such a transition would be very difficult and will require wise policies from both capitals. Both the US and Chinese militaries need an enemy. Although this may be a practical need of interest groups, it is a highly dangerous trend. The future of US-China relations depends on the implementation of sophisticated and cautious policies by each of their respective governments. It will require an ability to mobilize domestic and political resources to underscore goodwill and mutual trust.

At the same time, the United States and China need to formulate and pursue a long-term strategy to build on common interests. The core of this strategy should not be a simple comparison between the strengths of the two countries but also look for joint capacities for providing global commons for international peace, stability, and prosperity. Meanwhile, their strategic competition can safely remain as "hedging," that is, hope for the best and prepare for the worst. More importantly, Washington and Beijing must realise that competition between the two countries should not be used simply to mobilize their respective international supporters and domestic power bases. Instead, they should develop their bilateral relations in the context of a healthy development of the existing international system. The United States will continue to play a leading role in international society, and its ability to persuade others to engage in balancing against China may likely increase. However, at the same time China should have the confidence to avoid US-inflicted harm and to seek out greater room to rise. At the end of the day, if the United States weakens and damages the open, competitive, and free international system in order to balance against China, then it too will face a growing opposition of other states. Both countries have an incentive to cooperate and share equal responsibility to ensure the continued prosperity, stability, and peace of the world.

Notes

1. "Chinese scholar" herein refers to his ethnicity rather than current citizenship.
2. David Shambaugh, ed., *Charting China's Future: Domestic and International Challenges* (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 1.
3. The notion of Sinicization largely alludes to a distinctly Chinese way to approach the world exclusively based on ancient Chinese history, identity, and philosophy. But China's modernization process, initially driven by its defeat at the hands of British troops in 1840, has been a prolonged process toward China's adaptation and integration into the world community. China's ancient history and accumulated legacy eventually vanished as it further integrated into the international system first by force and later by will. For the differentiation of these two concepts, please see Jonathan D. Spence, *Search for Modern China* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999).
4. As for the scholarly exploration of Chinese "Sinicized" view of the world order, please refer to John K. Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: MA: Harvard University Press, 1968); Hok-Lam Chan, *Legitimation in Imperial China: Discussions under the Jurchen-Chin Dynasty, 1115–1234* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1984); and D. R. Howland, *Borders of Chinese Civilization: Geography and History at Empire's End* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1996).
5. John K. Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Policy*, 2.
6. As for an overstated argument, please see Martin Jacques, *When China Rules the World* (London: Allen Lane, 2009).
7. Odd Arne Westad, *Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750* (New York: Basic Books, 2012).
8. Minxin Pei, "The Loneliest Superpower," *Foreign Policy*, March 20, 2012.
9. Wang Jisi, "China's Search for a Grand Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90, No. 2 (March/April 2011): 68–79.
10. Alastair Iain Johnston, *Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000* (New York: Princeton University Press, 2007).
11. For an in-depth analysis of China's enduring struggle to reflect on changed relations with the world, please see David Lampton, *The Three Faces of China: Might, Money and Minds* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).
12. See also F. R. Ankersmit, *Historical Representation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 123–148.
13. Edward Wong, "Amid Calls to Open China's Politics, Party Digs in," *New York Times*, November 11, 2012; Keith Bradsher, "China's Grip on Economy Will Test New Leaders," *New York Times*, November 10, 2012; Michael Pettis, "Reform or Perish," *Foreign Policy*, November 7, 2012.
14. Warren I. Cohen, *America's Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations*, 5th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).
15. Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); and Susan Shirk, *The Fragile Superpower* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).
16. James Dobbin, "The War with China," *Survival*, Vol. 54, No. 4 (July/August 2012): 3–10.
17. Kenneth Lieberthal, "Xi Jinping's Challenges: Why China's New President Has a much Tougher Job than Barack Obama?" *Foreign Policy Blogging*, November 7, 2012.
18. Ezra F. Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011).

Contributors

Joshua W. Busby is associate professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, United States. He has written extensively on US and China's climate change and environmental policies. He is the author of *Moral Movements and Foreign Policy* (2010) and *AIDS Drugs for All: Social Movements and Market Transformations* (2013).

Daniel W. Drezner is professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, United States, a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution, United States, and a contributor to the *Washington Post*. Professor Drezner is the author of five books including *The System Worked*. He has published articles in numerous scholarly journals as well as in the *New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, and *Foreign Affairs*.

Zhu Feng is professor and Executive Director of China Center for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea in Nanjing University. He used to be professor of School of International Studies of Peking University and moved onto his new job from August of 2014. His recent books are *China-Japan defense exchange and security cooperation: the Past, Present, and Future* (co-edited with Mr. Hisashiro Akiyama, Tokyo: Aigi Press, 2011), and *China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Cooperation* (co-edited with Robert S. Ross, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).

Weixing Hu is professor of Political Science and International Relations in the Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong. Professor Hu has published widely on international security, East Asian regionalism, China's foreign policy, Sino-US relations, and cross-Taiwan Strait relations. His most recent book is *New Dynamics in Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations*.

G. John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He is also codirector of Princeton's Center for International Security Studies. In 2013–2014 Ikenberry was the 72nd Eastman Visiting Professor at Balliol

College, Oxford. Professor Ikenberry is the author of seven books, including *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American System* (Princeton, 2011). His book, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton, 2001), won the 2002 Schroeder-Jervis Award presented by the American Political Science Association for the best book in international history and politics.

Wang Jisi is president of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies at Peking University. He has been a member of the Foreign Policy Advisory Committee of China's Foreign Ministry since 2008. His area of interest covers US foreign policy, China-US relations, and Asian security.

Jeffrey W. Legro is Taylor Professor of Politics and vice provost for Global Affairs at the University of Virginia, United States. He is the author of *Rethinking the World* and *Cooperation under Fire*. Professor Legro has taught at China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing and was a Fulbright-Nehru Senior Researcher at the Institute for Defense and Strategic Analyses in New Delhi.

Michael Mastanduno is Nelson Rockefeller Professor of Government and Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Dartmouth College, United States. His most recent book, coauthored with Joseph Grieco and John Ikenberry, is *Introduction to International Relations: Enduring Questions and Contemporary Perspectives*.

John Owen is Ambassador Henry J. and Mrs. Marion R. Taylor professor of Politics and a faculty fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture at the University of Virginia, United States. His most recent books are *Confronting Political Islam: Six Lessons from the West's Past* (2015) and *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change 1510–2010* (2010). Professor Owen holds an AB from Duke University, United States, an MPA. from Princeton University, United States, and a PhD from Harvard University, United States.

Stewart Patrick is senior fellow and director of the program on international institutions and global governance at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of *Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security* and of *The Best Laid Plans: The Origins of American Multilateralism and the Dawn of the Cold War*. A graduate of Stanford University, he received his doctorate in international relations, and two masters degrees from Oxford University.

Fei-Ling Wang is professor of International Affairs at Georgia Institute of Technology, United States. He has taught at United States Military Academy (West Point) and United States Air Force Academy, held visiting positions in several countries, and published books and articles on China's political economy and foreign relations. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, United States. He can be reached at fw@gatech.edu.

Ming Wan is professor of Government and Politics and director of the Political Science Division at George Mason University's School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs. His PhD was from the Government Department, Harvard University, United States. He has authored five books including, *The China Model and Global Political Economy: Comparison, Impact, and Interaction* (2014), *The Political Economy of East Asia: Striving for Wealth and Power* (2008), and *Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation* (2006). His current research interests include Sino-Japanese relations and East Asian international relations.

Jianwei Wang received his BA and MA in international politics from Fudan University, China, and his PhD in political science from the University of Michigan, United States. He is currently professor and head of the department of Government and Public Administration as well as director of Institute of Global and Public Affairs at the University of Macau, China. His research interests focus on Sino-American relations, East Asian security affairs, Chinese foreign policy, and Sino-Japanese relations. He has published extensively in these areas.

Yang Yao is professor and dean of the National School of Development, Peking University, China. He also serves as the director of the China Center for Economic Research, an institute within the school. He obtained his bachelors and masters degrees from Peking University in 1986 and 1989, respectively, and PhD in development economics from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, United States, in 1996.

Bin Yu (PhD) is professor of Political Science at Wittenberg University in Ohio, United States, and senior fellow of the Shanghai Association of American Studies. He also contributes to the Center for Strategic and International Studies' *Comparative Connections* journal on Russia, China, and Central Asia.

Index

Page numbers in italics refer to tables and figures.

- Adams, John, 75
Adams, John Quincy, 76
Afghanistan, 31, 92, 121, 205–6, 316
Al Qaeda, 205
Alagappa, Muthiah, 235
Albright, Madeleine, 90, 357n93
alliances, 12–13
 “alliance of similarities,” 341, 344
 China, 52, 54, 62, 370
 US, 13, 83–91, 97, 83, 123, 189, 299,
 305–10, 314, 316–18, 320, 374
 and US historical reluctance, 24–5,
 76, 138
American Creed, 24, 28–9, 302
American exceptionalism, 10–11, 14,
 20, 24, 30–1, 72–3, 77, 83, 85,
 90, 93–4, 138, 261–2, 360–1, 364
apartheid, 119
Arab Spring, 36, 206
Argentina, 222, 308, 309
arms control and nuclear issues, 7,
 12–13, 359, 363–4, 367, 375
 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
 Treaty, 312
 Baruch Plan, 311
 China’s arms control/disarmament
 policy, 338–40
 China’s Defense White Papers,
 333–6, 340
 China’s developmental and
 deployment policy, 334–8
 China’s geopolitics, 328–31
 China’s no first use (NFU) policy,
 327–8, 330–1, 333–6, 338–42,
 347, 355n74
 China’s nuclear weapons program,
 327–47
 China’s support of nuclear-weapon-
 free zones, 339
 and the Cold War, 28, 299–300,
 304, 307–8, 311–12, 315–16,
 319–20, 328–9, 338, 343–5
 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
 (CTBT), 19, 29, 75, 254, 338–9
 and Confucian harmony of
 differences, 344–5
 Cuban missile crisis, 312, 340
 and favoritism, 303–6, 310–12, 340
 future of, 340–7
 Hague Convention of 1899, 310
 Hague Convention of 1907, 310
 history of US arms control, 310–12
 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
 Treaty (INF), 312
 and leadership versus coexistence, 346–7
 London Naval Treaty of 1930, 310
 and Mao’s paper tiger analogy, 329,
 331–3
 and multilateralism, 299–300,
 338–9, 344
 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
 312, 334, 338
 North Korea, 96, 313, 318–19, 330,
 338, 344, 374
 and Pax Americana, 328
 and pragmatism, 300, 304, 331,
 333–4, 342
 and Sino-American relations, 314–16
 and the Soviet Union, 304–7, 311–13,
 315, 319, 329–32, 334, 340–1

- arms control—*Continued*
 stockpiles, 308, 311
 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT I and SALT II), 312
 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and START II), 312
 testing, 310–13, 318, 332, 336–7, 340
 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 312
 and transparency, 327–8, 336–7, 353n51, 363
 and US alliances, 305–8, 316–18
 and US national interest, 301–5
 Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, 310
 and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 91–2, 96, 120, 344, 347
 World Disarmament Conference, 310
- Assad, Bashar, 96
- Australia, 148, 149, 266, 307, 308, 309, 316
- Bahrain, 308, 309
- basket one variable (power), 3, 20, 360
 and environment, 249, 261, 275
 and sovereignty, 30
- basket three variables (ideas, traditions, historical experiences), 359, 360
 and Chinese diplomacy, 366
 and collective security, 71, 328
 defined, 3
 and economic issues, 137–8, 139, 151–2
 and environment, 249, 261–2, 278
 as explaining preference and policies, 13–14
 historical legacies, 3
 ideological legacies, 3
 interaction with power and interests, 3–4, 6–9, 137
 national traditions, 3
 and policy continuity, 138
 and sovereignty, 20–1, 23, 30, 37
 and US global economic policy, 136, 139, 151, 153
 and US policy toward the UN, 71
- basket two variable (domestic interests), 3, 20, 360
 and environment, 249, 252, 260, 275
- Beijing Consensus, 173–4, 185n15, 224, 346
- Benvenisti, Eyal, 152
- Bierstadt, Albert, 246
- Biniiaz, Susan, 256
- Bodansky, Daniel, 253, 255
- Bonaparte, Napoleon, 347. *See also* France: Napoleonic wars
- Bosnia and Herzegovina, 34, 303
- Brazil, 94, 145, 202, 222, 226, 286
- Bremmer, Ian, 170, 176, 184–5n1, 213, 229
- Breslin, Shaun, 215, 227, 232
- Bretton Woods era, 139, 143–5, 150, 150–1, 199, 261
- Brezhnev, Leonid, 330
- BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), 94, 153, 236
- Bryan, William Jennings, 140
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 208
- Bull, Hedley, 234–5
- Burma, 120
- Busby, Joshua, 11, 289, 362–4
- Bush, George H. W.: administration
 and environmental issues, 250–2
 and new world order
 multilateralism, 72, 90
 and Taiwan, 335
- Bush, George W.
 Bush Doctrine, 31, 124
 and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 338
- Bush, George W.: administration
 and China, 168, 363
 and environmental issues, 250–2, 254, 268n3
 and liberal-democratic capitalism, 315–16
 nuclear policy, 254, 309, 313, 319
 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), 92
 and trade, 201
 and unilateralism, 72, 91–2, 124, 147, 300, 344
 and war on terror, 205–6
 and Washington Consensus, 147–9
See also Iraq War
- Byrd, Robert, 253
- Cambodia, 34, 114, 117
- Canada, 89, 140, 201, 252, 260, 286, 306, 307
- Carson, Rachel: *Silent Spring*, 247, 289

- Carter, Jimmy: administration, 145, 205, 251, 312
- Chen, Binkai, 185n10
- Chen, Jian, 129n58
- Cheng, Yi, 280
- Cheng, Yung-Nien, 315
- Chiang, Kai-Shek, 53, 107, 163
- Chile, 308
- China
- and “century of humiliation,” 8, 12, 35, 105, 233, 360
 - Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 45, 53–8, 63n5, 65n33, 108, 166, 169, 173, 185n4, 225–7, 234, 329, 331–2
 - and Confucianism, 45–6, 48–9, 57–9, 62, 104, 225, 277–82, 344–5, 354–5n68, 360
 - Cultural Revolution, 168, 234
 - disinterested government of, 186n22
 - foreign economic policy, 153–4, 161–84
 - Great Leap Forward, 54, 168
 - guanxi wang* (relationship system), 366–8
 - Han Dynasty, 44, 48–63, 278, 280
 - historical periods, 43–5
 - history, writing and teaching of, 46–7
 - isolationism, 45, 230, 361, 373
 - Japanese invasion of, 53, 107
 - Kuomintang (Nationalist Party), 53, 166
 - and League of Nations, 106–7
 - Liao Dynasty, 51
 - Manchu and Manchuria, 48, 52, 64n16, 107
 - Ming Dynasty, 48, 50, 230–1, 233, 281, 361
 - and Mongols, 48, 52, 64n15
 - and neo-Confucianism, 11, 58, 277–8, 280–1, 291
 - and New Confucianism, 280
 - Opium War, 166, 184, 233, 281, 365–6
 - overseas development aid (ODA), 169–70
 - PaxSinica (Peace under Chinese Rule), 43, 61
 - People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 117, 331, 335–7, 341, 355n74
 - pre-Qin era, 44, 46–50, 52, 55, 67n68
 - Qin Dynasty, 44, 279, 280, 366, 370
 - Qing Dynasty, 50, 52, 59, 60, 105, 232, 234, 357n97
 - Republic of China (ROC), 53, 55, 60
 - Self-Strengthening Movement, 234
 - Sino-Japanese War, 166
 - Song Dynasty, 44, 46–52, 55, 59, 62, 64n15, 64n26, 230, 280–1, 366, 370
 - Southern Song Dynasty, 51
 - state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 153, 162–5, 174–8, 181–2, 184, 201, 213, 217, 219, 227, 229, 369
 - Taiping Rebellion, 50
 - Tang Dynasty, 46, 49, 59, 230
 - Taoism, 48, 278
 - Tiananmen uprising, 54
 - and the United Nations, 107–27
 - Warring States Era, 45, 50
 - Yuan Dynasty, 46, 48, 50, 59, 232
 - See also* arms control and nuclear issues; collective security; environmental issues; finance and economic governance; sovereignty; trade and resources
- Chinese exceptionalism, 14, 364
- Churchill, Winston, 86, 306–7
- Clausewitz, Carl von, 302
- climate change, 135, 261–7, 362, 365
- attention given to, 262–4
 - and China, 163, 277, 283
 - global warming, 7, 30, 247, 251–2, 282–3, 285–6
- Kyoto Protocol, 149
- UN Framework Convention
- on Climate Change (COP15, Copenhagen, 2009), 163, 165, 172, 253, 257–8, 265–6, 276, 285–7, 290, 296n63
- UN Framework Convention
- on Climate Change (COP16, Cancun, 2010), 257, 285–8, 290, 296n63
- and US, 135, 149, 245–6, 248–55, 260, 276
- and US funding, 258
- and US partisan gap, 251
- and US public opinion, 261
- Clinton, Hillary, 316

- Clinton, William Jefferson
 2008 Democratic Party Convention
 speech, 357n95
 and Comprehensive Test Ban
 Treaty, 338
 and NAFTA, 201
- Clinton, William Jefferson:
 administration
 and assertive multilateralism, 72, 90–1
 and China's WTO entrance, 168
 and environmental issues, 251, 253,
 259, 268n3
 and Kyoto Protocol, 259, 268n3
 and nuclear weapons agreements,
 313, 338
 and trade, 201, 223
 and use of military force, 344
- Coben, Lesley A., 257
- Cold War, 4–5, 14
 and arms control, 299–300, 307–8,
 311–12, 315–16, 319–20, 328–9, 338
 and collective security, 10, 71–4,
 81–2, 86–90, 106, 112, 116,
 119–20, 122–3
 and economic leadership, 200
 and economic policy, 144
 and environmental issues, 261
 and Mutual Assured Destruction
 doctrine, 27, 343
 and sovereignty, 27–9, 31, 34, 43–5,
 54–5, 61–2
 and trade, 189, 191, 193
 US use of military force, 344
- Cole, Thomas, 246
- collective security, 2–3, 5, 10, 360–4
 and Chinese cultural heritage, 104–5
 and Confucianism, 104
 Fulbright Resolution, 84
 and great power internationalism, 77
 and identity, 73–4
 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
 Assistance, 89–90
 Lend-Lease, 81
 and liberal internationalism, 77–8,
 81–3
 Marshall Plan, 87, 144
 Monroe Doctrine, 32–3, 39n14, 72,
 76–8, 88, 99n26, 303
 and neutrality, 25, 27, 32, 75–6, 80,
 306–7, 330
- Organization of American States
 (OAS), 89–90
 and power, 72–3
 and Sino-US cooperation, 122–7
 US attitudes toward, 72–7
 and US isolationism, 72, 74, 76–7,
 79–82, 84–5, 87
See also League of Nations; United
 Nations
- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
 (CTBT), 19, 29, 75, 338–9
- Confucianism, 45–6, 48–9, 57–9, 62,
 104, 225, 277–82, 344–5,
 354–5n68, 360. *See also*
 neo-Confucianism; New
 Confucianism
- Congo Crisis, 31, 74
- Coolidge, Calvin, 79–80
- Cuba, 31, 34, 77
- Cuban missile crisis, 312, 340
- Dalai Lama, 36
- Daniel Drezner, Daniel, 10–11, 361–3,
 365
- Darfur, 92
- Darwinism, 161, 166, 173, 281.
See also social Darwinism
- Democratic People's Republic of Korea
 (DPRK). *See* North Korea
- Deng, Xiaoping
 economic reforms, 166–7, 169,
 211–13, 219–21, 225, 227, 231,
 234, 282, 314, 371, 373, 376–7
taoguang yanghui (laying low hiding
 and biding for time), 54, 163, 167
- DeSombre, Elizabeth, 248, 260
- Dickson, Bruce, 173
- Dominican Republic, 34
- Dong, Biwu, 108
- Dong, Zhongshu, 278, 280
- Downs, George, 152
- Drezner, Daniel W., 10–11, 148, 161,
 361–3, 365
- economic issues. *See* finance and
 economic governance
- Economy, Elizabeth, 219
- Egypt, 205, 206, 230, 304, 308, 309, 319
- Eichengreen, Barry, 141, 215
- Eisenhower, Dwight D., 29, 311

- El Salvador, 34
 Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 246
 environmental issues, 11, 360, 362–5
 Cancun Climate Change Conference (COP16, 2010), 257, 285–8, 290, 296n63
 cap-and-trade legislation, 253, 258
 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 149, 250
 and China's historical legacies, 277–82, 291–2
 and China's intellectual traditions, 280
 and China's strategic orientation, 282–8
 and China's view of world order, 275–6
 Convention on Biological Diversity, 250, 253, 260
 Convention on the Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), 249–50, 254, 270n29
 Convention to Combat Desertification, 260
 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (COP15, 2009), 163, 165, 172, 253, 257–8, 265–6, 276, 285–7, 290, 296n63
 and cosmic resonance, 275, 277–82, 284, 288
 and cyber-war, 230
 Doha Climate Change Conference (COP18, 2012), 285
 Durban Climate Change Conference (COP17, 2011), 285–7, 296n63
 Earth Summit (1992, Rio), 250
 Environmental Protection Agency, 247, 251, 291
 fishing, 248–50, 256, 262, 263–4, 269n10
 Global Climate Coalition, 254
 Global Environment Facility (GEF), 258, 259, 272n55, 272–3n56
 Law of the Sea Treaty, 248, 250, 253, 256–7, 259–60, 268, 271n43
 Montreal Protocol on ozone, 254, 260
 overfishing, 262, 263–4, 269n10
 and Sino-US relations, 266–7, 288–91
 and sovereignty, 261–2
 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 250
 and *tianxia*, 276, 279, 288
 and US environmental traditions, 246
 and US global environmental leadership, 246–68, 289
 and US party polarization, 251–2, 262, 296n64
 and US political system, 251–4
 and US regional differences, 252–3
 US treaty-making, 254–5, 271n43
 Warsaw Climate Change Conference (COP19, 2013), 285
 See also climate change; Kyoto Protocol
 European Union, 94, 236, 255
 common market size, 40n33
 and environmental issues, 149, 286, 291
 membership, 344
 and sovereignty, 38–9n6
 and trade, 202, 216, 222–3
 and Turkey, 356n86
 Evans, Gareth, 106
 exceptionalism. *See* American exceptionalism; Chinese exceptionalism
 Falkner, Robert, 261
 Fallows, James, 226, 228
 finance and economic governance, 5–6, 10–12, 360–77
 Beijing Consensus, 173–4, 185n15, 224, 346
 China's approach to, 153–4, 161–84
 and China's exchange rate, 179–81
 China's Five-Year Development Plan, 176, 226
 China's GDP, 55, 211–12, 220, 347
 China's history of, 166–8
 China's special economic zones (SEZs), 174, 220
 and competition among Chinese ministries, 171–3
 and eras of globalization, 139–49, 150
 Financial Stability Forum (FSF), 148
 and forum-shopping, 135, 148–9, 150, 152, 362

finance—*Continued*

- Group of Seven (G7), 146, 148, 152, 202
- Group of Twenty (G20), 92, 96, 152–3, 164, 202, 235
- historical institutionalist approach (basket three), 137–8, 139, 151–2
- and indigenous innovation, 183–4
- and interest group politics, 179
- interest-based approach, 137, 139, 149–50
- International Monetary Fund (IMF), 143–5, 147–9, 153, 159n115, 164, 198, 202, 218–19, 235–6, 363
- Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), 149
- monetary policy, 36, 146, 176, 236
- and natural resource acquisition, 181–3
- power-based approach to, 136–7, 139, 150–2, 166–8
- and pragmatism, 168–70, 230–2
- and production-oriented government, 170–1
- Ricardo-Viner model, 137
- and state capitalism, 162–3, 165, 170, 173–84, 184–5n1
- Stolper–Samuelson theorem, 137
- US approach to, 135–54
- US foreign economic policy, 136–9
- Washington Consensus, 139, 146–9, 150, 173–4, 177, 185–6n15, 189, 200, 224, 346, 365
- Foot, Rosemary, 144
- forum-shopping, 135, 148–9, 150, 152, 362
- France, 78, 81, 139, 143, 193, 305–6, 312, 341
 - Napoleonic wars, 27, 30, 32, 306
- Frieden, Jeffry, 142–3
- Friedman, Milton, 140–1
- Fukuyama, Francis, 135, 170
- G2 (China and United States), 202, 208, 236–7, 291, 346
- G7, 146, 148, 152, 202
- G20, 92, 96, 152–3, 164, 202, 235
- Gaddafi, Moammar al, 96, 122
- Garver, John, 330
- Geithner, Timothy, 153
- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 27–8, 143–5, 147, 192–3, 198–200, 218–23
- Geneva Convention, 19
- Germany, 26–7, 59, 80, 82, 146, 196, 198, 202, 214–15, 226, 260, 305–6, 310
- Gilpin, Robert, 5
- Glennon, Michael J., 254, 256
- global economic governance. *See* finance and economic governance
- global warming, 30, 247, 251
 - and China, 282–3, 285–6
 - and US political parties, 7, 251–2
 - See also* climate change
- globalism and globalization, 77, 344, 368–9, 373
 - and economic governance, 135–54
 - and sovereignty, 9, 28, 36, 43–4, 55, 58, 61–2, 362
 - and trade, 189, 195, 214, 219, 227
- Goldstein, Judith, 147
- Gorbachev, Mikhail, 5, 312
- Gore, Al, 268n3
- Gourevitch, Peter, 218
- Great Depression, 8, 26–7, 74, 80, 82–3, 141–2, 151, 198
- Grenada, 31, 34
- Grew, Joseph, 85
- Gruber, Lloyd, 152
- Guatemala, 118, 308
- Gulf War, 121, 335, 371
- Haas, Peter, 257
- Haiti, 34, 41n44, 92
- Hamilton, Alexander, 138, 151, 196
- Harding, Warren G., 79
- Hawaii, 31, 32
- Hay, John, 77, 140
- Hiscox, Michael J., 137
- historical legacies and world order, 3–10, 12–14
- Hoover, Herbert, 79
- Hu, Jintao, 95, 112, 124, 257
- Hu, Weixing, 12, 360, 362–5
- Hughes, Charles Evans, 80
- Hull, Cordell, 84, 85, 143
- human rights, 356–8, 374
 - and alliances, 303, 307–8

- and humanitarian intervention, 34, 96, 120–1, 367
- norms of, 314
- and sovereignty, 20, 22, 29–30, 34–5, 43, 49, 55–6, 60, 62, 96, 120–1, 122
- treaties, 254
- and the UN, 34, 95
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 34
- US human rights exceptionalism, 261–2
- Huntington, Samuel, 6, 302
- Hurrell, Andrew, 235
- Hussein, Saddam, 91, 204–5
- Ikenberry, G. John, 40n24, 88, 137, 143, 261, 370
- imperialism
 - anti-imperialism, 33, 109, 357, 356–7n90, 361
 - British, 31
 - Chinese, 161
 - Japanese, 8
 - “social,” 234
 - and sovereignty, 22, 31, 33
 - and the United Nations, 95, 103, 111, 126
 - US, 31, 33, 77, 79, 124, 234
 - US opposition to, 302
 - Western, 8, 95, 103, 111, 231, 373
- India, 97, 108, 202, 226, 277, 282–3
 - and environmental issues, 145, 149
 - and nuclear weapons, 308–9, 313–17, 330, 332, 334
 - and trade, 230, 233
- Indonesia, 108, 222, 223, 308, 316
- Inter-American Development Bank, 148
- International Band of Reconstruction and Development. *See* World Bank
- International Criminal Court (ICC), 7, 19, 22, 29, 36–7, 90, 254
- International Energy Agency, 148
- International Monetary Fund (IMF), 143–5, 147–9, 153, 159n115, 164, 198, 202, 218–19, 235–6, 363
- internationalism, 7, 27–8, 33, 77–87, 138, 143, 151–2, 195, 197–9, 371
- Iran, 311
 - 1953 Iranian coup d'état, 308
 - and nuclear issues, 96, 313, 318–19, 338, 344, 367
 - and US cyber-attacks, 320
 - and US foreign policy, 125, 204–7
 - sanctions against, 93, 96, 119, 193
- Iran-Iraq War, 204, 205
- Iraq, 34, 204, 206, 345
 - and China, 114
 - Gulf War, 91–2, 205
 - invasion of Kuwait, 90–2, 205
- Iraq War, 8, 94–5, 121, 125, 205–6, 307, 316, 371
- Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 206
- Israel, 204–6, 308, 309, 319
- Jacob, Tom, 255
- Jacobson, Harold, 219, 255, 260
- Japan
 - and arms control treaties, 310–11
 - and Asian Pacific Partnership for Clean Development, 149
 - attack on Pearl Harbor, 8, 80, 82, 306
 - and capitalism, 215, 223
 - and China, 8–9, 53, 216, 281–2, 291, 316, 330, 336, 349n8
 - and climate change, 254, 260, 285, 286, 291
 - economy, 1, 140, 144, 145, 171, 178, 199, 203, 211, 212, 221, 226
 - and education, 282
 - and energy efficiency, 182
 - imperialism, 140
 - invasion of China, 53, 54, 107
 - and Kyoto Protocol, 260, 285, 286, 295n42
 - and League of Nations, 78, 80, 107
 - and medical education, 282, 293n22
 - and missile defense, 313
 - and national identity, 305
 - and North Korea, 319
 - and Shandong concession, 356–7n90
 - Sino-Japanese War, 166
 - and technology development, 178, 199
 - trade, 145–6, 199, 201–2, 221, 223, 226, 249
 - and the United Nations, 97
 - and US, 5, 27, 80, 82, 89, 94, 145–6, 201–3

Japan—*Continued*

- US alliance with, 307, 308, 309, 316–17
- and World War II, 8, 80, 82, 306, 328, 349n8
- Jefferson, Thomas, 76, 155n19, 306
- Jeffersonian foreign policy, 24, 76–7
- Jiang, Zemin, 112, 123
- Johnson, Lyndon B., 198
- Jordan, 308, 309

- Kagan, Robert, 255, 160–1
- Katzenstein, Peter, 225
- Kelemen, R. Daniel, 250, 260
- Kennedy, John F., 28, 312
- Khan, A. Q., 313, 319
- Khrushchev, Nikita, 53, 332, 338
- Kindleberger, Charles, 142–3, 197
- Kissinger, Henry, 5, 330, 335, 343–4, 350n11, 357n95
- Knox, Philander K., 78–9
- Korea, 259, 281, 311, 328. *See also* North Korea; South Korea
- Korean War, 31, 74, 108, 110, 144, 328, 332
- Kosovo, 42n60, 91, 95, 303
- Krasner, Stephen D., 140, 151, 226
- Kuwait, 90, 114, 205, 308, 309
- Kyoto Protocol
 - and China, 163, 285–6
 - Japan, 285–6, 295n42
 - and Sino-US collusion, 37, 362
 - and US, 19, 29, 149, 248, 250, 253, 257, 259–60, 268n3

- Lamy, Pascal, 215, 230
- Landrieu, Mary, 253
- Laozi (Lao Tsu), 278
- Latin America, 76, 147, 185–6n15
 - and US alliances, 300, 302–3, 307
 - and US Good Neighbor Policy, 33
 - US interventions, 20, 31–4, 41n53, 194*See also individual nations*
- Lavrov, Sergei, 315
- League of Nations, 5, 7, 10, 26, 74
 - and China, 106–7
 - and collective security, 79, 106–7
 - debate, 72, 77–9
 - establishment of, 106–7, 141
 - and Franklin Roosevelt, 80
 - US rejection of membership in, 33, 79–81, 141
- Lebanon, 92, 113, 206
- Legro, Jeffrey, 4, 9, 361–2, 364
- Leninism, 56, 166, 234
- Li, Keqiang, 376
- Li, Zhaoxing, 106, 112
- Liberia, 34
- Libya, 363
 - and nuclear technology, 313, 319
 - UN intervention in, 22, 34, 36, 93, 122, 196
 - and UNSC Resolution 1973, 93, 96, 122, 169
- Lieberthal, Kenneth, 357n97
- Lin, Biao, 109
- List, Friedrich, 213, 227–8
- Listian influence on China's economic and trade policy, 12, 227–30, 364
- Liu, An, 278–80
- Liu, Wei, 295n50
- Liu, Xiaobo, 55
- Liu, Xiaoming, 287–8
- Lodge, Henry Cabot, 78–9, 99n22
- Lowery, Clay, 148
- Lū, Buwei, 277, 279

- Malaysia, 308, 316
- Mao, Zedong, 304, 314
 - on competing with the US, 65n35
 - economic policy, 1, 163, 166–7, 169, 212, 314–15, 370–1
 - environmental policy, 11, 277, 282, 291
 - and ideology, 53
 - nuclear policy, 329, 332–8, 342, 249–50n8
 - and sovereignty, 44, 53–6
 - on Taiwan, 36
 - and trade, 223, 231, 234
 - and the United Nations, 108–10
 - and world communist revolution, 44
- Martin, Lisa, 147
- Marxism, 50, 53, 56, 166, 234, 345
- Mastanduno, Michael, 5, 12, 361–4
- Mead, Walter Russell, 262
- Middle East, 34, 113–14, 319, 339
 - Arab Spring, 36, 206
 - and natural resources, 191, 203–4, 229*See also individual nations*

- minilateralism, 93, 363
- monarchies, 76, 169, 230, 301–3, 305, 309
- Monroe, James, 76
- Monroe Doctrine, 32–3, 39n14, 72, 76–8, 88, 99n26, 303
- Moore, Thomas, 219
- Moravcsik, Andrew, 254, 261–2
- Morocco, 148, 308, 309
- Mubarak, Hosni, 304
- Muir, John, 246
- Mundt, Karl, 85
- Munich Agreement, 8

- nationhood, 24
- natural resources, 12, 107, 161, 165, 179–83, 359, 370
 - and hydraulic fracturing (fracking), 203
 - and OPEC, 145, 204–5
 - and trade, 203–8, 216, 229–30
- neoclassical realism, 155n25
- neo-Confucianism, 11, 58, 277–8, 280–1, 291
- neorealism, 88
- New Confucianism, 280
- New Deal, 5, 8, 83
- New Zealand, 307, 308, 309, 316
- Nicaragua, 34
- Nixon, Richard M., 145, 330, 350n11, 371
- Nixon, Richard M., administration of, 206
 - economic policy, 144–5, 199
 - environmental policy, 247, 251
 - and Iran, 204
 - nuclear policy, 312–13, 330
- North, Douglas, 225
- North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 28, 146, 201
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
 - bombing of Yugoslavia, 121
 - and China, 121
 - creation of, 28, 89, 307
 - intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 303
 - intervention in Kosovo, 42n60, 91, 95, 303
 - intervention in Libya, 93
 - membership, 88–9, 307–8, 344
 - and missile defense, 313
 - and US alliance, 28, 307–9, 312–13
 - and US multilateralism, 87–8, 91–4, 96
 - and US policy of collective defense, 87–8
- North Korea
 - and China, 51, 110, 119–20, 125, 318–19, 368
 - nuclear issues, 96, 313, 318–19, 330, 338, 344, 374
 - and the United Nations, 93, 96, 110, 119–20, 125, 368
 - and US, 125, 193, 313, 316, 338, 344
- See also* Korean War
- nuclear programs and policies. *See* arms control and nuclear issues

- Obaid, Nawaf, 206
- Obama, Barack, 97, 206, 376
 - 2012 State of the Union address, 290
 - meeting with Wen Jiabao, 292n3
 - and UN permanent seat for India, 97
- Obama, Barack, administration
 - and China, 265–6, 290, 292n3, 296n60, 316
 - and environmental issues, 249, 253, 257–8, 266, 272n55, 286, 290, 292n3
 - and multilateralism, 72, 92–3, 95, 15
 - nuclear policy, 313, 338, 352n36
 - and trade, 183, 201
 - and US pivot toward Asia, 290, 316, 357n91, 375
- O’Keefe, William, 254–5
- Oksenberg, Michel, 219
- Olney, Richard, 76
- Olney Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, 33
- Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 143–4, 148
- Owen, John, 5, 12–13, 361, 364

- Pakistan, 31, 206, 308–9, 313–14, 316–19
- Pan, Wei, 225
- Panama, 34, 201, 256, 271n46

- Parker, James, 337
 Patrick, Stewart, 10, 361, 363–4
 Peng, Guangqian, 330
 People's Republic of China (PRC).
 See China
 Persian Gulf, 191, 194, 203–5.
 See also Middle East
 Persian Gulf War, 121, 335, 371
 Philippines, 31, 32, 77, 309, 316
 Pinchot, Gifford, 246
 Polo, Marco, 233
 Powell, Colin, 309
 Purvis, Nigel, 253–6, 274n83
- Qatar, 308
 Qiang, Qishen, 116
 Qiao, Guahua, 109–10
- Ramo, Joshua Cooper, 185–6n15, 224
 rational choice theory, 73–4, 81, 88
 Raustiala, Kal, 257
 Reagan, Ronald: administration
 and Iran-Iraq war, 205
 and Law of the Sea Treaty, 271n43
 nuclear policy, 312–13
 and party polarization, 251
 trade policy, 145
 realism, 5, 12, 48, 54, 61, 81, 136–7,
 235, 286, 299, 301, 316–17, 319
realpolitik, 78, 103, 150–1, 155n25,
 299, 303, 316
 Rhodesia, 119
 right/responsibility to protect (R2P),
 20, 22, 121
 Rockefeller, Jay, 253
 Romney, Mitt, 251–2
 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 28
 and China's permanent UN Security
 Council seat, 9
 and “four world policemen,” 84, 107
 and Good Neighbor Policy, 33
 and League of Nations, 80
 and liberalism, 73, 81, 83
 and NATO, 94
 and the United Nations, 94, 107
 and World War II, 82–4, 86, 306–7
 Roosevelt, Theodore
 and internationalism, 77
 and Monroe Doctrine, 33
 and national parks, 246
- Russia, 68n74, 76, 90, 94, 96, 107,
 122, 147, 306, 310–12, 315, 318,
 322n3, 327–30, 334–6, 341
 Rwanda, 90
- Saudi Arabia, 204–7, 304–5, 308, 319
 Schwartz, Anna, 140–1
 Sen, Gautam, 147
 Shanghai Cooperation Organization
 (SCO), 94, 235, 344
 Shen, Dingli, 354n57
 Simmons, Beth, 148
 Sinicization of world order, 365–71,
 378n3
 Smith, Richard, 249
 Smith, Tony, 300
 social Darwinism, 53, 340, 354–5n68
 Somalia, 31, 34, 90, 93
 South Africa, 94, 119, 285
 South Korea
 and Asian Pacific Partnership for
 Clean Development and
 Climate, 149
 and free trade, 201, 256–7, 271n46
 and missile defense, 313
 and technology and economic
 development, 177, 199, 223
 US alliance with, 148, 201, 304,
 307, 308, 309, 316–17
 See also Korean War
 South Sudan, 118
 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 89
 sovereignty, 6–10, 360–2, 365, 370, 375
 Chanyuan Treaty, 51–2
 China's history of, 45–63
 and Chinese Communist Party
 (CCP), 45, 53–8, 63n5, 65n33
 and the Cold War, 27–9, 31, 34
 and Confucianism, 45–6, 48–9,
 57–9, 62
 defined, 19, 21
 and freedom of the seas, 26, 36, 198
 Good Neighbor Policy, 33
 and human rights, 20, 22, 29–30,
 34–5, 43, 49, 55–6, 60, 62, 96,
 120–1, 122
 Neutrality Proclamation, 32
 and non-*tianxia* world orders, 49–52
 notions of, 20, 38–9n6
 Qin-Han *tianxia* system, 43–63

- and Sino-American relations, 34–7
- and US other-sovereignty, 20–2, 30–8
- and US own-sovereignty, 20–30, 34–5, 37, 43
- US views of, 19–21
- Westphalia system, 43–5, 50–63
- Soviet Union, 4, 5, 34, 53–4, 166–7, 189, 193, 198, 221, 223, 234, 289, 349n6, 349–50n8
- and arms control, 28, 304–7, 311–13, 315, 319, 329–32, 334, 340–1
- and collective security, 80, 82, 84–8, 108, 110–11, 113, 115, 122–3
- Spencer, Herbert, 281
- Speth, James Gustave, 257
- Sprinz, Detlef, 260
- Stalin, Joseph, 53, 86, 306–7, 329, 332, 349n6
- Stalinism, 56, 313
- state capitalism, 12, 162–3, 165, 170, 173–84, 184–5n1, 213, 229, 241n48, 365, 369
- Stewart, Alison L., 254, 256
- Stone, Randall, 149
- Strong, Anna Louise, 329
- Strong, Benjamin, 142
- Sudan, 31, 95, 118, 120, 122
- Suez crisis, 204–5
- Sun, Yet-Sun, 163
- Sussman, Glen, 251
- Syria, 36, 68n74, 95–6, 122, 125–6, 169, 206, 368
- Taiwan, 118, 199, 223
 - economic growth, 167
 - Korea compared with, 177
 - political system, 60, 308
 - Taiwan issue, 36, 109, 113, 335, 365, 374
 - Taiwan Strait, 110, 328, 332, 355n74
 - and the United Nations, 365
 - US arms sales to, 318, 337, 354n57–8
 - US-Taiwan relations, 304, 307, 308, 316, 318, 324n68, 335
- Taliban, 205–6
- terrorism, 55, 191, 205
 - 9/11 attacks, 34, 74, 91, 112, 120, 121, 124, 205, 207, 316, 338, 344
 - and Bush doctrine, 31, 34, 124
 - nuclear, 318–21
 - war on terror, 101n75
- Thailand, 308, 309, 316
- Thant, U, 109
- Thoreau, Henry David, 246
- tianxia*, 360, 364–7
 - and China's environmental policy, 276, 279, 288
 - and China's trade policy, 232
 - defined, 9
 - and sovereignty, 43–63
- Tibet, 36, 46, 51, 374
- Tong, Hui, 215
- trade and resources, 8–9, 11–12, 359, 361, 365, 374
 - APEC trade liberalization declaration, 222–3
 - China and free trade, 211–16, 218, 220, 222–4, 226–8, 237–8
 - China Model discourse, 224–30
 - and China's domestic reforms, 218–24
 - and China's image of world order, 232, 235
 - and China's trade surplus, 164–5, 176, 180, 222–3
 - Cobden-Chevalier trade treaty, 139
 - Fordney-McCumber Tariff, 142
 - General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 27–8, 143–5, 147, 192–3, 198–200, 218–23
 - Listian influence, 12, 227–30, 364
 - and mercantilism, 213–15, 223, 226
 - and nationalism, 230–4
 - and natural resources, 203–8, 216, 229–30
 - North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 28, 146, 201
 - Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act, 145
 - open door policy, 211, 219, 223–4, 227, 231
 - and openness, 192
 - and power and interests, 193–4
 - and privilege-taking, 192–3
 - and protectionism, 192–201, 203, 207
 - Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, 27, 142, 198
 - and role of the Chinese state, 225–7
 - and Sino-American relations, 207–8

- trade and resources—*Continued*
 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, 27,
 138, 142, 195, 197–8
 tariffs, 27–8, 138, 140–3, 147,
 159n100, 195–9, 216, 220–2, 233
 trade policy, 195–201
 Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment
 Partnership (TIPP), 201
 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 201
 and US domestic ideas, practices,
 and traditions, 194–5
 US history of, 195–200
 and US leadership, 192, 198–203
See also World Trade Organization
 (WTO)
- Truman, Harry S.: administration, 83,
 86–7, 89, 94, 100n45, 101n64,
 311, 323n49, 349n6
- Turkey, 94, 147, 148, 159n115, 307–8,
 356n86
- unipolarity, 1–2, 34, 73, 90, 94, 124,
 300, 341, 360
- United Nations
 China's attitude toward, 43, 107–27
 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
 (CTBT), 19, 29, 75, 254, 338–9
 Convention on the Elimination of
 Discrimination against Women, 19
 Convention on the Rights of
 Children (CRC), 29
 Convention to Combat
 Desertification, 260
 creation of, 33, 86
 Framework Convention on Climate
 Change (COP15, Copenhagen,
 2009), 163, 165, 172, 253, 257–8,
 265–6, 276, 285–7, 290, 296n63
 Framework Convention on Climate
 Change (COP16, Cancun, 2010),
 257, 285–8, 290, 296n63
 Framework Convention on Climate
 Change (COP17, Durban, 2011),
 267, 285–7, 296n63
 Law of the Sea Treaty, 248, 250,
 253, 256–7, 259–60, 268, 271n43
 peacekeeping operations, 74, 90,
 96–7, 102n90, 113–19, 125, 363
 sanctions and use of force, 10, 93,
 95–6, 102n90, 116–26, 363
 and sovereignty, 22, 33
 Universal Declaration of Human
 Rights, 34
 US policy toward, 71, 86–97
 US right-wing opposition to, 7
See also Kyoto Protocol
- United Nations Security Council
 Resolutions
 UNSC Resolution 1874, 119–20
 UNSC Resolution 1973, 93, 96, 122,
 169
 UNSC Resolution 2798, 109
- United Nations Transition Authority in
 Cambodia (UNTAC), 117
- United States
 and “American century,” 1–2
 Civil War, 25, 32, 75, 140, 155n19
 Committee on Foreign Investment in
 the United States (CFIUS), 35
 Ferguson riot, 356n89
 Founders, 8, 23–30, 85, 110, 194,
 196
 Jacksonian foreign policy, 76, 91, 262
 Jeffersonian foreign policy, 24, 76–7
 Louisiana Purchase, 76
 national park system, 246–7
 and national-security liberalism,
 300–1, 303–5, 313–21, 340, 361
 as a new nation, 8, 23
 “Open Door” note of John Hay,
 39n14, 77, 140
 pivot toward Asia, 290, 316, 357n91, 375
 Revolutionary War, 151
 separation of powers, 74–5, 248, 266
 Spanish-American War, 77
 as unipolar state, 1–2, 34, 73, 90,
 94, 124, 300, 360
See also arms control and nuclear
 issues; collective security;
 environmental issues; finance and
 economic governance; sovereignty;
 trade and resources
- universalism, 9, 84, 87
- Vaahtoranta, Tapani, 260
- Vandenberg, Arthur, 85–6
- Vandenberg Resolution, 101n64
- Versailles Treaty and Peace
 Conference, 4, 75, 79, 99n26,
 356–7n90, 372

- Vietnam, 281
 Vietnam War, 8, 31, 33, 54, 198, 328, 330
 Victor, David G., 257
 Vogel, David, 250, 260
- Walter, Andrew, 144
 Wan, Ming, 11–12, 246, 265–6, 360, 362, 365
 Wang, Chong, 278
 Wang, Fei-Ling, 6–7, 330, 360–2, 364–6
 Wang, Jianwei, 10, 95
 Washington, George: Farewell Address, 25, 32, 78, 305–6
 Washington Consensus, 139, 146–9, 150, 173–4, 177, 185–6n15, 189, 200, 224, 346, 365
 Weber, Max, 15n6
 Welles, Sumner, 83
 Wen, Ho Lee, 337
 Wen, Jiabao, 56, 292n3
 Westphalian nation-state system, 6, 9, 38–9n6, 67n68, 95, 118, 235, 362, 365
 and China's sovereignty, 43–5, 50–63
 and Treaty of Nanking, 233
 Treaty of Westphalia, 340, 354–5n68
 White, Harry Dexter, 143
 Williamson, John, 185–6n15
 Willkie, Wendell, 81
 Wilson, Woodrow, 5, 7, 33, 84–5
 and collective security, 5, 343
 Fourteen Points, 78
 and League of Nations, 5, 26–7, 74, 77–9, 141
 and World War I, 26–7, 306
 Woods, Ngaire, 147
 World Bank, 143–4, 147–8, 164, 185–6n15, 212, 219, 235, 272n56, 363
 world order, 1–14, 359–77, 378n3.
 See also arms control; collective security; environment; finance and economic governance; sovereignty; trade and resources
 World Trade Organization (WTO), 9, 192, 236
 Agreement on Government Procurement, 153, 183–4, 217
 China's entrance, 54, 147, 163–4, 168, 174, 211, 214, 110, 222–3, 359
 China's involvement in, 153, 163, 183, 365, 214–18, 365
 and China's trade and economy, 153, 164, 168, 174, 211, 214–18, 222–3, 230
 creation of, 146–7, 199, 200, 222–3
 effectiveness of, 200–2
 enforcement of rulings, 147, 40n32
 as multilateral entity, 192
 Trade Policy Reviews (TPR), 239n13
 and US criticism of China, 168, 249
 and US influence, 19, 145–7, 149, 153, 202
 and US steel tariff dispute, 147
 World War I, 31, 33, 74, 82, 104, 106–7, 141–2, 151, 196
 effect on US foreign policy, 83
 Treaty of Versailles and Versailles Peace Conference, 4, 75, 79, 99n26, 356–7n90, 372
 US entry, 306
 and US sovereignty, 26–7
 and Wilson, 26–7, 306
 Zimmermann Telegram, 26
 World War II, 9
 Atlantic Charter, 83, 86–7, 143
 Pearl Harbor attack, 8, 80, 82
 and US sovereignty, 27–8, 33
 Yalta Conference, 4, 86
- Xi, Jinping, 290–1, 376, 296n63
 Xie, Zhenhua, 285, 290
 Xinjiang, 36, 319, 374
- Yan, Fu, 281–2
 Yan, Xuetong, 128n32, 294
 Yao, Yang, 10, 11, 153, 179, 185n10, 226, 362, 365, 369
 Yemen, 31
 Yu, Bin, 12–13, 300, 363–4
 Yugoslavia, 90, 121, 307
- Zhang, Weiwei, 225
 Zhao, Tingyang, 57, 288

Zhao, Ziyang, 111

Zheng, He, 233

Zhongping, Feng, 95–6

Zhou, Enlai, 108, 109, 332

Zhou, Xiaochuan, 236

Zhou, Yan, 278

Zhu, Di, 233

Zimbabwe, 95, 120

Zoellick, Robert, 148

Zugui, Gao, 95